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THE NEW WORLD

PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY



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THE NEW WORLD

PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

By
Isaiah Bowman, Ph.D.
Director of the
American Geographical Society
of New York

FOURTH EDITION WITH 257 MAPS



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PREFACE

With a rapidly increasing rate of farm production in the United States and an even more rapid growth of city population bent on increasing industrial output and trade, the foreign commerce of the United States has grown to striking proportions. The process, though not new, has been greatly hastened in recent years. Since the beginning of the World War the United States has increased its foreign investments fourfold, doubled its foreign commerce, and become the creditor of sixteen European nations. It was hardly an accident that the reparation problem was at least partly solved by the adoption of a plan of American origin.

The merest glance at these events makes clear how complex and varied are the international problems of our times, how far-reaching are the decisions that must be translated into action by government executives. Our economic and political problems embrace a region whose extent is beyond the Arctic Circle in Alaska, southward to Samoa, and east and west from China and the Philippines to Liberia and Tangier. If our territorial holdings are not so widely distributed as those of Great Britain, our total economic power and commercial relations are no less extensive.

To face the problems of the day, the men who compose the government of the United States need more than native common sense and the desire to deal fairly with others. They need, above all, to give scholarly consideration to the geographical and historical materials that go into the making of that web of fact, relationship, and tradition that we call foreign policy. As we have not a trained and permanent foreign-office staff, our administrative principles are still antiquated. Thus even the loftiest intentions are too often defeated. To elevate the standards of government there is required a continuous examination of contemporary problems by citizens outside of the government service. In this way new points of view are set up and independent judgments made available.

It is in the light of these considerations that I have undertaken a complete revision of *The New World* to conform with the events of the period since 1921, when the first edition appeared. To make room for many additional maps and the discussion of the latest treaty developments, I have omitted the photographs that appeared in the first edition. As a guide in following many questions of general application, the regional chapters are preceded by a preliminary essay on mandates and colonies, minorities, boundaries, disarmament, and

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THE NEW WORLD

PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

CHAPTER ONE

MAJOR PROBLEMS

In the eventual history of the period in which we live, it is reasonable to think that the greatest emphasis will be put not upon the World War or the peace treaties which closed it, searching and complex and revolutionary as their terms proved to be, but rather upon the profound change that took place in the spiritual and mental attitudes of the people that compose this new world. There came into being a critical spirit of inquiry into causes, of challenge to a world inherited from the past, of profound distrust of many existing institutions. The effects of the war were so far-reaching that it was indeed a new world in which men found themselves. In some countries the whole structure of social and political life was altered. People everywhere had to create or adopt new ideas and make new material arrangements. Men were moved to inquire so intensely about the causes of the war and about just modes of settlement that they went on to look deeply into the social, political, and economic systems from which war had sprung.

The problems following the World War proved to be very much more complicated than those of any preceding time. The old causes of trouble that had their roots in unequal geographical conditions and in the policies of different dynasties and rival powers were complicated by universal unrest and dissatisfaction. In Germany the setting up of a new republican government took place immediately after the collapse of the military power. Even in the midst of the war the old Russian government collapsed, and a communistic movement set in which was to change entirely the whole political purpose of the Russian state as well as its social and economic life and the character of its post-war problems. Equally revolutionary but different in purpose were the changes that took place in Italy and Spain. It was in direct opposition to Soviet principles that a dictatorship arose in Italy. For the first time in English history, a Labor government came into power. The two principal members of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy passed practically into a state of bankruptcy, with the League of Nations acting as receiver. Newly created states suffered from a fever of nation-

alism. Minority peoples were persecuted on such a scale as to threaten the foundations of state. Labor everywhere was anxious about the great debts that were laid upon the societies of which it formed the humbler part. Political and economic expediency as well as fundamental disquiet led to a desire to cancel the war debts of the allies. Domestic obligations were met in depreciated currencies. Almost the whole middle class of European society found itself with its reserves of capital destroyed. A large number of new fortunes came into existence, fortunes that were built in many cases upon the disasters and despair of the millions who contributed to them in countries devastated by war. Struggling to escape from the net of circumstances, each country sought to raise high tariff walls and thus create favorable conditions for new industries that would enable it to become self-sufficient.

Naturally, land went the way of all other property. The boundary fences surrounding the landed estates could not resist the tide of peasant desire. Not only in Russia but throughout central Europe a revolutionary change in landholding took place. The large estates were divided up, in Russia without due process of law, in the states of central Europe by new constitutional forms. A limit was set to the acreage of soil and forest that a private owner could hold under his own control. The rights of the man who actually tilled the ground came to be considered a matter of first interest. The conclusion was accepted that land must be put to better economic use. That is, land cannot be circumscribed and reserved for play when social needs demand that it be used for the production of food. Though such a change in point of view is little heralded in a world beset by many complicated problems, this is one of the most fundamental changes that have taken place as a result of the World War. In the history of the time it will be considered to be more revolutionary than changes in governments, tariffs, boundaries, and the like, for it affects the foundation principles of organized social living.

The tendency further to restrict the size of holdings will continue until economic pressure has passed through the present cycle of change and has fixed a socially acceptable limit. This means that great wealth must be held in other forms than land. It means that the stable values associated with large land holdings have passed away in these societies. A great landed estate is no longer the last word in security. It is regarded as a resource, like coal and iron and oil, that cannot be held indefinitely inert but requires development under new forms of political and social control.

The societies that have set in motion the principles to which we have alluded are subject to further tests before we can be sure that they will survive. Self-government is still in an experimental stage. There are elements of economic strength and weakness in the newly created states and in states made larger or smaller in area. Resources have been diminished or increased by treaty, by new economic arrangements, by tariffs, and by transfers on account of debt, and no one can yet say how these measures will work out their complex results.

Equally noteworthy are the colonial problems now cast into new forms. Ultimately someone has to do the world's manual labor. How far will capital shift the burden to alien peoples, far distant geographically, socially unlike, with a low standard of living, and desiring advantages to be obtained through labor for the white man? The relation of the capital of industrial states to the ultimate labor which gives it effect on tropical plantations and in frontier societies is a complicated one, but little understood at the present time by the mass of humanity. But in time the relationship will become apparent and the rights and responsibilities of capital and of the great powers who put political force behind it will be a subject for challenge and debate. When that time comes, — and the mandatory system is hastening its approach, — there will be a wide range of consequences not only upon forms of political control but upon international policies.

The political geography of our time is still further complicated by the colonial holdings of the western powers in regions of unrest and fanaticism. We know that if the grip of these powers were loosened, anarchy would follow in many instances. "Protection" and "occupation" are often employed as terms of opprobrium in relation to Egypt and Morocco, for example; but if the relinquishment of power is to be followed by anarchy, who will say that protection is not a beneficent thing? If we recall the disorder, the inhuman cruelties, the oppression and fear, that ruled large parts of Africa before white control became established, and if we see these self-same communities now relieved of a great load of insecurity and superstition, who will say that the principle of "protection" can be abandoned in this stage of the political life of the world?

If colonial holdings are a responsibility of the great powers, then the powers must have the means of discharging that responsibility. To this end they must maintain armaments capable of reaching out to their distant possessions and maintaining their authority. Where will the line of division be drawn between armaments so employed and those held in reserve for war? Can the terrible burden of armaments be

reduced by common agreement, or will the continued struggle for trade privileges, raw materials, and strategic zones keep alive the ambitions and the forces that put off the day of deliverance?

To the general difficulties of the present there are added many regional or local difficulties which continue to vex peoples struggling for a more secure place in a restless and experimental world. The protection of minorities, which has so gravely concerned the great powers, has been brought about by treaties that in some instances seem to threaten the integrity of the unwilling signatory states. On the other hand, there is general agreement that there should come to an end that age-old persecution of minorities different in race, religion, or social customs from the ruling class. How to increase national unity and social solidarity in a given state and yet be just to a minority population is one of the most perplexing problems of the post-war world. In all time human beings have been imperfect. The world has always had its causes of affliction and downright wrong, which the wise men of each generation have tried to remove, never with complete success. This is a competitive world and we shall long continue the evolutionary struggle that marked the rise of mankind from the primitive state. National and racial ambitions and rivalries will continue to the end of time, though they may be greatly reduced in scope and intensity.

In the remaining sections of this chapter there will be a discussion of the problems that have been sketched above, in terms not of current tendencies merely but also of geographical relations and political and economic principles.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Ideals are extremely potent centers of gravitation. (*Keyserling*)

Large numbers of men in many countries now have the same intense curiosity about spiritual and political enterprises that scientists have long had with respect to the world of nature. Their curiosity and the idealism that impels them to make voyages of discovery and exploration in new spiritual seas may be decried by politicians who would still like to use the simpler methods of force in international relations. But in doing this the politician sets his face against a universal law — that the only permanent thing in this world is change. He is looking back with approval to the simple technic by which great powers have developed in the past. He sees war as an inevitable thing, little realizing that the World War showed that science and human co-operation have made it possible to conduct war to the point of self-

destruction, that in a world war there is no such thing as a victorious power — all alike suffer irreparable losses. The damage that war does cannot be made good by the aggressor even if we take all that the aggressor has. This is another way of saying that war has been developed to the point where it has passed beyond human control.

If these things be true, we must look at war and international relations from an entirely new point of view. It has been well said that a thing is impossible until it is first conceived to be possible, and the reduction or elimination of war is certainly an aim that ought to be tested by this truth. So far as it is the last resort of reason, war is a discredited institution. It obtained many good things for us in the past and it may yet obtain good things for the human race. It gave us many of the institutions of civilization, and to the people of the United States, for example, it brought national liberty. But peace has done vastly more. It has given us our body of law. It has permitted the growth of institutions. It has enabled man to test his life and relationships by reason and justice rather than by force. We should not look to history for the lessons of war, because war has become a new thing in scope and purpose and its possibilities of destruction are now limitless, whereas war in the past had a limited effect. We shall do much better to elevate the idealisms of the past, rather than to accept its weakness. "In the strength of our forefathers we go, not in their tracks. Their stars we follow, not their dead camp-fires, their virtues not their acts, under cruel penalties." (*King*)

In viewing the possibilities of improved international relationships we may well question the meaning and purpose of old tests, doctrines, and shibboleths. No one has challenged the profound truth in Edith Cavell's conclusion: "Patriotism is not enough." This is not a denial of patriotism. In fact, it says nothing at all against it. It implies merely that there is something over and above patriotism. When two equally patriotic people fight, something is the matter with the patriotism of one or the other, but neither can be made to see it. To extol unthinking patriotism in such a case is to spur on the combatants. This leads inevitably to a challenge to patriotism. What is it that one is patriotic about? If the word means that one should fight in support of a wrong, clearly the purpose in the word has been betrayed. Love of country does not mean hatred for other countries. Patriotism should mean pride in the works of idealism of one's country. If it has advanced law and order, regional coöperation, international good will; if it has protected the weak, advanced the arts of peace; if its influence



FIG. 1. The principal language groups of Europe. After A. Meillet, *Les Langues dans l'Europe nouvelle*, 1918.

has been beneficent — all of these things one can be proud of. But blind patriotism spoiling for a fight is now one of the most dangerous things in the world precisely because the world is now highly organized and war strikes at the very means and spirit of organization and the coöperative purpose.

We need never fear international coöperation as a leveling process. The peoples of the world are too unlike, their differences are too inveterate, for leveling to take place. Life has been poured out into many different moulds; the types of life are as varied as the regions that have helped to shape them through the centuries. The fact has impressed the thoughtful and the creative men of all ages. But if regional differences make the earth rich and interesting, they also fill it with problems, for our regional differences to a large degree create our international difficulties. These differences amused us in the past. We laughed at people unlike ourselves. But we are now obliged to accept each other, for our modern world is shrinking and our mutual relations are made constantly more complex.

FIG. 2. The distribution of religious elements to illustrate (with Figure 1 and other maps), what may be called the family life of Europe. Boundaries of religions after Stieler, *Hand-Atlas*.

The League of Nations has shown a degree of vitality that has raised it to the rank of the greatest world power in history in the regulation of international affairs. The story of its achievements is too long to present even in outline. It may be found admirably summarized in the successive reports of the League and other organizations (see Bibliography). The admission of Germany to a permanent seat in the Council has been the last step needed, save only the adherence of the United States, to give it full international significance. It is true that Spain once resigned from the League and that Poland has been deeply disappointed because she did not obtain a permanent seat in the Council; but the adhesion of Germany far outweighs the disaffection of any second-class power. It puts the business of the League upon a much higher level, because late enemies are now coöperating. After all, the security of Europe is far more dependent upon the mutual good will of Germany on the one hand and Great Britain and France on the other than it is upon any other nation or combination of nations.

The present position of the League has been attained by reason and logic, not by sentiment. The statesmen of Europe have seen war

change in scope and purpose, they have seen its uncontrollable nature, they have mutually recognized that peace is a necessity for all alike. Circumstances oblige them to work for peace. This means that there must be machinery for the purpose; it must be new machinery, capable of handling the complicated business that comes before it. In the League such machinery has been amply provided as well as the means for alteration of the scheme and for reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. Questions of most acute interest may thus be taken out of the hands of national leaders and put into the hands of carefully selected men of judicial temper who make decisions not according to national aspirations or to current opinion but in conformity with an increasingly important body of international law.

The Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament in 1921–1922, the Geneva Protocol of 1924, the Locarno Conference of 1925 — these are milestones on the road of international agreement looking toward relief from the crushing burden of competitive armaments and explicitly directed toward lessening the risks of conflict. War itself is now challenged like any other element of our cultural world. The League of Nations provides the machinery by which instant appeal may now be made in dangerous crises: in all the analyses that have been made of the causes of the World War it is not forgotten that one of the greatest was the lack of a clearing house for the business of Europe when it got into a tragically tangled state. The League is intended to promote the idea that it is a desire to have things work well that often makes them work well.

The practical question for America is not whether the United States shall or shall not join the League but whether its attitude shall be coöperative and helpful. The League, whatever our politics, is a needed form of international coöperation. If it did not exist, the world would devise something like it. Even its present enemies would most surely regret its passing. When Jonah confessed regret over the withering of the gourd by the sun and the sweltering east wind, he was reminded that he had not planted and watered it.

It will do no good to go back to international disorganization. Only through organization will international relations be improved. "The cure for the evils of organization is more organization." We sigh for a return to the primitive life as the weight of great cities presses upon us, but the world population will increase, not diminish, and we shall have more great cities, not fewer. Yet we can have better planned cities, and life in them can give more thought to purpose and

less to aimless speed. While the dissonance of the political world may offer a source of reputation for cunning diplomacy, statesmanship requires harmony, and this in a crowded world comes through organization, not a return to primitive conditions — not alone for the strong but for the weak, and for the black and the yellow as for the white. Born of conceit, the hate-breeding propaganda in support of the doctrine of racial superiority has had appalling manifestations in our time. It is a blind and savage sowing of the wind. To pull down the League from its high place, to spread a gospel of racial superiority, to elevate undisciplined patriotism to cultural rank, to accept prosperity as an index of national greatness, is to be guided by ignorant prejudice, not history, and to draw ourselves again into that narrow world of the ancients outside of which all men are "barbarians."

DEBTS AND REPARATIONS

Next to the organization of the League of Nations, the outstanding major problem of the entire post-war period has been that of reparations; and associated with it are problems of varying rates of declining exchange, the restoration of commercial life, and the payment of inter-allied debts. Not only was Europe exhausted by the extraordinary loss of life and the huge waste of labor and wealth consumed in war but its machinery of production and exchange was disorganized. Except to a small degree, the war was not paid for during its progress by taxation but rather by borrowings on a huge scale. These mortgaged the future strength and wealth of the world, and in a similar way the future was mortgaged for the sake of restoring the damage wrought by war, including the devastated areas of Belgium, northeastern France, and northern Italy. The income of the taxpayer was cut down at the same time that he was asked to pay taxes several times as large as he had been accustomed to pay. Aside from the ordinary cost of living, the service on the external and internal debts of the French and German peoples after the war would have required an amount equal to 70 per cent of the annual average savings of these countries in the pre-war period.

So great had become the burden upon governments that the amount of the war debts had only theoretical interest. They could not possibly be paid in full. Even the current expenses of government could not be met, so that only a declining exchange made it possible for governments to continue and industry and commerce to be carried on. However bad Germany's situation may have been, the situation of France was

equally desperate. But the French, seeing that they could not get reparations in guaranteed amounts from Germany, seized the Ruhr. They had given up hope that trust in Germany would bring about a better situation. The failure of the British and the Americans to support them in pressure upon Germany convinced the French that they must take matters into their own hands. Despite British opposition to the occupation of the Ruhr, it now seems certain that this was the ultimate act necessary of performance to bring not merely Germany but Great Britain and even France as well to a realization that only in joint action could a lasting remedy be found.

The perilous situation in which they stood toward each other led France and Germany to a quick appreciation of the merits of the Dawes [1] Plan, which sought to establish sound business principles of payment under international supervision and to bring about a clear understanding of that very difficult phrase "capacity to pay." Not only do capacities vary greatly from country to country but they vary from period to period. Not all the sources of wealth can be put into a table of statistics. Character is also an asset in a nation as in its constituent citizens. New discoveries of raw material, new technic of production or manufacture, constantly bring new factors into the international situation. The Experts' Plan followed a long series of conferences (London, Cannes, Genoa, etc.) intended definitively to settle the question of the amount which Germany was to pay on reparation account. Each of these conferences ended without permanent result. The Experts' Plan recognizes that there is a limit to the debtor's capacity. It was framed on the assumption that Germany should pay reparations under conditions that would permit her economic recovery. The plan at once established confidence. Credits were resumed forthwith, currencies stabilized. Germany restored the gold standard, and France accepted the scheme of payments in a spirit of hopefulness. These two countries seemed at last to come out of a wilderness of fear and intrigue and to begin their spiritual recovery.

The Agent General for Reparation Payments collects and distributes funds under a prescribed plan and is left with wide powers over certain specific assets. His reports are now among the world's most interesting documents. They show the extraordinary working of the full machinery of a complicated industrial civilization for the purpose of paying off debts of astounding magnitude. While the obligations of Germany under the Experts' Plan have been met up to the present time

[1] Hereafter designated the Experts' Plan, following the conventional use of the term by the Agent General for Reparation Payments.

it is only in 1928–1929 that the plan will have developed to the point where full payments will be required. It will then be possible to determine whether Germany's capacity to pay has been fixed too high. From her new seat in the League she will no doubt be prepared to present fresh arguments for a reduction of her agreed obligation. But with the passage of time the general economic life of the world is in process of restoration, confidence in peace and the existing machinery for peace increases, and in the resulting benefits Germany has a share.

Though the reparations problem has been at least temporarily solved, international relations are still clouded by debts of great magnitude. Cancellation of interallied debts has not proved feasible, despite repeated efforts, chiefly of Great Britain. She finally pledged herself to receive from France, her largest debtor, only such sums as she needs to pay the interest and principal on her debt to the United States. This put the United States in the position of ultimate creditor, receiving "tribute," as it is frequently called, from all nations in debt to her or her debtors. She is in the unenviable position of having incurred the ill will of debtors who envy her prosperity and believe that she should have contributed her war loans as an offset to their far greater war losses. At the same time American capital has gone extensively into European financial markets where municipalities, states, provinces, and individual commercial companies alike have sought frequently to obtain loans for the general purposes of restoration. How far European ill will may affect our future relations no man can say. Were international troubles on a world scale again to afflict us, that ill will would count heavily in favor of our debtors. On the other hand, the longer the debt runs and payments continue the closer will be the adjustments of other peoples to the conditions of living imposed by the debt. What people long endure they may find tolerable only if a general restoration of commerce brings about a betterment of their living conditions.

In the meantime, the United States holds in her hands a powerful political weapon. She can in the future attract allies to her by ameliorating debt conditions or by wiping out the debt of a given nation at will. Whatever the moral arguments against the continuation of debt payments to the United States may be, the matter has passed out of the moral and into the political field. No leader at the present time can persuade the mass of the American people to cancel the European debts to us. Such an argument can find no favor until the internal war debt of the United States has been discharged. While this seems small when compared with the debts of European nations (relative populations and



FIG. 3. The wool trade of the world. The international character of modern commerce is well shown in this map and others that follow, especially Figure 11, page 40, and Figure 12, page 42. Based on "International Trade in Wool," by L. A. Wheeler, *United States Commerce Reports*, Suppl., January, 1925.

resources considered) it is in reality a large sum. When it is greatly reduced and the special taxes that reduce it are lifted, and when new political situations arise that may make it profitable to overlook the obligation of another people, then the United States may consider debt reduction. Until that time comes the subject is one for theoretical consideration only: it is not in the field of practical politics.

RAW MATERIALS

Control over the production and distribution of raw materials has been one of the long-recognized causes of international dispute. Formerly that control was exercised through exchange merely. That is, the nation that controlled the sea or the most important lanes of land and sea commerce played a dominant rôle. But in the modern industrial period capital has not been content to spend itself upon the facilities of commerce. It must go into the very seats of production and there exercise an ultimate power over the men who work upon the soil. It does this by its installations and methods for increasing cultivation, by the tempting benefits which it extends to the available labor supply, by the application of science at the source of that stream of raw materials that flows from the ends of the earth toward the great markets of the industrial powers. This is one of the reasons why colonial possessions came to be so highly prized in the 19th century. Their importance is to be measured, not in terms of the colonial deficits which the



FIG. 4. The primary features of the cotton trade of the world. Based on "International Trade in Cotton," by L. A. Wheeler, *United States Commerce Reports*, 1925. Circles are proportional to weight. World production is below 20,000,000 bales of 478 pounds each.

ruling nations have incurred, but in those forms of indirect benefit in peace and war which the physical possession of territory implies.

Neither deficits nor favorable balances are the true measure of the worth of colonial possessions in any event. It happens that the geographical distribution of raw materials is very unequal. And territorial power came to be exercised and territorial rights established long before adequate surveys revealed the extent of the inequality of raw materials of vegetable, animal, or mineral origin. The more progressive nations wish to exploit reserves of raw materials, if not in their own possessions, then in the territory of other and possibly backward nations. They desire freedom of access to them unhampered by discriminatory regulations of any kind, whether tariffs or excessive port dues or the cost of obtaining concessions.

Out of this difficulty power beats its way by laying down the terms under which the stronger nation will exploit raw materials; that is, imperialistic leaders *demand* access to new resources or to increased territory with sufficient raw materials to form a complement to the home country. The tendency to do this is strengthened by the argument of big business and by the geographical fact that the resources of greatest concern in the vegetable world are to be found in the tropics, where control is exercised by the white man not by settlement and the crowding out of other populations, but by supervision and administration of natives through a limited number of whites. This is almost as true



Fig. 5. Cartogram to show world production of three leading minerals. From current publications of the U. S. Bureau of Mines.

of South and Central America as it is of Africa, except that in many countries of South and Central America the control is exercised through a native-born class that lives in the country and lends itself to foreign influences, whether political or financial.

To the argument for raw materials is added that based on national prestige. Colonies are a means for decreasing dependence upon foreign sources, but they are also symbols of power. No nation can afford to give up territory. France is absorbed in the problem of colonial development, yet only one tenth of her raw materials comes from her colonies, the other nine tenths coming from Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Belgium, South America, and a few other countries; and of the imports of France raw materials constitute two thirds of the total.

Pressing upon all industrial powers in the same direction is the force of concentrated city populations and the growing attention to their welfare. The industrialized city is a functioning organism with quite definite characteristics and needs. To it there must be a steady flow of raw materials of commerce as well as food. All merchants are seeking cheap sources of goods, and all governments desire independent sources. In the United States we have reached a point of great interest in these matters through the rapid increase of city populations and a corresponding demand for increased imports of raw materials. The streams of exports and imports must be uninterrupted in their flow if we are to avoid crises in our constantly expanding industries.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF LAND

Europe has long been troubled because of the small amount of land made available to its peasants. The great landed estates of men of wealth, of noblemen, and of the crown, as well as special reservations by religious societies and the like, had cut down the available acreage of arable land. This led the mass of the peasants and the proletariat of the towns to look upon the landed estate as an archaic form of holding. By one means or another efforts have been made with increasing intensity during the past half century to divide the estates or to have government sell them in small lots at nominal cost.

In a period of vigorous expansion during the 19th century, vast areas of pioneer land were occupied by millions of new settlers; by contrast we find that the cultivated area is now decreasing slightly in areas of close settlement. There is an almost worldwide flight from the land and an increase of population engaged in industry. Though large areas of new land are still available for settlement, the conditions of living are on the whole unusual or special and we can hardly expect such areas to be occupied either rapidly or efficiently until a science of settlement comes into being. Through such a science government will be able to tell what degree of subsidy to settlers is socially and economically possible or desirable. In addition, government must make more intensive studies of the natural resources than hitherto, so that the intending settler may know more definitely the conditions of life that he must face. A study of critical cases on the fringe of settlement is desired in order to furnish the prospective settler with surer means for carrying his activities to success.

A rising standard of living has affected a large part of the world. Unless capital enters agriculture and is controlled by coöperative and efficient methods like those that already prevail in industry, the standard of living cannot be raised to a level that will keep labor upon the land. Agriculture must avail itself of the findings of scientific research or government must provide it with general services in marketing, transportation, protection from insect pests, and the like. In England and parts of continental Europe the concentration of population in the cities has been carried to a dangerous extreme, since basic food supplies are too largely of overseas origin. An almost imperative demand for a continued flow of raw materials from outlying possessions and intense rivalry in basic industries at home, such as iron and steel production, textile manufacturing, and the like cannot be regarded merely as normal conditions of business. They are of general social

concern because a serious disturbance of business is followed by large-scale unemployment. The whole of society, not the unemployed part of it alone, in time feels the blighting effect of unstable conditions.

The internal migration of European peoples since the World War has had marked tendencies but little retarded by the division of the landed estates. The signs of saturation are everywhere. Since the World War, France has been a great receiving country. A few of the migrants have gone to Germany. Some European countries have virtually closed their doors. Contrary to expectations, there was no marked increase of emigration to South America, where conditions of work are very hard in many instances, and the collapse of currencies in the post-war period has made the steamship fares prohibitively high. Emigrating countries do not want their surplus populations to stay at home, and yet they do not want to lose contact with them. Countries of immigration may want new populations, but they also desire to have full control over them, if not to assimilate them.

The division of the landed estates in central and eastern Europe was facilitated at the close of the World War first by the fact that political thought was in a more fluid state. There were so many breaks with old principles that it was easy to make another. Expropriation of large estates or of crown lands or of idle, undeveloped lands became sound government policy, not merely in Russia, but also in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and the Baltic states. By this means governments sought and obtained wide popular support. Thousands of the peasantry saw themselves in possession of that which they had long desired. Of course mistakes were made and wrongs were done. These things are natural in the development of a revolutionary plan. In Soviet Russia even private ownership in land came to an end, a violent break with tradition, and one that makes the Soviet régime feared in western countries. For if private ownership in land ceases, the general question of private ownership arises and there is a weakening of that long-established tradition, especially strong in British and American law, that there is an essential sanctity surrounding the possession of private property and that rights in private property cannot be taken away except by due process of law.

Thus we see at work in the world today on a large scale two great agencies, the one scientific and the other political. By the first means the undeveloped parts of the earth are searched out, chemical fertilizers are invented and farm practices revised to raise the productivity of lands already under the plow, and a science of settlement is in process



FIG. 6. Trends of European populations, 1925. The figures in the legend express the absolute increase per thousand of population. Data from International Economic Conference, League of Nations, Geneva, May 1927.

of crystallization. The second means is political in nature. Through it, idle land held in large estates or for speculative purposes or by an aristocratic ruling class or by private wealth, is to be turned to social account, that is, tilled to grow food. It is remarkable to what degree this principle has taken hold in Europe. It has been applied in Denmark and the Baltic states as well as in Poland and Czechoslovakia. It proceeds more slowly in Rumania. It has had consideration in Spain.

It should not be thought that the economics of a country is necessarily bettered by the transference of title from a landed class to the peasantry. By the enlargement of holdings, more efficient practices may be instituted, that is, units of land may be brought to the point at which a family of ordinary size may maintain itself. That is the goal of the peasant who wants more land. But the measure of economic welfare must depend in the last analysis upon the output per working unit, and that may be larger if part of the peasant's time is spent upon a garden and the rest on an efficiently managed estate.[1] Again, a man may be more effectively employed when he works part-time upon the

[1] In some districts the laborer finds his wage scale lowered by part-time work upon a landed estate if he combines this with ownership of a small farm. The employer takes advantage of the fact that the laborer who owns property is less likely to migrate.

land than when he puts all of his time upon the land. This is especially true of regions of low-grade soil upon which it pays to grow only bulky vegetable products which the peasant must get cheap if he is to have them at all. However this may be, the land-tenure question must pass through a definite cycle of development before the present process comes to a halt. In the following chapters there will be a discussion of the extent to which the expropriation or division of landed estates has taken place. Here it is sufficient to point to (1) the general nature of the process and its relation to the migration of peoples among the states of Europe, (2) the streams of emigration overseas, (3) the movement of rural population into the cities, and (4) the continued advance of settlers into the pioneer belts of the world.

MANDATES AND COLONIES

It is chiefly as a market for manufactured goods and as a source of raw materials that colonies interest modern industrial powers, however valuable they may be from the strategic standpoint. The uplift of the native is mere pretense, because that would be missionary work and no government is permitted by the electorate to spend millions in doing good to distant aliens. The maintenance of order likewise would interest the merchant and the statesman not at all if there were no capital investments to safeguard from disorder. Japan, for example, had no interest in colonies and no desire for them until she needed markets for her newly created industries and homes for her rapidly increasing millions. There are two ways by which such homes may be secured: first, by migrating overseas and settling in undeveloped lands or poorly developed lands; and second, by providing more food in the homeland through expanding markets abroad. Naturally, Japan looked abroad for colonies, and the whole of her modern diplomatic and political history is marked by one positive act after another by which she has sought to provide herself with these acute necessities. France strives not only to expand her markets in colonial possessions but to place a heavy tariff upon colonial imports from other powers.

By the very modern device of highly specialized industries producing on a vast scale, and by cheap ocean transportation, a colony is not only a market place but also a field for the exploitation of labor. It is only because it is indirect that the true quality of the relationship to labor remains so long concealed. Of course the laboring man or the colonial native often has his lot improved in the process, first because he is enabled to buy necessities more cheaply than he could produce them by



FIG. 7. A general view of the principal territories under the control of overseas powers. No rigid classification of degrees of control is practicable, there being so many borderline cases. The outer dependencies of China are not included because the whole of China is debatable ground. Egypt is independent, like Iraq; but both might almost as well be designated controlled territory. Most islands are too small on this map to be shown by shading. It may be noted that with the exception of Iceland, a part of the Japanese archipelago, and the British Isles, every important island in the world is within the sphere of a stronger power or has in reality a limited degree of independence (Cuba and Santo Domingo).

his own labor. Moreover, he is able to buy many more things than he formerly did. Being a good piece of property, he has in many cases been well looked after. So long as he does not see his real economic relationships he will not complain, nor, in a broad sense, need anyone else complain if he does not. But when the moment comes that he sees his true economic position he wishes to lighten political control, in order to secure a still greater share of the economic benefits which his labor helps to create. Invariably the answer to his political challenge is that vested interests have to be taken into account. Invariably he is told that his is a lower order of political experience and that a long period of tutelage is necessary. Nowhere do we see that period of tutelage coming to an end, however it changes in form or degree. It is difficult to see how it can come to an end so long as the economic system of the controlling power pushes its government farther and farther in the support of fresh economic enterprises that add their claims to those already established.

With these considerations in mind the question of mandates takes on a new significance, not merely because it invokes the principle of trusteeship on the part of the League of Nations, which is responsible for the conduct of the mandatory powers, but also because it furnishes a norm by means of which we may measure national conduct in the exploitation

of colonial products. Hereafter all colonial possessions and all powers who control them will be challenged in terms of the beneficent governments which the mandatory powers seek to put into effect in the mandated areas. Again and again the question has been raised as to how far colonial exploitation may go. It is not sufficient to point to the security of the native and his improved lot under a given colonial administration. There is no doubt that his condition has been improved — witness the increase in peasant proprietorship in British West Africa. The real question is whether first consideration is given to his welfare. To put it concretely, do the French and British administrators consider first the question of a food supply for the natives of West Africa or do they consider first how much more palm oil and cotton might be produced?

Classification of Mandates

The government of the former colonies of Germany and of the territory detached from Turkey as a result of the World War was made the subject of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was concluded that the inhabitants of such colonies and territories could not stand alone "under the strenuous conditions of the modern world," and that their tutelage should be entrusted to advanced nations. The character of the mandate differs according to the stage of development of the people and the geographical and economic situation of the territory. Three classes are recognized, as follows:

A Mandates: Former Turkish communities provisionally recognized as independent nations that must accept, for a time, advice and assistance from a mandatory power.

Syria and The Lebanon (French)
Iraq [Mesopotamia] (British)
Palestine and Transjordan (British)

B Mandates: Principally central African communities administered by a mandatory power that is able to guarantee freedom and public order, and equal opportunities for trade under specially devised governments and regulations.

Ruanda and Urundi (Belgian)
Tanganyika (British)
French Cameroons
British Cameroons
French Togoland
British Togoland

C Mandates: Sparsely settled South Pacific islands and territory in Southwest Africa administered according to the laws of the mandatory power as an integral part of its territory, subject to safeguards in the interests of the population.

Southwest Africa (Union of South Africa)
Yap and other former German North Pacific islands (Japan)
German New Guinea and certain adjacent South Pacific islands (Australia)
Nauru (British)
Western Samoa (New Zealand)

The Mandates Commission

The Mandates Commission of the League of Nations has steadily urged fuller information from the mandatories and has sought a closer approach to judicial quality in its own decisions. This it has done through oral hearings, through well-ordered questionnaires, through increased recognition by the Council of the League of Nations, and through enlarged responsibilities. It is true that the great powers have in a measure resented the growth of authority exercised by the Mandates Commission as taking real government from them and depositing it in the Commission, but there has been no deadlock up to this time.

While the mandate principle precludes the idea of sovereignty by the mandatory power, that question will inevitably be raised not only by the mandatory powers themselves but by Germany. Already there is heard in British circles more than one voice declaring that England will not give up the mandates she now holds. The effect of growing nationalism in South Africa upon the future of Southwest Africa is a case in point. It is all very well for the League of Nations to define the status of this former German possession, but what if the Union government ignores it? It is not sufficient that British or Union government disclaim the intention of permanent sovereignty. If their acts become those of a sovereign, the right to exercise the mandate may be questioned. Who will question it? Clearly the power from which the territory was taken, namely, Germany.

So long as the mandatory nation exercises its power as a trustee and disclaims sovereignty, the mandate will hardly be in danger of recall. This of course is a logical deduction and political events are not infrequently quite illogical. German leaders may therefore at any time raise the question whether Germany's full partnership in the League does not imply the right to propose a transfer of mandates from one

nation to the other, and if from one nation to another, then from Great Britain to her. Public opinion in Germany may force such an issue, and it may be forced by unexpected turns in international politics.

The mandates system is primarily a safeguard against the greed of the controlling power, while at the same time it implies that the exercise of some control is absolutely necessary. The last point no one can honestly question in many instances. It would be unthinkable, for example, to leave the natives of the Cameroons and of Togoland to their own devices. We know what native rule means. Despite all charges made against European powers in the partition of Africa (pages 643 to 646), it is an indisputable fact that native relations have changed immeasurably for the better. There can be no thought of a return to the disorder and the cruelties of native rule. Whatever selfish desires the white man may satisfy in tropical Africa, he has certainly given security in return. If he now takes account of his modes of action, of his effect upon the natives, if he now discharges his duty in a responsible way, as provided through the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, the native has received all that he can fairly ask.

While there is no provision in the Covenant for the possibility that the League may break up some time in the future, it is clear that were this to happen the mandates would fall to the power in possession, for the native inhabitants would certainly suffer under a change of administration. It is the possibility of such sovereign power as well as Germany's entry into the Council of the League of Nations that has impelled German leaders to raise the question of a return of her colonies or at least some of them. By the treaty of Versailles she renounced these colonies to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and sovereignty rests in these powers and not in powers that, like Germany, have accepted the Covenant after the going into effect of the treaty. Therefore Germany can claim a colony only by asking for a modification of the treaty. Her case is weakened by the fact that colonial administration is closely watched by the League in any event. Her case is strengthened by the fact that her admission to the League implies equality of responsibility in colonial affairs. Germany has already advanced the claim that her entry into the League entitles her to expect the return of at least some of her former colonies.

When the overshadowing reparations question shall have been advanced towards a definitive solution, and the armies of occupation withdrawn, Germany will feel free to make two demands that she now hesitates to make: she will ask the return of her former colonies and the full enjoyment of former commercial privileges.

COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSIT

As soon as new boundaries had been set up in 1919 in accordance with the several treaties of peace, the countries of Europe entered a stage of extreme nationalism. Each had difficulty with depreciating exchange, and business in general was bad. To provide revenue, encourage home industries, and reach a state of economic self-sufficiency, tariff rates were raised in some cases to prohibitive levels. So high had the tariff walls grown that account was taken of their hindrance to trade and economic recovery in a manifesto by 165 leading bankers and industrialists of 15 different countries, including the United States, in October 1926. The signers pointed to the inevitable result of such a policy in contracting credits and depreciating currencies. They emphasized the modern business view that trade is not war but a process of exchange and that to pursue national interests too closely is economic folly, for the welfare of the individual country is inseparably linked with that of the world as a whole.

One sentence of the manifesto deserves special notice. "Railway rates, dictated by political situations, have made transit and freights difficult and costly." It is curious that these conditions should have grown into being in just the period in which European nations were studying how best to overcome the economic handicaps imposed by new boundary lines. A great political unit like the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy could not be broken up without serious economic dislocation. Markets changed, and food supplies had different points of origin or followed different railway lines. Some industries suffered for want of fuel, some factories for raw materials, and so far as new industries defended by tariff came into being they were likely to rest upon an artificial basis. It may be politically desirable to break up a long-established territorial unit and endure the consequences, whatever they may be, in order to achieve lasting peace; but the economic conditions are no less serious, and the problem of tariffs continues to afflict the countries of Europe and particularly those of central Europe.

The whole subject of communications in its broadest aspects was reviewed in the Peace Conference of Paris in 1919 and provision made in the Convention of the League of Nations for later action in respect to freedom of transit. Partly this was on account of the new boundary lines, partly because of new technical developments especially in the field of radio communications. Pursuant to the treaty agreements two conferences were held, the first at Barcelona in 1921, the second at Geneva late in 1923. Representatives of forty powers attended the

first conference and most of them signed the convention. Navigable waters of international concern are defined.[1] There are provisions for the free exercise of navigation. Each state is left free to control a navigable water in its own economic interest when such interest (e.g., irrigation) is clearly greater than that of navigation. The Elbe and the Oder are placed under the administration of an international commission. A similar commission for the Danube is composed of representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Rumania. The Rhine and the Moselle are governed by a commission including representatives of the Netherlands, Switzerland, German riparian states, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium. France is given special rights along the whole course of the Rhine between the two extreme points of the French frontier: (1) to take water to feed navigation and irrigation canals, (2) to have the exclusive right to power derived from works of regulation on the river (subject to payments to Germany), and (3) to construct works of regulation for the production of power. Belgium has similar rights upon the Rhine in her territory. Switzerland takes a view contrary to that of France and asserts that navigation is the predominant interest since the Rhine is one of its principal commercial approaches.

At the Geneva Conference of 1923 there was prepared a general convention on the international régime of railways and maritime ports, as well as general conventions on the development of hydraulic power and the transmission of electric power. It was the purpose of the conventions to assist through traffic, and it was desired to gain special privileges for such traffic by encouraging the reciprocal use of rolling stock and the establishment of the principle of international tariffs. To assist the development of the merchant marines of all contracting states, it was sought to free communciations from all restrictive conditions and to secure equal treatment for all flags in all maritime ports, such as the free use of all facilities for the loading and unloading of goods and the equal levy of port charges. It is one of the most promising among the signs of restoration that progress should have been made in the formulation of so comprehensive a program, though some of the essentials of that program, such as lower tariff rates and free communications across international boundaries, are still far from realization.

[1] Navigable waterways of international concern are (1) those waterways which are naturally navigable to and from the sea and which separate or traverse different states, and also (2) any parts of waterways naturally navigable to and from the sea which connect with the sea naturally navigable waterways that separate or traverse different states. Tributaries are to be considered as separate waterways; and lateral canals which improve a waterway are to be controlled as if a part of that waterway.

LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

The burden of competitive armaments was perceived to be increasing at an impossible rate even in the closing years of the 19th century. Either there had to be a general agreement not to increase armaments or a tragic situation would result, with these alternatives, — the collapse of society under the burden (prolonged revolution), or war followed by the forced reduction of the armament of a dangerous neighbor. At the Peace Conference of Paris in 1919 it was clearly recognized that Europe was far from a state of safety despite the victory of the Allied and Associated Powers, and provision was therefore made in the Covenant of the League of Nations for the systematic study and report of practical measures for the limitation of armaments. The Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament (1921–1922) was the first fruit of the new spirit. Its procedure was based upon directness; i.e., "Armament is something that you can disarm." (*Bliss*) The proposals of Secretary Hughes were shocking to the military caste, but their acceptance indicated that the desire to lift the burden of armaments is one that is shared by even the most powerful governments and peoples.

Opposed to the direct method is the more intricate and indirect method of European powers and Japan. When the British government replied to the American proposal of February 1927 to call a conference limiting the classes of naval vessels not covered by the Washington treaty, it emphasized "the special geographical position of the British Empire, the length of inter-imperial communications, and the necessity for the protection of its food supplies." The British believe that supervision or control of armaments by an international body would breed ill will and that it is impossible to limit the "war potential," that is, the ultimate forces which might be used in war and may therefore be classified as armament, such as industrial establishments, chemical and mineral resources, and the like. In the French view, war potential, or the total combatant resources of all kinds, is a question to be studied in its entirety, not by categories. They hold that industrial, financial, and economic factors must be taken into account in any general scheme. It is of the essence of French policy that security must be guaranteed by a military force at the disposition of the agency charged to deal with aggressors. France, like Great Britain, claims protection of the means of communication between the mother country and her overseas empire, now second only to that of Great Britain. Italy, like Great Britain, emphasizes her geographical position as a leading factor. She regards her position as unfavorable

while the positions of other Mediterranean nations (in Italy's view) are geographically favored. She would base peace-time armaments upon economic situation, agricultural wealth, and geographical position with respect to the main routes of supply of foodstuffs and essential raw materials, such as iron, coal, and petroleum. France wishes international inspection and control; Italy is opposed to it, and so too is Japan. The latter country agrees with France that one should consider armament as the total war potential of a country. She agrees with Great Britain and the United States that regional disarmament is a first step. Like the United States, she believes that the various categories of armament may be separately limited.

As a result of the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament a naval tonnage of 1,600,000 was scrapped, of which the United States supplied about half, Great Britain and Japan the remaining half. It was agreed that a naval tonnage in the ratio of 5 : 5 : 3 should be arrived at in 1941 by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan respectively, France and Italy to have at that time 1.67 each in proportion to the 5 : 5 : 3 ratio of the three leading naval powers. Committees of the League of Nations have struggled with the problem ever since 1920. In 1923 and again in 1924 the League put forward plans for the advancement of the subject; but these came to nothing, and in 1925 the Council of the League initiated a preparatory study to precede a conference on the reduction and limitation of armaments. In 1926 the preparatory commission for the disarmament conference met in Geneva and discussed the disarmament question as prepared by the League. The Geneva Conference of 1927 was called to give further impetus to the limitation of naval armaments. No program was set up for the future because British and American delegates could not agree upon the cruiser elements of their respective navies. The British held that their widely scattered possessions require a large number of small cruisers. The American view was that national defense, not colonial control, should be the leading principle and that a smaller number of heavier cruisers should be constructed.

The word *disarmament*, which is imported into discussions of the question, is a misnomer. It is not proposed to disarm but only to limit armaments. There is full recognition of the fact that no state can in the present stage of civilization afford to be without armament from the standpoint of internal security no less than that of preparedness for recalcitrancy on the part of an aggressor nation. It is equally clear that real disarmament is an affair of the spirit as well as of peoples and armies. When Poland, with a population of 30,000,000, has an army

of 270,000 (90,000 more than Great Britain), there is clearly indicated either a dangerous state of living or a warlike spirit. Seeing Russia with an army of more than a half million, Poland feels that there is no escape from the burden of a large standing army. Rumania, holding Bessarabia and fearing that Russia will take it back by force, constitutes herself the partner of Poland and maintains an army of nearly 150,000. Of course neither Poland nor Rumania has a navy, like Great Britain. France, with an army of 670,000 men, leads the world in organized military strength. To her the principle is clear that right must always have power with which to sustain itself. No one who has followed closely her history during the past half century will call her view unreasonable, however desirable it may be to change it. For all the sentiment associated with French spirit, French leaders are to the last degree realists. Only when they see positive signs of peace and can lay hold of adequate guarantees will they materially reduce their standing army.

✳ MINORITY POPULATIONS

At the close of the World War an attempt was made in a spirit of justice to provide against the oppression of minority populations. The great powers opposed to Germany and her allies were able to accomplish this purpose because it was through them that victory was won when the small states of Europe were overrun and prostrate. In addition, it was the will of the great powers, not the small powers with large minority populations, that prevailed at the Peace Conference. Though there were plenary sessions at which the representatives of all the allied states were present, the decisions were taken by a small group and principally by Great Britain, France, and the United States. The new states of central Europe that had come into existence as a result of victory and revolution (Poland and Czechoslovakia) and those states that had greatly increased their territory (Rumania and the Serbian nucleus of Yugoslavia), as well as the Baltic states and Greece, were receiving territory that had been made available through the strength of the great powers with which they were associated and not through their own military prowess. The several treaties of peace to which Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria agreed, had minorities clauses included in them.

The total result of these minorities provisions and the separate minorities treaties is shown in Figure 8, page 29. There are included 14 countries with an area of 805,000 square miles and a total population of 110,000,000. These have all agreed to deal with their minority populations upon a new basis. Unlike previous treaties intended to

serve a similar purpose, the minorities treaties were placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. The intention was to provide an impartial court of reference to which minorities could appeal for protection under the treaties themselves. The protection of minorities is not a new principle in European political life. Religious minorities received protection in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries in a number of European states, but only with the Congress of Vienna did there come into being definite provisions safeguarding the rights of national minorities.

Since the great powers had it in their hands to allocate territory taken from enemy states and available for their associates, they were able to attach conditions to the cession. This again is not a new principle. For example, the powers in 1830 (Great Britain, France, and Russia) recognized Greece on condition that "perfect equality" should be enjoyed by all subjects of the new state "without regard to difference of creed, in all their relations, religious, civil, or political." Again in 1856, when Moldavia and Wallachia were established as autonomous principalities, minority rights received recognition. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro were recognized as independent states on like terms by the treaty of Berlin (1878). But these are in a sense isolated cases, whereas the present scheme of treatment of minority populations is on a semi-continental scale.

The design of the treaties is not merely to be just to minority populations, to see that they have equality of treatment at the hands of a dominant national group, education in their own language, freedom to worship as they choose and in whatever language, and in general freedom from persecution as a submerged people, but also by equality of treatment to prevent those forms of bitter propaganda which keep alive hatreds between peoples and lead directly to international scheming and war. The great powers are in conflict in times of peace chiefly in the matter of armaments and major economic objectives. They represent the clash of industrial societies and economic rivalries. Old dynastic causes are largely in abeyance in the world of today. The motivations of the smaller states are quite different. They are not reaching out overseas for colonies and have little opportunity for securing special market privileges. Their concerns are more direct and immediate: here a seaport and a railway to it, there a corridor through an adjoining state. Again it may be a question of a tariff war. One of the most serious in the list is the treatment of minorities, Bulgars on the Serbian side, Magyars on the Rumanian, and Germans on the Polish and Czechoslovakian sides of international boundaries.

The question is a major one, for the minorities treaties are in effect a limitation of sovereignty. They tend to keep alive racial and linguistic differences. They prevent the consolidation of a people within national boundaries. They provide a means for increasing rather than diminishing the differences between the peoples of a given nation. Were they applied to the United States, they would require every major language group forming the dominant population in a given district of substantial size to receive instruction in its own language in the public schools and to be heard in its own language in courts of justice. It is the exact opposite of this, namely, the process of Americanization, that has largely tended to obscure the differences between European racial stocks in America. They are taught in one language; they are free to worship as they choose; there is no discrimination against any group because of the language it speaks.

FIG. 8. Distribution of those European countries in which minorities are provided with special means of protection. They form a broad zone with a mixed population, as suggested in the preceding maps of language and religion.

Experience has shown that the peoples of Europe cannot accommodate themselves to this point of view, whether from a too poignant memory of past wrongs or because of denser populations, or possibly because of an historically intolerant attitude toward peoples unlike themselves. Since all of the nations that have accepted League control of minorities are members of the League, they cannot be said to be without appeal. The question has been raised by some of them whether the minorities treaties are just in their application, seeing that the great powers have not imposed upon themselves a like obligation, though they have large minorities. Dickinson puts it in this form: "It is only *other peoples' subject nationalities* that states are prepared to liberate." Poland in particular has argued for the application of the treaties only in the form and within the limits that would have been observed if the great powers had accepted similar obligations. That is, Poland has argued for a restricted application of the treaties.

One must consider also the principle of exchange of populations effectively carried out in the case of Greece and Turkey by the Convention of 1923. By this means it has been sought to diminish the number of minority populations and thus make the ethnic boundaries correspond closely to the political boundaries. Never before in the history of Europe has there been so close a correspondence between the international boundaries and the lines of ethnic division. It was long argued that this was an uneconomic arrangement, that it Balkanized Europe. On the other hand, one should remember that peoples live at peace not always because of excellent economic arrangements but as often because the sources of trouble which spring from racial and religious differences have been attacked and basic conditions improved. If a people will fight because of religious persecution, then adjustment with respect to religious privilege is *much more important than economic advantage.*

Greece and Bulgaria have come to an agreement similar to that made between Greece and Turkey respecting the voluntary emigration of racial minorities across their boundaries. Whatever suffering is caused by the exchange of populations — and it is no doubt great — in the long run the effect of the exchange will be to diminish minority complaints and to lessen the force of one of the prime causes of war. Americans are not accustomed to measure the scale of racial and religious animosities in Europe, nor the intensity of the feeling that exists between opposing groups. What strikes at religious custom, the education of children, and the use of one's own language is vital, and the feeling of European minorities can be appreciated only by noting the occasions in which schools have been closed, means of education denied, members of religious sects persecuted, and no proper hearing provided for oppressed peoples in the courts. Few are the peoples in this world who could resist a tendency toward conflict under these conditions.

The League of Nations seems to have recognized the impossibility of providing for the detailed administration of minorities throughout Europe in the areas covered by the minorities treaties. By overlooking minor abuses, it has allayed the fears of those states which apprehended marked limitations of sovereignty. It has concerned itself seriously with only a few outstanding cases, like the Germans and Poles in Silesia, the Magyars in Transylvania, and situations affecting Lithuania, Greece, and Czechoslovakia. No one can maintain that the treaty guarantees are thoroughly enforced. The history of the successive changes in procedure for considering minority complaints shows an apparent leniency toward the minority states and increased difficulties in getting complaints heard. Such a procedure is intended

to eliminate propaganda and to oblige minorities to deal with their own governments through local conferences.

Doubtless the two most marked cases of perpetual minority difficulties are Poland and Rumania. Polish persecution of Ukrainians and Germans, and Rumanian persecution of Magyars, are among the outstanding problems in this field. Nor is the list complete without reference to those minorities that lie outside the competence of the League of Nations and that have no recognized form of protection. Of this class are Austrians in the Tirol, Germans in Alsace-Lorraine. The case of the Austrians of South Tirol is particularly noteworthy, when even the name "South Tirol" is forbidden by the present Italian government and any newspaper using it is confiscated. Instruction in the German language has been forcibly diminished; private schools taught in German are forbidden; all place names have been changed from German to Italian by royal decree (1923); German family names of Italian origin must be restored to their original forms. The effect has been to intensify local bitterness and to bring about sharp exchanges between Germany and Italy.

BOUNDARIES

Wars may come from economic rivalries or military threats, but it should not be overlooked that often they have sprung from disputed boundary lines or zones. "Frontiers are indeed a razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death for nations." After the close of the World War new states were formed and old states altered. Eight thousand miles of international boundary became ten thousand miles, of which three thousand represents new location. It is not the position of the line alone, whether on this side or that of a mountain range or stream, that is important; it is a whole group of economic, racial, ethnic, and religious factors that relate themselves to boundary location. Economic considerations are easy to understand. A coalfield or an oil pool is a matter of immediate importance and is above all concrete. Sentiment is not capable of such exact treatment.

Vague general frontier zones are now the exception rather than the rule. A line of defense must be defined exactly and of course it must be reasonably regular. This means in turn that violence must be done here and there to one or another of the principles which in general should be considered in delimiting boundaries. Ethnology, national sentiment, and historic claims are really incommensurable things. Religion does

not stop at a mountain crest, nor do marriages take account of ethnic majorities. But when a line is to be run it must be run upon the ground; that is, it must be definite and continuous. It cannot alter its position with every minor circumstance. It must have the advantages, even while recognizing the defects, of the broad and the general. A well-defined topographic feature that is followed in demarcating a boundary may separate a small ethnic group from a larger one with which it desires to be related politically. But the topographic feature may be too important to be neglected and may have to be followed in violation of the ethnic principle. The same may be said of any other line of defense, such as a river or a belt of marshes, as in eastern Poland. Modern geographical studies have disclosed a great variety of natural features which must be taken into account in the establishment of a permanent boundary, and not infrequently the misapplication of geographical knowledge or the complete lack of it has resulted in quarrels and even in war.

At no time in the history of Europe have political boundaries more closely expressed the lines of ethnic division or political sentiment. On page 388 there is described the exchange of populations by which still closer conformity of political to ethnic lines is brought about. But even if the two principles of political sentiment and ethnic character are harmonized, there remain boundary defects which are exceedingly difficult to repair. If it is an advantage to Rumania to possess the line of towns just inside her western, or Transylvanian, boundary, it is equally to the disadvantage of Hungarian cities to be separated from natural commercial associates (page 326). If Czechoslovakia is strengthened by the extension of boundaries to include taxable land and exploitable resources in ethnically Hungarian territory, Hungary is left resentful. This is not merely because so many of her people are excluded from the home country, but also because her economic limitations are made still more severe. It is easy to speculate on what might have been; it was not so easy to draw boundaries at a time when account had to be taken of war-time promises and of the actual state of the political world. In the long run, customs unions formed of naturally related states, and general security in time of peace, will prove of far more importance to the peoples of Europe than the exact position of boundary lines. To such an extent was this realized that in the Locarno treaties of 1925 all but a few of the most critical boundaries of Europe were confirmed and mutually guaranteed.

It is because men will insist upon looking only at material things rather than at spiritual values, which are complex and hard to measure

and troublesome to think about, that there has been criticism of the so-called Balkanization of Europe. The thought of the world after the peace treaties went into effect following 1919 was cast into an economic mould. Everyone thought of getting the world back on a working basis. Those who assert that the breaking up of central Europe into small states is a return to earlier minute division overlook the historical difference between division as the result of force exercised from without and division based upon democratic aspirations and the willingness of all classes to support a new scheme of broadly based political power. Were the European boundaries of today scrapped, we are not wise enough to foresee the outcome; knowledge is not broad enough to enable us to calculate it.

The new boundaries take account of a fundamental truth, that people are more inclined to fight about differences arising from contrasts in language, religion, nationality, and race than about economic objects. The treaties that grew out of the Locarno Conference of 1925 recognized this truth. Still suffering from the scourge of war, anxious lest war break out afresh, Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy signed a treaty of mutual guarantee. Article I of Annex A binds the high contracting parties to guarantee "the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France and the inviolability of the said frontiers" as fixed by the treaty of Versailles. Of course Hungary has not accepted her frontiers; nor is it easy yet to see how Russia and Rumania are to resolve their differences over Bessarabia except by war, toward which their present policies almost inevitably lead. But it is the beginnings that matter most in the development of a constructive plan, and these beginnings have now definitely been made. Clemenceau has pointed out "the fearful frailty of great causes," viewed at their beginnings. Some problems are insoluble, except over long periods of time. There was no ideal sweeping solution, whether of boundaries or of economic problems, to be found in 1919. There is no grand general solution now for the world's difficulties. We must be satisfied to apply laboratory tests here and there and make our way forward a step at a time.

CHAPTER TWO

PROBLEMS OF IMPERIAL BRITAIN

THE DIVERSITY OF GREAT BRITAIN

"The sounds of England, the tinkle of the hammer on the anvil in the country smithy, the corncrake on a dewy morning, the sound of the scythe against the whetstone, and the sight of the plough team coming over the brow of a hill, the sight that has been seen in England since England was a land, and may be seen in England long after the Empire has perished and every works in England has ceased to function . . . the smell of wood smoke coming up in an autumn evening . . . that our ancestors, tens of thousands of years ago, must have caught on the air when . . . they were still nomads. . . . These are the things that make England . . ."

Thus the imperturbable Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister, wealthy industrialist. He goes on to grieve that these things are not the inheritance of every child in England. That so many are deprived of gardens and fields, explains in part, he implies, the overseas migration of Englishmen to the dominions, "where they have room to see things like this that they can no more see at home." It appears that Stanley Baldwin's England is not theirs. Millions of industrial workers would picture England in different terms. They look at a forest of factory chimneys, breathe heavy coal smoke and city dust, hear the endless rumble of industrial machinery. Their England means undersized bodies, disease, poverty, and squalor.

Is all of England in these two pictures? If it were, then only an intense class struggle would mark England's future. But England is really a composite of troubles and advantages, of despair and hope. This is another way of saying that she is a country in evolution. It is a mark of her greatness that she has always passed from one crisis to another without ceasing to be England. If she but keeps her coolness and age-old spirit of independence, England is eternal. In *Cymbeline*, Caius Lucius threatens to return with Roman legions at his back and collect the tribute denied him by the Britons. Cloten answers defiantly, "You shall find us in our salt-water girdle." This was the moat of Napoleon's time. Airships crossed it in the World War and submarines narrowed it, so that great naval strength coupled with an island position no longer gives Great Britain the protection she once enjoyed. But this is a matter of degree. The moat is still a strategical barrier. Salt-water remains England's magic girdle.

Huge coal deposits and an island base have supplied two prime geographical advantages, but they have contributed power only through English character. The foundations of that character were laid in Saxon times in firm possession of the soil and a correlative instinct for property rights. Home-making upon the land ranks with industry and trade in building a stable society. England, until recently, was a nation of farmers. By 1700, her population numbered only 5,500,000; in 1831 it was 14,000,000. Between 1830 and 1900, machinery and world trade brought into being a new England of city-dwelling people. How little dependent upon their own soil when but 7 per cent now live by agriculture! In France this figure is 40, in Italy 35, in Russia 72, in Yugoslavia 80. The map, Figure 9, shows how remarkably concentrated is the industrial population of England, and how closely dependent upon coal. In general the population lives in dense agglomerations and its welfare is bound up with peace, because foreign trade flourishes in peace, with the manufacture and sale of goods and with markets free of access.



Fig. 9. Outline map showing the relation of cities to coal fields in the United Kingdom. The latest statistics of city populations are given. Symbolism according to Mark Jefferson, the *Geographical Review*, Vol. 4, 1917.

Time itself, added to what might be called the momentum of power, has worked toward the intensification of city grouping in England. Capital has flowed in increasing amounts into areas of production, into foreign marketing facilities, into industrial establishments under foreign management but motivated by funds from British sources. Power has thus become enhanced in the British metropole to an extent that almost surpasses belief on the part of those who are unaccustomed to measure economic forces. We see the process, with equally marked effect upon city growth and in its most active forms, in the United States, particularly in the period since the World War.



Fig. 10. It is difficult to fix dates for additions of territory acquired in so many different ways. Authorities do not agree: one may give date of occupation, another effective settlement, and a third treaty recognition. The chief references that have been followed are *Colonial Office List*, 1917; *Oxford Survey of the British Empire*, Vol. 6; Robinson, *Colonial Chronology*.

(A) Trade Organization of the Empire

Trade became the life blood of the British Empire in the period following the Industrial Revolution. In a very short time England took the lead in the industrial change that swept over western Europe and she has held it during the intervening period of 150 years. This she could not have done had she not acquired within the boundaries of an empire a large part of the raw materials that she needed for her mills. Nor could she have maintained her supremacy without making a world search for additional raw materials and pushing out her boundaries accordingly. Figure 10 tells some remarkable facts about the growth of the British Empire. It shows that down to the time when industrial machinery began to multiply British hands, — that is, down to the close of our Revolutionary War, — England was distinctly an Atlantic power except for one chief possession, India, hers in fact if not in name since the early days of overseas discovery and colonization. Before 1800 came a quick burst of activity that spotted the world map with British possessions. A third period embraced the second half of the 19th century. Each of these major periods represents a stage of British imperial life. The first was trade; the second, territorial expansion that brought many essential raw materials within the empire; the third was marked by the rise of those English-speaking commonwealths that through their own initiative and growth were to become in our time independent seats of British power and trade.

Control of Sources of Raw Materials

Parallel with territorial growth went the development of political principles of far-reaching consequence; for in the search for raw materials of every sort, Great Britain's activities and claims collided at many points with those of the other industrial nations of the world. One of the strongest reasons for colonizing America was to establish an independent supply of abundant materials for shipbuilding. "Her shipping was to England like the hair of Samson, the secret of her national strength." Richard Hakluyt in a different figure describes the navigation of the sea as "the very walls of this our island." In the days of wooden ships it had been a matter of anxiety to her that her sources of supply for shipbuilding materials from northern Europe might be cut off, and without shipping her trade would fail because of the small extent of her island base. She was not in the position of the United States at the present time, which with vast national wealth and a more nearly self-sufficient economy may safely depend in large part (70 per cent) upon the ships of other countries for transport.

Raw Materials within the British Empire

The pre-war figures are the approximate averages for four (or five) normal years. The post-war figures are only approximate, owing to the unsettled conditions still prevailing in many of the markets and the lack of necessary statistics. Where no explanation for increase or decrease is given in the explanatory notes to the table (Appendix A), it may be assumed that the difference is attributable to unstable market conditions. In the case of minerals, it was possible to obtain an acceptable average for three years, 1923, 1924, 1925. The figures for post-war mineral production should be compared with pre-war figures if the reader wishes to form a balanced judgment.

Commodity[1]	Annual Consumption of United Kingdom (with % from Empire)		Annual Production within the Empire		Annual Consumption within the Empire	
	Pre-war	Post-war	Pre-war	Post-war	Pre-war	Post-war
Antimony	1,900 tons (10%)	3,800 tons	1,000 tons	260 tons		
Asbestos	7,000 tons (60%)	14,500 tons	89,200 tons	256,000 tons		
Borax	10,000 tons	13,800 tons	none	none	12,000 tons	17,800 tons
Butter	6,500,000 cwt. (55%)	7,500,000 cwt.		7,200,000 cwt.		
Cheese	2,900,000 cwt. (80%)	3,760,000 cwt.		3,800,000 cwt.		
Chromium		22,000 tons		178,000 tons		24,000 tons
Cobalt ore				600 tons		
Copper	120,000 tons (25%)	152,000 tons	87,000 tons	83,000 tons	150,000 tons	190,000 tons
Cotton	1,000,000 tons (20%)	600,000 tons	1,250,000 tons	1,000,000 tons	1,400,000 tons	1,000,000 tons
Fertilizers (chem.)	1,800,000 tons	1,500,000 tons	2,220,000 tons	1,550,000 tons	2,000,000 tons	2,000,000 tons
Graphite	16,000 tons (45%)	13,300 tons	31,500 tons	13,500 tons	17,000 tons	14,000 tons
Iron (pig)	8,600,000 tons (70%)	6,680,000 tons	5,800,000 tons	5,200,000 tons	10,000,000 tons	8,300,000 tons
Lead	180,000 tons (25%)	220,000 tons	156,000 tons	359,000 tons	212,000 tons	255,000 tons
Manganese (ore)	430,000 tons (45%)	375,300 tons	600,000 tons	1,025,000 tons		
Mercury	600 tons	600 tons	none	none	850 tons	850 tons
Nickel	No data	No data	22,000 tons	29,400 tons		
Platinum	35,000 oz.	46,000 oz.		2,166[2] oz.	37,000 oz.	
Sulphur	18,500 tons	103,300 tons	none	none	87,500 tons	328,700 tons
Thorium (Monazite)	35–50 tons	No data	120 tons	434 tons	49 tons	No data
Tin	21,000 tons (60%)	20,000 tons	81,500 tons	58,600 tons	27,000 tons	26,000 tons
Tungsten			3,700 tons	1,200 tons		
Wheat	195,830,000 bu. (50%)	220,000,000 bu.	705,000,000 bu.	905,000,000 bu.	736,000,000 bu.	810,000,000 bu.
Wood pulp	844,000 tons (10%)	942,000 tons	1,260,000 tons	2,034,000 tons		
Wool	566,000,000 lbs. (80%)	587,000,000 lbs.	1,246,000,000 lbs.	1,255,000,000 lbs.	650,000,000 lbs.	675,000,000 lbs.
Zinc (smelter)	194,000 tons	169,600 tons	64,000 tons	110,000 tons	200,000 tons	180,000 tons

[1] The commodities of the table are indicated in three styles of type: **boldface**, representing those which are produced in quantities sufficient to supply the need of the empire; *italics*, those which could be developed to the point of supplying the needs of the empire; and ordinary type, those for which the empire will have to depend in part upon outside sources. A detailed explanation of the table and a note on sources will be found in Appendix A.

[2] See Appendix A.

The empire now contains well over one quarter of the land surface and population of the globe, and its possessions are so distributed that they give England access to vital commodities everywhere. British possessions (Fig. 10) lie in every geographical zone and major climatic province. There is hardly a vegetable or an animal product on earth that is not or could not be produced upon the soil or in the waters under British control. The table on page 38 gives a comparative view of the great stock of raw materials within the empire that are of chief concern to British industry. Successive imperial conferences and other agencies have dealt with the more effective use of these resources in creating new streams of empire trade. Self-support and independence are the objects of this form of empire building.

STRATEGICAL HOLDINGS

Of equal importance with natural resources is the strategical distribution of British territorial holdings. Since Great Britain is a maritime power, it can most effectively protect its possessions if they are on or near the sea. All the better if their landward side presents difficulties to invasion from continental interiors, as in India where great mountain barriers wall off fertile plains from the rest of the continent. Like the British Isles, Australia derives its protection partly from insularity. Of no small importance is it that the territories of France, Belgium, Portugal, and the United States — four friendly nations — flank the possessions of the British Empire more extensively than do the lands of other powers.

The lines of communication between British possessions are relatively short and are marked by admirable harbors. In facilities for the strategic disposal of her fleet in time of war, England has advantages no less critical than those that accrue from widely dispersed coal and cable stations for the work of commerce in time of peace. It is about the borders of the Atlantic and Indian oceans that British possessions are chiefly distributed and British commerce enjoys a dominating position. It is on the borders of those two oceans that her latest territorial expansion has taken place — in West Africa and Southwest Africa, in East Africa, and, in a qualified sense, in Iraq (Mesopotamia) — as a result of the World War.

So widespread and varied are British possessions at the present time that commercial, racial, and religious convulsions, no matter in what part of the world they take place, impinge upon the interests of Britain. Her territory has long been so widespread as to test her capacity for government. Following the World War she assumed new



FIG. 11. Shipping routes of the world. The widths of the lines and bands are proportional to the tonnage. Japan and Italy have greatly increased their merchant marine in recent years. Their ships carry a larger part of their own increased overseas commerce. After Friedrich, *Geographie des Welthandels und Weltverkehrs*, 1926, Pl. 3.

obligations which have involved her in enormously heavy financial and military expenditures. The mandates for Palestine and Transjordan and special treaty obligations in Iraq mean that she must cultivate good relations with the Arabs. Though Egypt has been given conditional independence, British responsibility is still active and thoroughgoing, for Egypt is Britain's corridor to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. In the Near East alone Britain has added to her former responsibilities since 1918 an area of 200,000 square miles with a population of three millions.

In the distribution of enemy territory at the close of the World War, Great Britain won the largest share, and with her gains in land go important gains in material wealth. Mesopotamia has rich oil deposits. Tanganyika Territory, as that part of former German East Africa now under a British mandate is called, has a large labor supply and valuable fibers, nuts, oils, cereals, coffee plantations, and cattle ranges. Those parts of Togoland and the Cameroons gained by Great Britain produce palm oil, ground nuts, and fibers. Nauru, in the Pacific, has valuable phosphate deposits. Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, now added to British New Guinea, has petroleum, copra, and pearl fisheries.

THE GROWTH OF BRITISH COMMERCIAL POWER

It would have been impossible to build up so large and diversified an empire if the British had not had special qualities of character that matched the dangers and difficulties of the task. For, despite the great colonial empires once held by France and Spain, it is the people of England who have been the most persistent colonial organizers of modern times. Though they have frequently abused native rights, they have nevertheless been the most successful in their use of native help in managing colonies in a lower state of development or of different race. Englishmen have a deeply rooted belief in the superiority of English institutions; they have also an alert sense of responsibility toward the native and a salutary degree of outspoken self-criticism. These are matters of special interest to America at the present time because we have so recently entered the stage of world trade. In the common language of England and the United States, and their common tendency toward liberal government, there is a bond of political significance. It is because their navies are powerful that the sea is free. As a result of the treaties related to the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament (1922) their fleets were reduced, but when combined they are still double those of all the other great powers put together.



Fig. 12. The seaborne coal trade of the world. By furnishing an outward cargo, exported coal reduces the cost of transportation of goods imported into the United Kingdom, and to this extent reduces the cost of food and raw materials. English and Welsh coal in part pay for Argentine wheat and meat and Brazilian coffee exported to the United Kingdom. The annual shipments of British coal to the Mediterranean and Black seas in large part pay for return cargoes of cereals, ores, oil, and cotton. See Supplement to *U. S. Commerce Reports*, No. 19 *d*, 25 September 1919; Friedrich, *Geographie des Welthandels und Weltverkehrs*, 1911, Pl. 6; and Bartholomew, *Atlas of the World's Commerce*, 1906, Pl. 131.

In a sense there are many Englands, and many different factors have contributed to growth. Geographical conditions have aided British world dominion, as we have seen. Social and political forms and ideals have an even greater significance. In the long historical view one sees Great Britain gaining experience in colonial administration from century to century and profiting by each experience. Every year large numbers of her young men enter the consular and diplomatic service. To do so they are required to pass very rigid examinations and the best of the applicants are chosen. Thus is formed a caste of officials from schools and colleges with similar purposes. A fraternal spirit with a strong imperial tinge is the result. Every official has been drilled in the principles of empire building. He goes out to British possessions wherever they may be, his mind well stored with the traditions of his race, eager to contribute in his measure to the vast streams of empire trade.

With rapidly growing industries and apparently limitless coal fields to support them, English sea power became dominant by the end of the 18th century. England's merchant marine became no less powerful than her navy. Her trading organization — banks, agents, expert information, credit systems, free-trade and other fiscal policies, and, not least, commercial courage — was the largest and best in the world. After the last threat of disaster to English power had passed, more than a hundred years ago, with the fall of Napoleon, the coast lines of the world became the frontiers of Britain. The men of England came more and more to think in terms of universal or world trade.

BRITISH WORLD TRADE IN THE 19TH CENTURY

With the growth of industry based on coal for fuel (19th century) Great Britain developed on a world scale the occupation of remote lands where she was free to exchange manufactured goods for raw materials. English capital flowed into the new trade regions of North and South America, where it built railways, ports, and canals, and bought land. English shipping carried more than half the trade of all the seas. London became the financial capital of the world.

In still more recent times the growth of the coal export business has further increased the commercial and naval power of Britain. British-owned coaling stations are located at scores of strategic points. Wherever the fleet may be, there is always fuel for it; and, more important, there is almost always a cargo for the freight steamer that otherwise would go out empty, or nearly so, to a distant port for cotton

or oil or hemp or wool or food to be brought back to the close-packed industrial populations of England. Except in the Central American and West Indian trade, where eastward bound freight is less abundant, specially low freight rates are given to British exporters, and these enable the British traders to secure foreign orders to the best advantage. The outgoing cargo gets the trade, the incoming cargo pays the lion's share of the freight charges both ways. In addition, the United Kingdom has developed a mercantile system which has made British wares known everywhere. The coal export (bulky) supplements the manufactured wares (light), and together they constitute an outbound tonnage that offsets the bulky incoming foodstuffs and raw materials.

The Indian Ocean has become a British lake. A great chain of English possessions stretches from Gibraltar to Nigeria, past Walvis Bay in Southwest Africa, to Cape Town, up to Zanzibar in East Africa, and to the distant coasts of Arabia and Baluchistan. On the Mediterranean route, Malta has been held since 1803, the Ionian Islands since 1809. After the Opium War, Great Britain obtained Hongkong from China (1842); Queen Victoria was made Empress of India in 1876; Germany in 1890 agreed to recognize British rights in Zanzibar and on the mainland opposite in return for the cession of Heligoland; the Boers were conquered in 1902; the British sphere of influence in Persia was recognized by Russia in 1907 — to mention only a few of the important steps in the progress of British empire building in the last few decades along the border of the Indian Ocean or related to it.

Singapore, founded in 1819, is a commercial and strategic outpost of the British Empire that illustrates perhaps best of all the significant location of many outlying British possessions. Its population is now nearly half a million. It occupies an unrivaled position in the center of a vast area in which cotton textiles, petroleum products, and tobacco are absorbed in large quantities and from which come rubber, tin, and rice to the value of a half billion dollars annually. As a naval base it guards the sea road to the Far East from southern Asia, commands the Dutch East Indies, is part of the outer defense of India, and is of almost equal importance in the protection of Australia (Fig. 13). Strategically it is to Asia what Key West is to the United States. Its founder said of it that its naval and commercial value exceeded that of "whole continents of territory."

It is in Latin America that the United States comes into sharpest conflict with British trade interests. Recently the merchants of the United States have built up a large trade with Latin American states; they have purchased railways and established steamship lines,

Fig. 13. Focus of American, British, French, Dutch, and Japanese interests in southeastern Asia. Burma, the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States, Sarawak, Brunei, and British North Borneo are the principal British possessions in the Singapore region. The Dutch own the greater part of Borneo in addition to Java, Sumatra, and other islands near by. French interests are concentrated in French Indo-China. In the northwestern corner of the region stand the Philippine Islands, an American possession. Japanese interests are both strategic and commercial and are related chiefly to trade with India, Java, and the Philippines, a trade which developed rapidly during the World War. (For more detailed maps of the Singapore region see Figure 201, page 566.)

banks, and industries, and have invaded zones of business once exclusively in British control. The United States upholds the Monroe Doctrine, especially in relation to the weak states of the West Indies and Central America. Should it also greatly extend its political influence into South America, and should it gain through political effort any special trade privileges, there would be conflict of one sort or another with the British Empire.

In 1902 Great Britain made an alliance with Japan, another sea power with an island for a base. It turned out to be a wise alliance, for in the World War it brought Japan into the camp of the Allies. When in 1920 the time had come to renew it, objections were raised by Japan on the ground that her subjects did not enjoy equality of privilege in British dominions. Against Japan's plea for equality the most vigorous protests were made by Australia, New Zealand,

and Canada. If Japanese subjects were let into those countries in large numbers and were permitted to acquire every kind of property, especially land, then British subjects in India would also insist on admission to the dominions, with the result that the white populations there would be submerged beneath a mounting wave of color.

Had Japan won the hoped-for concession from Great Britain, she could then have brought pressure to bear upon the United States for the freer admission of her subjects and the removal of special restrictions on Japanese settlers in California, which state now contains nearly half the Japanese in the United States. In closing their gates to Asiatic immigration into the white man's lands of the Pacific, the people of the British dominions and of the United States find themselves drawn into a closer understanding, which is the strongest present guarantee for the peace of the Pacific.

DEBTS AND RESOURCES OF THE EMPIRE

Great Britain had by 1919 a war debt of more than $26,000,000,000, in addition to $9,000,000,000 loaned to her weaker allies. For a small country this is a colossal figure. Of the total, more than $5,000,000,000 represents external debt which involves the transfer of goods and services to other countries, a particularly heavy burden as contrasted with the internal debt that involves only a transfer of purchasing power within the country. The dominions have incurred their own huge debts, and cannot help the mother country except through special channels of trade. By unusual effort the share of total British export trade accounted for by other parts of the empire was increased from 37 per cent in 1913 to 41 per cent in 1926. It has taxed British financial power to the utmost to keep the nation solvent. The interest alone is a staggering sum to pay each year. There are three principal ways in which it can be met:

(1) By increasing production through harder and more effective work.
(2) By developing important resources of food and raw materials in new colonies where land is cheap and labor abundant, as in former German East Africa.
(3) By capitalizing railroads and extractive industries, like agriculture and grazing, in underdeveloped non-industrial regions: South America, the East Indies, Australia, and South Africa.

The two last-named means imply political activity in every land where British capital goes, in order that investments may be safe and that they may grow in importance. Unless wise coöperative

plans are developed for the regulation of investment interests among rival powers, the present struggle may be found more keen than the trade struggle before the World War, because of the impulse of high taxes that are the necessary consequence of vast national debts.

INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE IN GREAT BRITAIN TODAY

With all of her wide extension of organized commercial life and empire territory, Great Britain faces political and social problems of the first order of importance. Some of them, like the huge national debt, have grown out of the World War; others, such as the coal crisis and the agricultural depression, have been in process of evolution for many years; and still others have to do with the structure of the empire itself. Peculiar to England is the great strain of feeding and clothing so many millions of industrial workers at a time when an enormous war debt must be paid. The English believe that unemployment, a chronic condition in England since the war, represents a war effect comparable in magnitude to the damage in the devastated regions of France. Certainly the comparison is fair if we add to unemployment the dislocation of shipping and trade produced by the war.

At first sight agriculture would appear to afford a partial remedy. It has been notorious that agriculture has been in a state of decline in England during the last fifty years, and no amount of industrial unemployment has halted the process. Neither has check or increase in the flow of immigration affected it. The English people have become city-minded. To a marked degree they have become permanently detached from the land and have lost their ancient capacity to live upon it. To understand the problem in its present degree of poignancy one must turn to earlier crises in British agriculture.

We often speak of the Industrial Revolution during the generation from 1780 to 1813, without realizing that it implied a corresponding agricultural revolution. Not only did the modern industrial cities come into quick being; changes in the social and economic life shook rural communities to their foundations. With the growth of great industrial wealth, land was accumulated by a few men who had vast holdings. For them agriculture became a business, like manufacturing. This was all very well during the period of Napoleonic wars, when the exclusion of foreign foodstuffs stimulated agriculture to increased production. The landowners and the large tenant farmers were in a state of prosperity; but farm laborers found themselves caught by the disparity that always exists after war between wages and the cost

of living. The former had doubled, the latter had nearly trebled. In 1815 at the close of the Napoleonic wars commercial depression became widespread. The ranks of the unemployed were steadily recruited by discharges from the army. War industries began to fail. It took agriculture two decades to make even the beginning of a recovery. The combination of civil war in America and favorable seasons in England with abundant harvests brought temporary relief. Russian cereals were excluded because of the Crimean War. The price of wool rose to unprecedented levels. The breeds of cattle and sheep were improved and their numbers increased. Farm machinery was modernized. In 1870 England's exports increased because of the Franco-German War. The Suez Canal was opened the year before and had a stimulating effect upon shipbuilding. Rural development in America increased the demand for English manufactured goods and thus for English coal and iron.

To trace these changes is to see how responsive agriculture in England had become to world conditions, no matter how diverse or separated geographically. It is therefore not surprising to learn that new inventions, the development of new land abroad, and a succession of bad crop years at home again threw English farming into a state of depression that endured throughout the last quarter of the 19th century. Diseases among cattle and sheep, a diminished wheat crop, and abundant harvests in America brought about disaster at home and the beginning of that long era of foreign competition in foodstuffs that threw English agriculture into a state of permanent decline. Foreign competition was greatly aided by the telegraph and by the steamboat with its swift and cheap deliveries of freight. It was a process that affected English agriculture in much the same way that the opening of the western farm lands affected agriculture in the eastern United States. As cereals declined in importance special attention was paid to grazing and dairying, to vegetables, fruit, and poultry. Land was kept permanently in pasturage. The price of labor rose and its efficiency diminished. Machinery became more expensive. The total effect of these harassing conditions was a deterioration in the quality of the land. In 1893 a royal commission made an inquiry into the state of agriculture; it was shown that farm production had diminished nearly one half in value, and that the cost of production had increased.

While all these events were in progress, city populations grew with amazing speed. In the century from 1801 to 1901 the population of greater London increased from 1,100,000 to 6,500,000. The rates of

growth for the industrial cities from decade to decade commonly ranged from 15 per cent to 25 per cent in the period from 1830 to 1900. Growth was particularly active in the middle of the 19th century. In an economically self-contained nation, — one whose development is self-stimulating in all branches so that it comes to be more and more nearly independent, — one would expect agriculture to be stimulated to a corresponding degree. This result did not follow because in a sense Great Britain had become commercially over-organized. Despite the expanding market demands of her cities, it was cheaper to carry foodstuffs even from the most distant places in large and fast steamships than it was to produce them at home in the face of rising standards and costs of rural living. Modern machinery upon cheap virgin land in the new countries of the west had thrown English agricultural economics out of gear. By so much had industry overbalanced agriculture that cheap food for industrial workers became the first necessity, rather than a high or even an economically possible price for farm products. Fields declined because it did not pay to cultivate them, not because there was less demand for food.

While rural depopulation at this time afflicted a large part of western Europe, it was nowhere so rapid or so grave as in England. There seemed to be no halt in the process, though commissions, recommenda-



Fig. 14. Comparative view of the area and population of the British Empire.

tions, and acts succeeded each other as government sought to prevent the ruin of agriculture. In 1811, 34 per cent of the population was agricultural; in 1831, 28 per cent; in 1861, 10 per cent. One would suppose that by this time the process of rural depopulation and city growth would have checked itself, but the commercial machinery of Great Britain showed no limit of power. The city populations seemed to grow spontaneously. In the decade from 1881 to 1891 the urban population increased 15.3 per cent, the rural 3.4. From 1891 to 1901 the urban population increased 15.2 per cent, the rural 2.9. We gain perhaps a better idea of what happened upon the arable land by looking at the number of men who actually worked upon the soil. Limiting the figures to laborers and shepherds, we have:

1851	965,000	1891	756,000
1871	962,000	1901	609,000

Between 1871 and 1901, one third of the agricultural laborers (adding their families we have a million in all) withdrew permanently from the land. Nor has the division of large estates remedied the situation. In the period 1885 to 1910 nearly 1800 holdings of 300 acres or more disappeared. Only 3 per cent of the present agricultural holdings of England exceed 300 acres.

To some students the post-World-War decline of British trade represents not a passing episode but a new alignment of industrial power. Despite new imperial policies, the dominions, with increasing populations, continue the process of industrialization and make a diminishing demand upon British manufacturers. The process is hastened by the disproportionate growth of industrial city populations in the dominions as well as in England. The tropics offer but little relief for the next generation at least, because their conquest is conditional, limited, and specialized. Moreover, tropical peoples are in a low state of culture and represent a limited market. Tropical agriculture does not lend itself to extensive machine methods of tillage. It has been estimated that if all the people now living in the tropics could be organized for exploitation as in India and Java, the annual trade possibilities of the world would be increased probably not much more than a billion dollars, about equally divided between imports and exports.

The full force of the ominous facts of agriculture and business was not realized until the coal strike of 1926 still further dislocated British trade, already in a perilous state as a result of the World War. The direct losses due to the strike amounted to the cost of a war: $275,000,000 in wages, $1,500,000,000 in production. The indirect

losses are incalculable. In 1913, coal represented 10 per cent of Britain's aggregate export ; in 1925, only $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The meaning of these figures is apparent if we recall that for a century the coal industry was the foundation of British economic strength. The Royal Commission of 1925 reported the coal industry overmanned and the capital structure and mining works too large in size for the requirements they have to fulfill. It was concluded that even lower standards of living among the miners and the abandonment of low-grade collieries, with resultant transfer of labor, would not prevent a shrinkage of the industry. The seriousness of this conclusion is appreciated when we recall that, during the lustrum 1923–1927, the annual figures of unemployment exceeded a million, and that about a million and a quarter are engaged in the coal industry. Textiles have been in a state of chronic depression since the World War, and they also employ a million and a quarter. In addition the stream of emigration was halted by the World War. There are two million more people than if peace had continued and the flow of population had been uninterrupted.

GREAT BRITAIN'S PRESENT POSITION IN TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Competition in industry, particularly in iron and steel and in textiles, has advanced to the point where its effect upon England is now definitely felt. America, France, and Germany lead Great Britain in steel production, the United States alone having a production five or six times that of Great Britain. Cheap German coal applying on reparation account has given France a great advantage which has been reinforced by the low wage scale. In addition, Great Britain is rapidly exhausting her iron ore resources and is now importing annually five million tons of ore, whereas the ore of France is so abundant as to give her no concern for a long time to come. In the textile industries the use of old-fashioned methods and machinery, as well as the exactions of the trade unions, and the necessarily high cost of their production to the ultimate consumer, have tended to keep cotton and woolen textile industries in a state of anxiety.

In shipbuilding and in the facilities of commerce England is still the leading country. She carries by far the largest share of the world's goods and enjoys preëminence in banking. It is not in industry but in trade that Great Britain has maintained her position in the world's economy in the years of terrible strain following the World War. Her brokerage services are without a rival. Her overseas possessions are recovering their position in the field of primary production.

(B) The Empire in Relation to Its Parts

With this general view of the British Empire, we may now turn to regional conditions that in a measure threaten its existence or limit its contribution to human welfare. Other empires have been great in their day, and the Roman Empire, in many respects the greatest of all, was for long periods in a state of comparative peace and was finally overwhelmed only after centuries of proud history. The Mohammedan Empire was at one time the greatest in existence (8th century). At the beginning of modern times, the colonial empire of Spain was the most remarkable. In a century Spain had pioneered a way into the western world, built up a powerful navy, and developed a system of colonial government. Yet all these empires failed, partly by reason of their vast extent and the inclusion of alien peoples in large numbers, but partly and chiefly because of the decay of national character, or at least its failure to develop in proportion to the growth of its responsibilities. When men became corrupt or soft, neglecting their own internal economic affairs, then each empire collapsed under the strain.

Seeing their problems in the light of historical experience, the British have sought to anticipate the causes of decline and to provide against them by the adoption of coöperative plans whereby there is achieved a greater degree of local self-government. The collapse within a few years of four other empires now makes the faults of the British Empire stand out in clearer perspective; for its past beneficence was but relative, and its record was bright in part by reason of its contrast to the record of the autocratic empires of Germany, Austria, Russia, and Turkey. It must be said to the credit of the British that they have learned to develop, even in remote and diverse communities, a capacity for self-government in a manner and to a degree never before known in history. It must be admitted also that the British have dealt with a greater diversity of peoples and conditions than have the other colonizing nations of the modern world.

While a marked devotion to high political ideals is evident in the present attitude of the British government towards its possessions, it was not the compelling force of such ideals that was responsible for the extension of British power. Political administration was assumed only because it was found necessary for the development of trade, and with each new development went the necessity for new conquests to protect the frontiers of the trade regions into which British merchants had penetrated.

"The British Empire," according to *The Statesman's Year-Book* (1927), "consists of:

I. Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Channel Islands, and Isle of Man.

II. The Irish Free State, India, the Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates, and Dependencies."

While there are many differences in political structure and relationships between the parts of the British Empire, outside the United Kingdom, they may be grouped into five great divisions:

(1) The six self-governing dominions — Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, Newfoundland,[1] and Ireland[2] — units which are largely of the same stock and speech as the United Kingdom, each with a political consciousness that has led to the development of what amounts to separate nationality.

(2) Those parts of the empire in which Great Britain governs peoples of race and speech different from her own. Some regions, like India, are complex countries with a wide range of civilization; others — the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, for instance — are undeveloped tracts sparsely inhabited by people of a low order of social development; and there are dependencies, protectorates, and chartered-company possessions in various stages of political development between these two groups.

(3) Crown colonies that came into existence under widely varying conditions of trade, government, and proportion of English settlers. They are under the direct control of the Colonial Office at London, but they manage their local affairs through legislative councils or assemblies and an executive, these operating within the limits of the charter under which the colony came into being. Southern Rhodesia and Jamaica are in this class.

(4) Military posts and coaling stations (as Malta, Aden, Gibraltar).

(5) Mandated territories, for which Great Britain is responsible to the League of Nations (page 21).

"Its widely scattered parts have very different characteristics, very different histories, and are at very different stages of evolution, while considered as a whole it defies classification and bears no real resemblance to any other political organization which now exists or has ever yet been tried." Thus Lord Balfour has described that extraor-

[1] A colony in name, but with a special status similar to that of the dominions (page 71).

[2] Ireland is included in this group, though the statement of Premier Baldwin in November 1926 should be noted: "Although the Irish Free State has a dominion status, Ireland, which includes Northern Ireland, is not a dominion." This distinction recognizes the special geographical and military position of Ireland in relation to England as described in following pages (56 to 59).

dinary political composite which constitutes the British Empire. If we add the fact that the empire as a whole has no common government or citizenship, that social and religious standards are extremely diverse among its peoples, and that the control of its several parts is admittedly illogical, we may more clearly see the force of his statement. How the government of such an empire works is a mystery to most outsiders.

(1) The *Colonial Office* has to do with the chartered companies, the mandated territories, the crown colonies, the self-governing dominions, and the protectorates outside India.

(2) The *India Office* is responsible for British India and the protectorates of India.

(3) The *Foreign Office* is responsible for spheres of influence.

(4) The *Home Office* is responsible for Northern Ireland and Great Britain.

Each Office is under the charge of a Secretary of State, that is, a minister who is a member of the cabinet and a part of the government of the day.

THE STATUS OF THE DOMINIONS

If my house be taken, thine tumbleth anon.
If thy house be forfeit, mine followeth soon.
RUDYARD KIPLING, *The House, a Song of the Dominions*

It is with the dominions that we shall first concern ourselves, for it is from them that there has come the most insistent demand for a larger degree of independence. Even during the World War they expressed deep anxiety about the political changes that might follow the war. On 4 May 1917 the prime ministers of the self-governing units recommended a special convocation after the war to consider the entire question of constitutional relations within the empire. That empire was founded upon the old imperial idea in large part; and the commonwealth idea, most strikingly and daringly set forth by General Smuts of South Africa during the World War, was at last to gain the ascendancy without either ill will or revolution.

This political development did not come on the initiative of the government of Great Britain. It came in large part from the activities of a small group of liberals outside the government, and chiefly those associated in the work of the quarterly journal called *The Round Table*, who saw most clearly after the Boer War that the empire would crumble unless the home government accepted the point of view of the dominions. Dominion territory represents a new geographical environ-

ment, and in that environment the natural political drift of a people is toward independence. Rarely can the mother country long maintain its hold unless it adapts itself to this tendency. In addition, settlers of diverse views and nationalities become merged into a group with common aims and with plastic habits of thought. A national spirit is developed that cannot fail to exhibit original and independent tendencies. Here we have the essence of the colonial problem of every nation that attempts to rule distant peoples of the old stock in the interests of home commerce and industry and the general safety of the sea routes. Great Britain lost the thirteen American colonies: if she sometimes forgot the lesson, at least the dominions were allowed to become in all practical respects independent. They have long made their own laws, imposed their own taxes, and even decided how much they should contribute to the defense of the empire. Finally, the Peace Conference of Paris (1919) accorded to each of the dominions representation in the Assembly of the League of Nations, as if they were wholly independent states.

There were two respects, however, in which the dominions were not free. Canada, for example, had growing difficulties over the question of the status of the governor-general and his powers. South Africa was tending steadily toward secession because of the irreconcilable views of those who sought to strengthen the bonds of empire as opposed to those who sought to be entirely free, not to mention the traditional hostility between Englishmen and Boers and their conflicting views respecting native races and the powers of the Union parliament. All of the dominions alike were without power to conduct independent foreign relations. Because they had incurred colossal debts and given thousands of their best men on the battlefields of Europe, and because they were likely at any time again to be called upon for aid in war, the dominions insisted upon a larger share in the direction of imperial policies. Either their view had to be accepted or the government would be obliged to face the alternative of complete separation. The turn in the road came in 1926, when there was held at London an Imperial Conference at which the structure of the empire was deliberately altered so far as the dominions were concerned and the title of the King was made to correspond with the change that had already taken place in the government of Ireland (*i.e.*, not George V, "of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas" . . . but "of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions. . . ." (Footnote, page 53.)

The Imperial Conference agreement of 1926 recognizes the equality

of status of the dominions and their autonomous nature. They are united only by a common allegiance to the Crown and their friendly association as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In conformity with this change, the governor-general of a dominion, formerly appointed on the advice of His Majesty's ministers in London and acting as their representative, now has a relation to the administration of a dominion similar to that of the King to the home government. He is informed of public affairs and he has certain definite functions; but he is not the head of the government. The change recognizes the growing opposition of dominion governments to the exercise of power by the governor-general at variance with the political majority of a dominion parliament; as, for example, in recent years, in Canada. Freedom is allowed the dominions in negotiations with other countries, though the home government and the other dominions as well are to be informed and may join in the ratification of a treaty if they so desire. Provision is made, however, for treaties applying to only one part of the empire. Plenipotentiaries for the various British units are given full powers by the King on the advice of the government concerned. Representatives at conferences of a political character called by a foreign government are appointed in accordance with special agreements. In all cases, neither Great Britain nor a dominion is to be committed to the acceptance of active obligations in matters of foreign policy except with the definite assent of its own government.[1]

THE IRISH FREE STATE

The altered status of Ireland commands our first attention, for its political changes have been more extreme than those of any other part of the empire.

It has been well said that the key to the misfortunes of Ireland is the geographical situation of that country as the European "outpost." It is near enough to England to enforce connection and yet far enough away to discourage intimacy. St. George's Channel, which separates Ireland from Wales, is three times as wide as the Strait of Dover. Had it been narrower, Roman power might have been extended to Ireland; and thus there might have been achieved in early times a unity of people in the British Isles out of which might have grown, if not a permanent union, at least a sympathetic understanding. A British leader, contrasting the Irish status with the progress of imperial

[1] Canada is now a temporary member of the Council of the League of Nations as if it were an independent country.

policy in Canada and Australia, remarked: "The dominions are geographically remote and morally near — the Irish are geographically near and morally remote."

After the fall of Rome in the 5th century, Ireland remained a *secluded* island and there grew up an indigenous culture, especially marked by the rapid development of a distinctive Celtic literature and art. From Ireland, where Christianity was introduced in the 5th century, Christian teaching spread to England and to northern Europe. In spite of its cultural progress, however, Ireland kept its tribal system of government. In contrast to this system was the more highly developed English government, and out of that fundamental contrast and what it stood for in the way of English power in trade and land tenure was born much of the trouble that devastated Ireland in the bitter centuries that followed.

The English Conquest

The foci of trade would inevitably be the foci of trouble also. It is on the eastern coast that the central plain of Ireland is in contact with the Irish Sea, with Dublin at the southern end of the 50-mile lowland strip. Through this eastern gateway English troops and tenant-settlers came and through it flowed such mutual commerce as the two peoples had developed; and here, all through the 12th and 13th centuries, armed contests took place, until not more than one eighth of the soil of Ireland finally remained in native hands. Many Irish proprietors were executed without due process of law. Nothing less than the destruction of the Irish people was contemplated.

Added to the political and social differences between the two peoples was the fact that most of the Irish were Catholics. Strongly influenced by a religious motive, the people of Ireland regarded English law and government as opposed to their religion. Garrisons of Protestant landowners, supported by Protestant colonies, kept in subjection a backward Catholic peasantry, progressively more hostile. The most powerful of the colonies was "the plantation of Ulster," in the north (Fig. 15), a settlement encouraged by James I and composed largely of Scotch Presbyterians. Thus a division on religious grounds was established on the soil of Ireland itself that has made Ulster a symbol of irreconcilable conflict. Whenever in recent years there was an approach to a solution of the general question, Ulster asserted its adherence to England and refused to accept union with the rest of Ireland. To compel it to go seemed to Ulster to be denying it the freedom that the rest of Ireland sought.

FIG. 15 (left). The historic four provinces and the counties of Ireland.
FIG. 16 (right). Compare the boundary between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State with the province and county boundaries shown in Figure 15.

Believing that Irish industry competed with that of England in English and continental markets and that the naval defense of the British Isles was solely an English responsibility, England imposed her commercial system upon Ireland. In 1665 and 1680 Ireland was forbidden to send to England live stock and the products of live stock. In 1663, 1670, and 1696, acts were passed excluding Ireland from trade with the colonies. The only way in which Irishmen could meet these restrictions was by emigration or by rising against the British authorities.

Outbreaks against the British government were resumed after the conquest of Ireland by Cromwell in 1652 and continued, from one cause or another, down through 1761 and 1771, each difficulty being marked by cruel repressions, continued confiscation of the land, and a swelling stream of emigrants. It was to America that most of the emigrants went, and during the period of the American Revolution the Irish in America were an important element. Australia and New Zealand also received important contingents with like political attitude toward British association.

Amidst all the complexities of Ireland's later relations with England there is one episode which stands out in strong relief, and that is the development of an Irish Parliament, which tended more and more strongly toward independence. The significant date in this move-

ment was 1782, when the British Parliament at length gave to the Irish Parliament practically the full measure of power that the American colonies had sought before the War of the Revolution. But instead of coöperating, each parliament sought to increase its authority. Irish people talked more and more about the "independence" that they had gained in 1782. Englishmen, on the other hand, pointed to the common union of the two countries under the Crown and assumed authority over the weaker state. During this period of political trouble the religious differences were never forgotten, and from time to time they led to disorders in various parts of Ireland. The end of the experiment was marked by the dissolution of the Irish Parliament and the union of Great Britain and Ireland (1801).

The perpetual disorders of Ireland had their roots in the soil of consuming hatred. The leaders looked backward to the misdeeds of past generations of English rather than forward to the practical business of securing such conditional freedom as they could. During the three years following the World War, Ireland was in a state of disorder and revolt. The whole of Irish and English relations was one long sequence of conflict and mismanagement. It was an English scholar who wrote, "Ireland is the one spot in the British Commonwealth where anarchy has continuously flourished."

Attainment of Dominion Status

Agreement upon the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act which came into effect in 1921 was one of the most dramatic episodes in English political life. By its terms Ireland was permitted to enjoy the same relationship to the Crown and the Imperial Parliament as the Dominion of Canada. An extremely difficult article to negotiate was the oath of allegiance required to be taken by the members of the Parliament of the Irish Free State to the Constitution of the Irish Free State and to the British Crown. For the present Great Britain is to provide for the coastal defense of Ireland and Great Britain is to have the use of harbor facilities in time of war. An Irish military establishment is restricted on the basis of the ratio between the populations of Ireland and Great Britain. Provision was made for the establishment of a boundary between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State, to be determined in accordance with the economic and geographical conditions. There is full assurance of religious toleration. Neither the Irish Free State nor Northern Ireland may make any law directly or indirectly endowing any religion or discriminate

as regards state aid between schools of different religious denominations.

It had been supposed that even conditional independence would set the seal upon peace. But there were two provisions of the treaty that threw Ireland into a new and terrible state of domestic conflict. First came the claim of a large opposition, led by De Valera, that only complete independence would be acceptable. Equally disastrous was the contention of the opposition that only a United Ireland — that is with Ulster absorbed — would satisfy an Irish patriot. Ulster, having been given the option of remaining a separate political entity with its own parliament or of joining southern Ireland, chose to manage its own affairs. Naturally this brought the Ulster boundary settlement forward in a form as acute as if two totally unlike nations were contending for territory. Part of the army mutinied, chiefly as a protest against the division of the island between two governments. Irish Free State troops were ambushed by nationalist irregulars; a boycott on Belfast was declared; and civil war of a peculiarly atrocious variety made havoc of that peace with independence for which Ireland had longed for centuries.

The relation of Ulster to the rest of Ireland is indeed one of the most difficult problems. A temporary boundary was recognized in 1920 when the Government of Ireland Act was framed. As for a permanent boundary, the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, which created the Irish Free State, provided for the setting up of a boundary commission to delimit Northern Ireland, provided that the Ulster government chose to remain outside the Irish Free State. The boundary was to follow a line "compatible with economic and geographical conditions." The three parties in interest were to appoint boundary commissioners, but the government of Northern Ireland refused to appoint its representative or to agree to a plebiscite as a basis for boundary negotiations, fearing a reduction of territory as a result of substantial Catholic enclaves. The schemes of the plebiscite and of boundary making through a commission were abandoned late in 1925 when the British government, the Irish Free State, and Northern Ireland signed an agreement continuing in force the division of 1920 (Fig. 16).

The Irish Civil War made constant waste of Ireland's economic resources and put upon the state a heavy burden of taxation to repair the destruction. The new government had to face eighteen months of civil war. Only the high courage and faith of its leaders carried it through this critical time. Opposition to the new government marks the policy of De Valera and his followers, and in the election of 1927

they held their ground in Parliament, the government continuing to have a bare majority.

In January 1922 the Irish Free State began to function. It is difficult to conceive how completely this change in political status has entered into the economic and social life of the Irish people. It is equally difficult to exaggerate the change in mental outlook of the inhabitants of an island of restricted resources, intensely individualistic, that have suddenly to manage their own affairs and to confront their own difficulties instead of blaming their rulers for them. Economic troubles must now be met through the national parliament, not by local violence or by protest to London.

It is not to be supposed, however, that Ireland's economic life will be immediately raised to a high level. That is dependent in the first place upon geographical conditions that determine the products of the country and the routes by which they must pass. It is related to the economic structure of the commercial world of which Ireland is a part. In that commercial world Great Britain is the principal medium of communication with other industrial countries, and the welfare of Ireland continues to be bound up perforce with the welfare of Great Britain because of the mutual relations of their markets. England needs Irish cattle and dairy products. Though Ireland has coal deposits, they are of limited extent and of inferior quality, so that coal must be imported from Great Britain, this alone representing more than one quarter in value of all of the raw materials imported into Ireland. Regulated by law in times past, the import of cattle, the conveyance of goods by ship, came under British control. Communication with Ireland was by way of England. Liverpool and Glasgow are Irish ports for overseas commerce. Some parts of Ireland communicate with others by way of British ports. Only since 1920 has there been direct steamship service between Ireland and America. Before that Irish immigrants came by way of Liverpool.

The Economic Outlook

So abundant is the rainfall over most of Ireland that there is a heavy growth of grass, but the cultivation of cereals is difficult. Since 1860 there has been a steady increase in the extent of permanent pasture. Dairy products lead in farm economy. It results that agriculture rests not on a varied basis but upon a limited number of crops and upon stock-raising especially.

The principal food crop is potatoes, and a pastoral and potato culture leaves but a small margin of safety in unfavorable seasons.

Thus, in the fifteen years from 1846 to 1861, during and after the potato famine, 2,390,000 Irish emigrated and more than a quarter million left in a single year, 1851. The population has continuously declined since 1841. On that date the twenty-six counties included in the Irish Free State had more than six and a half million people, whereas they now have less than three million. From 1841 to 1926 the population of country districts in the Irish Free State had diminished from 5,281,000 to 1,878,000 and the town population from 1,267,000 to 1,095,000.

Ireland is a country of small landholdings. From the 17th to the middle of the 19th century, in the period of greatest increase of population, the land became subdivided into uneconomic units. In the time of English rule there were set afoot a number of schemes for the benefit of the Irish peasantry. One of these was the encouragement of coöperative societies designed to improve marketing conditions. The first dairy coöperative was founded at Limerick in 1890. Since that time coöperatives have spread throughout the country, particularly in the counties of Limerick and Tipperary. Under the name of the Irish Coöperative Agency the coöperatives became organized for marketing purposes in England and Scotland, especially in the industrial districts. While notable progress was made in this matter, the Irish leaders oftentimes opposed the development of better economic conditions on the ground that they diverted the public mind from home rule. The leaders were bitterly preoccupied with obstruction and nationalism rather than economic betterment. Likewise, at the most critical moments the country traders opposed the work of the coöperative societies because they feared that the movement threatened their livelihood as middlemen. Despite these difficulties the movement grew and was a factor of real importance even in the troubled political period in which it had its beginning.

A second economic measure related to the division of the land and the shifting of the population within Ireland. Two thirds of the used land in the middle decades of the 19th century was held in lots of 30 acres or less, this figure representing the *minimum* upon which a peasant and his family could live in view of the prevailing type of land use. Certain districts became congested, even though the population was declining, and the British government hastened the land-purchase process through the acts of 1903 and 1909, attempting to shift a part of the population to the holdings of the landed proprietors. Between 1885 and 1909 nearly 145,000 tenants became proprietors of the lands they cultivated.

With the organization of the Irish Free State a number of practical measures were put into effect, despite the heavy handicap under which the government labored. Though it was burdened with a debt not of its own making and though much material wealth had been destroyed by civil war, it resolutely set about the collection of taxes, not only those that were current but those that were in arrears. The quality and quantity of agricultural products and exports were improved so that live stock, dairy products, and the like, might attain a better standing in the world markets. This policy has greatly altered farm practice, tending to make production, manufacture, and marketing more scientific. Assured of certain tenure, relieved of the risk of eviction and high rents, the Irish peasant has at last his chance under his own government to rise from squalor to independence.

CANADA AS A NEIGHBOR OF THE UNITED STATES

It was a great Canadian leader, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who most succinctly expressed one of the chief ambitions of his countrymen: "The 19th century belonged to the United States: the 20th century belongs to Canada." This reads as if Canada might now be possessed of certain firm advantages formerly held by the United States; but in truth no such shift of advantage has taken place. Nor can it take place so long as the inescapable facts of geography continue to play a part in the political life of peoples. Some of these facts need to be held in mind, because they do not change with each administration. Their effects are more nearly permanent than those of government and war. They are among the elemental forces of life, and no political leader can long ignore them.

First is the fact that Canada lies in a northerly latitude. Its climatic and topographic layout, the distribution of its warmest soils, have favored the growth of population chiefly along the southern border. Its most valuable timber belts, its most convenient waterways are near the United States, and some of the greatest industrial cities of the United States are near Canada. From the standpoint of concentrated populations and the power they represent, Canada is a long and generally narrow belt of population extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific. This belt of population is widening northward, and when the illusions and inhibitions respecting sub-Arctic lands have been further dispelled the population will be still further extended in this direction. But even when fully developed, these sub-Arctic lands of wide extent (they occupy by far the larger part of Canadian territory)

FIG. 17. In general the resources of Canada are more abundant and accessible in a belt which borders the southern boundary. The densest population is found in the upper St. Lawrence and eastern Great Lakes region where mixed farming and industries are combined.

will support but a thin population, like all other pastoral regions. No matter what startling northward advances may be made here and there — as at the present time in the Peace River country, for example — it is the southern part of the country that will be the Canada of leadership, power, concentrated industry and trade, and of greatest political significance to the British Empire and the United States.

Economic Relations to the United States

A second fact of outstanding importance: upon the Canadian side of the boundary there are 10 millions of people and upon the American side 120 millions. There are no forts and no war vessels along these four thousand miles of "unguarded boundary," and before the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States there was but a very small number of government officials. On both sides of the line there has long been a natural pride in the amicable relations between the two countries. For more than a hundred years there has been no war between them. Since they are of corresponding race, speech, education, and political ideals, the ties of kinship are constantly strengthening.

Curiously enough, the very freedom of communication and the growth of business relationships has brought about a problem that sorely vexes Canadian statesmen: the economic dominance of the United States in Canadian industries and markets. The 120 millions against 10 millions does not represent a ratio of 12 to 1, for economic power does not depend upon a direct ratio between populations. Russia was long an example of a large population that had small economic power. England, on the other hand, for more than a hundred years has represented a small population with large economic power. In the United States the rapid growth of business facilities of all kinds, the extraordinary gravitative pull of great industrial concerns, the wide employment in industry of the principle of mass production with consequent cheapening of product, the favorable conjunction of raw materials, markets, and efficient transportation lines — all these have played their part in giving the country economic power out of proportion to its population.

The effect is seen in the economic ascendancy of the United States to the embarrassment of Canada. In the period between the close of our Civil War and the end of the 19th century, Canadian trade was in a state of almost chronic depression, whereas the United States was rapidly increasing in wealth and population. The Canadian Far West

struggled with the difficulties of poor transportation facilities. Cheap or free land in the United States led its own people as well as the European newcomer to occupy the western plains region of the United States rather than that of Canada. The relations between the two countries were occasionally strained by the effect of American tariffs upon Canadian products. At the beginning of the 20th century railroad development in the Canadian West was in full swing; the demand for certain Canadian raw materials in the markets of the United States was rapidly increasing; the western frontier had disappeared in the United States, whereas it was in a state of active development in the Canadian West; Canadian industries began their period of modern development; and Canada by all these means gained a sense of nationhood that had been lacking hitherto. This was clearly shown in the pull which the country exerted upon foreigners. From 1903 to 1913 more than 2,500,000 immigrants arrived, or as many as had entered the country in all the years since confederation (1869). Canada encourages immigration by propaganda through European agencies. The government seeks chiefly agriculturalists with capital. Like all countries with virgin agricultural lands to be developed, Canada wants farmers; her older stock too readily leaves the land for the cities. She has also to attract new hands beyond the needs of normal agricultural development, because her losses by emigration continue to be serious: 866,000 in the period 1900–1910; and nearly 1,300,000 in the next decade.

Canada is now working her way through a later period that has still too much of dependence upon the United States, according to her political leaders. For though Canada came into a period of rapid industrial and agricultural development at the turn of the century, she lacked capital for expansion in both these directions. But for the World War, her dependence upon British capital sources would have continued. At the outbreak of the war (1914), British investments totaled $2,500,000,000, while investments by the United States amounted to $700,000,000; but the rate of investment by United States bankers was increasing rapidly, and in the same period Americans were moving at an alarming rate across the border to settle in the Canadian Northwest. In the five years before the World War, more than a hundred thousand Americans had settled there. By 1920 the total American investments in Canada exceeded $1,300,000,000, while those from Great Britain barely held their own. By the end of 1927 the total of American investment was $3,000,000,000 and it is increasing at the rate of about $200,000,000 a year. Canadians own

but do not control more than 50 per cent of their industries. Owning their own land, having strong coöperative grain organizations, having purchased nearly 80 per cent of all dominion, provincial, and municipal bonds, and owning railways free from foreign influence, Canadians have been by no means bought out by the American investor.[1] It should also be remembered that these investments have gone into Canada because of the substantial character of her natural resources and the integrity of her people. These qualities cannot be alienated by the borrowing of money. To the extent to which invested money works, it supplies opportunities to Canadians themselves not only for a livelihood but for increasing capital reserves.

Expansion Within the Dominion

To understand the true position of Canada in relation to the United States one must take account of the manner in which the occupation and use of the land has paralleled American experience. In westward expansion, in the binding together of the extremes of the dominion, in advancing settlement on its distant frontiers, Canada has been a generation behind the United States. This has had disadvantages in the past, but it has brought many advantages to the present generation. There is still new land to be occupied, an opportunity to make new homes on the pioneer edge of settlement, raw materials are relatively abundant and cheap, the nation has become unified, and its political strength is unquestionably greater in proportion to its population than ever before. In commerce it reaches out to the West Indies, England, and the Orient, despite the disproportionately large part that the United States plays in Canadian industry and trade.

These are solid advantages, and not the least of them is the active colonization in progress on all Canadian frontiers. Land settlement took on a definite form only after 1869, when the federal authorities came to an understanding with the Hudson's Bay Company. Three

[1] The vast forest resources of Canada have placed her for the first time in her history in a position of high strategic advantage in trade agreements with the United States. Since 1910 Canada has prohibited the exportation of raw pulp wood cut from Crown lands; and as these lands embrace 92 per cent of all pulp wood stands, there is left little raw pulp wood for export. At least one process of manufacture must be gone through before Crown land pulp wood may be exported, and this means that only pulp may be exported from such lands, for the first process is the transformation of wood to pulp. About 90 per cent of the newsprint and other paper, the pulp wood, and the pulp production of Canada was exported to the United States in 1925, to take a single year. Canada has here a product that is of increasing value to the United States, where newspaper and magazine production is on a gigantic scale, as the magazine publishers of Canada know to their cost. Wood and paper exports from Canada to the United States in 1927 were valued at $242,000,000, or more than half the total of Canadian exports to the United States.

years later a system of land allocation went into effect, Ontario and Quebec having already adopted methods of their own to attract settlers. In 1908 the various laws framed in successive stages of land development were revised and coördinated, and substantially the regulations adopted at that time are in force today. After the World War a "Soldier Settlement Board" was established. Each soldier was entitled to a free grant of land and an advance in cash up to $2500. By the end of 1927 more than 38,000 soldiers were settled upon the land and 25,000 loans had been made, the total exceeding $110,000,000. Coincident with these post-war developments the Canadian Pacific Railway and the Hudson's Bay Company disposed of portions of their land holdings on more liberal terms. By way of encouraging Canadian land development and providing for the settlement of British emigrants within the empire, the two governments made a special agreement in August 1924. Canada has undertaken to provide suitable farms in established districts for selected families from the United Kingdom. It is too early to estimate the importance of this step in Canadian settlement.

It was in 1869, after confederation had gone into effect and Canada had adopted a definite land policy, that the first great stimulus was provided for the occupation of the relatively empty lands of the Canadian Northwest. Canada as a nation stretched from ocean to ocean, and the realization of her great future possibilities came to be a popular purpose. Scientific advances and exploration had dissipated the ignorance that long prevailed concerning the northward limit of the growth of cereals and other crops in the Canadian Northwest. The effect has been not merely to people the whole stretch of territory from Manitoba to the Rocky Mountains by a westward wave of migration, but to produce another wave that runs northward through half the extent of Canada from east to west. This direction of movement characterizes what may be called the third era in Canadian colonization, the first being the settlement of the East, the second of the Canadian Northwest and Far West. We see the northward movement not only in the Canadian Northwest but also in the belt of clay soils in northern Quebec and Ontario. Here are extensive belts of glacial and fluvio-glacial clays that are like oases in what may be called a desert of rock. In the Canadian Northwest the northward advance has been made conspicuous by the fact that cereals, particularly wheat, are grown in extremely high latitudes. It has been found that quick-maturing breeds of wheat can be grown almost as far north as rye and barley, thanks to the high summer temperature. An

advancing front of settlement has now occupied the land up to 53° north latitude; and in narrower bands and patches there is close settlement beyond 55° in the valley of the Peace River. Here in the period from 1911 to 1921 the population increased from 2000 to 20,000, and new settlers are still streaming into the region. Diversified farming in part offsets the occasional bad effects of untimely frosts and severe winter seasons.

Population Elements

Upon the northern frontier of the clay belt of Ontario and Quebec the French-Canadian is an active element. This migration is brought about by the meager resources and the limited extent of the land of his birth. The strip of old French-Canadian settlements along the St. Lawrence below Quebec is one of the most densely populated areas in Canada. An overflow has long taken place into New England, chiefly in the mill towns — Fall River, Lawrence, Lowell, New Bedford, Haverhill, Worcester. Of the 1,750,000 people of French-Canadian origin in the United States, three fourths are in New England, where they form one seventh of the population. The clay belt now absorbs a part of this St. Lawrence surplus. Lumbering, mining, and water-power development here represent the principal sources of income, and agriculture is in most instances next to impossible without them in the present stage of development of the region. This relation of agriculture to lumbering resembles a similar relation long maintained in New England. When terminated it set back agriculture in New England, for agricultural holdings and methods were often uneconomic. Communities and farms that could be maintained by combined agriculture and lumbering could not be maintained by agriculture alone. It is often said that this means that many farm clearings ought never to have been made; but the fact is that they were economical in their time, when lumber afforded an additional means of income. The settlements of the Canadian clay belt are now in an intermediate stage, although the deep soils suggest permanent agriculture even after lumbering has passed the peak of its development.

In the Canadian Northwest are both French-Canadians and people of old English stock, as well as whole communities of foreigners, such, for example, as the Ukrainians, who form a large and prosperous body with considerable voting power in the prairie provinces. *The Manitoba Free Press*, the leading newspaper of the Canadian Northwest, is said to devote more space to international affairs than any other Canadian paper — a reflection of the cosmopolitan population of the region.

It is only in British Columbia that Asiatic immigration is a vital issue, for out of some 58,000 Chinese in Canada, 38,000 are in this province. They are employed in the fruit, vegetable, and fish canneries, in coal mines, and in wood industries. They have invaded the retail trade, and in Vancouver and Victoria they own very considerable blocks of property. A large part of Vancouver's produce comes from Chinese farms.

The oriental population forms a part of the international problem of Canada but not of the domestic problem, like the agricultural settlers upon the frontier. Its presence has led to restrictive measures similar to those in force in the United States. In 1908 an agreement between Canada and Japan was made, restricting the number of laborers entering Canada from Japan to about four hundred a year. In 1922 British Columbia petitioned the Dominion Government for an amendment to the British North America Act, permitting British Columbia to prohibit the acquisition by orientals of proprietary interests in agricultural land, timber land, and fishing and other industries and prevent them from obtaining employment in certain industries. All but 1000 of the Japanese in Canada are in British Columbia. Similarly, of the 1200 British Indians in Canada, 1100 are in British Columbia. Orientals of whatever country are not permitted to vote. Both Chinese and Japanese have been included in coöperative agricultural enterprises, to which they have proved markedly loyal. Since orientals number one eighth of the total population of British Columbia, it is natural for the government of that province to take a serious view respecting further additions. On the problem of restricting the admission of orientals, Canada, the United States, and Australia think very much alike. This has brought a white solidarity in the Pacific realm that will affect international relations and treaties for a long time to come.

We have spoken of the large number of Americans who crossed the boundary into the Canadian Northwest and of what may be called a counter-current of French-Canadians moving into New England. The problem of population losses is of deepest significance to the people of the maritime provinces, where tens of thousands of vigorous young men and women have passed over the border to become citizens of the United States. Their young blood is lost to empire-building in the British scheme and to nation-building in the Canadian scheme. It is natural that people of exceptional vigor and intelligence should go where opportunities most abound. The effect has been to diminish the material prosperity and to lessen the rate of intellectual advance

of the regions of emigration, to the corresponding advantage of the United States.

The two contrasting streams of population movement emphasize the geographical deficiencies of Canada. Up to the time of confederation (1867), the adhesion of British Columbia to the rest of Canada was doubtful; it was persuaded to confederate only by the promise of a railroad connection with the East. That sectional division which has marked the history of the United States has operated in like manner in Canadian history and is so operating today. Not only does this make it difficult to find what has been called "a common denominator of public opinion"; it also tends to political seesawing, owing to the attempt of each region to gain special privileges. For example, the maritime provinces of Canada have suffered serious economic stagnation in the time that the pick of its young people have been drawn to the south. It results that the Canadian parliament has felt obliged to pass a series of measures to increase federal subsidies to the three Atlantic provinces, to give financial assistance to coking plants in Nova Scotia, and to transfer control of the ports of Halifax and St. Johns to harbor commissions. At the same time the agricultural West periodically complains that it is suffering economically as a result of policies intended to build up the industrialized East. Cutting across the regional divisions of the country is the line of division between urban and rural population, a line of increasing political importance because of the rapid growth of cities and city influence.

Present Relation between Canada and the United States

It is sometimes assumed that the thoroughgoing economic dependence of Canada upon the United States and the strong regional and racial differences from section to section tend to draw Canada to increasing degree within the political orbit of the United States. The intensity of the discussions on the reciprocity proposals of 1910 reflected this fear. The gravitative pull of the United States has been emphasized by the fact that it has always been natural for the separate units of Canada to trade region by region with the United States. In fact, it was in part to offset such regional trading that confederation was put through and transcontinental railway systems were built. But to think of Canada as a part of the United States is sheer fancy. Something very little understood in the United States is the continuance and growth of loyalist sentiment in Canada. The whole of Canadian political life has been colored by persistent loyalty to the

British Crown. There is also to be taken into account the activity of both British and Canadian imperialists themselves. The market aspect is still important to both. Canada has supplanted India as the empire's chief wheat-producing area. The Indian crop is smaller than before the World War; Canada's crop has doubled. A higher percentage of the wheat crop of Canada is exported; the Indian crop is now consumed chiefly at home. Canadians as a whole look upon their place within the British Empire as a much more important asset than union with the United States could be.

Between Canada and the United States, the relation of their boundary to trade is not nearly so important now, with smooth-working agreements, as is the equitable use of common resources upon it; as, for example, the waters of the Great Lakes for power and transportation and those of the Milk River and other streams for irrigation. It is true that boundary disputes in the past kept alive bitterness between sections of the population that remembered the confiscations and expulsions of the Revolutionary War. Similarly, the fisheries and the Bering fur seal dispute furnished sources of resentment; but war was never provoked, and resentment has not been permanent.

Happiest of all the arrangements between Canada and the United States is that put into effect in 1912 through the operation of the International Joint Commission. It has been said without exaggeration that the effect of the treaty creating this commission has been to erase the boundary and pool the resources of the United States and Canada (in the boundary region) for the benefit of the people on both sides. The navigation of all boundary waters is free and open to both countries, and this applies as well to all canals connecting boundary waters. The first claim upon water is for domestic and sanitary purposes, the second for navigation, and the third for power and irrigation. By Article 10 of the treaty it is possible to leave to the Commission any difference that may arise between the inhabitants of the two countries. Of twenty-five decisions made up to the present time by the Commission, all have been unanimous. The scope and economic importance of these decisions and of the treaty creating the Commission, and the strength of the sentiment behind it in both countries, are so great that the Commission has become one of the major international tribunals of our time.

At the present time, the St. Lawrence waterway project is receiving the full attention of engineers and statesmen upon both sides of the boundary. It is proposed to canalize the shallower sections of the St. Lawrence and thus, with the new and larger Welland Canal now

building, permit ocean-going vessels to steam to any part of the Great Lakes. The problem is complicated by the shallowing effect upon Canadian harbors owing to excessive diversion of lake water at Chicago by the Sanitary District authorities. The use of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway has grown so enormously and its importance to both the United States and Canada for ore and grain shipments is so great that its joint improvement is next to imperative. A decision on how to get it done and under what terms is one of the tasks confronting the Canadian legation at Washington, whose foundation is no less significant of Canada's altered status in the empire (pages 55 to 56) than of the ever closer and more beneficent relations subsisting between Canada and the United States.

THE COLONIAL SYSTEM

The dominions have a special point of contact with the home government, besides a direct relation to it. This is supplied by the colonies; all of the dominions, except the Irish Free State, have British colonies as neighbors. In view of Canada's close and important trade relations with Newfoundland and with the British West Indies, a consideration of the administration of these colonies is in point at this place.

Like the dominions, the British colonies have problems of a high order. These received special recognition in the first British Colonial Office Conference, held in London in May 1927. At the conference most of the non-self-governing colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories were represented. The conditions of government were an object of general attention. Discussion centered chiefly on technical and commercial agencies for the increase of production and the promotion of trade, the improvement of wireless communication, education, and the like.

At the opening of the conference the Secretary of State for the Colonies drew a distinction between the dominions and India on the one hand and the colonies on the other as to forms of government. The Colonial Office (page 54) has to deal with some thirty-six different governments, each entirely separate from the rest and each self-contained in matters of legislation, finance, and administration. Each is adapted to local conditions and on the whole sympathetic with the population it administers. Noteworthy are the undeveloped resources of the colonies and their trade, now exceeding $2\frac{1}{2}$ billion dollars a year and "doubling itself every few years." Equally noteworthy is the endless diversity of colonial problems, constitutional, economic, and cultural. This is better realized when we learn that their area is not

less than 2,000,000 square miles and that their population exceeds 50,000,000. Colonial diversity is owing in part to the fact that Great Britain's colonial empire is almost wholly tropical and subtropical, and is made up of populations mixed and in the main non-European and largely primitive.

Though the British colonial system appears to be haphazard and to lack coördination on any structural basis, the system of colonial conferences now contemplated will give an increasing measure of uniformity, at least in standards of administration if not in administrative practice. In addition it has been supplemented by local or regional conferences, such as the West Indies Customs Conference, the Railway Conference in West Africa in 1926, an Agricultural Conference in East Africa, and unofficial conferences of settlers from East African territories as well as the West Indian Colonial Conference in London in 1926.

NEWFOUNDLAND AND ITS FISHERIES

Though Newfoundland is a crown colony, it has had since 1855 a degree of self-government equal to that enjoyed by the British dominions. Perhaps nowhere else in the British Empire is the relation of a British possession to the mother country so universally approved. Not only is Newfoundland proud of that relation but the pride is deep seated. This feeling springs from its status as the first British settlement in the New World to be authorized by the Crown, from its geographical position and maritime interests, and also from the large amount of overseas trade with the mother country. Just as New Zealand emphasizes its separateness from Australian interests by disapproving of the word "Australasia" because it submerges the New Zealand individuality, so Newfoundland desires the world to know that it is not a part of Canada, in either a political or an economic sense. In geographical position it has special distinction: from it to Ireland is the shortest distance across the North Atlantic. The fact was of importance in the early explorations of North America and more especially in the subsequent development of fishing interests on a great scale, not only on the Great Banks but on lesser banks off the northeastern coast of North America and in the fishing waters of the maritime provinces of Canada. Here came Portuguese, French, and British fishermen in small vessels that made the stormy and hazardous crossing each season. In later times transatlantic cable and wireless stations took advantage of the nearness of Newfoundland to Ireland,



FIG. 18. Location map of Newfoundland and Labrador, showing the new boundary with Quebec. The "French Shore" is represented by the shaded portion of the coast extending from Cape St. John (northeast) to Cape Ray (southwest). From map, 1927, by Natural Resources Intelligence Service, Department of the Interior, Dominion of Canada.

and the first airplane passages across the Atlantic followed the same historic route.

The whole of Newfoundland history and modern economic life is stamped with a special character given by its basic industry, the cod fishery. Fishing as a source of livelihood occupies 38 per cent of the population, or more than 100,000 out of a total population of nearly 260,000. As high a percentage of population is engaged in fishing in Newfoundland as is engaged in agriculture in the United States. This means not only a history marked by local laws affecting fishing rights and privileges, but a group of highly important treaties and conventions with foreign countries respecting those rights.

The earliest fishing industry was based upon ships and crews that went out for summer fishing. The fish were salted and dried on shore, and when winter came the fishermen returned to England. They discouraged settlement of the country, describing it as unfit for human occupation, because they wished to retain the harbors, coves, and fishing grounds for catching and curing fish. The fishing waters were regarded as a national preserve, the island as a great English ship moored near the Banks for the convenience of English fishermen, and the industry as a school for English seamen. Only in the 18th century was the settlement of the country in any way encouraged. Even at the present time there are few farms more than three or four miles from the coast, a limitation of settlement not to the most favored parts but to the accessible parts. The extension of the railway system is the first condition of interior settlement.

The close dependence of Newfoundland's economic life upon fisheries means the high development of foreign trade. A quarter of a million people with an annual foreign trade of about $60,000,000 is unique. Take by comparison Panama with 440,000 people and a total foreign commerce of but $16,800,000. The per capita share of the foreign trade of Newfoundland is $213, while the corresponding figures in 1926 for the United States, Argentina, South Africa, and Belgium are $77, $160, $110, and $150 respectively. (Iceland, 1923, $238.)

The distribution of Newfoundland trade is surprisingly wide, dried codfish being the leading export item. The United Kingdom is first in importance with $7,000,000 worth in 1924–1925. The United States and Spain are next in order with $2,700,000 each; then follow Portugal $1,900,000, Canada $1,700,000, Italy $1,650,000, Brazil $1,400,000, British West Indies $1,375,000, The Netherlands $1,330,000.

Like Canada, Newfoundland has forests of great value and especially accessible in the northeastern and western parts of the

country. The export of unmanufactured pulp wood is prohibited, except under special conditions. Industries are limited to the extractive type and depend upon the fisheries, the forests, and the mines. There are ample water-power resources for the expansion of industry, and raw materials are not lacking. Especially important are the reserves of iron ore. While there is but one coal field of considerable economic value, the Cape Breton mines in Nova Scotia are sufficiently near to form a base of supplies should industry expand in the future.

The large percentage of the population engaged in fishing, the almost complete dependence of the foreign trade upon the export of fish products, naturally mean the greatest concern on the part of Newfoundlanders for rights affecting the fishing industry. This is seen clearly in the "shore treaties" with the French. By the treaty of Utrecht (1713), and as confirmed and further defined in the treaty of Paris (1763), French fishermen were to be permitted to catch fish and dry them on land along a stretch of Newfoundland coast thereafter commonly called "the French Shore." It extends from Cape St. John northward and down the west coast to Cape Ray (Fig. 18). In addition, France was allowed to keep the two islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon (and adjacent islets) as fishing stations. There have been repeated disputes between the French and British in the interpretation of the treaties and over the regulations of Newfoundland with respect to the use of the shore.

A dispute arose also between Newfoundland and the United States over the fishing privileges enjoyed by American fishermen in Newfoundland waters. The case had its beginnings in early colonial times, when the fishermen of Massachusetts and other New England states were accustomed to resort to the fishing grounds and felt themselves possessed of a claim to them. In order to enjoy a continuation of these rights, the plenipotentiaries of the United States, when they made peace with Great Britain in 1783 at the close of the Revolutionary War, reserved American fishing rights in those waters without limitation of distance from shore, except that American fishermen were not permitted to dry and cure their fish on the island of Newfoundland. There was serious trouble following the War of 1812, and only in 1818 were American fishermen again given a definite status, through new treaty rights, to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbors, and creeks of the southern coast of Newfoundland and on the coast of Labrador; these rights, however, were terminable when a given district came to be permanently settled. All other shore rights elsewhere in British territory were given up, not

only on shore but within three marine miles of coasts, bays, and creeks. The sole reservations related to shelter, the repair of damages, the purchase of wood, and the acquisition of water.

When Newfoundland's regulations began to press upon American fishermen early in the present century, a dispute arose that was referred to The Hague Tribunal (1909). The award, rendered in 1910, affirmed the rights of Great Britain, Canada, or Newfoundland, as sovereigns of the territory in question, to make regulations without the consent of the United States as to the exercise of the liberty to take fish. On the other hand, it asserted that the exercise of that right was limited by treaty and therefore that regulation must be *reasonable*. To help carry out the award a mixed commission of experts was appointed, forming a permanent mixed fishery commission.

An illustration of the importance of fisheries in the relations of Newfoundland to its neighbor is the dispute between Newfoundland and Canada respecting their common boundary in the Labrador territory. By a royal proclamation of 1763 creating the Province of Quebec, the boundaries of the province were fixed on the Labrador coast and the River St. John, and the Canadians claimed that the coast of Labrador should be interpreted as a strip of land a mile wide, measuring from high-water level. Newfoundland claimed that the term should be interpreted to mean all that territory lying between the shore and the watershed from Cape Chidley as far south as the 52d degree of north latitude, thence east to a point due north of the eastern boundary of Anse Sablon Bay. By decision of the Privy Council at London in 1926 substantially all of Newfoundland's claims were upheld. Thus Newfoundland has obtained title to territory with a total area of 100,000 square miles, of which 30,000 square miles have timber of commercial value. Besides this there are resources of water power, furs, and minerals of unknown extent.

THE EXAMPLE OF THE WEST INDIES

The British West Indian possessions are of special political interest because they are the largest and most widely dispersed among western possessions of European powers. They are of special economic interest because of the great concentration of population in small areas and the high value of their tropical products cheaply transported by sea.

The West Indian colonies of Great Britain are distributed throughout an area which for thirty years has proved to be of increasing importance to the United States. Their interest to Americans springs first from

their relation to the scheme of naval defense that centers upon the Panama Canal, and second their commercial relations with the United States on the one hand and with Great Britain and Canada on the other.

During the 17th and 18th centuries West Indian possessions were of great importance in the eyes of European countries, chiefly because of their production of sugar. So highly prized was this product to a civilization that had just acquired a taste for it that an importance was attached to tropical lands, capable of sugar production, out of all proportion to their subsequent worth. With a huge increase in the production of beet sugar, supported by government bounty in many instances, the commercial importance of the West Indies declined. In recent years, with the reorganization of the tropical sugar industry through better methods and machinery, the value of West Indian lands has again risen. Further stimulation has been supplied throughout the whole Caribbean area by the modern highly specialized and now widely extended fruit production and trade. With the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 the whole Caribbean region received a vitalizing shock, and all possessions focusing upon that waterway or related to it had thereafter greatly increased importance.

It is instructive to see in what way Great Britain has managed her



Fig. 19. The ring of British possessions in the Caribbean region. Based on map in the *Geographical Review*, Vol. 16, 1926.

colonial possessions in the West Indies, because the people who inhabit them are extremely diverse, the islands are widely separated, and their natural connections are with distant countries rather than with each other. Moreover, they came into the empire under widely different conditions and are now governed under most diverse forms. British Honduras had government by public meeting for a time. British Guiana, conquered in 1803, has a curious form of constitution inherited from the Dutch occupation. Barbados, settled by the English in 1626, still has almost unchanged the constitution granted to it by Charles I. Here are eight separate colonial groups, if we include British Guiana and exclude the Leeward Islands Federation, each with its own expensive paraphernalia of government, and each with its own tariff and trade regulations drafted to fit the peculiar and often narrow needs of the individual colony, without — until recently, at least — any consideration of the group as a whole.

The most serious difficulty to overcome in any scheme of British West Indian confederation is the wide separation of the colonies. Jamaica is distant from the nearest British possessions in the Lesser Antilles by nearly a thousand miles. Between different islands there is often no direct steamship service. Even in the existing federation of the Leeward Islands and the Windward Islands, the officials are faced with many practical difficulties because of the lack of good communications. There is no large volume of intercolonial trade to support intercolonial steamship services. The sea tends to divide rather than unite the separate communities. As much diversity exists in political and social opinion as in physical features and climate. There is even a distinct movement for defederation of the Leeward Islands.

Efforts to Stimulate Trade of British Possessions in the Caribbean

In spite of the difficulties in the way, the colonies see the value of coöperation and have sought means of federation. But no great headway has been made because of the reluctance of the several colonies to yield to a central government any of the autonomous rights which they now enjoy. As a result of the long struggle for existence in the days of colonization local traditions developed, and close adherence to them prevents that give-and-take so necessary to successful federation.

In recent years, however, there have been many conferences of the Caribbean colonies to treat of matters of common interest, and they have had excellent results. In 1916 a West Indian Court of Appeals

was established for the colonies east of Jamaica. A College of Tropical Agriculture, to the support of which all the colonies contribute, has been established on the island of Trinidad. A quarantine convention has been arranged. The Customs Conference of 1919 resulted in the adoption of uniformity of definition and arrangement of West Indian tariffs. A West Indian Chamber of Commerce has been formed. Perhaps the most important of these conferences were the three held at Ottawa in the ten years before 1925, between representatives from the Caribbean colonies and the Canadian government, at which reciprocal trade agreements were signed. The last of these was held 7 July 1925, at which thirty delegates from the colonies agreed to a "Canada-British West Indies-Bermuda-British Guiana-British Honduras Trade Agreement" (valid for twelve years). It increased tariff preferences (a 50 to 75 per cent rate is now in force on some Canadian goods and, in exchange, a low rate or free entry is accorded West Indian goods) and provided by subsidization and otherwise for improved steamship service between Canada and the West Indies. "The trade agreement with the West Indies . . . is the greatest treaty so far as the maritime provinces are concerned that has ever been entered into by Canada since confederation," said an enthusiastic member of Parliament from New Brunswick (1925). He saw the West Indies as a field for overseas trade that would remove the handicap of competition with the manufacturers of Ontario in their home market.

In May 1926 a West Indian Conference of representatives from all the British Caribbean colonies and British Guiana was held at London for the express purpose of considering the establishment of a Standing Conference to deal with the common affairs of these colonies and the drafting of a constitution for it. The report of the conference discusses the number and selection of representatives; offers a list of subjects falling within the scope of the conference; suggests that the meetings be held at intervals of eighteen or thirty months alternately in London and in one of the larger colonies; provides for a permanent secretary to be appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies; and arranges for procedure and costs. Finally, it expresses the hope that at some future time the Caribbean colonies may have representation in the Imperial Conference, since their regional problems are now important enough to warrant placing them on a new footing in the imperial scheme. Thus the ground has been broken, and the ultimate result may be expected to be some sort of federation — not a single federation, perhaps, but separate federations for those colonies that fall into natural groups.

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Among more distant possessions of the empire, the question of local government in relation to British sovereignty is always colored by problems of race and often of religion and land tenure as well. In these respects South Africa presents complications of as serious import as those encountered in any other part of the empire. While the retention of South Africa in the imperial scheme is now assured, it must not be supposed that either British or South African problems end there. The treatment of Indians and blacks and the mode of exploitation of minerals and land, as well as the geographical situation of the several parts of the Union, are problems that continue to divide the councils of government.

In her development of the resources of South Africa and in her efforts to strengthen her political and military control of its populations, England found herself confronted with three prime difficulties:

(1) The richest regions had long been occupied by native blacks, who constituted a dense population fringing the eastern coast and the border of the adjacent highlands.

(2) The land unoccupied by natives had been largely acquired by the Boers, or settlers of Dutch descent.

(3) The distances that had to be covered were so great and the means of transportation so feeble that English control of the region was at first only nominal.

When England first became interested in South Africa as a way station on one of her imperial roads, she found the region in the hands of the Dutch. In 1806, during the Napoleonic wars, Great Britain occupied Cape Colony, and the Congress of Vienna formally recognized her position there. By 1820 a fairly large stream of English emigration to South Africa had begun. The development of gold and diamond mining in South Africa thereafter led to a heavy investment of capital and a natural stimulation of white settlement. Parallel with these developments went the displacement of both natives and Boers or — what amounted to the same thing — the extension of English political control. Treaties were made with the native chiefs establishing new conditions of trade, and thus control came to be extended over millions of blacks along the eastern border of the territory. But the Boers were determined to keep to themselves. They moved farther and farther north as English colonists came in. They reached

FIG. 20. British possessions in Africa, and the Cape-to-Cairo Railway. Except for a short section southwest of Albertville, the railway is completed from Cape Town to Lake Tanganyika. The principal unfinished section is in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. British possessions in Africa that were held before 1914 are stippled; those gained as a result of the World War are crosslined. Because its independence is limited by Great Britain, a distinctive shading on the map is employed to set off Egypt. To permit ready comparison of French and British African territories, heavy lines are drawn about French possessions or where French and other possessions join. The same scheme is followed in Figure 52, page 184.

Lake Ngami at the northern edge of the Kalahari Desert, whence considerable numbers of them "trekked" still farther northward, into the interior of central Africa, cutting across the grasslands to the edge of the tropical forest, and westward almost to the Atlantic coast in Angola (Portuguese West Africa).

The journeyings of some of these early Boer colonists occupied years, and their settlements were temporary, being maintained only

until news came of richer prospects ahead. The largest compact body settled permanently in the Transvaal, the country north of the Vaal River. They regarded this as their own country, one in which discriminatory laws could justifiably be framed to the disadvantage of the foreigner.

Naturally the English felt that the ensuing contest was not so much for political ownership as for equality of commercial opportunity, since the Boer republics frankly sought to keep out the British trader. By the middle of the 19th century, relations between English and Boers had settled down to a bitter struggle for mastery. After the Jameson raid (December 1895 to January 1896) and other less important episodes, came the Boer War, 1899–1902. There were heavy losses on both sides, and altogether the victory was an expensive and disheartening enterprise for Great Britain. The general rejoicing in England at the close of the war was exceptional in that it took note merely of the end of a struggle, not the achievement of victory. Probably no war was ever more unpopular.

The world has seen no more remarkable feat than the one that English and Boer leaders achieved at the close of the Boer War. Sincerely trying to forget former hostility and bitterness, both sides adopted a policy of conciliation and coöperation. The Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, consisting of Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Orange River Colony, and Transvaal. General Botha, who had been fighting the British less than ten years before, became the first premier of the new dominion, with a cabinet composed entirely of Boers.

Since then, political and economic problems have been squarely faced. Whatever their differences, most English and Boer leaders have determined to get on together. During the World War, South Africa played a notable part. General Botha's army invaded and conquered German Southwest Africa. A long and eventually successful campaign ensued in German East Africa. But it was not chiefly of the British Empire that South Africans were thinking. It was the consolidation of a nation that they sought, and German East Africa and German Southwest Africa were regarded as a menace to the security of the Union rather than the empire. Naturally, South Africa was opposed to the return of these colonies to Germany, and early in February 1921 the Council of the League of Nations approved the terms of a mandate whereby German Southwest Africa is administered by the Union of South Africa. Since then the Union government has made ever-increasing claims to ultimate, rather than

temporary or conditional sovereignty, not accepting merely an idealistic rôle as a mandatory power.

Even before federation (1910), the colonies of South Africa disagreed with each other over customs arrangements, railways, legislation respecting native black labor, and immigration from India. The Transvaal government favored the foreign port of Lourenço Marques (Portuguese) rather than Cape Town and Durban (British). Fearing the effects of education and industrialization upon the natives, the Boers wished to keep the blacks "in their place." They believed they had Biblical authority for a degree of black inferiority that implied servitude. They bitterly opposed the English view that blacks and whites should be treated upon a basis of approximate equality. An article included in the constitutions of the Boer republics (Transvaal and Orange Free State) announced: "In Church and State there is no equality between black and white." Opposed to this was the English principle of "equal rights for all civilized men."

The disposition of whites by political divisions is as follows:

White Inhabitants in the Union of South Africa
(Census of 1926)

Political Division	White Population	Increase over 1921	Density per Sq. Mi.
Cape of Good Hope . .	706,137	8.5%	2.6
Natal	158,916	16. %	4.5
Transvaal	608,622	12. %	5.5
Orange Free State . .	202,985	7.5%	4.1
[Southwest Africa . . .	24,115	24.1%	.074]
	1,700,775		

In contrast to the small total of 1,700,000 whites is the large total of 5,000,000 blacks in the Union of South Africa. The maintenance of the ideal of a white man's country is difficult to carry out in the face of this appalling disproportion. Nor will time ameliorate the white man's lot, for the percentage of poor whites is increasing. The old style pioneer, or trek Boer, practised extensive rather than intensive farming. He roved for roving's sake, and in his migratory life he lost even the tradition of learning. With the country more fully occupied, the ignorant farmer is pushed to the wall; and the more prosperous farmers refuse to employ poor whites when natives are available at a fraction of the cost. Partly this is a matter of economy, partly it is owing to the low mentality of the poor whites; then again,

the poor whites themselves disdain "kaffir work." Relief has only left them still further weakened in character, and their attempted settlement upon agricultural tracts has been in most cases a failure. The standard of white wages is very difficult to maintain, especially in unskilled lines. Whatever measures have been taken against it, it is a fact that the employment of colored labor is gaining in factories and mines, in general 50 per cent more rapidly than the white. This figure is the more significant when we consider that not the total white population, but the occupied or employed whites, represent the critical number. They are less than a half million, and the bulk of them lies far below the income level of the members of the leading trade unions. It is the improvement in earning capacity of this great mass of people that is the first object of the present economic and political policies of the government.

The race problem in South Africa is intensified for those whites who have permanent homes there because of the fact that nearly as many Europeans have left the Union of South Africa in recent years as have entered it. In addition, the white population has come in largely as a result of the expenditure of large capital sums in opening up mines and developing railway and harbor works. These improvements the gold discoveries demanded and largely paid for. Now that regular mining development is under way, with a diminishing margin of profit, the tendency is to employ fewer whites in order to earn dividends. Various remedies have been proposed. One is to make the employment of white labor compulsory in certain industries; another is to select lands suitable for white occupation and for specialized crops. In any event, it is not at all certain that the white race can maintain itself under normal conditions throughout most of South Africa, at least in lines of primary production. Either the whites have capital in considerable quantity, employ black labor, and maintain a high standard of living, or they have no capital and tend to drop down to the lowest social and economic levels.

In seeking to make South Africa a white man's land the Union government has encouraged the economic development of the country. Geological explorations have been carried forward to the point of making known the varied mineral wealth of South Africa; but it happens that the white man's lands, that is, those that have sufficient elevation to make them cool enough for men of the white race, are in great part too dry for normal agriculture.

More than 65 per cent of the country has less than 20 inches of rainfall and half of this acreage has less than 10 inches. In the critical

FIG. 21. The political divisions and plant regions of South Africa. The position of the 10-inch and 20-inch rainfall lines should be compared with the railways and cities shown in Figure 20. From *The Guide to South and East Africa*, 1916, map opp. p. 101, supplemented by Bews, *The Grasses and Grasslands of South Africa*, 1918. Only the 10-inch and 20-inch rainfall lines are shown; for the location of belts of heavier rainfall in the east see A. D. Lewis, "Rainfall Normals . . . ," Cape Town, 1927. Nearly 73 per cent of the Union of South Africa has less than 25 inches of rainfall annually.

months of August, September, and October there is little rain, and in 90 per cent of the area irrigation is the necessary condition of agriculture. The number of rivers is small, the run-off limited, and the topographic conditions unfavorable to the development of large irrigation schemes. Only in the south and east, where the coastal zones have sufficient rainfall for most crops, is there no anxiety about water supply. The distribution of rainfall from year to year is quite unequal, so that destructive droughts occur from time to time, as in all lands of limited rainfall. Such a drought occurred in 1903 and again in 1918–1919. During the latter drought direct losses were estimated at not less than £16,000,000. The losses from drought in 1926–1927 totaled £3,000,000. In earlier years, dryness affected grazing grounds that were in a natural state. Today it affects veld that is overstocked, trampled, and hardpacked by sun and fire. The vegetative cover has been eroded. River floods are more frequent.

In the eastern and southern coastal strips agricultural and industrial development could be greatly developed if the run-off were regulated,

forest growth encouraged, and the water power developed. Here in a belt of mountain and upland country near the coast is a rainfall exceeding 40 inches a year. The extent of the better favored country is 1000 miles in length and at least 15 miles wide. In time it may be expected to become a center of industry in the manufacture of raw materials of tropical East Africa. Throughout the dry veld country where grazing is the principal industry a large number of deep wells have been drilled, and these furnish the water necessary for stock, thus greatly extending the range of South African herds. Comprehensive irrigation schemes have been developed to reclaim part of the desert land of South Africa; but irrigation is only a local expedient: it is never capable of turning a whole desert into arable land. The recovery of ground water likewise provides only a local remedy.

Parallel with the troubles between blacks and whites run the difficulties between white and Indian laborers. British Indians consider themselves possessed of peculiar rights in East Africa and South Africa because they have from time immemorial engaged in active trade between India and the east coast of Africa. They came under British protection in 1808 (when the British East Africa company was granted a royal charter), partly for the reason that it would better the commercial interests of British India to have Indians in Africa under British auspices. Considerable numbers of them were first brought in about fifty years ago as indentured laborers on sugar and tea plantations.

In South Africa alone there are now 150,000 Indians, and this number presents a problem not through immigration but by its own high birth-rate. They have persisted in raising questions that have had the active support of political leaders in India. The Asiatic Trade and Land Act of 1919, designed to settle the question, only further aroused the indignation of Indian subjects. They resented the restriction upon property ownership in the Transvaal no less than the non-issuance of trading licenses (after 1 May 1919). To give Indians a better status, a round table conference was held at Cape Town in December 1926 and January 1927. Then for the first time India entered into direct negotiations with a dominion without the intervention of the home government. The conference resulted in the decision not to proceed with the Areas Reservation Bill introduced into the Union Parliament in July 1925, which provided for the segregation of the Indian community in each town and for rigid restrictions upon rights to acquire fixed property and to trade. The Union government requested the appointment of an agent of the government of India with which it might deal in treating Indian questions in the

future, and promised assistance for the uplift of Indian communities. South Africans have always maintained that they cannot treat the Indians on even terms with the whites because the Indians do not adopt western standards of living, their sanitary conditions are poor, and increasing unemployment is general. The Indians insist they cannot be treated like the natives, and the whites of European descent are not prepared to recognize three distinct civilizations — European, Indian, and Native. Compared with the 320,000,000 Indians in India, those in South Africa are a handful, and if their numbers are restricted and a form of assisted emigration is worked out so that larger numbers may return to India, the question will be less acute than it is today.

By so much as the stream of colored labor is increased will the stream of white immigrants be diminished. The process of black or Indian displacement of white population is therefore self-stimulating. While the effect of colored immigration in the large cities is socially and morally deplorable, it is not confined to the cities but presses upon the European laborer in the veld, in gold mining, cattle farming, and the cultivation of maize. There is a large Indian population on virtually all plantations owned by white men. In the vicinity of the Indian quarter in the towns of Pietermaritzburg, Dundee, and Ladysmith, residence property has diminished in value and some European firms have been rendered bankrupt.

Confronted with so many perplexing problems and divided into political parties in violent opposition to each other, the government of the Union of South Africa has operated on a very small majority since the World War. First was the government of General Smuts, who as leader of the South African party advanced three main principles as the basis of national unity and security:

(1) The maintenance of South Africa's place in the British Empire as opposed to complete independence.
(2) Fair and hearty coöperation between the various branches of the white race, particularly the Boers and the English.
(3) Concentration of the national energies upon a policy of industrial development.

In 1926 General Herzog, who had become premier in the meantime, and who is the leader of the powerful Nationalist party which stood for disunion and a narrow racial policy, seemed about to carry South Africa out of the empire. At this critical juncture came the Imperial Conference of 1926 and the reorganization of the British Empire, if we may so term the changes that took place (page 54). Satisfied

FIG. 22. Zones of altitude and railway connections in Rhodesia. From the *Geographical Review*, Vol. 17, January, 1927.

by the new form of association within the empire, Herzog declared that South Africa could leave the question of separation from the British Empire to the future. In the view of the leaders of the Nationalist party there is no longer any question of superiority by the London government over the dominions, each dominion now being left free to develop its own institutions and to a large extent its own policies. South Africans of whatever descent can now unite in advancing the interests of South Africa, retaining affection for Great Britain if they are of English descent, or giving exclusive allegiance to the South African Union if they are of Dutch descent. In any event, Herzog's declaration since the Imperial Conference has diminished the force of the notion among the Dutch that they are the real South Africans and all others are intruders — one of the root causes of the racial enmities of past years.

RHODESIA

Northern and Southern Rhodesia owe their existence to the genius of Cecil Rhodes, who in 1889 organized the British South Africa Company for the purpose of developing concessions in what was to be called Matabeleland and Mashonaland. Though this was a private trading enterprise the government, in face of a native rebellion (1896–1897), sent troops into the region. Bearing upon further settlement was the Boer War of 1899 to 1902, since this made the country better known to many of the young men of the volunteer corps, who turned pioneers.

Until 1923 Northern and Southern Rhodesia were governed by the British South Africa Company. It developed the region partly by the investment of large sums of money; and to avoid making this a charge upon the small number of whites inhabiting the country when a colonial status was granted, the railroads and likewise certain land tracts and mineral rights were left in Company hands. Southern Rhodesia voted in 1922 for responsible government and now has a governor, a council, and a legislative assembly. Northern Rhodesia was similarly constituted in 1924, except that there is still no legislative assembly. The population of Southen Rhodesia is more than 840,000 (40,000 white); of Northern Rhodesia, 1,145,000 (4600 white).

Figure 22, which gives the distribution of land above 3000 feet and again above 5000 feet, shows that there is an extensive zone between the lowlands of the Limpopo on the one side and the Zambezi River on the other in which the white man may find a congenial home.

The rivers on either side have cut deep valleys, on the borders of which one may pass from temperate to tropical conditions with sharp dividing lines between. But only on the valley floors are there tropical conditions the year round. The mean annual rainfall is more than 28 inches, increasing toward the east to 40 inches, diminishing on the west to 15 inches. Droughts are less frequent than in South Africa, and water is not difficult to obtain from wells.

In Rhodesia the settlement of the country is closely related to the native question. There are more than 800,000 natives in Southern Rhodesia, of which 516,000 live on reserves, 151,000 on white men's farms, 122,000 on unalienated government land, and 25,000 in compounds attached to municipalities. The native reserves include more than 20,000,000 acres of land, and here natives live under a sort of communal tenure. The methods of agriculture are primitive, and some of the reserves will not long be adequate for the population. They must be enlarged, or the native must be given the right to acquire other land by purchase, or the output of the land must be increased by improved water supplies and better methods of cultivation. While the native population is increasing constantly, it is not increasing in greater ratio than the white. The recent studies of a commission on native lands has recommended that the European territory should embrace about 62 per cent of the total area and the native about 37 per cent.

Trade unions are active in order to keep up the standard of living of the white workingman, who falls in a class between the native proletariat and the white aristocracy which owns the large plantations and ranches. In Rhodesia, where large supplies of raw labor are available, it is impossible for the newly arrived immigrant to support himself by either skilled or unskilled labor until he has learned the country and has accumulated a little capital with which to become a landowner or an employer. This in turn slows down the rate of increase of the white population by immigration. In order to prevent the growth of a poor white class the Rhodesian government admits no immigrant who does not have employment guaranteed him or £50 for his own use. An additional factor in slowing down immigration is the high cost of the railway journey from Cape Town to Rhodesia. As a result the government recommends that the incoming farmer-settler should have a minimum capital of £2000.

The problem of transport is of first importance in the development of Northern and Southern Rhodesia (Fig. 22) as well as of South Africa. All streams of consequence are broken at the plateau border by

immense falls or rapids. It is true that railways have conquered physical obstacles; but as in all pioneer countries the cost of railway transportation is so high that primitive methods of transport are still employed, and they too are expensive. One sees this elsewhere in the world — in Australia, throughout the Central Andean country of South America, in Matto Grosso, Brazil — no less than in South Africa and Rhodesia. In the last-named country, where land was opened and colonized by ox-wagon, this still remains the cheapest form of transport for many regions and the only one in some. Even this mode of transport is not possible north and east of Rhodesia on the Zambezi and the Portuguese frontier, where cattle cannot survive because of the tsetse fly. Despite the 1250 miles of railway, the country is still badly hampered because of its difficult transport conditions. Twenty-five miles represents the outer limit of an economic or effective cotton and grain growing zone. The question of cheap transport must be solved by improving low-priced roads, constructing bridges, building motor roads through critical belts of land or population, and overcoming the present difficulty of floods along the railway to the port of Beira in Portuguese East Africa. Such indirect ways of assisting land settlement are by all odds better than the direct subsidization of settlement, as some have ventured to urge. By maintaining high standards of quality in agricultural and pastoral production, — the mainstay of the country apart from gold, chrome, asbestos, and coal, — the handicap of the long haul to the coast may be partly offset. This as well as other problems of development require a government that is progressive and above all scientific in its point of view. A highly organized rather than a densely populated community is the aim of Rhodesia's most intelligent leaders.

For both Northern and Southern Rhodesia, as for Nyasaland and the British possessions in East Africa (Fig. 20), the question of confederation will inevitably be raised again as in the immediate past. Here is an interior empire with outlets southward through the Union of South Africa and eastward upon the Indian Ocean. A third connection, that with the Belgian Congo and the rich mineral area in its southern border where Northern Rhodesia joins, is of no small advantage with improving transport facilities. How mutual benefits may be derived through confederation, while regional advantages are kept, is the problem confronting those imperially minded administrators who think only in round terms. That all have some problems in common is true, but conference (as in 1924) may guide solutions as surely as confederation.

THE INDIAN EMPIRE

It is the trade of India that gives that densely populated peninsula its chief importance to Great Britain. For some years the British exports to India have been greater than to any other country. India is now at the beginning of industrial development and the machinery for that development with respect both to material and to organization can be supplied by Great Britain to her great advantage. Related to trade is the service of transport that maintains it, and this means employment for men engaged in running ships, in building and repairing them, and in all the collateral shore services that shipping requires or implies. Finally, there is the relation of India to the Far East, a trading realm of vast extent and great potentiality.

Some of the historical relations of so important a dependency are especially noteworthy. Under the Portuguese, in the early years of the 16th century, there was developed a trading and governmental system which first brought European wares and political ambitions into the Indian field. Later came the East India Company, which was organized at London in 1600. The Portuguese were easily displaced, and the Dutch were driven to concentrate their efforts in the East Indies. The French, however, offered a more effective resistance, and a long struggle was waged that finally resulted (1760) in victory for the English company. During the hundred years that followed, the East India Company gradually lost its valuable monopolies, and after the Company had proved itself incapable of handling the great revolt of 1857 (the Sepoy Rebellion), Parliament assumed full control of the government of India.

The problem of England is twofold — to control the 320 millions of India and to develop British trade, both to be done in such a manner as to keep the peace. For India has always been a difficult country to dominate. Alexander the Great reached it in 327 B.C., but his empire did not endure. Many later invasions took place across the northern frontier, especially in the long interval between the 7th and the 18th centuries: there came Mohammedans, congregated chiefly in the northern part; Persians and Afghans, the latter waging an almost continual border warfare; and Turks, who sought to extend their power over the masses of India and of China as well. In large measure India absorbed the invader. With the British, however, this was not true: they came for trade, not for settlement.

As in so many of the protected regions of the world, the question is one not merely of trade, but of order. Many of the most progressive



FIG. 23. The importance of the monsoon rains is suggested by the denser populations of the eastern and western coasts; and the Ganges valley is marked by a population density greater than that found in all but a few other regions in the world. After Bartholomew, *Advanced Atlas of Physical and Political Geography*, 1924.

and intelligent Indians believe that were Great Britain to leave India to her fate, the land would fall into disorder and there would be rivers of blood. For when India ruled herself, there was incessant warfare between her many local rulers; each one sought an extension of his realm and an increase of power; intrigue, bribery, and war followed in logical sequence. Under British rule the country has been in the main peaceful. As in Egypt, there is a nationalist movement, directed against the British. Its followers wish to see Great Britain driven out and native rule restored.

Disorder in India is a particularly grave matter, since it affects not only the control of the country but also the distribution of food and the whole modern system of trade that has become established there. India now has 71,000 square miles of irrigated land, and the irrigation works require coöperative control and an orderly government. Were the railroads and the irrigation works, the ports, and the whole

machinery of commercial life to be disorganized, India would be ripe for a great disaster. The famines of the past would be repeated, millions would be killed by starvation and war as in China today (page 601), and misery and anarchy would spread from India to adjacent lands. If an Indian policy can be developed that will give autonomy to the local Indian governments, fair treatment to the natives, and an equitable distribution of the profits of business enterprise among natives and foreigners, there will follow a better state of affairs than could be obtained under the rule of rival princes.

The contrasts among the peoples of India are very great. The differences of caste and race are too extreme to permit any real unity of the population for a long time to come. But what is of more present practical interest, the diversities are so great that there is no such thing as general public opinion. Each section of the country, each part of a religious sect, each caste, has its own ideas and has no respect for those of another. The contrasts and animosities of feeling could not be more marked if the various groups were separated by great distances and lived under quite different conditions. "India" is not in their minds when they find fault with British rule; they think only of the autonomy of their own district. The population has grown so large and varied that breadth of view is required to govern it; yet in the very period of most rapid growth Indians have kept their paralyzing provincialism.

The contrasts between the different races, languages, and religions of India have been increased through a long history involving many different kinds and degrees of civilization. Moreover, the people are agricultural, three fourths of them living in villages of less than 2000. In general, the better types live in the cooler regions of the north. The moister the climate, the denser the population and the greater the ignorance. Climate and physical environment, as well as racial and religious characteristics, have produced a degree of diversity almost incomprehensible. India's 320,000,000 people are composed of 45 different races speaking 170 languages and divided into 2400 tribes or castes. They are scattered over an area almost half as large as Europe.

Of the total population, 217 millions are Hindus, and 60 millions of them are members of the so-called "depressed classes." The latter form the lowest grade of inhabitants in the country. Many of them are outcasts doing the lowest and most menial work; others have kept their freedom by living in the mountains, in the deserts, in the forests. All of them bitterly hate the high-caste Hindus, or Brahmans (14,000,000). With the coming of the British, the rivalries which had formed



FIG. 24. Religions of India. The widespread effects of the caste system of the Hindus may be realized from a study of this map. Note the large Mohammedan population of northwestern India. From *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. 26, 1909, Pl. 15.

the basis of past anarchy subsided. But even now the number of castes, the prejudices of the people, the restraints which their religions put upon their treatment of animals, all greatly retard the economic development of the country.

In all India there are some 700 feudatory states, each jealous of the others' rights and privileges. They include two fifths of the land of India and have a population of about 75,000,000. There are states of every size, scattered from one end of the land to the other. The largest is Hyderabad, with a population of 13,000,000. Some of the states are of ancient origin; others are recent; some were formed out of the fragments of the Mogul Empire (1526–1761). When the British government took over the management of the country, it guaranteed the integrity of existing states and the dignities and privileges of the rulers, making treaties with them which have persisted



FIG. 25. The native states and territories are shown in light stipple and the territories permanently administered by the government of India with diagonal ruling, while British India is left white. From *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. 26, Pl. 20, 1909.

down to the present time. The rulers are not sovereign, but are subordinate to His Majesty the King-Emperor and to his representative the Viceroy, or Governor-General, of India. Were the people warlike, they would present to Great Britain an impossible problem of race, religion, and general order. But only 25,000,000 can be said to have any military spirit, and these are widely scattered.

India is fundamentally agricultural; less than 10 per cent of the population is urban, while we find 79 per cent in England and Wales and 64 per cent in Germany. In Bombay, 23 per cent of the population is urban, this high percentage reflecting an increasing number of cotton mills. In Assam, where the country is broken and the people lead an unsettled life, only 3 per cent live in cities. India as a whole has but 35 cities of more than 100,000; the United States, with one third the population, has 68 cities of this class. Only two Indian cities, Calcutta and Bombay, have more than a million people each.

The population, almost completely dependent on agriculture, is crowded on the flat lands of the plains. The more remunerative crops in Indian agriculture are wheat and cotton, and these are to a large degree dependent upon artificial irrigation. The rainfall of India is seasonal in character. Ninety per cent of it falls during the southwest monsoon. Only eastern Bengal, Assam, and Lower Burma have a rainfall sufficient to be free of the necessity of irrigation. Elsewhere there are great variations in rainfall from year to year and from district to district in the same year. As a consequence, famines ensue when the rains are light. Their severity is increased in many districts by the dependence of the people upon a single crop. Formerly, famines were accompanied by terrible loss of life; but with increased railway mileage and better facilities for the transportation of food by motor and otherwise, and especially by the organization of a "famine service," loss of life is now largely averted. The ensuing poverty is still very great, however. The peasant's capital is often wiped out by the wholesale loss of cattle when all sources of forage fail. Much has already been done to further irrigation; but the task is only begun. The irrigation service in India includes not only modern engineering works but also an immense system of artificial reservoirs, some of great antiquity. Others are of recent construction, such as the innumerable earthen "tanks" built across the local drainage lines.

Among the larger irrigation works is the Punjab system (at the northwestern corner of the northern famine district, Figure 27), whereby nearly 2,000,000 acres of land once arid have been placed under irrigation, in addition to more than 9,000,000 acres previously irrigated in the Punjab district. This was done by turning river water into three great canals that, with their main branches and smaller tributaries, have a total length of 3000 miles. In all India the major works supply canals that irrigate about 20,000,000 acres. The figure is more than doubled if we add irrigation from wells, tanks, and the like. The irrigated area lies in a region whose average rainfall is from 7 to 25 inches, and where agriculture would always be precarious without artificial help. Of the total cropped area, the government works irrigate 12 per cent.

So rapidly does the population increase (50,000,000 during the past 50 years), so limited is the relief through migration, that millions cannot get sufficient food. The farmer finds most of his crop divided between landlord and government. His condition has been aptly described as "underfed and overworked." He has to go into debt to the village shopkeeper, getting credit for food and seed in the ensuing year.



FIG. 26. Distribution of wheat and rice crops in India. Compare with Figure 23. From Finch and Baker, *Atlas of American Agriculture*, 1917, Figures 25 and 58.

Since 229,000,000 people in India are connected directly or indirectly with agriculture, this means that a large majority of them, probably two thirds, are living in a state of squalor. Pressing upon the people of India in a manner to produce great distress is the land tax, in addition to the water tax in irrigated areas. The land tax is the source of nearly a quarter of the whole revenue of the state. It is assessed in some provinces on the basis of the cash rental, the percentages being 25 in Bengal and 50 in the United Provinces and Punjab. In other provinces, e.g., Lower Burma and Madras, practically the same figure is arrived at by taxing the net produce, that is, the gross produce minus cost of production as augmented by percentages based on crop vicissitudes, distance from market, merchant's profits, and the like.[1] Indians complain of uneven assessments. On the other hand, the British have progressively revised the rates downward and they assert that only by a land tax can the state raise revenue without enhancing prices. The system was developed in the remote past long before the English came.

This does not mean that many Indians are not living under better conditions than heretofore. Thirty millions of them, many of whom are town-dwellers, have prospered by the general increase of trade and through the benefits of the English administration. There are many rich bankers and merchants. But the position of the farmer remains the same, and it cannot be improved until the heavy land tax is light-

[1] In India as a whole the land tax amounts to $.50 U. S. gold per head of population and slightly more per acre of tilled land. This appears to be a trifling sum, but it is really a substantial part of each farmer's income. Taxes of all kinds averaged $2.01 per person in 1923–1924.



FIG. 27. Rainfall and famine areas in India. Rainfall from *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. 26, 1909, Pl. 10. Famine areas from Andree, *Geographische Handbuch*, 1899, p. 579; id., *Geographie des Welthandels*, Vol. 2, 1913, p. 552; supplemented by Digby, *The Famine Campaign in Southern India*, 2 vols., 1878; Merewether, *A Tour through the Famine Districts of India*, 1898; Scott, *The Famine Land*, 1904.

ened and the birth rate reduced. As fast as the British improve Indian conditions the population increases up to the new possibilities, with no improvement at all in agricultural practices long regarded as among the most obsolete and least effective in all Asia. Little relief is found in larger export (in the present economy) because of the inequality and uncertainty of the food crops that are the main sources of supply. Cotton export, chiefly to Japan, has increased, with ocean rates extremely low. Indian mills are growing in number and locally have large resources of water power upon which to draw, but their chief dependence is still on coal. Cotton is now the largest single item in the list of commodities in which India is both producer and consumer. The export of pig iron and the production and consumption of steel are increasing, the pig iron going principally to Japan, the steel coming chiefly from the United Kingdom and Belgium. But neither export nor manufacturing has yet had an appreciable economic effect upon the mass of the population.

The most serious of the social and economic problems of India were not created by the British, but the people of India look to their British rulers for a solution. As in all times and places, a government remote from the common people is blamed for disaster and appealed to for relief.

What has England done to meet the complaints of her Indian subjects?

In the government of India, Great Britain has applied a principle that has gained in importance steadily since the Boer War, when a group of young Englishmen set in train the study of regional problems of empire by round-table organizations and by publication. They have effected a quickening of the political conscience that has done away with exploitation as the ruling motive for imperial government. It is now generally accepted in principle that with the exercise of power and dominion there should grow a sense of responsibility, "that empire is a method of holding liberty and the institutions of self-government in trust until the destined heirs of the inheritance reach their majority." This means in essence that the largest number of men must be brought in the shortest time to the full enjoyment of self-government.

Applied to India, the principle works out that purely executive control of Indian affairs, which has been the historical method, is now giving way to divided control, or *dyarchy*, as it is called. Under this system one branch of the government is under popular control, another under bureaucratic control. An Indian legislature was provided for shortly after the World War through the so-called Reforms Bill. Under its terms each of the eight major provinces, excluding Burma, had its administration divided between a governor who retains power over "reserved" questions, and ministers who deal only with "transferred" questions. Among the transferred subjects are local government, agriculture, industrial development, public health, education, and public works. The governor is appointed by the Viceroy, the ministers are chosen from the elected members of the Legislative Council, not more than one fifth of whom may be British officials. Three seats on the Viceroy's Executive Council are assigned to Indians. The Reforms Bill extended the franchise to more than five million persons, where it was formerly exercised by little more than thirty thousand. Through the exercise of the franchise a legislature has come into existence which consists of the Governor-General and two chambers. The upper chamber is called the Council of State and consists of sixty members; not more than twenty of these may be officials. The actual representation at the present time is 16 Hindus, 11 Mohammedans, 3 Europeans, 3 Sikhs. The Legislative Assembly is limited to 140 members, of whom 100 are elected. The government does not go to the polls, so there are no parties. Without the approval of the Governor-General no bill can be introduced which affects the public debt, religion, the defense forces, or foreign policy. The extent to which the legislative councils and the governors exercise power differs widely

from province to province. To prevent government coming to a standstill, provision is made for declaring bills passed in case one or both chambers withhold their consent to matters considered essential to the safety or peace of British India.

Many Indians feel that the transferred subjects are of minor importance. Certainly the degree to which government has been divided by the Indians and British has gone far to quiet the troubles which originated after the World War, when the Swaraj party came into being. Its policy of passive resistance could create unrest and even disorder, but it was not constructive in nature. The party is now of little consequence, since its activities are directed mainly to obstructing government business, whereas the principle of coöperation in a responsive manner is one that is gaining in popular esteem.

Indian government is gravely complicated by the presence of some 66,000,000 Mohammedans who, if they joined their co-religionists in the Arab world, might threaten British hold on southwestern Asia. There is very strong probability that were that hold broken at one place it would be released at all others. The Moslem Indian population was more or less disorderly throughout the World War. An Indian National Congress of Mohammedans met in 1919, following the killing by British troops of 400 natives at Amritsar, and sought to promote Indian independence. The government of India has tried to avoid the creation of political camps on a religious and national basis, but the Mohammedans have to be given special attention in the present scheme of government, owing to their large numbers and their racial and religious solidarity. However, the Hindu-Moslem quarrel is one that runs back through the racial life of the people and it will not be allayed by governmental devices. The tension between the races makes every religious occasion a source of anxiety to the authorities.[1]

In many respects India's problems are of her own making. It was not British rule that created the powerful Brahman caste, which, though constituting only 5 per cent of the population and despising all other Indians, may win fresh political and administrative power through the new scheme of government in addition to the vast social, religious, and official powers which it already possesses. It was not through British machinations that more than 66,000,000 Moslems came to inhabit northern India, nor has it been British policy to keep Moslems and Hindus at odds with each other. In fact, it has been England's fear that their historic enmity might develop into a whirlwind of destruction.

[1] For the special difficulties concerning Moslem tribesmen on the northwestern frontier of India, see page 139.

These are evils inherent in Indian history and life. Moreover, the population of India has been accustomed through the centuries to having its government managed by its superiors. Political ambitions do not fall within the mental range of the masses. If the educated leaders employ the symbols of politics, they are without the political experience to give their views practical effect.

How far Indian politics is a matter of emotion rather than of relation to Great Britain or to political history or geographical background has been admirably summarized by Sir Frederick Whyte, former President of the Legislative Assembly of India:

> Political peace in India is never long-lived, and the calm of today is but an armistice which will not last more than a year or two. Storms of emotion, now political, now religious, more often the latter exploited by the practitioners of the former, break over the Indian scene with an almost incredible ferocity, suggesting the onset of devastation which nothing can resist. But soon the storm abates, the disturbing emotion subsides, and who can say what result has been achieved? The tempest itself is to be seen as a protest, not as a purpose: it usually explodes by emotional pressure from within, not in order to break a resistance without. This is a historic truth, just as valid today as it has been any time these thousands of years.

If government means anything aside from law and order and the maintenance of civil rights, it means economic improvement. In all lands there are broad constructive policies and acts that are for the good of the whole people and that only a central government can initiate effectively. They affect its destiny because they are conceived on a broad scale. They take account of the social and political character of a people, the economic status no less than the geographical position and the character of land and country. They are policies and acts that transcend regional needs and desires and even the regional imagination. They represent in a sense the whole personality of a country. Such conceptions as these are in the minds of the leaders of countries whose people have learned to disregard the local and the trivial in order that the general and the important shall have right of way. In India the politics of the people is founded upon local ends and upon the narrow principle of obstruction, not construction. While the dyarchical principle has yet to prove its success, it has had moderate support from some sections of Indian opinion, who acknowledge it as the only practical form now possible. Certainly the present form of government provides abundant scope for economic and social reforms such as Indian leaders have long sought to bring about. What degree of welfare India will enjoy in the future depends upon the character of Indians themselves.

EGYPT

Going up the Nile is like running the gantlet before Eternity. Till one has seen it, one does not realize the amazing thinness of that little damp trickle of life that steals along undefeated through the jaws of established death. (RUDYARD KIPLING, *Letters of Travel*)

Egypt has been described as shaped like a wineglass, mostly stem. Lower Egypt, the triangular delta, is the main part of the country, and Cairo, the capital, is at the apex. Here is nearly three fifths of the cultivated land and here, too, is by far the larger part of the land that might be brought under cultivation. Outside the delta and valley of the Nile live but 80,000 of Egypt's 13,000,000 people. Like India, Egypt is an agricultural country with holdings divided minutely and the mass of the peasant farmers (the fellahin) in a state of extreme poverty. Like so many other countries, Egypt has its problem of increasing population. When political and civil life were unsettled and the water supply inefficiently used, as before the English military occupation in 1882, it mattered less to Egypt how the Nile waters and valley lands were used, for Egypt had then only seven and a half millions of people. During the period of British occupation, the rate of increase has risen until it is now 200,000 a year. The country having no industries worth mentioning, there is a constant pressure upon government to extend the cultivated area by increasing the delivery of water from the Nile. Since it is an extremely arid country [1]



FIG. 28. Map of Egypt showing the principal towns, the bordering deserts, and the cataracts of the Nile.

[1] At Alexandria the mean annual rainfall is 8 inches; at Port Said, 4 inches; and south of Cairo there are only rare showers.

FIG. 29. The ribbons of irrigated land along the Nile, including the broad irrigated expanse of the Nile Delta. From *Annuaire statistique de l'Egypte*, 1914, and later sources.

and since the summer supply of river water is even now insufficient for the lands dependent upon it, the economic life of the country has focused its attention upon the Upper Nile where flood waters may be impounded to be given out during the low-water season. But the Upper Nile waters flow through the Sudan, Uganda, and other possessions of Great Britain, and this establishes a dependence of Egypt upon Great Britain for the right to extend the use of Upper Nile waters, not only because Great Britain is in possession of or controls most of the headwaters but because both British and natives have their own plans for using water in the Sudan.[1]

In 1903 the first experiments were made in irrigating the alluvial lands of the Nile in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The purpose was to produce exportable crops like wheat, cotton, sugar. By agreement between the Sudanese and Egyptian governments the quantity of summer water to be drawn off in the Sudan was limited, and this amount was only increased when the Aswan Dam was heightened. The fact is of importance because it shows that the Nile has been looked upon as a river whose use was of primary concern to Egypt as well as to the Sudan, and of even greater concern to Egypt because of her long-established civilization and her far larger population. But the Sudan attracts capital because it is under British control and produces a high grade of cotton of importance to English mills. Where the development may end no one knows, but Egypt fears that it will end in a curtailment of her own rights, considered to be primary.

The Suez Canal

The conditions which have just been sketched form one of two geographical facts that are of greatest importance in the present political geography of Egypt and the relations of Great Britain thereto. The other is the Suez Canal. ". . . we need safe open seas, above all, a safe Indian Ocean." This is the English point of view. Said Lord

[1] Rice and cotton are the two principal crops, and if cotton is at a tempting price level and there is an extension of its cultivation, Egypt pays by having less rice than she needs; yet it is not good economy to import rice, because it cannot be grown elsewhere at a lower labor cost than in Egypt itself, directly where it is consumed.

Allenby in his reply to the Egyptian objections to the conditions of independence laid down by the British Government in 1921 :

> Egypt lies upon the main line of communications between Great Britain and the King's dominions to the east. The whole territory of Egypt is indeed essential to those communications, since the fortunes of Egypt are inseparable from the security of the Suez Canal zone. The immunity of Egypt from the dominant influence of any other Great Power is therefore of primary importance to India, Australia, New Zealand, and all His Majesty's Eastern Colonies and Dependencies; it affects the welfare and safety of nearly 350,000,000 of His Majesty's subjects.

Thus independence to Egypt from the British point of view means independence limited by British reservations, and though these have become the basis of British policy they have not been accepted by Egyptian leaders. The conditions are of peculiar interest to Americans because of the special relation which the Republic of Panama bears to the Panama Canal Zone, where the United States has special interests comparable to those of Great Britain at Suez. It is also of interest to Americans because the Philippines desire independence, their population is about equal to that of Egypt, they also occupy a strategical position (with respect to the Far East), and successive governments in the United States have also proclaimed their desire to hasten the day of independence, but always under conditions of close supervision lest some other power carry out alleged designs — a constant reiteration of British representatives in discussing Egyptian affairs.

Foreign Control

Although both British and French military occupation of Egypt took place during the Napoleonic wars, it was not until 1869 that, with the completion of the Suez Canal, British and French commercial interests in Egypt increased to such a degree that the country became politically of much importance. There was factional war during the first half of the 19th century. There was only moderate control by the Turks, though they have been the nominal rulers ever since their conquest of the country in 1517. The most critical time came in 1875, when the Khedive sold his shares of the Suez Canal Company to the British. There had been accumulated a large public debt on the part of the successive rulers of Egypt, and since most of the money had been borrowed from British and French sources those two powers established a condominium known as the Dual Control (1876–1883). Foreign interference was then decried and a general revolution sought to be organized. France declining to use military force, British troops took

the field and crushed a rebellion engineered by Arabi Pasha, an army officer. Thereafter Great Britain kept in Egypt an army of occupation and named herself "adviser" to the new Egyptian government (1882).

Trouble had arisen also in the Sudan, where a self-proclaimed Mahdi, or "deliverer," appealed to the fanaticism of his followers (1881), defeated the Egyptian troops, and massacred General Gordon and 11,000 men at Khartoum (1885). The Mahdi died soon after the taking of Khartoum, but for about twelve years his successor held the region in his grasp. Finally, in 1898 General Kitchener completely annihilated the Mahdist army at the battle of Omdurman. As a war measure the Sudan, as well as Egypt, was declared annexed to the British Empire in 1914, with the status of a "protected state."

British and Egyptian Views on Control

In 1922, when the British Protectorate over Egypt was abolished and the country made independent under a constitutional king, it was indicated by Great Britain in specific terms just how far that independence might go. The principal reservations in favor of Great Britain were:

(1) The British Government "shall at all times be entitled to an exceptional position," and the closest relations shall exist between the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a British High Commissioner.

(2) The Egyptian Government may not make any political agreement with foreign powers except with the approval of the British High Commissioner, and diplomatic and consular relations will be aided by the British Government.

(3) Great Britain assumes the responsibility for protecting the legitimate interests of foreigners in Egypt.

(4) Great Britain supports Egypt in the defense of her territory and to this end, and "for the due protection of British Imperial communications," British troops are to have free passage through Egypt and garrisons may be maintained at such places and such periods as shall from time to time be determined.

(5) Foreign officers or officials may not be appointed to the Egyptian army and public services without the concurrence of the British High Commissioner, nor may an external loan be raised nor the revenue of any public service be assigned by the Egyptian Government without the concurrence of the Financial Commissioner.

(6) While Great Britain undertakes to secure for Egypt her fair share of the waters of the Nile by providing for a board of water conservators who will study the Upper Nile and its tributaries, on the other hand, Egypt is to continue to afford the Sudan government military support as in the past or its equivalent in financial assistance.

To these limitations Egypt replies that the right to move troops and maintain garrisons is occupation pure and simple and no country is independent if obliged to endure occupation by foreign troops. Just as this constitutes an invasion of internal sovereignty, so the limitation of foreign political agreements by British approval constitutes an infringement of external sovereignty. So far as the Sudan is concerned, Egypt desires to exercise "her indisputable right of sovereignty over that country and of control of the waters of the Nile."

When two governments are opposed on economic and strategic grounds of such vital concern to both, peaceful agreement is difficult because the terms they employ mean quite different things. To the British, Egyptian independence means permitting the Egyptians to have their own king, a parliament, and other branches and aspects of civil government (as provided in the constitution promulgated by King Fuad in 1923), and such other limited rights and privileges as British control may see fit to grant. This to the British is a long step forward, and if independence is conditional it at least represents something better than the past. To the British these concessions seem very liberal because they claim to have won no special economic privileges in Egypt, in fact, to have profited less by the order they have imposed than the French, Italians, and Greeks, whose merchants constitute a large part of the foreign population of 150,000.

On the other hand, to the Egyptians these conditions imply bondage, so it is worth while to see by what process Egypt fell into British hands, so to speak, and what rights her people have to a larger share of independence and how far government may be based upon popular opinion and judgment. Of the 13 millions of Egyptians, only 7 or 8 per cent are literate. Even in the towns the standard of literacy is low, probably around 25 per cent for the most advanced urban districts. It has been well said that grievances sometimes are an effective substitute for the political instinct which the peasant lacks; and no matter what happens, whether a low Nile or a low price for cotton, it is easy and indeed natural to blame the foreigner and particularly the English. Moreover, there is a feeling that all politically conscious peoples share, that a second-rate government under native

control is better than a first-rate government under foreign control. Holding this view, the Egyptian leaders do not accept proof of the benefits of British occupation as having any political meaning. The problem of government under these conditions is always a most serious one, for with an illiterate people there is always the temptation of the ruling class to look upon the ignorance of the masses as a guarantee of their own continued enjoyment of power.

The Egyptian Nationalist program calls for nothing less than: (1) Independence from British control. (2) Neutrality of the Suez Canal (3) The assignment of the Sudan to Egypt. (4) Complete freedom as to both internal affairs and external relations. Under the arrangement that went into effect in 1923 with the adoption of a constitution and the appointment of ministers responsible to a newly constituted parliament, there was left for further discussion the conditions under which the British limitations upon Egyptian sovereignty should be exercised. Before the constitution went into effect Zaghloul Pasha, the leader of the nationalists, was banished by the British government to the Seychelles Islands and with him some of his extremist followers. Though he was permitted to return and in course of time became premier, his death followed soon after (1927).

British fear of the extremists was justified by the events of 1919–1920, when the nationalists, failing to obtain that independence which they demanded at the Peace Conference of Paris, broke into insurrection. From one end of the Lower Nile valley to the other, property was destroyed and shops were looted; a number of British soldiers were killed. With this example before them the British were not slow to take extreme measures in 1924 when Sir Lee Stack, Commander-in-Chief (Sirdar) of the Egyptian Army and Governor-General of the Sudan, was murdered. The British suspended constitutional government, exacted an apology for the murder, an indemnity of more than $2,000,000, the punishment of the criminals, the suppression of political demonstrations, the acceptance of British proposals for the protection of foreign interests in Egypt, and the increase of the Gezira irrigation area to whatever extent the British government might see fit. The last item aroused deep resentment in Egypt because the diversion of water for the irrigation of the Gezira region (supplied by the Makwar barrage near Sennar on the Blue Nile) would diminish the amount of water available in Egypt. Egyptian and popular British opposition led to the suspension of this provision and the appointment of an arbitration committee of three to make an inquiry and a recommendation as to the basis upon which irrigation should be conducted in the Sudan

without detriment to Egypt. The committee originally consisted of Egyptian and Sudanese representatives and a neutral Dutch chairman.

An election in 1926 gave back the control of the country to a large extent into Egyptian hands, though the reserved questions that had been in the way of settlement were deferred until a later time and Great Britain has for practical purposes taken over completely the control of the Sudan, at the same time maintaining garrisons in Cairo and Alexandria and near the Suez Canal.

In addition to the stipulations mentioned above, Great Britain imposed upon Egypt by way of punishment for the murder of Sir Lee Stack the immediate withdrawal from the Sudan of all Egyptian military officers and of purely Egyptian units of the army. The place of the expelled Egyptian troops was taken by a Sudan Defense Force whose allegiance was to the Governor-General of the Sudan, not to the King of Egypt This was regarded by the nationalists of Egypt as a violation of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899 whereby a condominium was established in the Sudan, and even as an attack upon the sovereignty of Egypt itself. The British replied that Egypt was the first to violate the terms of the condominium and therefore had no standing as a complainant.

Whatever the morals of the case may be, it is clear that the decisive action of the British government has given a quite new aspect to Egyptian affairs, since it showed to Egyptian leaders that the British government is determined in all seriousness to keep Egypt under British control and that the future welfare of the country cannot be achieved by further agitation for the ending of British rule. So long as British power is maintained on an imperial scale, so long must Egypt accept its status as a country whose independence is limited by its geographical position beside a waterway of vital interest to British communications.

In its ultimate form the Egyptian question is geographical and biological rather than political. Only the narrowest strip of land on either side of the Nile may be watered (Fig. 29), and no resources of consequence are discoverable in the desert uplands that enclose that "damp trickle of life." Only the irrigable soil of the immediate valley floor may be cultivated. Subdivision of fields has been carried out to an amazing degree. Many of them are less than a meter wide. Yet there is no halt to the growth of population. Until the impossible happens and restraints are devised, the recurring decades will find the Egyptian problem acute.

FIG. 30. Six hundred miles in a straight line south of the Nile mouths the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan begins, to extend nearly fifteen hundred miles farther south. Much of it is desert. Part of its population is difficult to manage. Its control is one of the many difficult tasks which the British have undertaken in the field of colonial government. The British view of the northwest boundary is shown here; for the Italian view, see Figure 76.

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN

South of Upper Egypt there is a vast extent of country known as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, extending from Wadi Halfa to Uganda in the Lake Victoria region. It was formerly a source of great difficulty to the British administration of Egypt. Unruly tribes inhabit its semi-arid western sections, and their fanatical religion (Mohammedanism) has led them to oppose bitterly the authority of Christian rulers.

The country lies partly in the basin of the Nile and partly in the interior-basin drainage of the Sahara. The portion lying in the east and south is fertile and has great possibilities for cotton production and cattle breeding, while the northern and western portions are arid or semi-arid.

Negroes and Arabs comprise the bulk of the population. It is a mixed stock of many tribes, languages, and cultures. Transplanted, raided, regrouped, commingled — both vicissitudes and the peace now so long enjoyed under French and British administration have tended still further to the blending of native stocks. They fall into the following groups:

(1) Cattle-owning nomads who occupy the watered and more luxuriant country toward the south. In the region of the Nile the country is thickly settled.

(2) Sedentary peoples of mixed type (as in central Kordofan); these live in villages of a dozen or several score huts, the size of each village depending upon the quantity of ground that can be conveniently cultivated and upon the supply of water.

(3) Camel-owners living chiefly in the northern desert districts; these own also large herds of cattle, sheep, and goats, and cultivate the soil.

Great Britain and France have now agreed upon the boundary line on the western frontier of the Sudan (Fig. 30). It is a settlement of importance to the region by reason of the fact that until it was made neither the British nor the French could effectively pacify the more remote peoples on their common borders, the British operating from Khartoum and the French from the forts along the Shari River, the principal feeder of Lake Chad.

Fig. 31. The difficulties in the way of management of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan may be judged by studying this map of comparative distances. A single main railway line runs from Wadi Halfa southward through Khartoum to El Obeid, 230 miles southwest of Khartoum. This line has but one important branch, to the Red Sea coast near Suakin.

We have already discussed the peculiar position of the region of the Upper Nile with respect to Egypt. It will be recalled that the withdrawal of water from the Nile to irrigate in the Sudan is a modern development. It had its beginning in 1904. Cotton-growing through the investment of foreign capital gave the first stimulation to this development; and throughout the negotiations between Great Britain and Egypt respecting Egyptian independence the British held steadfastly to the principle that they were the guardians of the Upper Nile. While they have been perfectly willing to discuss the division of water as between the Sudan and Egypt, they have never let go of the principle that Egypt's share was to be won by conference, not by extension of Egyptian sovereignty to the Sudan or by the extension of water rights to the Uganda country, where the Nile takes its rise (Fig. 20). The position of the British government is of acute interest to Egypt because of the fact that in the Sudan a population of about three millions does not so thickly populate the arable land as to crowd the food resources, and thus cotton production may be rapidly developed; whereas in Egypt the population crowds the irrigable land and the question of food, not cotton, is paramount. The problem is almost perpetual because the growing population of Egypt compels Egyptian leaders to look to the water supply of the Upper Nile for relief.

IRAQ, AN ARAB KINGDOM

In Iraq, Great Britain confronts two matters of special concern to her, in addition to the general problem of responsibility toward the native Arabs:

(1) The country flanks Great Britain's land route to India.

(2) In southeastern Iraq Great Britain has built great oil refineries and docks for handling the petroleum yield of Iraq and southwestern Persia.

Great Britain's sense of responsibility to the native is not unmixed with other motives; for Iraq released from British control might become part of a general Arab confederation. A British company has long controlled transportation on the Tigris-Euphrates river systems, and British capital has been invested in the railroad from Basra northward (now extended almost to Mosul as part of the Baghdad system). Originally opposed to the Portuguese (Ormuz) and later to the pirates that infested the Persian Gulf and preyed upon British shipping, England established political residences and trading posts about the shores and assumed protectorates over all the local chiefs of the Gulf region, though they are nominally independent. She extended her commercial and political penetration until she has today a secure hold of the chief resources, which are growing in value with the rapid increase of the world's industrial population. British surveys of the irrigation possibilities of Mesopotamia have shown the enormously productive capacity of the soil when properly watered. Cotton, tobacco, silk, and other subtropical products could be grown on a large scale and thus give the region great commercial importance.

Population Elements

The population of Iraq is markedly uniform in origin and characteristics. The Arabs are the predominating race, the Arabic language being spoken for 200 miles north of Baghdad, as far as Mardin and Diarbekr (Fig. 32). Many of the once nomadic Arabs of Iraq have settled on the valley floors to live as best they can by cultivating the soil. Kurds form about 17 per cent of the total population.[1] In Iraq, religion is almost a matter of race. The overwhelming majority of the population is Moslem, divided almost equally between the *Sunnite*

[1] The British census, or estimate, of 1920 gave the following statistics for Iraq: total population 2,849,282, distributed as follows: Shiite Moslems, 1,494,015; Sunnite Moslems, 1,146,685; Jews, 87,488; Christians, 78,792; others, 42,302.

and the *Shiite* sects. The Arabs of Jazirah, the Kurds, Turkomans, and Turks, are Sunnites, while the southern Arabs and Persians are Shiites. The most important Sunnite shrine is at Baghdad, and the especially holy places of the Shiite sect are Karbala, Najaf, and Kadhimain (about three miles northwest of Baghdad).

Economic Situation

At present Iraq is a small and poor country. Most of its 143,000 square miles is used for grazing only. Its tax rate per inhabitant is high and its immediate resources are meager. It is in the stage of primary production rather than industrial development. The farmers must depend largely upon cereals sown in the winter and autumn seasons, when the winter and spring floods supply water to the irrigation canals. Of first importance are wheat, dominant on the north; barley, dominant on the south; rice, produced largely in the second growing season from August to November and in the marshy country of the lower Tigris and the Shatt al Arab. There is an increasing acreage in cotton. In addition, there are hides, skins, and wool, the exports of extensive pastoral lands. Fundamental to the maintenance and development of agriculture is irrigation upon the floodplains and lower terraces of the principal streams. The Tigris and Shatt al Arab valleys are naturally the seats of the densest agricultural population.

The enduring wealth of Mesopotamia is the extraordinary fertility of the soil. It is competently estimated that the average combined discharge of the Tigris-Euphrates rivers would irrigate 7,000,000 acres in winter and 3,000,000 acres of varied crops in summer. Half of this area could be immediately reclaimed if the ancient system of canals and drains were restored and the Euphrates water turned into the land west of the Tigris, while the Tigris and its tributaries were made to irrigate the land east of the Tigris. It is even suggested that for the better utilization of their waters for irrigation purposes, the rivers should not be used for navigation, but should be superseded by railways for the transport of cereals and cotton. Iraq yields 40 per cent of the world's production of dates. The annual harvest amounts to 400,000 tons, the export exceeds 100,000 tons. From the economic standpoint it is important to stimulate cotton growing, for which the soil and climate are well adapted, because this gives higher returns in the face of a steady world demand. With 150,000 to 200,000 acres capable of cotton production, but 1300 acres are actually so employed at present.

The facilities of transport include, beside camel caravans and mule packtrains, three modern means: (1) river navigation, which serves a

large part of the population inasmuch as settlements are concentrated along the rivers; (2) railways, which were extended during and since the World War and need only two short connections (Fig. 32) from Kirkuk on the south and from Nisibin on the west to make at least one complete trunk line system; and (3) airplanes. In addition, a number of motor roads have been built, notably one from Baghdad to Damascus. There is now a regular transdesert automobile service between Baghdad and Beirut. In April 1927 King Feisal named the first airplane in regular use "City of Baghdad." The service extends to both passenger and mail traffic. During 1927, 134,000 miles were flown over the Middle East Air Route, which includes in its schedules Cairo, Basra, and Baghdad (Fig. 46). More than 1100 passengers and 1,900,000 letters were carried.

While irrigation may furnish the basis for the chief riches of Mesopotamia, the immediate wealth of the country lies principally in trade and in the development of the oil resources (Fig. 194). The production of the Persian and Mesopotamian oil pools is small at the present time; but the reserve is great, and this is a matter of prime importance to Great Britain, whose navy depends chiefly upon oil for fuel, and whose commercial carriers are being turned into oil burners at a rapid rate. Large refineries have been established at Abadan on the Shatt al Arab.

In the period 1904 to 1914 there had developed rivalry between German, Dutch, and British capitalists for power in developing Mesopotamian oil fields. The territory was Turkish, but Germany had made preliminary oil surveys and the British were already intrenched as a result of their Persian developments, the British government having gained, in 1913, a controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In 1914 the parties in interest resolved their rivalries by having the German and Dutch companies participate to the extent of 25 per cent in the Turkish Petroleum Company, newly organized for the purpose, whereas the Anglo-Persian Oil Company held 50 per cent. In 1920 the German interests were transferred by Great Britain to France, on condition that the former was to be guaranteed the right to transport oil to the Mediterranean across French Syria (San Remo Agreement, 1920). The protests of the American government were recognized by permitting a group of American oil companies to take 25 per cent, or half of the British share of stock (1925). The American objections to earlier agreements were on the ground that the principle of the Open Door had been violated; but since American participation and arrangements for eventual free competition, these conditions have all been met.

All of these agreements relate to a resource which in the first instance concerns Iraq; but that country is too poor to borrow money on favorable terms, it incurs an annual deficit, and it costs the British government thousands of pounds a year to keep its present measure of control. Naturally, a part of public opinion in Iraq is opposed to foreign exploitation and seeks to reject as unfavorable the terms of the treaties relating to oil. A more practical view is that since it depends for development upon foreign capital it must accept the terms that capital is able to offer.

Boundary Agreements

One of the terms of the treaty of Lausanne (page 501) stipulated that the boundary between Turkey and Iraq should be laid down by friendly agreement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain; and that in case of disagreement the question was to be referred to the League of Nations. Direct negotiation between them having failed at the Constantinople conference of May–June 1924, the dispute was referred to the League, which body appointed a boundary commission to investigate and report. In order to avoid local trouble the Council of the League laid down a so-called Brussels Line as a provisional boundary, the name being given because the decision respecting the boundary was made at the Brussels meeting of the Council. The Boundary Commission reported (1925) that it would recommend the territory south of the Brussels Line to be united with Iraq, on condition that autonomy be given the Kurds and that Iraq agree to remain under the mandate of the League for about twenty-five years. In case this recommendation proved inacceptable to Iraq, it was proposed either to partition the Mosul territory, giving two thirds of it to Turkey, or to give all of it to Turkey, since that country's internal condition and external political situation were more stable than those of Iraq. The British contended for a strategic frontier north of the Brussels Line, where a range of mountains presents a formidable obstacle to troop movements in winter and may be crossed readily at only a few places in summer. Turkey maintained that the Brussels Line was only a concession to British imperial ambitions and insisted upon receiving the whole of the territory.

The matter was further complicated by the racial composition of the territory. Here live Kurds, Arabs, Christians, Turks, Yezidis, and Jews to the number of 800,000, with Kurds predominating and the others in numbers of much less importance, following the order of the

FIG. 32. Boundaries of the Kingdom of Iraq as determined (1) on the north by the Turkish-British-Iraqi treaty of 1926 and (2) on the southwest by the Mohammerah and Bahra agreements of 1922 and 1925 respectively.

names as given above. The Turks insisted that a plebiscite would show a majority in favor of Turkish rule; the British that popular sentiment, weak in any case, was more favorable to Iraq. A further complication was the fact that the richest grain-growing region in Iraq is in Mosul, and there are oil prospects of uncertain importance. Eventually the Brussels Line was accepted (Fig. 32). The boundary was demarcated in 1927. A neutral border zone is established from which raiding bands are excluded. Turkey was promised 10 per cent of the royalties accruing to Iraq from the oilfields over a period of twenty-five years. An annex of the treaty provides for the capitalization of this sum within twelve months of the coming into force of the treaty

by payment to Turkey on the part of Iraq of 500,000 pounds sterling. Inhabitants of Turkish nationality on the Iraq side of the line were permitted to choose Turkish nationality. A permanent frontier commission is to promote neighborly relations.

Besides the Mosul boundary, one other important boundary question has been settled by the new kingdom. This is the southwestern boundary, where Iraq territory runs off into the desert to join territory under at least the nominal control of Ibn Saud, who rules the country of the Nejd and the larger part of the Arabian peninsula. While no definite boundary can come into existence in this place, owing to the migratory habits of the nomadic tribes that live here, the two countries have agreed[1] to the allocation of certain tribes to each of the two states. Figure 35 shows the bearing of the various agreements upon the territories concerned. In each case the conditions of migration are laid down and the principle established that unauthorized migration is forbidden, though tribes are free to graze wherever they choose once they obtain a permit. Freedom of transit to merchants of the Nejd is allowed in the case of those who desire to trade between Nejd and Syria in both directions, provided they follow established routes and enter and leave by designated places. The exception is in the case of trading caravans, whose trade is confined to camels and other animals, or to migrating tribes that are specified.

An Independent Kingdom

When the conquest of the Mesopotamian region had been completed by the British at the close of the World War, it was decided to set up an independent kingdom, and the choice of a king fell upon Prince Feisal, son of a former king of the Hejaz (Hussein). It is his brother Abdullah who is the Emir of Transjordan, likewise under British mandate. In 1921 the British High Commissioner was able to proclaim Feisal king as the result of a plebiscite in which he was the almost unanimous choice. The form of government is a limited monarchy with ministers responsible to a legislative body consisting of a Senate and a House of Deputies.

The new state had the Mosul boundary question before it and rela-

[1] Mohammerah Agreement of 1922, supplemented by the Bahra Agreement of 1925. The Hadda Agreement of 1925 establishes the boundary between the Nejd and Transjordan. These agreements are part of a series affecting Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine. By means of them Great Britain sought to secure from raids the southern border of territories under her mandate. To have achieved success is a notable performance that strengthens the British Empire in relation to the entire Arab world.

tions with the Nejd were in a state of tension because of the migratory movements of nomadic tribes. Under these circumstances it could not be left alone. The discarded treaty of Sèvres placed it under Great Britain as the mandatory power, and this responsibility Great Britain has exercised ever since, though under a special form, namely, a direct treaty between Iraq as an independent country and the Government of Great Britain. The first treaty to be signed in 1922 provided (1) for the maintenance of British troops in Iraq to support those of King Feisal and (2) for the employment of British military and financial advisers. The rights of foreigners are especially provided for in view of the abrogation of the immunities enjoyed by them under the Turkish régime. The King agreed to be guided by the British High Commissioner in all important international interests affecting Great Britain and in respect of all financial obligations. This treaty was rejected by parliament but in 1925 the first elected parliament came into existence and ratification followed. The government found itself with the Mosul boundary still unsettled, and it was not until June 1926 that a treaty between Great Britain, Iraq, and Turkey definitely delimited that frontier. The preamble to the treaty recognizes Iraq as an independent state which maintains a special relation to Great Britain in accordance with the treaties between Great Britain and Iraq signed 10 October 1922 and 13 January 1926 (the latter providing for treaty termination in 1950). In short, the boundary decision has been made with the understanding that Great Britain is responsible for the execution of its terms. Should Iraq enter the League of Nations, Great Britain has agreed to terminate the treaty at once, provided that reasonable modifications of her relationship to Iraq are made from time to time. The principle of the British government is stated to be to continue its coöperation and advice, not to spend money or to keep troops in Iraq for the artificial maintenance of power.

The present political situation of Iraq is abnormal because the mass of the people are lethargic with reference to measures for coöperative control, understand hardly at all the principles of British occupation, and have no opinion as to the destiny of their country. The educated or partly educated Moslem townsmen have a desire to secure complete independence for their nation but are unwilling to coöperate with each other or to make sacrifices to attain that end. The large sums of money which the British have spent in the country have given it a prosperity that the sheikhs would like to keep, though they oppose any measures tending to diminish their power. The government policy of bringing land under irrigation to an increasing extent may persuade more

and more of the tribesmen to settle down to agriculture, thus ending the tribal confederations with a nomadic basis. Largely to the extent that the population becomes agricultural will the nation acquire stability.

The effect of British control was felt at once in a more orderly administration, the regulation of land registration, the direct encouragement of agriculture, railroad building (700 miles of new railroad have been constructed), and the appointment of administrators trained by British advisers in contrast to the inefficient political officers of the period of Turkish rule.

TRANSJORDAN

On the eastern side of the Ghor, the long depression that limits Palestine on the east and includes the Dead Sea and the Jordan, is a line of elevations as shown in Figure 49. The principal ones are Hauran, Jebel Druse, and a chain of lesser heights. Eastward the country declines to the Syrian Desert and there is drainage in that direction as well as down the steeper slopes of the westward-facing country to the Ghor. Of the eastward-flowing streams the most notable group are found southeast of the Dead Sea about 150 miles. They are tributary to the Wadi Sirhan, the most important depression in the Syrian Desert. Locally there are watering places and uplands of strategic value (Fig. 48). The line of elevations that forms the backbone of the Transjordan country receives enough rainfall to support an annual crop of cereals and here there is a settled population in contrast to the Syrian Desert, where the rainfall is much lighter and the population nomadic, not sedentary.



Fig. 33. Railway connections across the mandated territories of Palestine and Syria. See page 172 for air routes.

Thus the administration of Transjordan is complicated by the fact that two opposing groups of people have to be satisfied, the sedentary farmer and the nomad. From time immemorial the nomad has been not merely a pastoralist, going by well-recognized routes from one pasture ground to another, but a raider of the farming communities. This feature of the life of the Transjordan country has impressed itself upon the administration of the region under British mandate subsidiary to Palestine. To leave the Transjordan country to itself would be to invite attacks at all the eastern gateways of Palestine, and the distances that separate nomad from settler are so short and the space occupied by the Ghor so narrow that trouble with Palestine would surely be constant were the region left to itself. But when placed under a regular administration there can be supervision only so far as settlements go. To attempt to administer or discipline the desert tribes, the Shammar and the Rwala Bedouins (the chief tribes on the south and east), would be to invite disaster. Desert campaigns are notoriously expensive, for the desert as well as the desert inhabitant fights the invader (page 131).

The British have chosen to make agreements with the desert tribes in order to define the limits of grazing grounds and the rights of settler and nomad. Such agreements would have been difficult to make with the local nomadic groups, but the difficulty was greatly increased by the fact that Ibn Saud, leader of the Wahabis, had extended his conquest far out beyond the borders of the Nejd, the region upon which his power was based. He had conquered the Shammar and some of his contingents had reached the borders of the Transjordan country. By negotiations with his representatives at successive conferences the British were at last able to effect an agreement establishing a boundary line between territory under the control of the Nejd on the one hand and Transjordan and Iraq on the other. The results are shown in Figure 35 (page 140). Though great effort was made to secure a more favorable position, that is, a more southerly position, to the boundary line of Transjordan, it was impossible to overcome the resistance offered by Ibn Saud. It resulted that the Wadi Sirhan and some adjacent heights of strategic importance fell into the hands of Ibn Saud, which puts not only watering places but pasture grounds on the wadi floor, and the floors of its tributaries, so close to the Transjordan border that they form bases from which raiders may attack the frontier zone in Transjordan itself.

The affairs of the Transjordan country were still further complicated by the Wahabi invasion of the Hejaz, for the Hejaz Railway, which

runs southward from Damascus and Medina and is projected to Mecca, is vital in the control of Arab activities. Its ruler, the Emir Abdullah, is brother of King Feisal of Iraq; and Feisal has not forgotten, nor is his family likely to forget, that he was driven out of Damascus, where he hoped to build up a center of Arab unity and independence but where he was ultimately frustrated by the determination of the French military authorities. Syrian Nationalists have used Transjordan as a base of operations against the French, despite the efforts of the British authorities to the contrary. While political and military authority must run hand in hand in the rule of so difficult a country, the military will be in evidence with but little abatement for an indefinite period. By controlling a substantial section of the Damascus-Medina railway line, by having their boundary run coterminous with the French in Syria, and by annexing the Red Sea port of Aqaba, formerly belonging to the Hejaz, Great Britain has provided herself with means for defense that are as favorable as the country will permit.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MOHAMMEDAN WORLD

The two largest colonial empires are those of Great Britain and France. It follows that these powers have to deal with many social and religious as well as political problems. Among them none is so wide-ranging, none so fateful, as the question of control over large and bigoted if not fanatical Mohammedan populations. We have therefore placed this chapter between those dealing with Great Britain and France since the issues it raises are a common preoccupation of both governments.

Unlike Christianity and Buddhism, the Mohammedan religion does not confine itself to the realm of ideas and their influence upon the spirit of man: it is a religion of force and authority, a system of law, a political guide, a basis of government. Upon the quarreling Arabian tribes that he brought together Mohammed impressed the fact that they were joined by a common purpose — war against the non-Moslem world and the extension of Moslem authority. The Hejira took place in 622, and Mecca was gained in 629. Mohammedanism has had thirteen centuries in which to exercise its influence, and in that time it has had abundant opportunity to make its power felt over a wide area and among many different kinds of people. Brown and black and yellow have responded to its teachings. It has spread with terrific speed, not only among the crowded populations of the East but among the blacks of central Africa. Altogether extraordinary is its strong hold upon its followers. No people once Mohammedan has ever been converted to the Christian religion. Since its foundation the peoples who profess it have been unaffected by neighboring states that have passed through whole cycles of cultural and political development, disunion and union, expansion and defeat, and finally the World War.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Mohammedanism has thus had no lack of opportunity to discover the weaknesses and foil the strength of its chief opponents. We may well ask whether anything in that history or in the present situation of the Islamic world furnishes ground for fear that it may issue forth from its vast realm to the undoing of western civilization. During the World War and immediately after it, there seemed to be an immense stirring within the Mohammedan world. There were many attempts at achieving solidarity of political purpose; for example, through Pan-



FIG. 34. A study of the map suggests the extent to which colonial government and commerce are affected by religious considerations in the East Indies, northern Africa, and the Near East. After Schrader, *Atlas de géographie historique*, 1911, Pl. 51, and later sources.

Turkism and Pan-Islamism, related but quite unlike and in some respects rival programs. The Mohammedans gave the British serious trouble in northwestern India. Egypt has passed through some of the most difficult stages in its history since 1919. The French have had constant trouble on the Syrian frontier. Turkey, long the most important political unit of the Mohammedan world, refused to sign the treaty of Sèvres; she broke up the first Near East Peace Conference at Lausanne; at the second conference she refused outright to continue the policy of the capitulations and at last accepted service upon but 40 per cent of the pre-war Ottoman debt. A survey of these more recent circumstances and a glance down the perspectives of history furnish ample material for a picture of disaster to modern civilization, should the power of the Mohammedan world be thrown against it.

It may be admitted that the historical facts, when viewed superficially, are somewhat ominous. Entering Spain in the early 8th century, the mixed breeds of North Africa, under the name of Moors, penetrated the peninsula, crossed the Pyrenees, and in 732 fought out the issue on the plain of Tours. Finding Spain disunited and the climate congenial, the invaders established themselves with such success

that not until seven centuries later was the last of their strongholds taken, though effective Moorish control had ended two centuries before. Thus for more than half a millennium the Moor dominated the Iberian Peninsula. In the 15th century the Moslem Turks crossed over from Anatolia to the northern shore of the Ægean, established a capital at Adrianople, swept over the Balkans in all directions, captured Constantinople in 1453, and advanced toward the interior of Europe with marked success. It was only after united and protracted effort that the second siege of Vienna was lifted, so late as 1683. In 1571 the power of the Turkish fleet was broken at Lepanto.

There is something appalling in the swiftness and ruthlessness with which the invasions were carried out, and something portentous in the length of time it has taken to rid Europe of the Moslem menace in the Balkans, a region so near that European industrial power could here strike its most effective blows. Against this background of historical fact, we have the present state of unrest and religious and political agitation in the Mohammedan world, the latest success of the Turks, the founding of the new kingdom of Iraq, the extension of Wahabite control from central Arabia to the Red Sea: it is easy to be persuaded that there is here a menace of the first order against which the united forces of Christendom must be thrown if modern civilization is to stand.

Of course anything may happen to the western world, and any accident may betray it if it chooses to live in a disunited state. The twenty-six so-called Christian nations of Europe united against Islam is but a remote possibility; all of them will have to see Mohammedanism as an overwhelming menace before such a union takes place, for the mutual fears and ambitions of the European states are objects of far livelier concern. The Moslem menace appears to be far away or otherwise to lack reality. Should blindness to this or any other menace carry the civilization of Europe to the brink of disaster, it would need but little force to push it over the precipice. But if we assume that Europe will again develop its pre-war economic machinery, how real do we find the Moslem menace?

There is much geography in the analysis and conclusion of the matter. The accompanying maps (opposite page 146) reduce the discussion to its briefest terms. What is the geographical relation of the Mohammedan world to the rest of mankind, what resources are behind it, what geographical conditions circumscribe its activities and limit the exercise of force either by it or upon it from the outside? The maps point out the rigorous conditions under which most Mohammedans live;

the very special nature of the vast tract in which their religion dominates; and, above all, the fact that the Mohammedan realm is not to be considered as a vast reservoir of power from which may be drawn the means for carrying modern war into the European field. Mere area upon the map may be impressive, and mere enumeration figures likewise; but the character of the land and its resources and the disposition of the population, region by region, are the essential things, and these give no basis for a broad conclusion that the Mohammedan world need be a menace to Europe.

OF THE POPULATION NUMBERS AND DISPOSITION

Let us first turn to the physical layout of the Mohammedan world, with special attention to its borders, for there live most of the population and there are the contacts of greatest political significance. The 270,000,000 Mohammedans [1] are disposed for the most part in and around a broad belt of country about four times the area of the United States, or roughly 12 million square miles, extending across northern Africa from the Mediterranean to the Sudan, thence eastward across Arabia and Anatolia, Persia, Afghanistan, northwestern India, Russian Turkestan. It is a belt of territory that practically encircles the Caspian, extends far into Russia, and has important outliers in the East Indies, as in Celebes, Sumatra, Malay States, Borneo, and particularly Java. There is a large block of Mohammedan population in the Calcutta district, another block in western China, and a band running down the eastern side of Africa to the region opposite Madagascar. In addition there are many minor tracts, for example Albania and a part of Bosnia, to mention a few among Balkan examples, besides scattered districts in central Africa.

Superimposing upon this great belt of country the line representing an average annual rainfall of 10 inches a year, gives the result shown in Plate I (page 146); and, when we consider that agriculture, though not pasturage, is limited to irrigated tracts, except where the rainfall exceeds 10 or 15 inches a year, we see at once that huge areas of this vast region can support only the thinnest population and much of it none

[1] Figures for population and resources are approximations. Accurate statistics are lacking for the major part of the Mohammedan world. Furthermore, it is difficult to define the limits of the "converted" populations in the border regions. René Le Conte in the article "La Géographie de l'Islam" in *Le Mouvement Géographique*, Vol. 35, November 15, 1922, estimates a total Mohammedan population of 225,000,000 distributed thus according to zones: in Africa — Atlantic zone, 6 millions, Mediterranean zone, 18, Sudanese and Eastern zone, 25; in Europe, Asia, and East Indies — Arabian zone, 8, Turkish zone, 30, Iranian zone, 11, Hindu zone, 67, Chinese zone, 7, Malay zone, 43.

at all. Or, if we go further and examine the area having 10 inches or less, we see a close restriction to irrigated tracts, so close as to give no support to Moslem solidarity or the accumulation of material resources for the invasion of other lands. It is true that most of the Mohammedans of India live in a region having less than 20 inches of rain and that the entire population of Egypt (13 millions in number) lives in the Nile delta and the ribbon of lowland, favored by the Nile flood, with less than 5 inches of rain. It is also true that these populations have great capacity for disturbance, should economic troubles thicken about the controlling European governments. But populations that are immediately dependent upon irrigation cannot take with them, into a foreign country, agencies or resources that will sustain a military campaign. A population dependent upon agriculture by irrigation is substantially rooted to the soil. It is the nomadic or semi-nomadic grazing society that is restless and menacing to the settled lands beyond; and such a society is nothing if not widely dispersed.

We thus have withdrawn at the outset one of the most impressive facts of the Mohammedan world, namely, the area of the territory under the control of Mohammedans. Closely related with this is the distribution of important Mohammedan units about the borders of the Mohammedan world. It is not the total number in a wide area with large resources upon which attention should be fixed, but specific units of that world in their critical relation to those that matter to European powers. For example, the 35,000,000 Mohammedans of Java have high productive capacity in the field of agriculture: they export foods to other lands; they are more than self-sustaining. But beyond this they are of little consequence in achieving Mohammedan solidarity or expressing that solidarity through political action; for Java is an island, and western Europe controls the sea.

Likewise the map discloses that there are deep arms of the sea penetrating the Mohammedan world, and none of these arms are under Moslem control. There is but one geographical point where a serious question of control must be debated with any portion of that world, and that is at the Bosporus, the control of that strait having been one of the chief points of objection on the part of Turkey to terms proposed at the two conferences of Lausanne. Another important block of Moslem population is in Egypt; but sea and desert enclose it. Egypt may agitate and riot and boycott as much as it wishes; yet it remains isolated from the rest of the Moslem world either for effective resistance or for exercising its power in distant countries, so long as the sea is under European control.

Christian powers control all the gateways of Mohammedan lands except those in Turkish hands. The pacification of Morocco, the French mandate in Syria, Britain's control of Emir Abdullah's Transjordan country and Feisal's Kingdom of Iraq, Italy's control of Libya and the Dodecanese — these form a ring that will remain powerful if the nations that forged it do not attempt to fight the strongest ally of the remoter tribes — the desert environment.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SEA CONTROL

It is control of the sea and of modern industry that makes the chief difference between the present situation and the situation of past centuries when the Moslem not merely threatened Europe but invaded it. In the centuries in which he occupied Spain and dominated the Balkans and threatened Europe, the life of Europe was as detached and incapable of effective organization for the achievement of a common object as the Moslem world is today. Europe is an immensely fertile area, densely populated and powerful: it requires a conscious effort to realize how divided and difficult a country it was when some of its marginal lands were under Moslem control. It had an immense acreage of forest that has since been largely cut away; its roads served foot traffic chiefly, not wheel traffic. It had nothing at all that resembled modern industry in the matter of materials and resources upon which modern war are based. Since then its forests have been cleared; not merely have roads been built, but an immense network of railroads has united every part; and above all it has turned its technical achievements in the direction of maritime control to such an extent that the sea is today a determining factor in any world organization that must sustain protracted war.

In order fully to realize the bearing of this fact upon the Mohammedan world, take the case of the railways. Upon Plate I (page 146), we have shown all the railways in that realm, whether large or small. Outside that realm only trunk lines have been indicated. It is noteworthy that the railways within the Mohammedan world are short, disconnected lines for the most part or mere spurs or extensions of main trunk lines built and controlled from without. The railways of French North Africa are based upon the sea. They lie within the zone of effective and continuous French occupation. The same is true of the railways of Lower Egypt; and the link that connects the railway system of Egypt with that of Syria was built as a strategic line during the World War and lies so close to the sea as to be easily kept

under the control of sea power. The railway at the head of the Persian Gulf is based upon the power that controls the gulf; and so it is all about the border of the Mohammedan world, with few exceptions. There is an apparently detached line running through Russian Turkestan, and of course the control of the railway system of Anatolia is now entirely in Turkish hands.

The geographical situation of the railways makes it impossible for them to serve as bonds of union or as sustaining features in a political policy; and their very lack of mobility greatly diminishes their value from the standpoint of sea or modern air control. A battleship, on the other hand, is a completely mobile unit. It represents a high degree of technical skill, both in construction and in operation. There is not enough technical skill in the whole Mohammedan world outside of Turkey either to build or to operate a single battleship. Moving from place to place, a battleship, or the fleet it represents, is able to focus men and resources upon a given point either as a base for further operations or in the way of attack upon mobilizations of the enemy. The railroad is a fixed thing; it cannot be moved in any strategic sense; the amount of technical skill it represents is less and the quality of the skill is simple, compared with that required to build and operate a battleship. Moreover, almost without exception the railroad represents a mere point upon the coast, a point that in almost all cases has its strategic importance modified by access on the part of maritime powers.

LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY DESERT ENVIRONMENT

The most important limitation of all is the environment in which the Moslem dwells. Over the greater part of the area in which he lives desert conditions prevail. The sand, the rock, the heat, the absence of water or its great scarcity, the thin and scattered forage, the unimproved natural lines of communication — these constitute the allies of the desert dweller. When the invader comes into the desert these allies fight for the native. The experience of Pershing in Mexico in 1916 is illuminating. A deep penetration of the desert section of northern Mexico put him in possession of no important cities and created no fundamental change in the life of the great majority of Mexicans. Pershing's expedition fought not Mexicans chiefly but the hard conditions of mere existence in desert Mexico. The cost of the expedition must be charged to heat and drought and sand and the energy required physically to overcome them by the expenditure of motor trucks, gasoline, oil, and food.

How different is the case when the desert dweller tries to take his resources abroad! In gathering together these resources he is fighting precisely the opponents that the invader would have to fight. If he gathers forage, food, transport animals, resources of whatever kind, he must fight the unimproved spaces. He suffers from the same lack of water that was the dread of the invader. He finds himself with few transportation lines, and with ports for the most part unimproved, and he lacks ample sustenance spaces to support his mobilized forces at points of attack. Moreover, not only does his own environment fight him when he tries to use it in carrying his operations into the enemy's country, but his chief ally stays behind. Said Gibbon, "Safety reposes in the heart of the burning solitude." When the desert dweller faces his enemy in his enemy's environment he matches his numbers, his skill, his material resources against those of his enemy on equal terms. His hosts can no longer be scattered through the desert; he can no longer conceal his trails and watering places. Standing on a common footing, the disparity between him and his enemy is so great as to leave him no chance at all in the modern world except in the desert itself.[1]

At this point we may ask what capacities the desert dweller has upon his own ground to develop industry and the material power that opposes him when he carries the fight into Europe. Let us look first of all at the natural means of communication. Plate I (opposite page 146) shows the outlines of the area in which interior-basin drainage prevails in the Mohammedan world; and comparing it with the map which shows the rainfall, we are struck at once with the absence of natural means of communication, except in a few isolated cases. The Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates system, and the Volga are the most conspicuous exceptions; since only the lower Volga is bordered by Moslem

[1] When fighting on his own desert terrain the Arab has resources of the first importance. Thus Lawrence in *Revolt in the Desert:*

"The Arab war was geographical, and the Turkish Army an accident. Our aim was to seek the enemy's weakest material link and bear only on that till time made their whole length fail. Our largest resources, the Beduin on whom our war must be built, were unused to formal operations, but had assets of mobility, toughness, self-assurance, knowledge of the country, intelligent courage. With them dispersal was strength. Consequently we must extend our front to its maximum, to impose on the Turks the longest possible passive defence, since that was, materially, their most costly form of war. . . .

"We must not take Medina. The Turk was harmless there. In prison in Egypt he would cost us food and guards. We wanted him to stay at Medina, and every other distant place, in the largest numbers. Our ideal was to keep his railway just working, but only just, with the maximum of loss and discomfort. The factor of food would confine him to the railways, but he was welcome to the Hejaz Railway, and the Trans-Jordan Railway, and the Palestine and Syrian railways for the duration of the war, so long as he gave us the other nine hundred and ninety-nine thousandths of the Arab world."

NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE MOHAMMEDAN WORLD[1]

COMMODITY (IN BRACKETS, WORLD'S PRODUCTION IN 1925)	LOCALITY	PRODUCTION IN 1925	ESTIMATED RESERVES
Coal [1,187,803,000 tons]	USSR[2] (Asia)	17,637,000	
	Turkey	650,000 (est.)	
	Dutch East Indies	1,401,000	
Oil[3] [1,071,300,000 bbls.]	USSR (Caucasus)	52,447,600	Important reserves
	Dutch East Indies	21,500,000	Still only partly developed
	Persia	34,700,000	Persia and Mesopotamia regions of great possibilities
	Egypt	1,200,000	Minor workings in Algeria
Iron Ore [142,342,000 tons]	North Africa	3,311,000	Minor workings in Turkey and Egypt
	Egypt	150,000 (1924)	
Copper Ore [1,387,390 tons]	Russia	224,000	Includes Caucasus
	Algeria	2,000	
Lead [1,523,800 tons, metal]	North Africa	33,000 (ore)	Algeria and Tunis small production
	Turkey	5,100 (metal)	
Zinc [1,131,700 tons, metal]	North Africa	34,000 (ore)	Unworked deposits in Dutch East Indies
Gold [$395,968,000]	Dutch East Indies	$2,743,500	
	Malay States	292,400	
	Turkey	19,300	Lesser workings in Turkey and Nigeria
	Egypt	29[4]	
	Abyssinia	622[4]	Placer mining
Silver [244,180,200 oz.]	Turkey	219,900	No important known reserves
	Dutch East Indies	2,385,000	
Mercury [104,000 flasks]	Algeria	58	Lesser workings
Tin [150,200 tons — metal]	Malay States	48,000 (ore)	Placers cover large areas
	Dutch East Indies	32,700 (ore)	Reserves, 325,000 tons
	Nigeria	6,300 (ore)	Important reserves
Manganese Ore [2,570,000 tons]	USSR (Caucasus)	816,500	Nikipol deposits estimated at 7,400,000 tons; Georgia reserves at 200,000,000
	Dutch East Indies	10,000	
	Egypt	80,600	
	Tunis	1,700	
Antimony [24,600 tons]	Algeria	1,460	
	Turkey	400	
Chromite [280,100 tons, 1924]	Turkey	2,540 (1922)	Reserves estimated at 15,000,000 tons
	N. W. India and Baluchistan	46,200 (1924)	Reserves in Baluchistan, 800,000 tons
Tungsten [8,140 tons]	Malay States	159	Federated States only represented in production figure

[1] After: *International Statistical Year-Book 1926* (League of Nations); *International Year-Book of Agricultural Statistics 1926–27;* recent bulletins of the U. S. Bureau of Mines; *The Statesman's Year-Book; The Chambers of Commerce Atlas*, 1925.

[2] USSR: Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

[3] The four principal mineral resources are in bold type.

[4] Kilograms.

NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE MOHAMMEDAN WORLD (*continued*)

COMMODITY (IN BRACKETS, WORLD'S PRODUCTION IN 1925)	LOCALITY	PRODUCTION IN 1925	ESTIMATED RESERVES
Phosphate [8,822,000 tons]	North Africa	4,226,804	Large deposits, Algeria and Tunis; Morocco reserves 20,000,000 tons. Important phosphate deposits in Egypt
	Egypt	87,869	
Salt [21,117,100 tons] 1924	Dutch East Indies	132,000 (1924)	
	Turkey	100,000 (1924)	
	North Africa	147,100 (1924)	
	Egypt	68,000 (1924)	
Wheat [4,022,400,000 bu.]	Egypt and Sudan	36,608,000	
	North Africa	68,721,000	
	Turkey	39,428,000	
	Near Eastern Mandates [1]	11,553,000	
Corn [4,328,551,000 bu.]	Egypt and Sudan	63,694,000	
	North Africa	4,460,000	
	Dutch East Indies	59,114,000	
	Turkey	19,191,000	
	Syria	1,639,000	
Barley [1,699,420,000 bu.]	North Africa	94,041,000	
	Egypt and Sudan	10,846,000	
	Near Eastern Mandates [1]	6,824,000	
	Turkey	55,330,000	
Cotton [28,478,000 bales]	Egypt and Sudan	1,792,000	
	Turkey	108,600	
	USSR (Turkestan)	760,000	
	Persia	61,905	
	Near Eastern Mandates [1]	16,000	
Tobacco [3,762,000,000 lbs.]	Dutch East Indies	132,000,000 (1924)	
	Turkey	103,000,000	
	Algeria	59,400,000	
	USSR (Central Asia)	30,000,000 (1921)	
	Near Eastern Mandates [1]	9,182,000	
	Persia	22,818,000	
Date Palms [90,000,000 trees]	Iraq	30,000,000	(From Popenoe, *Geogr. Rev.*, Jan. 1926)
	Persia	10,000,000	
	Arabia	9,000,000	
	Egypt and Sudan	12,261,600	
	North Africa	20,549,100	
	N. W. India, Baluchistan	5,500,000	
Sheep and Goats [648,920,000 head]	Turkey	21,452,300	
	USSR (Central Asia)	21,076,400	
	North Africa	24,998,100	
	Near Eastern Mandates [1]	7,459,400	
	Egypt and Sudan	4,595,600	
	Dutch East Indies	3,259,200	
Horses [94,739,000 head]	USSR (Central Asia)	6,262,300	
	Turkey	638,900 (1926)	
	Dutch East Indies	730,200	
	Syria	50,378	
	North Africa	458,570	

[1] Include Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq.

populations (and these very weak), it therefore does not form a connecting link between two important units of that world. In all the area shown in color in the drainage map the streams run from the sea, not into it. With the exceptions noted above they are fed by the notoriously intermittent rains of the desert over at least two thirds of their drainage area, and constitute waterways of only local value to commerce and with limited value even as sources of water supply. For the most part the drainage lines are mere dry stream beds with an occasional water hole but no stream, except at long intervals of time separated by periods of extreme drought. To this area of interior-basin drainage must be added a still greater expanse of desert where intermittent drainage is also the rule, despite outlet to the sea, and in which the above handicaps operate with equal or even greater effect.

MATERIAL RESOURCES

It is in the field of material resources that we find the Mohammedan world chiefly lacking. The table on pages 132 and 133 shows all the important natural resources of the Mohammedan world (twenty-two in number), ranging from live stock and cereals to minerals of every description. Out of the total of twenty-two items there are but four that have any significant development today, — phosphate, manganese, tin, and oil. There is a fifth, coal, that may have considerable development, though no real importance in relation to the rest of the world. The table deserves close study, for it reveals in the clearest possible light the extreme scarcity within the Mohammedan world of those resources upon which modern industry rests, that is, resources necessary for the waging of modern war.

The distribution of the four mineral resources that occur within the Mohammedan world in significant amounts neutralizes the value of even these limited advantages.

(1) The *phosphate* is found exclusively in French North Africa, where escape from European control, without any question of access and development, depends entirely upon control of the sea.

(2) The *manganese* is produced in Georgia, now under control of the Soviet Union, and its possible control by a Mohammedan power is chiefly important as a means of withdrawing a valuable but not a vital commercial product from an enemy.

(3) The *tin* is produced exclusively in the region of the Straits Settlements in southeastern Asia; and here again both development and transportation, which are indispensable to the use of

the deposits, are determined by control of the sea. Added to that is the distance and the precarious nature of the routes by which it could be made available even if it remained in Mohammedan hands.

(4) The *oil* has a wider distribution; but the main center is at Baku in the Caucasus, in the Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan, within the Soviet Union, and practically all of the production up to the present time has been consumed in Russia. It does not affect the modern industrial powers to an important degree except as it supplies a need which spares their own reserves in time of peace. In time of war the withdrawal of the Baku supplies has no vital relation to the stakes of a controversy.

In view of this layout of mineral resources and the lesser facts which the accompanying table discloses, it is clear that sustained warfare in a modern sense is entirely out of the question if it is to be supported by the technical skill and the resources of the Mohammedan world itself.

Naturally this is far from saying that war cannot be long sustained upon the border of that world. Until traffic in arms and munitions is strictly controlled, it will still be possible to barter such resources as a given country possesses for the means of waging at least guerrilla warfare that is likely to tempt an opposing power to send armed forces into the desert. The drain of such continued warfare is enormous in view of modern army standards of living and pay, which are in marked contrast to the standards of living that prevail as a rule among Mohammedan populations. It is not victory or defeat that is the critical issue with the invader, but the expense of maintaining a military force and the protests of the taxpayer at home, who in all cases desires that his government shall take every step to foster commerce without risking war.

A POLICY OF MARGINAL CONTROL

The political geography of the Mohammedan world appears to indicate a definite line of action on the part of contending powers. It would seem to be a sound policy to leave the Mohammedan world to itself so far as possible; but, above all, if force must be exercised, to exercise it only in strategic regions of high productivity or at strategic points where special sustaining resources like oil, phosphates, and tin may be developed. While this has been the line of general historical development, it is by no means a line that has been closely followed. Of all the powers that have dealt with the Mohammedan world, probably the British Empire has made the most intelligent use of military and

naval force in support of a national policy. We may fairly designate England's acts as representing a *policy of marginal control.* It is not a widely extended force that England has sent repeatedly into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, but a small force directed toward a minimum number of objectives and withdrawn at the first opportunity. The British force in Egypt has always been too small to satisfy the military and naval critics of the government. In Mesopotamia (Iraq), England has controlled the outlets and a small number of strategic points. In lightening the burden of occupation in Mesopotamia she resorted within the last few years to airplane control of distant villages and to the disciplinary effects of bombing expeditions at points of active resistance. In Anatolia her ships of war have appeared repeatedly at the several coastal gateways, and marines have been landed there to attain only the nearest objectives, to be held for the briefest possible time. In northwestern India there has been a constant interplay of negotiation and diplomacy on the one hand and the exercise of a minimum amount of military force on the other — a situation that has been maintained for nearly two generations. It is always touch-and-go between the French and British military and naval forces and the Mohammedan forces opposed to them. Hejaz was created during the war under the ægis of the British, who relaxed their control rather than give military support to King Hussein against Ibn Saud, ruler of the Nejd, head of the Wahabi tribesmen that swept over northwestern Arabia and seized Mecca.

The policy of marginal control of the Mohammedan world is one that requires the most intensive study, not only from the standpoint of strategy but also from the standpoint of national budgets. There may exist wide differences of opinion upon the question of control in any form at all; but once control is set down as a *sine qua non* there can be little difference of opinion upon the narrow limits within which that control should be exercised. For there is not only the teaching of history; there is also the whole of modern experience during the past century and during the World War, to indicate that Mohammedan populations have in their geographical environment an ally of such power that expensive modern war would ruin the nation that attempted their subjugation.

If we look for concrete illustrations of the principles to which we have alluded, we find them thickly sprinkled upon the map. The cost of the French occupation and control of Syria is adding weight to the already heavy burden of France. When confronted with the Turkish terms at the Second Conference of Lausanne, France threat-

ened to send additional troops to the support of the force in Syria, and there is no doubt at all that she could do this; but when and how would the cost of the expedition be met? There are no resources within Franco-Syrian territory that could possibly sustain the troops for any length of time, and the Turk can afford to wait; he can even afford to let his land and his people be wasted for a considerable time to gain his diplomatic objectives. His recovery will be rapid; the loss of financial power and the further weakening of her credit might well become dangerous to France.

Italian experience offers a close parallel to that of the French and also to that of the British in Mesopotamia. Italy's gains in Libya in the war with Turkey (1911–1912) were held at great cost during the World War, when the restless Senussi occupied the hinterland and extended their operations to the oasis of Siwa near the Nile only to meet defeat at the hands of the British. After the armistice of 1918 Italy pursued a policy of conciliation; and, finding the task of occupation and actual government an altogether impossible one, she temporized with the head of the Senussi, signed a treaty with him, invited him to Rome, conciliated the Moslems of Albania, and in short reoriented her entire Moslem policy to the end that she might have peace and engage in constructive enterprises as an alternative to continuous war. Her gains in this respect are neither permanent nor important as yet, but they at least indicate that severe limitations in the exercise of power over Moslem countries have been recognized by Italy.

Local marginal successes by Mohammedan peoples have been won chiefly on the part of Turkey, the largest political unit in the Mohammedan world. It is situated on that corner of Europe farthest removed from the great industrial centers of the continent. The distance from London to Constantinople by sea is as great as that from London to New York. From Paris to Constantinople overland — and there are three mountain systems on the way — is as far as from St. Louis to Querétaro, far beyond the Mexican border. At first this looks altogether favorable for the case of the Mohammedans, and our balance of judgment will be restored only if we closely estimate the effect of physical geography and character upon political unity within the Mohammedan world itself. First in importance is that persistent sectarian division which from Mohammed's time down to our own has thwarted every leader who sought Mohammedan solidarity. There is not merely the broad division between Sunnites and Shiites, but the large number of minor sects that thrive in every quarter of the Mohammedan world. A common working program has been out of the question,

whether in the field of religion or in that of politics and government. This conclusion is supported by the events of the past ten years as well as by thirteen centuries of history. Ibn Saud's followers hate and fight the Hejazi as fiercely now as ever; the border of the "Fertile Crescent" of Syria is still raided by the nomadic Arabs, though they profess equal devotion with the settled farmer to the precepts of the Prophet; the question of the Caliphate is as little advanced toward definitive solution as when it first arose; the suggestion that there may be a union between the millions of blacks in the Sudan with the Kirghiz of Turkestan or even the less-distant Bedouin is an altogether fantastic one; and equally fantastic is the implication that any combination of units has the technical skill, the resources, and the physical layout that furnishes any basis whatever for aggression on a great scale. European disunion alone furnishes an opportunity for striking effectively in critical marginal situations and at critical times.

THE RELIGIOUS CONFRATERNITIES

Closely related to British imperial interests in Egypt and also to the fields of French and Italian colonial expansion in northern Africa, are the powerful and influential secret societies, or "confraternities," among the Mohammedan populations. This is a general or collective name for the various religious societies of the Mohammedan world, of which there are from fifty to one hundred distributed all the way from Morocco to Baghdad. Almost every adult male Moslem is a member of one of these societies.

The confraternities came into existence in an interesting way. After Mohammed's death, Mohammedanism changed its aspect. It reached into the field of law and gave religious authority to the words and decrees of the lawyers. The rulers on their side also sought to control the church and make it an instrument of military and political conquest. In addition, the Turks and the Arabs developed strong racial and then political animosities. In reaction to all these changes, pious men of strong character founded sects, or confraternities, withdrew to remote regions, gathered disciples, and built monasteries.

Some of these societies were active and reached from one end of the Moslem world to the other; others were obscure and local. Some have lived for a long time; others went out of existence almost with the death of the original founder. Some were military in spirit; others were pacifistic. Some of them have become great missionary agencies whose

chief goal has been the vast interior of Africa, where they would be far from the arm of European authority, and where there are millions of ignorant, superstitious negroes to convert. Some were devoted to poverty, and others amassed great wealth with which they could fit out small military expeditions. These extended Mohammedan authority and provoked border tribesmen to make trouble for European governors about the borders of the Sahara as well as in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Libya, French Equatorial Africa, and elsewhere.

The most powerful of the African societies is the Senussi, which has been in existence for about eighty years and has a quite special character. Its founder claimed to be a direct descendant of the Prophet, and in addition he preached a puritanical variety of Moslemism — a back-to-the-faith-of-the-fathers gospel. This he conceived to be impossible in close contact with the wickedness of cities and especially of Christians. He finally settled down in the remote interior desert settlements of Cyrenaica, where he was almost out of reach of the Turkish authorities and where he could communicate with his own people by convenient caravan routes. He traveled from Mecca through northern Africa, founding fraternity centers, and for a time became so powerful that the Sultan of Turkey feared loss of prestige as Caliph. The oasis of Kufra, five hundred miles west of the Nile and in the heart of the Sahara, has been the central source of Senussi power since 1894. From this point the influence of the leader of the sect has extended over a vast desert country.

Though at first free from all political influence, the Senussi gradually were drawn into political relations which have affected their later development. They resisted the coming of the Italians after the Italo-Turkish War (1911–1912), thinking that with Italian control over northern seaports, the lucrative trade in slaves would be suppressed or heavily taxed, and ordinary trade diverted. Between 1912 and 1914 they were supplied with arms, ammunition, and money by the Turks, and thus were able successfully to resist, down to the end of the World War, the Italian advance into the interior of Cyrenaica.

REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

We now turn to certain more specific situations of critical interest to western Europe, that have taken shape because of their relation to Mohammedan groups and principles. Arabia holds the center of the stage because it is the only independent Moslem state in the world save Turkey and remote Afghanistan (page 559), and the latter is less important as a seat of Moslem power than as a territorial buffer be-



FIG. 35. Boundaries of the Nejd and adjacent countries. The heavy lines show international boundaries, solid where the line is determined, broken where undetermined. The dot-and-dash lines show internal boundaries. From the *Geographical Review*, Vol. 17, January 1927, after Martin (*Foreign Affairs*, July 1926) and Musil, 1927.

tween England and Russia. Arabia is indeed the heart and center of the Mohammedan realm. Opposite it on the western side of the Red Sea is Egypt, — often called the "wasp-waist" of the British Empire, — which though now independent is subject as before to supervision by Great Britain. At the northern end of the Red Sea is the Suez Canal, on the direct route to India from the whole Mediterranean region and from England. Of the 320 million people of India 66 millions are Mohammedans. During the recent war it took 340,000 Anglo-Indian troops to hold in control the Mohammedans and the border tribes of northern India. Egypt and India and Mesopotamia and the Gibraltar gateway of the Mediterranean Sea are all related to Great Britain's road to India and marked by the presence of Mohammedan elements. The problems of these regions have long had vital and sinister aspects for England.

With the break-up of the Turkish and Russian empires, Great Britain's relations to the Mohammedan world and the Near East have been altered in many respects; for Turkey was always able to threaten trouble among the Mohammedan populations of the British Empire, not only in the Near East but also in Zanzibar and British East Africa, South Africa, and India.

Arabia

To understand the political problems of Arabia, let us look first at the physical geography. The country is a huge desert peninsula. Placed over the United States, it would extend from San Diego, California, to Chicago, and from Canada to Mexico (Fig. 36). Every part of this vast region is more or less a unit in itself. It is bordered on at least one side by a broad and nearly impassable desert. The country is still further isolated by the absence of good harbors and improved roads.

The country is broken into strongly marked physiographic units, and its people have always been divided into primitive organizations in which the tribal idea is paramount. They

Fig. 36. Anatolia and Arabia in terms of American distances.

are all fiercely fanatical and have excluded the intruder to a remarkable degree, being helped in this respect by the inaccessibility of the country. Even the Turkish officials have been kept out. Though the desert interior is sufficiently high to make the climate possible for white men, no white men — not even explorers — have penetrated the inner populated districts until recent times. Inner southeastern Arabia contains a broad tract called the Empty Quarter, which has never been traversed by a European. The nomadic tribes live within a limited space, and the persistent feuds, especially between the northern and southern tribes, have intensified the tribal isolation. This is the more remarkable when we consider that the general mode of life and the language of the different tribes are the same.

The population groups lying in the heart of Arabia are strikingly located. The oases are scattered along the valley floors of a drainage system associated with a belt of highland, the backbone of central Arabia, known as the Jebel Tuwaik (Fig. 37). It is in the form of a long ridge extending roughly north and south for a distance of nearly 400 miles, with an average breadth of 20 miles. Its western border is a relatively steep and regular scarp 400 to 600 feet high. Its eastern slope descends by broad steps to the desert wastes that flank it on this side. On the south, the north, and the west lie other sandy desert tracts that form a great moat about the central uplift, which, far removed from the coast and from other desert settlements, having small resources, inhabited by scattered groups generally of small size (only Riyadh has a population of 12,000 to 15,000), and with a people singularly hostile toward the stranger, is more isolated than if it were a remote oceanic isle.

The tribes of the highland region of the Nejd have never been brought under subjection by foreign powers in modern times. They are Wahabis, who recognize Ibn Saud as ruler. The latter has maintained a rather high state of military efficiency and religious ardor, and by favoring the development of the principal towns and villages is able to preserve the integrity of his desert empire and to extend it to alarming proportions. On the west he has pushed his control to the Red Sea. On the north he has been stopped by treaties that give him control right up to the borders of Transjordan. Toward the Persian Gulf his territory runs coterminous with that of Kuweit. In addition he has come to terms with both Transjordan and Iraq (through British representatives) over grazing and water rights to be enjoyed by migratory pastoral tribes that find it desirable to cross boundaries in search of better pastures.

Arabia has a northern border of better-watered country, the Fertile Crescent, where the nomadic Arab has become a sedentary tiller of the soil. Mesopotamia and Syria, like the Hejaz, Yemen, and Oman, are settled by branches of the Arab people. The government of the outer coastal states, the commerce, and the customs of the people as well, are quite different from those of the inner desert tribes. In many places the latter are peaceful enough; in others they periodically raid the rich valleys of the fertile border, or they take to piracy, as on the shores of the Persian Gulf.

FIG. 37. The heart of the Arabian desert and home of the independent Wahabis. After Philby, *Geographical Journal*, March 1920.

Owing to the lawlessness of its people and their disorganized political condition, it has been the fate of Arabia to have its borders invaded by foreign interests. Non-Arab powers have controlled all the water approaches — Great Britain on the south and east and formerly Turkey on the west.

Opposed to the much discussed and long desired Arab union or confederation is the physical geography of the Arabian peninsula. The detached tribal states are widely separated on the margin of the great Arabian desert. It is nearly a thousand miles from Damascus to Mecca. While the Hejaz has a population of several hundred thousand, its military power is feeble and its political experience small. The local differences of culture and history likewise oppose confederation. Syria and Arabia have unlike customs, traditions, and habits.

Damascus has an age-old ambition herself to become the head of an independent Arab kingdom.

Even before the World War, the Arab half of the Turkish Empire was interested in the founding of a separate Arab empire. Among the Arabs there was never any real interest in the short-lived Pan-Turanian movement of the Turks. Here we have a very interesting fact: there was a growing division of the old Ottoman Empire along lines of nationalism rather than religion.

While the movement for Arab independence made rapid headway during the World War, it has now taken on very artificial forms. As soon as the war was over, the traditional disputes of the Arabs were revived. They ended in an armed conflict between Ibn Saud, leader of the Wahabis of the Nejd, and King Hussein of the Hejaz. The former represents the most extreme and fanatical elements of Mohammedanism; the latter holds orthodox views. The quarrel grew out of a question of boundaries, but it rests in large part also upon deep-seated religious differences that illustrate the difficulties of Arab unity. It was Ibn Saud's war cry that Mecca had become corrupt, harboring brigands who preyed on hapless pilgrims, and that Hussein winked at corruption, thus implying that indulgences had been bought.

Because of its position on the Red Sea, the Hejaz will continue to be important in international affairs in spite of its small size and the recent change of authority from Hussein to Ibn Saud. It is only about 700 miles long and 150 miles wide, and lies between the highlands of the plateau of Arabia and the Red Sea coast. The name "Hejaz" means *barrier*, which refers to the wall of high mountains on the edge of the tableland. The largest city in the Hejaz is Mecca, with a population of 80,000; next is Medina, with about 40,000. The principal traffic is related to the pilgrimages made by many devout Mohammedans from all parts of the Moslem world. From 100,000 to 130,000 people annually visit the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Most of them come by sea, but many travel by caravan and, more recently, by rail as far as Medina. Fifty per cent are from the Netherlands East Indies, twenty per cent from India.

Of special interest in a study of Arabia is the principality of Oman. The eastern Oman is one of the most advanced districts of the peninsula. The population of the entire province is estimated at 500,000. First in importance is the town of Maskat, with a population of 10,000, the seat of extensive trade with India and East Africa. One of the long-standing difficulties at Oman has been the illicit trade in firearms. In 1912 the British compelled the Sultan to promulgate a law pro-

hibiting this trade; but French vessels, down to the time of the Hague arbitral decision of 1905, had entire freedom of commerce in the waters of Oman and could not be searched by British gunboats.

Since 1885 the various sultans or emirs of the small Arab states along the southern coast of Arabia have virtually recognized British protection. The British have also annexed the Kuria Muria Islands and assumed a protectorate over Bahrein Island in the Persian Gulf (Fig. 35), the latter in the face of protests by Persia. A treaty concluded with Turkey in 1909 recognized as a British sphere all of Arabia south of a line drawn between Yemen and Aden and extending northeastward to the Katar peninsula, on the Persian Gulf.

The two border provinces of Yemen and Asir remain to be considered. Yemen is the small province at the southwestern corner of the Arabian peninsula with possibly a million and a half inhabitants. The strip near the coast is barren country with a few oases. Toward the east is a tableland with local mountains exceeding 10,000 feet in height, and here is greater rainfall and high production. Paying little heed to Turkish overlordship, Yemen was a virtually independent country up to 1914 and will probably remain so, provided it enters no alliance that threatens the welfare of the great powers. Recent Italian advances are noted in a later chapter (page 242).

Like the Hejaz, Asir has for its eastern boundary a rugged mountain belt, with well-watered and fertile valley floors. There are no navigable waterways. All inland communication is by caravan. In 1912 the ruling sheik declared his country autonomous. In 1914 Turkey sent warships to the coast, but the World War prevented further military measures. When Ibn Saud conquered the Hejaz, he made overtures to Asir, then threatened by the Yemen, with the result that this small unit finds itself holding for a time the balance of power in Arabian politics in the Red Sea region.

There is a particular spot near the border of Arabia that deserves notice because of its critical relation to the Aden and Red Sea outlet on the British road to India, at the Strait of Bab el Mandeb. This is the port of Sheikh Said, which the French have claimed for more than half a century. It lies on the eastern shore and directly opposite the British-owned island of Perim in the strait itself. It is between Perim and Sheikh Said (Fig. 228) that ships pass, and if the place were fortified it would menace the Indian and eastern Asiatic commerce that passes this way. The British look longingly at it, for with this and Socotra Island — which they already own — in their hands, every part of the Indian route would be amply protected. The small French

colony of Somaliland exists near by, but it is so completely overshadowed by British Somaliland and the British Aden colony that it can never become a menace to legitimate British interests, either commercial or naval. East of the port of Aden is an undefined hinterland on the Gulf of Aden, a British protectorate known as the Makalla Sultanate. The town of Makalla (10,000) is the capital and owes its existence to a single permanent stream.

As the mandatory for Palestine and Mesopotamia, Great Britain has almost encircled the Arabs, and she need fear no immediate difficulties in protecting her sea route from the Suez Canal to India, unless there should come about an improbable general union of Mohammedan peoples. With the pacification of Morocco and especially the Riffian tribes on the border of the Spanish Zone (Fig. 55), France has completed her immediate military program in relation to North African Mohammedans, though her Syrian problem still remains one of first magnitude. The policy of marginal control is now in full swing.

RECENT MOSLEM CONFERENCES

In March 1924, shortly after the abolition of the Caliphate in Turkey, a movement was begun to hold a general Moslem conference. Disorders in Egypt and the attack upon the Hejaz by Ibn Saud delayed the calling of the conference until May 1926. Fourteen countries were represented, though Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan were among those that did not send delegates. A special commission appointed to study the question reported that the restoration of the Caliphate was not practicable in the present state of Moslem society; but the members of the Congress refused to accept this conclusion and insisted upon a favorable one. Thereupon a permanent central committee was established to coöperate with local committees in all Moslem countries in order to work out the problem of the Caliphate.

The "Congress of Cairo," described above, had hardly ceased its meetings when a "Congress of the Mussulman World" met at Mecca in July of the same year, under the presidency of the victorious Ibn Saud. Nineteen Moslem countries were represented. Among those absent were Persia and the Moslem countries of North Africa. The seventy-five delegates passed upon a large number of questions, religious, sanitary, and economic, including the construction of new railway lines. Among the territorial questions was the possibility of the return to the Hejaz of Maan and Aqaba, ceded to Transjordan. A Permanent Executive Commission was established, and it was de-

PLATE I









A. Hoen & Co.

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The Geographical Review, Vol. XIV, No. 1, 1924

cided that the congress should meet each year at Mecca at the time of the pilgrimages.

The two conferences have brought together representatives of nearly all Moslem countries and they have considered questions of general interest to the Moslem world. While they are unofficial in character in the sense that they have been called together without previous organization, they have started organizations that may result in united action of greater import. Turkey having adapted its religion to the conceptions of the modern world, the Arab, not Turkish, domination is now the ruling idea among advocates of militant Mohammedanism. It remains to be seen whether the modernists of Angora or the orthodox Mohammedans of Arabia and India will become ascendant, the former emphasizing the importance in the first instance of political and economic considerations, the latter of religious motives.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLITICAL AND COLONIAL AIMS OF FRANCE

(A) Readjustment and Reorganization

The most intense and critical phases of the World War (1914–1918) were fought chiefly upon French soil, in the densely populated northeastern section facing Belgium and Germany. The results were destructive alike to farming land, cities, industrial works, coal mines, highways, woodlands — in short, the whole establishment of civilized life. "The devastated region of France" became a principal object of concern in framing the treaty of Versailles which closed the war. The costs of restoration have been for years a leading item in the general reparation scheme that has dominated both the internal politics and the external relations of France. Enormous outlays were made by the French government in order that the displaced population might be returned home, so far as possible, dwelling houses and industrial works rebuilt, and roads and railways restored. Because France sought to secure reimbursement from Germany for the costs of restoration, she had to deal firmly with the question of reparation payments, thus bringing about one crisis after another in European affairs.

The loss of manpower which the World War entailed was especially serious for France because her population was not quite holding its own in the pre-war period, whereas the populations of surrounding countries had been increasing. More than 1,400,000 of her soldiers were killed. Of these about half came from French farms, and almost all of them were young men whose death resulted in a heavy capital loss to the state. In addition, France made courageous expenditures of her material resources during the conflict. Her manufacturing energy was spent largely on big guns, ammunition, and the repair and replacement of the wastage of war. In consequence the whole economic life of France had to be made over to a degree not true of the life of any other nation in Europe except, possibly, Belgium.

To accomplish the great task of reconstruction France required assurance of peace, lest in the midst of the task she should be surprised again by an unfavorable political or military situation. The whole of French policy since 1919 is based upon a desire for security. Unless we see clearly the force of this desire and its natural relation to the temperament and psychology as well as the political situation of the French people, we cannot understand post-war Europe. Without a recognition of this outstanding fact, the successive phases of French



FIG. 38. Relief map of France, based on Vidal de la Blache. North of the line *A A'*, one third of all persons engaged in gainful pursuits were employed in industry in pre-war years (*Album graphique et statistique de la France*, 1907, p. 82). This is the chief industrial region of France (Fig. 45). It was the seat of the German invasions of 1870 and of 1914-1918. The plains of Belgium are continuous with those of northern France. It was by way of Liége, Brussels, and Lille that the German armies invaded France in 1914, reaching in a few weeks a point within a few miles of Paris. Note the position of Alsace-Lorraine and the defensive value of the Rhine.

policy since 1919 appear disconcerted and inharmonious. One may disagree with the point of view of French leaders, but one can hardly do so without sympathy; their acts cannot be branded as mere imperial design. For more than four years the sound of artillery fire could be heard at Paris. There was almost nightly danger of air raids. It takes but an hour to drive from the city to the nearest battlefields of the World War. France desired above everything else to be free from the long-standing menace of German invasion.

To obtain security the French people sought at first to put Germany in a state of economic bondage, not because there was a desire to inflict a state of bondage, but because by this means Germany could

be made to pay the costs of the war. Disillusionment followed the discovery that Germany had destroyed so much that she could not pay for the destruction even if everything in Germany were confiscated and sold for what it was normally worth. This was a terrible blow to France. The effect on the French spirit was not unlike that of a great military defeat. The French people had to accept the appalling conclusion that the costs of the war and of the damage done upon their soil could not be repaid except in small part.

The next two steps that were taken to obtain security were financial and strategic. By a scheme of reparation payments extending over a period of sixty years, France sought to obtain a semi-permanent hold upon German resources. This aspect of her policy will be discussed in greater detail in a later paragraph (page 152). The strategic step was an attempt to obtain the Rhine as the eastern boundary of France. Said Marshal Foch: "Recourse must be had in the first place to all the means provided by Nature, and Nature has placed but one barrier across the line of invasion: the Rhine." He wished to utilize and contest this barrier and he could do this only by occupying it. He believed that without the exercise of such a basic precaution western Europe would be "bereft of any natural frontier and . . . exposed to the danger of an invasion which may be more violent than ever." Failing to secure this barrier, an alternative was written into the treaty: the occupation of the Rhineland for a period of fifteen years with provision for successive withdrawals in less time if the treaty conditions were fulfilled; and finally, the demilitarization of a zone thirty miles broad along the east bank of the river.

Nothing could have induced France to accept less than her great object of fortifying the Rhine and holding the country behind it in permanent possession except the Franco-British and Franco-American treaties of guarantee signed in June 1919, on the same day that witnessed the signing of the treaty of Versailles. But neither of these treaties of guarantee was carried into effect by the governments concerned, so that French leaders were again to be disappointed in the realization of one of their most fundamental aims. It is true that France had obtained Alsace-Lorraine and a portion of the Rhine as a frontier; but it is also true that a much more critical portion of the boundary was left in German possession, namely, that part which runs from Strasbourg to Metz, close to the Belgian frontier, save an opening in the high country of the Argonne and that of the Vosges, one of the two great openings between France and Germany, the other lying across the plain of Belgium.



Fig. 39. Navigable waterways of France.

In addition to these two great disappointments (respecting the costs of the war and a Rhine frontier), France had to suffer a third: Germany excused herself from the full payment of reparations on one ground or another and it appeared eventually that she would cease payment altogether. If we look at these three things from the French point of view, — first, that the damage done by the World War could not be repaid by Germany; second, that France had given up a Rhine frontier under pressure from Great Britain and the United States and with the promise of treaties of guarantee that never became effective; and third, that the final compromise agreement upon reparations was in danger of nullification by Germany, — we shall be slow to allege that France acted in a spirit of revenge or of imperialism when she sought by direct means to take care of herself. She felt that she

had been abandoned by her allies and that her own acts alone could bring salvation. We now see why her army numbers more than 670,000, far larger in proportion to population than that of any other country in Europe except Poland, and why she thought it necessary to occupy the Ruhr, the heart of industrial Germany on the east bank of the Rhine.

When diminishing reparation deliveries at last were made by Germany with increasing protest and denunciation, repeated conferences were held between British and French (with some participation by Belgium and Italy) for the purpose of determining what measures could be taken to meet the German demands. During this period the mark fell steadily, with only temporary halts, and at last became almost worthless. Related to its fall was the general decline of German industry. From one point of view the fall of the mark and the decline of German industry were a result of the reparation policy pursued by France in accordance with the treaty. This view was held to an increasing degree by Englishmen as the situation grew in intensity. The French point of view was that the fall of the mark could be corrected if Germany stabilized her currency and supplied an important business ingredient, confidence, by honestly meeting the reparation obligations of the treaty of Versailles, as repeatedly modified in her favor.

Increasing divergence between the French and British points of view brought about a virtually complete break, and when French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr in 1923 the British Army of Occupation did not participate. The leading cities and industrial plants in this great mining and metallurgical district were occupied; railroads, mines, telegraphs, telephones, were seized; a new customs frontier was established and administered by French officials and engineers. What was the purpose of the French in entering the Ruhr and was that purpose accomplished? In his reply to the Curzon note of 11 August 1923, Poincaré said: "We did not go into the Ruhr to find immediately money for reparations, but above all to create in the German Government a wish to pay, and to seize guarantees." He went on to say that the French had destroyed nothing in the Ruhr, that Germany's capacity for production was greater than ever, that the ill-effects upon German life alleged by the British had already been felt before the occupation, and finally that Germany herself declared she was unable to pay and asked a moratorium of four years. He protested against the hypothesis that France desired to annex the Ruhr or remain there, and above all, disclaimed responsibility for the economic crisis.

FIG. 40. The narrow belt of country between France and Germany is an old zone of friction. It was once held as a separate kingdom, as shown above. A line of buffer states in the same general position was discussed during the World War. After Putzger, *Historischer Schul-Atlas*, 1923.

Associated with the occupation of the Ruhr was the German fear that the French people would be tempted to stay permanently in the region called "the Left Bank of the Rhine." This feeling arose partly because of Marshal Foch's insistence that the Rhine was the natural frontier of France and was indispensable as a guarantee of future protection. Nor was it forgotten that political leaders no less than military experts had long considered the creation of a buffer state or states along the Rhine in which there would be no danger of military preparations directed against either Germany or France. Germany had reason to be alarmed. Just after the close of the World War (1919) a few local leaders started a separatist movement and proclaimed the "Republic of the Left Bank of the Rhine." They immediately won French sympathy, and so too in 1923 did France sympathize with and openly support the formation of a Rhineland state when a movement of wider scope was initiated. There were local disorders and loss of life. Düsseldorf and the Palatinate were the principal centers of action of French-aided separatist governments styled "autonomous." As a whole the movement did not succeed, for it was never supported by the mass of the German population in the Rhineland. Moreover, the allies of France most immediately concerned, Belgium and Great Britain, made it quite clear that they would oppose so artificial a movement for the division of German territory, and that they considered the movement a blow at the very foundations of the treaty of peace.

Successive conferences and temporary agreements succeeded each other, but the premiers of France and England could find only expedients; they could not find a fundamental cure. France clung to the belief that she must hold German territory as ransom until Germany ceased to debate on every occasion the question of her ability to pay. In the winter of 1923–1924 matters had become so critical that it was plain to all the world that the collapse of European economic life and even European civilization itself might depend upon a settlement of this great issue. To solve the problem an expert committee was formed under an American, General Charles G. Dawes. So broadly based and impartial a study of German resources followed that a

proposed solution was adopted forthwith. The committee found that Germany could pay substantial amounts for an indefinite period on reparation account provided (1) that the Ruhr and the Rhineland railroads and the Ruhr mines were returned to Germany, and (2) that an independent bank were set up (*a*) to control the issue of German money and (*b*) make reparation payments to the Allies according to percentages that reflected the state of German prosperity. Regular payment of reparation funds would enable France to repay the cost of reconstructing the devastated regions and to pay her debts to England and the United States. It would assist England in the payment of her debt to America, and likewise it would enable Italy and Belgium to repay their loans to all three.

A principal feature of the Dawes Plan[1] for German Reparation is to require the payment in Germany of taxes as heavy as those borne by the French and British taxpayers. This would be the easier to do because the decline of the mark had completely wiped out the German internal debt, all former paper evidences of debt becoming practically worthless. The expert committee concluded that German industries would reach a normal economic condition if there were provided a graduated system of reparation payments (with moderate sums for the first four years), a balanced budget, and an effective tax distributed upon real property, incomes, railroads, etc. After 1934 it is expected that 2,500,000,000 gold marks can be paid. In order to provide these sums it was necessary to begin sweeping changes in Germany's domestic fiscal arrangements. Under normal conditions no sovereign country would consent to the type of receivership so easily set up in the crisis of 1924; but the alternative was a continuation in more extreme forms of French military pressure.

The definitive payments toward reparations are now made in gold marks, or their equivalent in German currency, into a proposed "bank of issue" created as an essential part of the plan; but not all of the money so accumulated is paid out in actual cash to the Reparation Commission, as otherwise the German currency system would again be thrown into disorder. It can to some extent be more effectively employed in Germany itself. The bank of issue has a paid-up capital of 400,000,000 gold marks. In order further to increase the bank's gold reserves and help stabilize its currency issues, Germany made a foreign loan in the sum of 800,000,000 gold marks, and the proceeds were deposited in the bank of issue. The bank is adminis-

[1] Hereafter referred to as the Experts' Plan, following the conventional use of the term by the Agent General for Reparation Payments.



FIG. 41. Mineral resources and principal water communications in the Alsace-Lorraine region. By taking these two districts from France in 1871, Germany deprived France of the strategic frontier of the Rhine and won for herself immense iron-ore resources that were of increasing value in Germany's industrial and commercial development. Petroleum products to the amount of 70,000 tons are now derived annually at the Pechelbronn locality. The annual potash production is over 300,000 tons. After Gallois, the *Geographical Review*, August 1918.

tered by a managing board under the chairmanship of a president, all of whom are of German nationality. In addition, there is a general board consisting of fourteen members, half of whom are of foreign and the other half of German nationality, and each serves for three years. This is designed to provide the machinery for enforcing the provisions of the agreement in all its details. The Commissioner who heads the general board is a foreigner, and an American was the first appointee.

FIG. 42. The Saar district (diagonally ruled); the Left Bank (stippled area west of the Rhine); and the bridgeheads and adjacent territory east of the Rhine, subject to temporary Allied control and to demilitarization. After the withdrawal of the American Army of Occupation the French and Belgian Zones were extended. The British occupy only a small tract at Cologne.

To utilize for reparations the net revenue of the government-owned railways, these have been converted into a joint-stock company managed by a board of directors. This reorganization is designed to relieve the German budget of the heavy burdens the railway account has carried hitherto, owing to poor management — one of the factors in the defeat of the Allies in their attempt to secure reparation payments. With company management, a 5 per cent first mortgage of 11,000,000,000 gold marks was laid on the railways. A further contribution to reparation was made by German industry (agriculture excluded), through the issue of first mortgage bonds in the sum of 5,000,000,000 gold marks and bearing 5 per cent interest. While this sum seems large, it is less than the total debt of industrial undertakings in Germany before the war, a debt that has been virtually discharged in depreciated currency and by which industry was freed of a burden that it normally carries in other countries. The continuance of deliveries in kind was recommended only for the natural products of Germany, such as coal, coke, and dyestuffs.

By these arrangements reparation payments have been taken out of the hands of politicians, placed in the hands of economic experts, and made the subject of regular non-political action. The greatest single post-war difficulty has thereby been removed. Equally stable have become the conditions of the Saar Basin. The governing commission

exercises its functions in a friendly and helpful spirit and has successfully carried out the economic and industrial arrangements authorized under the treaty of Versailles. Though the German Government at first charged the commission with attempts to make the region French, that charge has broken down in the face of actualities. On the other hand, there is little doubt that at the end of the present régime in 1935 the plebiscite of that year will return the basin to Germany. The annual post-war production of 15,000,000 tons has not yet reached the pre-war production of 17,500,000 tons, but the rate is of less concern because France is in complete and perpetual ownership of the coal mines, regardless of the result of the plebiscite.

Fig. 43. The Saar district of the treaty of Versailles. It includes by far the larger part of the Saar coal basin (Fig. 41).

ALLIANCES WITH CENTRAL-EUROPEAN POWERS

Coincident with her effort to obtain reparations from Germany and provide guarantees of security in the west, France has persistently sought to build up in eastern Europe a chain of friends whose military power might be called in aid should a grave crisis arise, as in 1914. With Czechoslovakia she signed in January 1924 a treaty whose purpose was to guarantee the integrity of the territorial arrangements made in the treaties of peace, and especially to prevent Hungary from carrying out its design of breaking down treaty arrangements on the part of Austria and Germany. The treaty was made on the assumption to which both parties held, that their interests required mutuality of political principles and of military aid in case of emergency.

Three years before, a similar treaty was signed and ratified between France and Poland. The expressed object was to coördinate the efforts of the two governments and to harmonize all political questions involving other powers, in order that the present international régime should be maintained in conformity with the several treaties of peace

and with the Covenant of the League of Nations. The two governments agreed to consult each other with respect to new arrangements that either made touching upon matters of policy in central and eastern Europe. A similar treaty with Rumania went into effect in 1927 and one with Yugoslavia was signed late in the same year, thus completing a chain of alliances from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

FRANCE AS A GREAT POWER

Rising above the temporary expedients in finance and politics in French life are a number of forces of a more permanent nature to which both political leader and economist must of necessity give heed. One of these is the long sustained conviction that France is safe only if she skillfully attaches other powers to her cause. But permanent security is impracticable except through a world league. One of the plainest lessons of history is that *devices* fail at critical junctures. It is impossible for an alliance to last, because the fundamental conditions upon which it is based in time become archaic and it is against self-interest to assume that original conditions are still potent. This calls for fresh alliances, and these cannot always be made under favorable terms. Sooner or later some nation must go down, some other must rise, under the scheme of alliances. Having failed to put Germany in a state of economic bondage and having failed equally to secure the pledges of her two most powerful allies (Great Britain and the United States) through treaties of guarantee, France sought alliances with her eastern friends, particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia, as we have just noted. But the power which these countries may contribute at a critical time may become wholly illusory. The exercise of that power may be determined in the first instance by military situations with which neither nation can cope, particularly Poland. What, then, is to be the permanent relation of France to Germany? She would like it to be that of two equal powers, equality to be obtained in the first instance by taking territory and limiting economic advantage. But whether these heavy conditions are laid upon Germany for ten years or for sixty years, eventually Germany will discharge her obligations or defeat the purposes of the treaty, and the fact will still remain that she has sixty or more millions of people to back up her position as opposed to the forty millions of France. This disparity in population and in rate of population growth on the two sides of the boundary line is one of the really fundamental facts of European life. France resists the conclusion that time is forcing upon her, that

she must be second to Germany in material and political power as well as in population. She saves herself for the present by the temporary expedient of alliances; but these rest on the cleverness of professional politicians and no nation can safely trust its life in their hands.

FIG. 44. Population changes in France between 1881 and 1920. The white areas show significant decrease; in general the black areas correspond with industrial centers. From the *Geographical Review*, Vol. 17, 1927.

The expedient of encouraging population growth is also temporary. That which is in the character of a people will find expression, and it is traditional in French life, whether from motives of prudence or otherwise, to limit the size of families and to make secure provision for the future of children, thus limiting population and national strength. Individual prudence is more powerful than national prudence. No government can control the expression of motives that lie so deeply imbedded in the character of its citizens. To accept the rôle of a power substantially weaker than Germany is a very difficult thing for France; but is it not a less difficult thing than to maintain that chain of alliances that surely will bring her into the next European war? Coupled with it is a tradition which French leaders elevate and which government representatives disseminate everywhere, a force that may ultimately be one of the historic causes of the destruction of France, the tradition of "la gloire." The desire to have the world recognize the historic power and glory of French arms is one of the most extraordinary qualities in French character and one which the foreigner finds most difficult to understand.

There is one way in which France has rightly elevated her prestige, to her political glory and material profit, and that is by making conquered peoples recognize and share in the "soul" of France. This is an extraordinary thing in French political life and colonial administration and is quite different from the policy pursued by the British.

The latter seek to maintain themselves a class apart and to show by forms and conventions as well as by their treatment of the native that they are a superior race. The French, on the other hand, attempt to secure a recognition of the advantages of French culture and to have France accepted as the model of western civilization. In a number of notable instances she has succeeded in securing native adoption of French ideas, and in most of her colonial dealings she has maintained the local or provincial organizations that have sprung out of native life while at the same time increasing appreciation for French cultural ideals.

INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT

To appraise the power of France in modern Europe one must look below the surface of things, at some of the fundamental bases of life in soils and minerals. Above all one must look at the character of the French people, for it is they, rather than the natural resources, that in the last analysis make their land what it is. To do this is difficult, because we are accustomed to think in terms of a few years rather than decades. We are likely to think of economic improvement or depression in a given year as having much more significance than it really has in the long run. If the World War wrought destruction upon French soil, it also brought many advantages. The port installations of the British and the Americans were in the nature of permanent improvements in some cases, and both harbors and waterways have been still further improved by the addition of floating docks, cranes, port railways, and canals. The French merchant marine has rapidly increased in tonnage, having risen from 2,200,000 tons to nearly 3,500,000 tons. Despite the increase, France still pays half a billion francs a year by way of freight charges for the transport of French goods in foreign ships. This large sum is a powerful incentive to further ship-building and port improvements. Tending in the same direction is the ownership of docks and ships by those huge companies that have come into existence in recent years as France has learned the lesson of organized industry, that is, production upon a large scale. The horizontal and the vertical industrial trusts (that is, those that respectively branch out widely in a given line and those that extend their power by controlling many lines affecting a single product) have come into existence in increasing number and have revitalized French industry. They are active in the metallurgical field as well as in chemicals and textiles.



FIG. 45. The concentration of France's mineral resources and industries on her northeastern frontier is shown. Though iron and coal deposits are rather generally distributed, those of greatest commercial value are in the eastern districts, where more than half of the iron and steel products are manufactured. Redrawn from map by Jean Brunhes, Editor (with E. de Martonne) of *Le Monde nouveau*, the French edition of *The New World*. See also *La France d'aujourd'hui, agriculture — industrie — commerce* (with maps), by G. Walter, 1927.

One of the most important assets of a modern industrial nation is technical education and skill. These things greatly increase the power of competition in the production of essential goods, their transport, and the conditions of marketing. The French technical schools have always been of a high order and France's present situation in the coal, iron, and chemical industries has given her technicians a far larger field of opportunity than at any time during the past hundred years. This condition has made it possible to carry out the improvements cited above as well as the electrification of railroads, and the increased employment of water power for electrical energy, and to increase the home production of coal so as to become more nearly self-supporting in this respect, rather than lean to a dangerous degree upon English and German importations. The effect of technical power is shown even in the colonies, where study commissions are laying the basis for an advance in the production of raw materials which France requires, such as phosphates and mineral and vegetable oils in the African possessions of France, notably Morocco, Algeria, and the Ivory Coast and Gold Coast.

THE AGRICULTURAL BASIS

Naturally the developments described above have reacted upon French agriculture. Were the population of France increasing rapidly, new work could be undertaken without drawing men off the land. With the population just holding its own, increased activity in industry is not wholly offset by immigration. There has been a decline in the area of cultivated land and a smaller percentage of total population employed in agriculture (now below 50 per cent).

But these are recent changes; in the long view the agricultural population of France is one of its most stable elements. It is remarkable how little change has taken place in France in the industrial period while great changes have taken place in other countries. Even the United States, so recently come to the point of dominant city growth and thoroughgoing industrialization, can show no such record of stability as France has exhibited in the past fifty years. According to the 1882 census there existed in France 5,672,000 agricultural holdings occupying an area just under 50,000,000 hectares. The 1892 census showed almost the same condition. By 1908 the number of holdings was just under 5,500,000 and the total area just over 50,000,000 hectares. Private properties covered 89 per cent of the total territory of France, according to the census of 1892, indicating

an exceptionally large number of small proprietors. Moreover, direct cultivation by landowners is more general than cultivation by lessees, in the proportion of about three to one.

The agricultural situation is well reflected in the status of France as a self-sufficing nation. Foodstuffs are produced chiefly upon her own soil. The contrast between her and England with respect to dependence upon overseas sources of food supply is far-reaching. Again and again in French history the peasant has saved the day. Unless there are offsetting disadvantages, a country's future is far safer if it depends largely upon an agricultural folk than if it depends upon perishable mineral resources, or sea roads that may be closed by a stronger power, or over-developed industry that lives in a state of tension because of the uncertainty of its markets and their control.

The favorable balance between industry and agriculture in France and the efficient employment of her total population is shown in the small number of unemployed. In that respect France is better off than either England or Germany. The short period of unemployment which France passed through in 1921, as a result of the stagnation of industry in the post-war period and the absorption of huge armies into the civil population, was but an episode of reconstruction. By 1925 France needed more labor than she could get at home. To intensify production without depopulating her rural districts was the problem. Quantity production was tried; yet industries continued to expand and the demand for manpower increased. Labor flowed to France in a volume greater than to any other country in the world except the United States, the arrivals in France exceeding those of immigrants into Canada, or Brazil, or Australia, or the Argentine. Of the more than two and a half million foreigners living in France in 1926, the main divisions were:

808,000	Italians	91,600	Russians
467,000	Spaniards	84,000	British
460,000	Belgians	64,600	Germans
310,000	Poles	49,500	North Americans
142,000	Swiss	39,600	Czechoslovakians

In a single year (1925), 174,000 Italians entered France, to settle mainly in the southeastern corner of the country where a French rural exodus had been most marked (one third of the population of Marseille is foreign). Immigration of Belgians and Poles is marked in the industrial regions of the north and west, and the manufacturing centers in the Paris region and the Garonne Valley. Of more than

300,000 coal miners in France, one third are foreigners living in foreign communities. Anxious lest the industrial centers have an inferior racial composition, France, like the United States, sought to obtain a higher quality of immigrant and finally reduced industrial immigration almost to the vanishing point.

What of the French stock itself? Since the World War the French birth rate has slightly increased. In 1913 there were 18.8 births per 1000; in 1924 there were 19.2. (In 1913 the birth rate of Germany was 27.5; in 1925 it was 20.4.) The population of France is gaining slightly in response to the agitation for larger families and the pull of industry and industrial expansion. Relief to large families was made obligatory by the law of 1913 and later laws have increased the amount of aid provided. From 1921 to 1926 the population increased from 39,210,000 to 40,744,000. But of the million and a half persons thus added to the population, 957,000 were foreigners; only 577,000 were French. The critical time in French population growth will be between 1935 and 1940, when the effects of the greatly diminished birth rate of the World War period will be felt and the number of persons of marriageable age will drop to half the present total. Mussolini's repeated references to military action in 1935 are often interpreted as a menace to France, Italy having a rapid increase, France a slow decrease culminating in that year. To some extent this disadvantage may be offset by a diminished death rate, which happens to be high in France at the present time.

DEBTS AND TAXES

If France is stable because of her agricultural basis it is equally true that she is less prepared than a stronger industrial power to find the means to meet the colossal debt of the World War and all the incidental losses that the war entailed. She is in the position of a person who has a fixed income rather than one who is engaged in trade or business and who may devise means for increasing his income through new ideas applied to production, more vigorous salesmanship, or the indirect stimulation of buying power. How the French people can earn more money is the leading financial problem of their economic leaders.[1] Until they can do this they cannot pay their debts, or balance their budget, or stabilize the franc, or continue to meet the great losses which their colonial possessions entail, or invest money in productive enterprises overseas that will yield them a larger indirect revenue.

[1] No account is here taken of invisible sources of income, such as the tourist business affords, which is important but not capable of exact statistical expression.

It is true that a high tax level will accomplish much and that almost any people is capable of still further taxation; but France has now reached nearly the limit of possibilities in this respect. The French taxpayers pay 52 per cent as much as all the taxpayers of the United States put together, though they have but 32 per cent as much income and but one third of the population. This means that 20 per cent of the incomes of the French taxpayers is absorbed by the government. The people of the United States pay 11½ per cent. For political reasons the French have not chosen to reveal the true facts of their annual budgets and the mounting deficits strike at the foundations of prosperity, by discouraging both the foreign banker and the French industrialist.

One of the most important steps in French financial reconstruction was accomplished in July 1926 when a definitive War Debt Agreement was signed with Great Britain. During 1926–1927, £4,000,000 was paid; in successive years, six, eight, and ten million pounds are to be paid; and from 1930–1931 to 1956–1957, £12,500,000; from 1957–1958 to 1987–1988, £14,000,000. At the same time Great Britain agreed to relate the French War Debt payments to the payments made by Great Britain to the United States on war debts. The Franco-British debt agreement has put French and British finances in a healthier even if temporary relationship — temporary because the agreement runs over too long a period to be considered final in all human probability and also because Great Britain will interest herself in the exact character of the final debt agreement between France and the United States.

To reorganize the economic life of France is only slightly less difficult than to solve the problems of security and population. France is an old country, with life adjusted to resources and with modes of thought and work against which modern ideas have long beaten in vain. This adjustment has some advantages: the life of such a nation is steadier. But the disadvantages also are great. The ports of France furnish an example. Control of a given port is divided among many government authorities. For instance, at Havre the Ministry of Public Works can build the docks, but the French Ministry of Marine controls the pilot service, the Minister of Commerce is responsible for the warehouses, the Minister of Finance collects the dues and regulates the hours of work, and the Minister of the Interior polices and lights the quays. It takes many years to carry out improvements under this cumbersome arrangement. All French ports, including Paris, have obsolete rules for their regulation that interfere with trade.[1]

[1] Significant progress was made (December 1924) by constituting Bordeaux, Havre, and certain others as autonomous ports.

THE POLICY OF CENTRALIZATION

One of the leading elements of French life is the centralized system of internal administration. We shall note its effect in the relations of the French government to Alsace-Lorraine (page 169), but its influence does not stop there. In Napoleon's time military organization of manpower and resources led to a system of centralized control that was strengthened by the preponderating influence of the national capital. The system was also helped along by the sentiment of the French people themselves and by the geographical position of the country. To deal with centralized governments abroad in an effective way requires a state to have a centralized system of its own; otherwise region is played against region by a foreign power. Thus it has come about that Paris has played a part in the economic life of France out of proportion to her industrial advantages. Thus, too, the agents of French culture sent out from the capital have not infrequently been more anxious to sermonize upon Parisian culture and ideals or upon distant and general government policies and the elevation of the glory and prestige of France as a nation than to take account of local problems. The effect has been markedly unhappy in many instances. Nearly all the local functionaries have long been appointed by the central government or its local representatives, and even the mayors of the towns are under its control. The ninety administrative units of the country — the *départements* — are artificial divisions with few geographical or economic bases. The strong movement for government decentralization even before the World War has been emphasized since that period. It has been proposed to divide the country for purposes of local administration into a number of geographical regions, each several times the size of an existing *département.* It is thought that such regional capitals would become strong centers of intellectual and political life and to that extent decentralization would increase, not diminish, the political strength of the nation.

The principle of decentralization has been strengthened through the increase in the speed of telegraphic and other communications, which has enabled the provincial newspapers to publish the world's news long before the Parisian newspapers could reach the provinces. Thus the provinces have come to have opinions of their own on the happenings of the day. In addition, the people are demanding a greater share of power in the settlement of their local affairs. The movement has been strengthened further by the post-war struggle for autonomy in Alsace-Lorraine. In order to concede privileges to those

provinces and yet keep firm hold upon the principle of centralization, the government has issued decrees transferring certain powers to local officials and councils in order that local decisions might be made as a substitute for the decisions and decrees of a minister at Paris. The handicap of centralization would be still further offset if the government would encourage rather than retard regional coöperation and regional improvement. The last-named difficulty is not exclusively French. In all highly organized governments the problem of maintaining local interest and patriotism is disturbingly serious. A central government can accomplish many things so much more efficiently than a local government that the tendency, in a highly organized community, is to lodge power to an increasing degree in the executive branch. On the other hand, the whole experience of history, as well as commonsense, makes plain the need for local patriotism, if we may so term it, that is, pride in a region, its culture and aims and its willingness to undertake the responsibility of fostering local culture and of participating in the functions of local government. If France has exercised undue zeal in official proselytism for French culture, it has been not merely to encourage a cult but rather to strengthen the bonds that unite the provinces of France, to the end that all her resources may be called upon to give that security and independence which Frenchmen believe to involve the fate of France as a nation.

THE REDEEMED PROVINCES: ALSACE-LORRAINE

Before examining the special problem of Alsace-Lorraine, it would be well to reflect upon the position and meaning of the whole Rhineland of which it forms a part, from the standpoint of that security which is the preoccupation of the French leaders. If we look at Figure 42 upon which the occupied zone and the bridgeheads of Cologne, Coblenz, and Mainz are shown, and if we consider further the demilitarized zone thirty miles wide on the right or eastern bank of the Rhine, we see that France is now protected so far as the absence of frontier fortifications is concerned. But the French have not stopped with this. They have already begun to spend money in fortifying the eastern frontier from Verdun to Belfort, thus reëstablishing the old pre-war line of defense, taking advantage of such natural features as the formidable wall of the Vosges and the wooded heights of the Argonne. Indeed, it is one of the anomalies of the French position and one of the clearest proofs of their passion for security that their plans for this great eastern line of fortifications no less than

their encouragement of separatist movements in the region of the Left Bank of the Rhine in 1923–1924 should have taken place in the very period when France was heartily supporting the League of Nations and at least cautiously aiding in schemes for disarmament. Having won certain solid advantages through the treaty of Versailles and being placed in a privileged position in the management of European affairs (through permanent membership in the council of the League of Nations), she is anxious to stabilize the present working arrangements while letting go of no single advantage of a military or strategic character which would enable her to withstand an eastern onslaught, should the present arrangements for peace unhappily fail.

The importance of what might be called her Rhine policy should be kept clearly in mind in reviewing the present situation of Alsace-Lorraine. The attachment of this region to France must be real and thoroughgoing if France is to gain any permanent advantage from her present Rhine border in Alsace. This makes it desirable for France to pursue a policy of strong control in the redeemed provinces. On the other hand, such a policy, though based on the general desire for security, might operate to alienate the good will of the population of the provinces. The problem has contradictory elements that require special examination.

Following the Franco-Prussian War the two provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were annexed by Germany (treaty of Frankfurt, 1871). The whole of Alsace was taken and the greater part of Lorraine, the line of division in the latter province running in such a manner as to take in the most important iron-ore beds believed to exist. The population of Alsace is predominantly German. That of Lorraine is partly German with French predominating on the west, the line of division cutting the province into two nearly equal parts. While but 6 per cent of the area of Alsace is occupied by French-speaking people, the population as a whole is unquestionably French in sympathy. The language frontier is not in this instance also a line of nationality. The speech of the German-speaking people is a patois, but they read and write High German. On the other hand, a large majority of them is also able to speak French. One would suppose from the standpoint of language alone that their attachment to Germany would be at least sufficiently strong to incline toward union with the German state.

The explanation of the anomaly is to be found in the history and character of the people as well as in their geographical position between the common frontier of the Latin and the Germanic civilizations. As

far back as the 13th century the cities of the Rhineland had formed a confederation which gave the region a certain political unity of its own, neither allied to nor dominated by that Germany east of the Elbe which won its final predominance in the Franco-Prussian War. In short, the Rhine Valley had a political individuality as well as a cultural individuality which was not lost in the six centuries that followed. This is one of the fundamental facts of European life, as elemental and important as sunshine and soil and life itself. To live in Alsace is to be an Alsatian first and a Frenchman second.

That centralization of government which we noted upon a previous page is as basic to the France of the 19th century as provincial sentiment and culture is to Alsace. Whatever modifications have been made in it since the World War, it is still a dominant principle of political life which no one may forget who wishes to understand France. Desiring to bring the two regained provinces fully into the French family, the Paris authorities began by attempting to change one of the most fundamental things in the life of the people, namely, its speech. Having believed in French protestations during the World War that French victory would bring respect for the liberties, traditions, customs, and conventions of Alsace, Alsatians were disappointed in the first instance by the large number of French officials brought in, not merely civil officials but teachers in the public schools, railroad personnel, and the like; they felt that they were governed by foreigners just as they were when in German hands. The authorities interpreted the desire of Alsace and Lorraine to be French, as meaning that they were willing to abandon their German culture and their local traditions and customs. This the people emphatically resent, and their resentment has so far carried the day that the government has at last expressed its approval of the bi-lingual principle.

There is a second question hardly less difficult than the first, and strangely enough it is a matter of religion. The people of Alsace-Lorraine are predominantly Catholic and have been so for centuries. The 1910 German census gave a population of less than 2,000,000 for the two provinces, and of this number about 1,400,000 were Catholics. It is estimated that Catholics today comprise 62 per cent of the population of Bas Rhin,[1] 84 per cent of the Haute Rhine,[1] and 85 per cent of Moselle,[1] the Protestants in the same order being represented by 35 per cent, 14 per cent, and 13 per cent. It happens that church and state were divided in France in 1905, the state taking over church

[1] Three administrative districts formed out of the two former provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.

property. An anti-clerical parliamentary majority has been maintained ever since. A similar separation of church and government in Alsace-Lorraine was proposed in 1924 by Premier Herriot and it caused a most emphatic protest on the part of Catholics, particularly what might be called the common people as distinguished from the bourgeois class. The latter are much more in favor of French education and allegiance than the former. Thus we see loyalty to church, to class, to religion, and to nation, making a complicated problem but one that from the standpoint of the mass of the people is capable of a very simple solution, — that is, to permit a large degree of autonomy in Alsace-Lorraine in the matter of religion, education, local government, and the like, though the provinces remain within the French circle and give willing political allegiance to France.

The religious question is one that might be simpler of solution if it were not for a division among French leaders themselves as to the policy that France ought to pursue in its relations with the Vatican. Some Frenchmen regard the papacy as a foreign power and its political acts as foreign intervention. In the administration of Millerand, following Clemenceau, an attempt was made to restore diplomatic relations with the Holy See, partly on grounds of general policy, partly because it would tend to weld Alsace and Lorraine more firmly to France. It was a principle of Herriot's government that the opposite course should be pursued. So long as there is uncertainty over the question there will be a weak policy in relation to questions of church in Alsace-Lorraine. France would find it politically advantageous to improve its relations with the Vatican; for its foreign problems might then receive more sympathetic consideration in Spain and Italy, where powerful clerics still exercise an important influence in the management of political relations. France might also benefit in her relations with Turkey; for the Vatican is concerned in the treatment of Christian populations in Asia Minor and Syria and in the disposition of the shrines of Palestine.

The return of Alsace-Lorraine to France adds a population but little under two millions. It gives her also the richest iron-ore beds of Europe, thus enabling her to become a great producer of iron and steel to provide for her own normal needs, to restore the devastated areas, and to export to her colonies and elsewhere. It was from Lorraine that Germany derived 75 per cent (21,000,000 long tons) of all the iron mined in the empire. Alsace has oil wells at Pechelbronn, and at Wittelsheim there is one of the two greatest potash deposits in the world, the other being at Stassfurt in Germany. The Saar

basin coal deposits extend into northern Lorraine, and there are also valuable salt deposits. In contrast to the mineral resources of Lorraine, and the industries dependent upon them, is the great agricultural production of Alsace. Its soil is a marked addition to the wealth of France.

OTHER FRENCH INTERESTS IN THE RHINE REGION

By the treaty of Frankfurt (1871) the eastern frontier of France was pushed back from the Rhine. By the treaty of Versailles (1919), which gives her possession of Alsace-Lorraine, France once more becomes a Rhine power. Regulation of the traffic of the river had long been conducted by the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine created by the Mannheim Convention (1868). Upon that commission France (after 1870) was not represented, nor Belgium nor Switzerland. France now has four representatives, and the other powers, including Italy and Great Britain, have two each. The powers of the commission are extended to include the upper Rhine between Basel and Lake Constance, if Switzerland agrees, and, in the interests of Belgium, the lower Moselle with its connecting canals. By special treaty provision the port of Kehl (Fig. 91) was joined to that of Strasbourg for seven years (1919–1926), in order that the port facilities of Strasbourg could be developed more conveniently.

The map of the Rhine region (Fig. 91) helps to explain why France wished to secure control of Luxemburg, which lies in a narrow frontier belt, every part of which has high strategic importance. This duchy was taken into the German Customs Union almost eighty years ago; its ruling house had a German origin; its railways were built by German capital; it has valuable iron mines that were used by the Germans during the World War as one of their sources of steel for shell and cannon. Clearly Luxemburg could not be returned to German control, and its small population (260,000) and area (1000 square miles) do not permit it to stand alone either politically or economically. It had been taken from Belgium in 1839. In the plebiscite of September 1919 it voted to enter the French Customs Union and French control of its iron mines and blast furnaces appeared to be a possibility. France refusing an economic union, Belgium and Luxemburg agreed in 1921 mutually to remove all customs barriers for fifty years.

The Saar is tributary to France for a short time only, since a plebiscite in 1935 is to decide its future ownership. There is no doubt that it will again be joined to Germany. It consists essentially of a coal basin from which, before the World War, Germany obtained about

FIG. 46. Except for the Basra-Karachi connection, which awaits Persian approval, only commercial lines, operating regularly, are shown. For source, see Figure 85.

9 per cent of her total coal supply, or more than 17,400,000 metric tons. France is poor in coal and has practically no petroleum at all. She wished therefore to have outright ownership of the region. Eventually she obtained ownership of the mines (which were also placed in the French Customs Union), as compensation for the damages inflicted by the Germans on the French mines at Lens and Valenciennes.

Following the French occupation there was the expectable difficulty between the Mixed Governing Commission and the inhabitants, respecting French economic penetration, the presence of troops, and freedom of relations with Germany. But these things were mere episodes compared to the larger problems that have beset the new European order.

The interrelations of the industrial regions of eastern France and western Germany are among the most intricate and critical in the whole European economic field. Since they affect Germany at least as seriously as France, they are as appropriately discussed in Chapter Ten. The reader who wishes to follow the problem from this point may turn to page 278.

(B) Special Colonial Interests of France

France is now second only to Great Britain in the extent of its colonial holdings. It will be seen from Figure 47 that French possessions are widely scattered and of unequal value. Some are important for their large native populations and resources (Madagascar), others for their strategical position and special mineral or vegetable products (New Caledonia), still others because they form a part of extensive trade realms of growing consequence (Indo-China [1]). The two outstanding problem areas in French colonial administration are Syria and North Africa. Though its overseas territories are widely scattered, France, in the colonial field, is primarily an African power. Because of its large extent of territory along the shores of the Mediterranean, French economic and political policies intimately affect relations with Great Britain; for the latter holds Suez at one end of that sea and Gibraltar at the other. Spain and Italy likewise look closely at every step taken by France about the borders of a sea regarded by them as peculiarly their own. The eastern Mediterranean has been a preoccupation of French statesmen and military leaders since 1918. An advance into Russia, from Odessa, based on the control of the Ukraine was frustrated by the Bolshevist armies. Northern Syria was reduced in area by Turkish opposition (page 496) and spheres of influence envisaged in 1916 (Fig. 50) and 1920 (Fig. 51) were not realized.

All the overseas possessions of France are directly dependent upon the central French government. Because France had rapidly expanded her colonial possessions before the World War and has recently gained additional territory, she has new and heavy responsibilities. If she has no self-governing dominions of French stock to satisfy in developing an overseas empire, the growing demands of her subjects for native representation in government require satisfaction. She has acquired a mandatory over Syria, has divided with Great Britain the Cameroons and Togoland as mandated territories, and has had her status in North Africa confirmed by the great powers. Figure 52 shows her present territorial status in Africa and the new territorial gains that followed the World War. France formerly opposed British expansion in Africa and in the Persian Gulf region, and German expansion in central Africa and Turkey. It is the thought of some of her wisest leaders that it would be greatly to the interest of France if she were to undertake no further territorial expansion. The world has now been parceled out nearly to the limit of vacant "political space."

[1] For a brief discussion of French interests in southern China see page 594.



FIG. 47. Distribution of French and Dutch colonies. Present boundaries are shown upon the individual country maps. Though widely distributed, the French colonies are of small economic importance, outside Africa, Madagascar, and French Indo-China. The Dutch East Indies have an immense labor supply and furnish heavy exports of raw materials — fibers, rubber, coffee, spices, etc. (French mandated territories are included.)

THE SYRIAN MANDATE

In the government of Syria account must needs be taken of four main physical divisions:

(1) A belt of mountains and plateaus along the coast.
(2) A long dry valley east of them that represents a sunken block of the earth's crust.
(3) A highland belt along the eastern border of the valley.
(4) A semi-arid plateau that grades eastward into the Syrian Desert.

These four north-south belts retain certain essential features throughout Syria and Palestine. They are in turn divisible into three sections arranged in order from north to south according to varying combinations of topography and climate. *Northern Syria* (Fig. 49) has a low relief that has attracted the main commercial route from Iraq to the Mediterranean. Because of its dryness it has only a limited agriculture here and there, especially in the northern part. Farther south is *Steppe Syria*, with rain enough in its western part for agriculture but so low in elevation on the east as to have little rain with a corresponding increase eastward in the amount of steppe land. In *Southern Syria* are the Lebanon Mountains, with a rainfall so heavy that their western slopes are covered with flourishing orchards, vineyards, farms, and gardens. In this third section even the rift valley that runs southward to the Jordan trench is high enough to support crops of grain, mulberries, and olives. East of the rift valley the elevation increases again and rain is sufficient to make possible vineyards and orchards. Still farther east is a topographic elevation called the *Hauran*, with greater rainfall and with extensive grain fields whose products are famous throughout the Levant. The Taurus ranges shut Syria off from the Anatolian plain (Fig. 49), for the great pass in the Taurus, called the Cilician Gates (Pylae Ciliciae), has long been in Turkish hands. The effective northern frontier has been the ranges of the Amanus Mountains, with a passageway at the Syrian Gates. A desert separates Syria from Iraq (Mesopotamia). Across it, year after year for centuries, slow-moving caravans have made their laborious way. Now airplane and motor car have changed the pace of travelers and railway and steamship the routes of commerce. The old routes are the scene of regional trade chiefly.

Syria has an area of 60,000 square miles (Illinois, 56,000). At least three quarters of its territory is inhabited by a nomadic population of



FIG. 48. The Damascene population group is dependent upon irrigation. The city is a central point in the caravan trade of the desert of Syria. Jebel Hauran, Gilead, Moab, and the plateau of Judea are districts of heavier rainfall and denser population. The coastal fringe of population also corresponds with a belt of heavier and more dependable rainfall. The nomad of the Syrian desert has always coveted the crops and raided the villages of the settled oases dwellers. See also Figure 49. From *L'Asie Française*, February 1920.

the pastoral type. Only 10 per cent of the total area, or 6000 square miles, is effectively cropped in normal years. The cities and agricultural lands lie chiefly in a narrow belt from 50 to 100 miles wide inland from the Mediterranean shore (Fig. 48). The population now numbers 2,500,000; two thirds are Moslems. There are also nearly 500,000 Christians and 100,000 Druses. Damascus (170,000) on the south and Aleppo (140,000) on the north are the two largest cities; Beirut (90,000) is the leading port. Damascus owes its importance largely to its position in the midst of a grain- and fruit-growing region dependent upon irrigation in some places and in others upon the greater rainfall of heights like those of Jebel-Druse (Fig. 48). The city itself is in the heart of a great garden a hundred and fifty square miles in extent, irrigated by streams that descend from the slopes of the Anti-Lebanon range immediately on the west. Damascus lies on an old caravan route to Baghdad (due east), and this relationship, together with its position as a regional center, has made it the political and commercial capital of Syria. Trade between the Mediterranean ports and settled country on the west and the nomadic Arabs on the

east flows over routes of great historical antiquity that connect Syria with more distant sources of trade products in Iraq and Persia. From the standpoint of production, Syria is an agricultural country, cereals predominating. Wheat and barley are the leading products, though neither is sufficient to meet the home demand, cereals being one of the leading imports. There are few industries and no mineral resources of consequence upon which a regional industrial life may be based. All of the cities are maintained by the export of primary products, such as raw wool, cotton, silk, tobacco, and dried fruits, and a corresponding trade in imported manufactures, such as cotton goods, iron utensils, and oils.

Fig. 49. Relief map of Syria to serve as a reference in the study of Figure 48. See also Figure 33, showing railways.

Most Syrians speak Arabic and are of Semitic family with large admixtures of Arab blood and additions from Egyptian, Greek, Roman, and Turkish stocks. In the mountain valleys of the Lebanon itself and in central Syria live the Druses, warlike tribes sharing the Lebanon with the agricultural Maronites, whose settlements they frequently raid. On the grassy seaward slopes of the mountains bordering the Gulf of Alexandretta are the Ansariyeh, a folk given in increasing degree to an agricultural life, though traditionally nomadic. While the Turk long administered Syria, he was an alien there. He did not settle upon the land in any numbers. Separate Turkish colo-

nies did not exist. There were few social and family ties between Turks and Syrians. The removal of the Turk from Syria therefore involved no important social or economic readjustments.

Among all of the mandated territories none has given more trouble to the mandatory power and to the League of Nations than Syria. If the French have been conscious of administrative shortcomings, they have also tenaciously maintained that they are the natural heirs of power in Syria. Their claims rest upon tradition and history. For centuries France has been the champion of Christendom in Syria. During the Crusades she took the lead in attempting to redeem the Holy Land from Mohammedan conquerors. Antioch and Tripoli had French princes for a time, Jerusalem a French king. France has been called "the eldest daughter of the church," and for her part in the redemption of sacred lands the Pope conferred on French kings the title of "Protector of Oriental Christians." Castles in the French style were built in Syria. From the days of the early Phœnician traders, long before the Christian era, Marseille and southern France had maintained commercial intercourse with Syria. Silks, pearls, spices, and camphor were brought from India to Palestine and Syria, and thence to France, Germany, and England. The material aspects of French interest in northern Syria are displayed chiefly in the silk industry and the railroads. Excepting the Hejaz line, every railroad in the country has been financed by French capital.

If the position of France in Syria was privileged because of her protection of the Christian, the same condition was a handicap in dealing with the Moslem population. These felt that the Christian populations would receive all the advantages and they would much have preferred Turkish rule to French. Promises of self-government were of little consequence in the face of so much ill will based upon religious passion. Syrian leaders had quite definitely the idea that self-determination meant independence for them and that Arab nationalism was on the verge of realization. In addition, Syria like the rest of the world suffered from local disturbances, religious jealousies, and the hesitations, uncertainties, and general inefficiency of untrained civil officials. And yet it seems certain that Syria cannot stand alone. Its population is too heterogeneous, its religious animosities too violent and deep-seated, its geographical subdivisions too poorly related and too one-sided to encourage unity for a long time to come. In the interest of western civilization and as a barrier against anarchy and the spread of Moslem power, there is need of France in Syria and elsewhere in the Near East. England alone is unequal to the task, and indeed should



FIG. 50. Division of Turkey according to (1) Sykes-Picot agreement of May 1916 (and the later Italian agreement); (2) the secret treaty of London of 1915 as it affected the Straits Zone at Constantinople, the Italian sphere of influence in southern Anatolia, and the Russian sphere in Turkish Armenia. From maps and text in the *Manchester Guardian*, 8 and 10 January 1920. International boundaries as of 1914.

not desire to undertake alone so vast a program in view of her already great if not dangerous extension of power. Those who criticize French administration in Syria commonly overlook the fact that the alternative is either British administration or Turkish administration. If Britain has her hands full elsewhere, this leaves only the Turk. If Turkish rule is substituted for French, there are the Christian populations to be taken into account. The Syrians themselves could not possibly maintain the rights of minorities.

Finally, an Arab confederation, which implies control of settled country by desert chieftains, is out of the question; for the desert Arab has never long held or effectively governed the inhabitants of settled lands. It would be sheer folly to have the nomadic Arab hold coastal Syria. While we commonly think that the pure-bred Arab nomads of the desert typify the Arabian population, as a matter of fact they have little in common with the Arabs settled on farms or in towns, as in Iraq and in Syria.

The Syrian Mandate became effective in September 1923, after France had passed through a troubled period of boundary adjustment

with Turkey on the north, Great Britain on the south, and Iraq under British advice on the east. Italy too came forward with claims respecting the status in Syria of Italian schools and settlers. The conflict with Turkey on the north was settled by the Franco-Turkish accord of 1921, by which a new boundary was negotiated (Fig. 180), the district about Alexandretta to have a special régime giving it a certain measure of autonomy. The British claim to the Mosul area was based on the fact that it is a natural part of Iraq, is the principal wheat-growing district of that country, and can be administered more readily from the eastern side of the Syrian Desert. Besides this it has valuable deposits of oil. The French were persuaded to relinquish their claims through the Anglo-French oil agreement signed at San Remo in 1920 (page 116).

Political Development

After the border agreements had been made the French government experimented with the internal division of the country, a first division into five districts in 1921 being replaced 1 January 1925 by division into four territories: Syria proper with a population exceeding 1,200,000; Lebanon with 630,000; Alaouite, 260,000; Jebel-Druse, 50,000. At first the Lebanon was recognized as a separate administrative district and even proclaimed an independent state (1920), though it has had difficulties with the French High Commissioner on account of the tendency of the centralized Syrian administration to encroach upon its powers. The Alexandretta region has given the French administration difficulty because of the proximity of the Turkish border, kept in a state of unrest by Turkish and Kurdish bands. The southern border of Syria has also experienced almost continual difficulties from 1920 to the present time; for desert tribesmen near the borders of Transjordan have frequently raided the territory under French control. The population groups are here loosely organized and receive constant encouragement from Arab nationalists.

The political life of Syria since 1920 has been marked by chronic disorder and opposition. France has been engaged in a policy of pacification that has not succeeded, because of her desire to centralize her administration and firmly to organize the country in a manner which is resented not only by the Moslem Arab element of the population but even by the Christians themselves, as in the Lebanon. It will be remembered that when Great Britain needed the help of the Arabs at a critical time in attacking the desert flank of Syria and Palestine during the World War, the revolt of the Arabs against Turkish authorities was

brought about by the abundant use of gold and general promises of Arab independence in an Arab state, or group of states, to be created at the close of the war. These promises were taken by the Arabs to be binding and real, with the consequence that a national spirit rapidly developed among the leaders. In Syria the movement for independence took shape more definitely in July 1919, when the first general Syrian congress was held at Damascus. The Arab leaders wished to create a Greater Syria; to control not only a great block of Arab territory lying between the Syrian Desert and the Mediterranean, but to make sure of their hold upon the Jews of Palestine and the Christians of the Lebanon. They insisted above all upon complete independence without protection or foreign interference by mandate or otherwise.

Disappointed that a Zionist state was to come into existence, convinced that neither the United States nor Great Britain would accept a mandate for the country, and realizing that France was determined to govern them, the Syrians took a still bolder step in March



Fig. 51. The tripartite agreement between Great Britain, France, and Italy (10 August 1920) regarding equality of commercial privileges in the respective spheres of influence of the signatory powers. This agreement displaced the provisions of the secret treaty of London of 1915, the Sykes-Picot agreement, and certain other special agreements and promises. By its terms Italy was to have her special interests in Zone C recognized, France in Zone D; and the three powers were to give each other diplomatic support in their respective spheres; provision was made for the capitalization on terms of equality by British, French, and Italian bankers of the Baghdad railway and other lines; the coal basin of Heraclea (on the north coast of Anatolia, east of the Bosporus) was to be exploited by Italy with French and British reservations. On the map, A represents the southern, or Asiatic, part of the Zone of the Straits as defined in the discarded treaty of Sèvres, B represents the Greek zone at Smyrna (Fig. 138), and E represents Syria.

1920, when a second Syrian congress was held at Damascus and the independence of Syria was proclaimed with Feisal of the Hejaz as king. So aggressive and independent an attitude quickly brought French military action. Damascus was taken in the same year, a heavy fine levied against the city, and Feisal driven away. Thus there came to fulfillment French hopes that had an earlier expression in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which provided for the eventual division of Turkey among the powers, France to obtain a large zone of influence about the Gulf of Alexandretta and in Syria. Even as late as 1920 definite spheres of interest in Turkey were staked out by Great Britain, France, and Italy. Not by these acts alone do the French claim rights to the region, nor by the accident of war, but because of their military and commercial relations extending through the centuries. As for the British-Arab agreements with respect to Arab independence and Arab states, the French took no part in these and refused to be bound by them. While the Sykes-Picot Agreement provided for actual possession of the coastal strip only, France extended the mandated region far to the eastward in the final settlement, basing her arguments on geographical and ethnographical grounds.

The disappointment of the Syrians over the failure of France and Great Britain to provide an independent kingdom was profound. They characterized French control as more suitable to a colony than to a native government. They could not see why Iraq should be an independent kingdom under the mild supervision of Great Britain while Syria remained under firm French control. The French justified the division of Syria into states on the ground that differences of race and religion made representative government impossible unless the population were grouped in a natural manner. It is the official view that sentiments of nationality are in a confused state, owing to religious complications. The French have pointed out to their associates in the League of Nations that in no other country have religious or feudal wars been waged more furiously, and that the country is not now in a national era of organization but in a religious or feudal era. They hold that the "weight of the country's history" would break down an artificially created European state and that it takes a mandatory power to reconcile the several "patriotisms" that actually exist. The Syrian leaders protest that the subdivision of Syria into states and the partition of the whole region between the French and the British have made the development of national ideals impossible. The nationalist uprising of 1925 was an expression of wide dissatisfaction and called for not only renewed military pressure but a reorientation of French

policy. It had the effect of removing an unpopular French High Commissioner and bringing into office a more sympathetic successor. It brought about the substitution of civil government for military government. From the national point of view it had the effect of uniting leaders of diverse faiths in opposing French administration; and such coöperation has tended to give Syrians of all classes a sense of power and an increased hope of ultimate independence.

There is little prospect that a greater or united Syria will be established, owing principally to the impossibility of withdrawing either British or French from their respective mandates. Unquestionably also the breaking up of Syria into small units would perpetuate the old religious differences. In a single state or group of states under unified control it is thought that religious hatreds might be lessened to some degree and that men might give their minds to political experimentation and to the organization of a new economic life. Whether or not these beneficient results would follow is a matter of speculation. Political leaders must begin with facts when dealing with international situations. The future of Syria will be worked out under British and French guidance, with such a degree of independence as these masters believe it expedient to grant.

FRENCH INTERESTS IN NORTH AFRICA

The African territory under French control (excluding Madagascar) is 4,250,000 square miles in extent and has a population in excess of 30,000,000. This is 40 per cent more than the area of the United States, and 25 per cent as many inhabitants. Area alone is a handicap in this instance. Much of the land is uninhabited desert (Fig. 52). It presents a terrain difficult to cross. Great distances between settlements, the lack of waterways or water supply, meager forage, unruly tribesmen, — these are the characteristics of much of French West and North Africa.

Algeria and Tunisia

France appeared on the southern Mediterranean shore in 1830, when several coast towns were occupied as a result of minor diplomatic incidents in Algeria. Negotiations with native chieftains followed, military advances and retreats, vacillation, and the suppression of a "holy war" of serious proportions. With these difficulties out of the way, France could not negotiate a permanent peace; for there was no reliable local authority and she could not evacuate without risking again the depredations upon Mediterranean commerce that for centuries had

FIG. 52. French possessions in Africa. The dotted areas were acquired before 1914; the cross-lined areas are under French mandate. Compare with map of British possessions, Figure 20. (Since 1881 northern Algeria has been treated practically as a part of France.)

made the Barbary coast the symbol of piratical enterprise. Permanent occupation seemed the inescapable conclusion. A struggle with the natives dragged its way for almost half a century. Step by step the French pressed inland until by 1901 their control of Algeria extended over the whole desert interior, including a large section of the Saharan hinterland, organized as "Les Territoires du Sud de l'Algérie" (population 542,000).

Algeria has nearly 1,000,000 square miles. This means that it is five times the area of France, though the fertile part of the country — except for the scattered oases of the interior — is confined to a strip

parallel to the coast and from 50 to 100 miles wide. The coastal belt is desertic; then follows the "Tell," or mountain country, with fertile valleys and local plains. This is the region of real economic importance to France; here live most of the inhabitants. The native population numbers 6,100,000, in addition to 873,000 Europeans, of which the French number 690,000. Berbers form three quarters of the total population. Though port improvements have been made and several thousand miles of railway constructed, besides roads, telegraph lines, and other facilities, the European population has increased but slowly, owing chiefly to ill-defined boundaries and insecure land and other property titles, the natural result of the tribal custom of holding lands in common. The French have pursued the worthy policy of increasing native settlement on the land and encouraging the division of land in the form of individual properties among natives rather than among foreigners. How French colonization has proceeded is shown by the quotation below.[1] The land of Algeria is capable of high production: cereals in the valleys of the maritime belt where there is the largest water supply; olives, tobacco, and wine in the lower valleys and the cultivated oases of the desert interior. The export of live-stock products now exceeds $250,000,000 annually. The mineral resources are varied: iron ore, phosphate, zinc, and petroleum being especially important. There is a very practical basis of French interest in the territory, for the products of Algeria are such as France needs to supplement her own resources and feed her industries. Fortunately the wealth and commercial relations of Algeria enable the country to pay its own way.

It was to be expected as a result of firm French occupation of Algeria that colonial administrators would be concerned with the territory on either side of this valuable possession — Tunisia on the east, Morocco on the west. French occupation was finally extended to Tunisia, on the ground that nomadic tribes raided Algeria but in reality to gain a

[1] "In the period 1904 to 1922, 194,000 hectares have been handed over to be colonized by Europeans, 79 new villages and 53 groups of farms have been formed and 77 already existing centres enlarged, while 2405 French families have been established, of which 1188 came from France and 917 belonged to Algeria. Of these, 823 French families and 582 French-Algerian families purchased 1405 separate holdings with a total area of 137,000 hectares. The 1000 free grants, covering an area of 57,000 hectares, were made to 665 families from France and 335 French-Algerian families. Although the State reserves are exhausted, new territories have been allotted every year, and rural centres and groups of farms have been constituted. The immigrants have come chiefly from the southeast of France, the Alps, and Corsica. During this period Sersou has been settled and provides one of the most striking examples of the success of official colonization; a large number of villages have been formed in the south of Oranie, in the plains of Sétif, and in the Dahra." "New regulations for colonization by French Settlers," *Intern. Rev. Agr. Econ.* Jan.–Mar. 1925, pp. 130–132.

commercial hold on a country whose products and whose proximity to Algeria and accessibility to France made it a prize of real consequence. While some Tunisian tribes are composed of settled people who raise cereals, cattle, and sheep, others were long and naturally in a state of opposition to European control, not only on political but also on religious and racial grounds. The local chieftains had a practical stake in the struggle: the enjoyment of power and tribute and the desire to continue their piratical exploits along the Barbary Coast. The French occupation was not without interest to British and Italian rivals. But barter is as well-recognized in diplomacy as in trade. At the Congress of Berlin (1878), British recognition of French priority in Tunisia was given in exchange for French support of the British lease of the important island of Cyprus. The irrevocable step was taken by France in 1881, when a military expedition ended with the ruling Bey recognizing the French protectorate. Great Britain accorded recognition of the new status in 1883, Italy reluctantly followed in 1896, and Turkey withheld recognition altogether, claiming Tunisians as Ottoman subjects. By the treaty of Lausanne (1923) Turkey renounces all rights and titles to territory outside her new frontiers, thus implicitly confirming the French status in Tunisia. To an increasing degree France has been able to reduce nomadism and increase settlement in agricultural communities. With 2,160,000 people (chiefly Berbers and Arabs) to govern in this possession alone and under an inherited system of administration, there have been difficulties without number in bringing under control warlike and fanatical tribes. But the difficulties have been admirably met, largely by French appointment of tribal chiefs and the division of the country into territorial units rather than according to tribes. Like Algeria, Tunisia is a prosperous country, paying its own way, with products of high importance to the growing industries of France.[1]

Tangier and Morocco

West of Algeria the mountainous coastal belt bifurcates, one branch running northwestward to form the Riff Range, a second and much larger branch running southwestward to form the High and Middle Atlas. The coastal towns are supported principally by trade. Agricultural settlements have spread from the interior, where there is readier access to streams fed by the rainfall of the higher mountain

[1] For a discussion of the Italian population in Tunisia and the vexed question of citizenship see André-E. Sayous, "Les Italiens en Tunisie," *Revue Économique internationale*, 1927, pp. 61–99.



Fig. 53. Generalized relief belts of Algeria and Tunisia.

zone, westward toward the sea, thus giving Morocco an Atlantic as well as a Mediterranean outlook. French Morocco has today a population of 4,250,000. From this and adjacent territory in North Africa swarmed the Berbers and Arabs (Moors) who overran the Iberian peninsula in the 8th century, and until the 14th century in successive dynasties threatened the reconquest of Christian Spain. The northwestern corner of the continent has been the scene of conflict between Moroccan and Christian invader at one time or another during the past five hundred years. The Portuguese took Ceuta and Tangier; the Spanish, Algiers and Tunis. By the end of the 16th century the fateful battle of Kasr el Kebir had eliminated the Portuguese, and the Spanish possessions were reduced to a few fortified posts. A long period of piracy ensued, to flourish not so much because of the strength of the Barbary states as because of the diversion of British and French enterprise to more promising fields. A French naval unit bombarded Tangier and Mogador and forced Morocco to sign a treaty at Tangier in 1844. After much vacillation, Great Britain's interest was heightened when France had occupied Algeria and a French company had completed the Suez Canal.

At length the growth of Mediterranean trade and the commercial value of the Barbary States caused the western European powers to take action. French intervention in Moroccan affairs began with an attempt to make more secure the western border of Algeria, where French troops were repeatedly in conflict with Moroccan tribes. An agreement of sorts was made in 1845 when the prerogatives of frontier tribes were defined; but the first effective instrument of French pene-



FIG. 54. Sketch map of Morocco showing the natural features and the means of communication. Compare with Figure 55, showing French penetration of Morocco. The tribes of the inner districts of the Atlas Mountains are still unpacified. The forest wealth, now protected from waste, is large and may become important to French industry.

tration was made in 1901, when, with expressions of respect for the integrity of the "Sherifian empire," France settled down to the business of making Morocco the scene of exclusive French influence. French relations with the Sultan of Morocco and with the natives was a problem of the first magnitude, but it could not be solved until rival European powers had been eliminated. France was enabled easily to come to terms with Great Britain. When France attempted in 1898 to link her possessions in East and West Africa across the territory of the Upper Nile, just after Kitchener's victory at Omdurman, Great Britain objected so vigorously to an infringement of her new rights that France could only give way (the Fashoda incident). In retiring France still maintained that she had rights in the region. Now that France had increased her political interest in Morocco she was ready to abandon her shadowy claims in Egypt in return for a similar declaration from Great Britain with respect to Morocco. Forms of recognition were exchanged in the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904, whereby Great Britain retained an interest in Tangier only. It was recognized that France, whose territory runs with that of Morocco, should preserve order in that country and to that end take such steps as she might find necessary. The free use of the Strait of Gibraltar was guaranteed by a provision that the Mediterranean coast was to be unfortified except for the Spanish *presidios* (page 222).

Thereupon France set to work to limit the aspirations of Spain in Morocco. By the Franco-Spanish Declaration of 1904 she transferred to Spain all rights in northern Morocco except Tangier, thereby delimiting the Northern Spanish Zone substantially as shown in Figure 70. If Spain got a more definite status, she also obtained an exceedingly difficult terrain, the fiercest tribes, and more than twenty years of costly war. France had still to deal with Germany. That country was little inclined to see the colonial empire of France grow to huge proportions. Assuming equal rights in Morocco, Germany supported the Sultan in the plan of an international conference which met at Algeciras in 1906. Though the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan were reaffirmed, together with the integrity of Morocco and the equal treatment of foreigners, France was still allowed to retain control, principally owing to support from Great Britain and the United States. Further interference by Germany brought about the Franco-German Declaration of 1909, which recognized the special political rights of France. This third Franco-German crisis was quieted only after France had agreed to buy off Germany by transferring to her part of French Equatorial Africa (Fig. 52).



FIG. 55. Note the location and number of French military posts. From map in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, No. 5, page 159, Suppl. to *l'Afrique Française*, May 1927.

With three rival powers satisfied and rendered impotent in Moroccan affairs, France was now free to consolidate her authority and step by step to occupy the country. She began by negotiating the Franco-Moroccan treaty of 1912, whereby the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Morocco was to remain unimpaired. But such a declaration had often been made before. Its purpose now, as always, was to save the face of the Sultan. It was mere diplomatic verbiage to proclaim sovereignty at the moment that a new régime was imposed which gave the French government, in effect, complete control over administrative, economic, and military affairs, and even educational and judicial reforms. There can be no question of the beneficial results of French occupation. French colonial administration is here shown at its best. Under Marshal Lyautey, who became Resident-General

in 1912, a policy of pacification went into effect. Each district was provided with sound administration and military protection before the next step was taken. The European population increased rapidly; railways, bridges, and telegraph systems were constructed or improved, agriculture and mining encouraged. The ports of Casablanca, Qnitra, and Mogador were provided with new facilities. More than 1200 miles of metalled roads are open to traffic. Imports and exports doubled and then trebled. Relations with the natives have been conducted in a most delicate manner and with fine respect for established custom; yet at the same time both military and civil administrators have been sufficiently firm to make steady progress in the pacification of hitherto unsettled regions.

In the government of the towns France has tactfully provided for municipal commissions upon which the native population is represented in a manner to accord equality of rights to the different elements — Europeans, Mohammedans, Jews. Outside of the towns the administration of Morocco is divided into zones according to the degree of pacification that has been achieved. Smaller subdivisions are under civil or military authority according to the state of public order. South of the Grand Atlas there is a special régime: the region is closed to foreign commerce and foreign visitors. Here are strong, restless tribes which the French have not yet subdued. Contact with dominant chieftains is maintained through political officers. The Berbers of the Atlas have submitted to French rule reluctantly, just as they did to that of the Sultan of Morocco in times gone by. By contrast the sedentary population ploughs and harvests as of old, with little attention to a change of masters.

Over the greater part of the Saharan territory of France, vigorous control is exercised by the pursuit of raiders and attack upon armed bands even in isolated oases. French patrols have pushed into the Sahara to the very limit of possibility, to the Sudan, eastward to Lake Tchad, and even beyond. These advances have required their own special forms of organization. Affairs developed more rapidly after the World War with economic prospects ahead, as we shall now see. In 1920 Mauretania was raised to the rank of a separate colony.

While airplane and motor have proved useful in the control of population scattered over a difficult terrain, the French regard the railway as a more effective military and economic instrument. A number of schemes of trans-Saharan railways have been studied to connect the country of the blacks in the Sudan and in French West Africa with Morocco and Algeria on the north (Fig. 52). It is proposed to con-

struct a main line to Dakar, now the most important commercial center of the French West African realm. Here, at the western tip of Africa, good harbor works and numerous piers and warehouses have been installed, and a water supply is provided. The city is the terminus of a railway enterprise of the first magnitude, a line 800 miles long running inland to the headwater regions of the Niger and the Senegal. In this transition country between the wet forest on the south and the desert on the north is an intermediate rainfall supporting grassland and scrub. The soil is of sufficient fertility and the rainfall sufficiently reliable to make possible agricultural production on a far larger scale. The cultivation of the ground nut, or peanut, has been widely extended. Cotton-growing is capable of vast extension. The French Sudan has been described as a potential Egypt. Need may provide the necessary stimulation to its development: France imports annually from 300,000 to 370,000 tons of raw cotton. In the French possessions on the Guinea coast, as in British West Africa, the production of palm oil has grown to large proportions. The labor supply is abundant, and if large corporations capable of sustained effort will enter the field the successful economic conquest of the country may be accomplished. So important is the trans-Saharan railway program to France in realizing the wealth of French West Africa that surveys are now under way in the hope of effecting the early beginnings of construction (see also Chapter Thirty-three).

International Control at Tangier

Few places on earth have been the subject of more frequent diplomatic incidents during the past fifty years than Tangier. This is owing not to a struggle for additional territory on the part of European powers but to the position of Tangier at the entrance to the Mediterranean, to its possible use as a point of political and economic penetration in Morocco, and to the desire of the interested powers — Great Britain, France, Spain, Italy, and the United States — that gained a place in the government of Tangier, to prevent any one power from having ascendancy in the control of a place of such outstanding importance. At times we hear of the unalterable purpose of Spain to possess Tangier and extend its Moroccan territory. At other times it is reported that France is about to acquire Spanish holdings and rights. Again Italy announces a new and aggressive position with respect to rights at the entrance to the Mediterranean, regarded by her as predominantly an Italian as it once was a Roman sea. On geographical

grounds the Spanish claim is the strongest. On strategic grounds, and considering the interests involved, Great Britain has primary rights. But if France has been permitted to extend her authority over the greater part of Morocco and if she has done this by successive steps well known and acknowledged by other European powers, then her claims would seem to have precedence. Nor must we forget that France herself is a Mediterranean as well as an Atlantic power.

It was largely by accident that Tangier came to be under international control. To keep foreigners from interfering with Moroccan affairs and to avoid foreign penetration of the interior, the Moroccan government long made Tangier the residence of diplomatic representatives and merchants. It also followed naturally, in view of the bad state of the judicial system in Morocco, that foreigners should seek and obtain extraterritorial rights with respect to exemption from certain taxes and the right to be tried in their own consular courts. The capitulations were codified in 1880 and benefits under them were to be enjoyed equally by the subjects of all foreign powers. Foreign guns and warships were so readily available that the progressive control of Tangier and its administration by the resident diplomatic corps gradually came about. The difficulties and penalties of joint government soon became evident. Though the Tangier zone, with its area of about 200 square miles, has an excellent geographical position and has grown to be a large commercial center, the city has suffered through the lack of centralized administration. Neither industry nor agriculture could find encouragement in the wavering policies of an unwieldy and hesitant administration. In 1924, after unconscionable delay, the Tangier Convention, concluded between the interested powers and Morocco, came into effect. By its terms authority is still vested in an international body, but a Legislative Assembly is provided so that both Moroccan and foreign representation shall be possible. France has been left in the position of greatest authority, with Spain second. A Frenchman serves as chief administrator, responsible for giving effect to the decisions of the Legislative Assembly and for directing the international administration of the zone. Foreign affairs are exclusively under the control of France, with exception only as between Tangier and resident consuls on questions of local concern. This does not mean that all is peace and happiness at Tangier. The natives complain that the reforms do not go far enough, and the answer to complaints is not always a diplomatic conference. On several occasions marked by strikes it has been the arrival of a British or a French warship.

CHAPTER FIVE

BELGIUM AND HOLLAND

(A) Belgium as a European Focus

Throughout recorded history Belgium has been a battle ground of rival tribes and nations. As early as the middle of the 17th century she had been called "the military arena of Europe" — and since that time she has continued well to deserve the name. For more than two hundred years previous to the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713), Belgium was ruled by the Spanish Hapsburgs. As a result of that war she was handed over to the Austrian Hapsburgs, the dynasty which continued to rule Austria-Hungary until the armistice of November 1918. In 1792 an army was sent by France, then in the midst of her great Revolution, ostensibly to free Belgium from Austrian rule; but before long Belgium found herself annexed to France, and French domination continued until 1814.

At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the wishes of the Belgian people were again ignored; for instead of becoming independent, Belgium was joined to Holland to form the Kingdom of the Netherlands, in order to improve the defenses against France. But there were differences of language, religion, and economic interests between the two peoples that could not be reconciled after a separation of one hundred and thirty-five years, especially as the Dutch took care to enforce the use of the Dutch language and to occupy the best offices of the government. In 1830, when the news reached Belgium that Charles X, the Bourbon king of France, had been deposed by his subjects, the country was profoundly stirred. Petitions were sent to William I, King of the Netherlands, asking for the administrative separation of Holland and Belgium. William replied by sending an army to put down the ensuing disorders, whereupon Belgium declared and won her independence. Her final status, however, was not settled until 1839, when Holland accepted the treaty of London, which in 1831 had established Belgium as "an independent and perpetually neutral state." This was the treaty which was broken by Germany when she invaded Belgium in August 1914.

Thus the World War saw Belgium afflicted by the most grievous of a long succession of servitudes and disasters. The reason for her melancholy history is clear: she stands upon a great world highway that joins central and western Europe. She has suffered, not because of her own ambitions, but because of the ambitions of others who have struggled for supremacy on her soil. Her shattered hopes have been the evidences of her neighbors' greed.



FIG. 56. Comparison of the European theaters of war a hundred years ago and today. The Napoleonic Wars are taken from Putzger, *Historischer Schul-Atlas*, 1923.



FIG. 57. Modern defenses in a historical field of conflict. Note the chain of German defenses on the Rhine, the belt of forts close to the French frontier, and the great forts of the intervening country, — Strasbourg, Metz, Namur, Liége, and Antwerp. There is a large industrial population between Paris and the northeastern frontier (Fig. 58). A dense industrial population also occupies the frontier zone of Germany. From map, *Guerre Européenne*, 1914, 1 : 1,200,000.



FIG. 58. The two converging belts of densest population in Europe, with Belgium at the meeting place. Based on Andree, *Handatlas*, 1924, Sheet 31.

It would be difficult to measure the human energy that has been dissipated and perverted upon the fields of Flanders; it is imperative that every means be employed to prevent a recurrence of so terrible an expenditure. To this end the powers signatory to the treaties of 1831 and 1839 — excluding, in the case of the latter treaty, the Netherlands (page 200) — have ratified a new treaty giving Belgium full sovereign status. British support of Belgium when her neutrality was violated in 1914, and like support for her present status, is based upon a cardinal principle of British policy — that the occupation of the Belgian or Dutch coasts by any other power is a direct threat against England. British negotiations are nowhere more delicately handled than in the case of these two small countries a few hours' sail from the English coast.

If the position of Belgium has brought her tragic consequences in times of war, it has nevertheless given her prosperity in times of peace. During the 19th century, and in spite of her small size, Belgium became a great industrial nation. By 1927 her population (7,850,000 or nearly 660 to the square mile) was comparable to that of Pennsylvania, whose area is four times as great. She is the third greatest industrial nation of the continent, mines considerable coal of her own, and has other valuable mineral resources, although her iron supply is wholly insufficient for her needs. Not the least of her advantages is a position on a world highway of commerce. It is an ancient source of revenue and power. Flemish merchants were leaders in the development of the early European mercantile system. Canals, rivers, and railways in the modern era have aided Belgium to serve and profit by the inland trade of Europe with Atlantic ports.

THE TASK OF REBUILDING

The German occupation and the destructive effects of the World War required that the industries of Belgium be rebuilt from their foundations. It is estimated that from 1914 to 1918 the country suffered damages totaling $7,600,000,000. Although she is to receive 8 per cent of German reparation payments, the total amount that the Allies can collect is wholly uncertain. In addition, Belgium is to receive reimbursement from Germany for all sums (about five billion francs) borrowed by Belgium from the Allied and Associated Powers during the war, with interest at 5 per cent. It must be added that at no time has Germany questioned her moral obligation to repair the damage done by invading a country whose neutrality she had promised by treaty to respect.

The recovery of Belgium has been extraordinarily rapid. Within a year of the time of the armistice (11 November 1918), almost the whole Belgian railway system was restored to full activity, and this in spite of labor difficulties and the lack of building material. Likewise the road system, of which a thousand miles had been damaged or destroyed, had been restored and the canals had been cleared, putting Belgium again in possession of all her means of communication. In a few years Belgium had recovered her place among the leading industrial nations of the world.

THE LANGUAGE QUESTION

There are two outstanding problems in Belgian political life, — a vexatious language question at home, and, across the border, misunderstanding with Holland. A little more than half the people of Belgium are Flemish, and quite closely resemble the Dutch; the rest are Walloons, and speak French (Fig. 59). The Flemings have kept their old indigenous language, adding French in the higher levels of society and business. The Walloons, as French-speaking people, have had a preponderance of power in the past, though the Flemings in recent years have slowly been gaining an improved status.

While the Germans occupied Belgium, they tried to foster a separatist movement, and even promised the Flemings a guarantee of independence. But the Flemish people remained loyal to the idea of national unity. Since the World War the effort to advance Flemish culture and institutions has suffered reproach and contemptuous treatment because it was fostered by Germany in Belgium's evil days of military occupation. Flemish extremists would carry their views to the point of division of the country. They cannot forget the grievous wrongs suffered, for half a century after the establishment of the Kingdom of Belgium, under a French-speaking governing class. With the decline of the old Flemish cities the Flemings became dependent upon agriculture chiefly. In Wallonia this period was marked by the rise of industry and of modern cities. To language and occupational differences are added differences of religion. The Flemish people are conservative Catholics who look askance at the religious liberalism imported by the Walloons from France. But insoluble problems are not necessarily fatal. The Belgian scheme of constitutional government and a large measure of local autonomy offset the dangers arising from so prolonged and bitter a discussion of cultural differences. The fading of memories of the World War will also help to diminish regional divisions.



FIG. 59. The shaded areas represent the districts in Holland which Belgium would like to have. Possession of the one on the left would permit Belgium to improve the Scheldt and thus remove long-standing restrictions on the growth of Antwerp; possession of southern Limburg would increase the defensive strength of Belgium's eastern frontier. The Flemish-Walloon speech boundary is after Vidal de la Blache.

BELGIAN INTEREST IN ADJACENT TERRITORY

Belgium's misunderstandings with Holland arise out of her claims to Dutch Limburg and to the left bank of the lower Scheldt (Fig. 59). The Limburg region is inhabited by Dutch and Flemish people and was retained by Holland in 1839, greatly to the dissatisfaction of newly created Belgium. Belgium would now like to possess it, chiefly on account of (1) its coal deposits, (2) its strategic value in the military defense of the country, and (3) its relation to the eastern water transportation routes. (Compare Figure 65, page 207, with Figure 91, page 279.) With the coveted strip in her hands, she could connect the Meuse and the Rhine by canal through her own territory rather than by agreement with Holland as in 1873: Belgium has the densest population in Europe and the closest network of railways and canals. Belgium feels that Holland cannot defend the region in time of war and calls attention to the fact that German troops retreating into Germany just before the armistice of November 1918 crossed Dutch territory, thus violating the neutrality of Holland. From another point of view Limburg, in Dutch hands, was an aid to Belgium, for it constricted the territory through which the German armies advanced. Under the treaty of Versailles, Germany is not allowed to maintain armed forces in the Left Bank of the Rhine, and Belgium is now fully protected against sudden attack from this side.

As for the problem of the Scheldt, Belgium claims that the growth of her great port, Antwerp (on the Scheldt, 50 miles from its mouth), is largely at the mercy of Holland, which controls both banks of the river for a distance of 40 miles. By the treaty of 1839, regulations regarding pilotage, buoying, and dredging of this river must have the joint

consent of Holland and Belgium. Holland is alleged to have made insufficient improvement of the river in order that Rotterdam might profit at the expense of Antwerp — a rivalry that has been active for at least three hundred years. By the Westphalian treaties of 1648, Holland gained the right to close the Scheldt and she also had her sovereignty extended over a part of the left bank [1] (shaded area of Fig. 59). Antwerp has prospered despite its handicaps of position and is now one of the great ports of Europe. Demangeon calls it "the symbol and instrument of commercial Belgium." Dutch influences can scarcely be called strangling, for the city has doubled its population in the past fifty years.

The recent negotiations between Belgium and Holland have had for their object a guarantee to Belgium of the full use of the river in time of peace and of its improvement to meet Antwerp's growing needs. A determined attempt to compromise the differences between Belgium and Holland failed in the first chamber of the Dutch Parliament in 1927 when the question came to a vote. The Dutch feared that the proposed treaty would deflect the traffic of the Ruhr and of Alsace-Lorraine, divert to Antwerp the coal exports of Limburg, and give Belgium permanent rights on the Lower Scheldt by allowing her representatives to sit on a proposed river commission.

Since Holland was a signatory of the treaty of 1839, whereby she recognized the independence of Belgium and its neutral status, and since she has not ratified the new treaty recognizing Belgium as a fully sovereign state, her relations with Belgium are still anomalous. Both countries are so highly commercial and so densely populated that each endeavors to keep every inherited advantage and to oppose compromise.

Belgium has always wished to regain possession of the grand duchy of Luxemburg, for it was a part of Belgium, or the southern Netherlands, until the French Revolution. In 1839 the western, or Walloon, portion was assigned to Belgium and the eastern, or German, portion became the grand duchy of Luxemburg as we know it today. Though its neutrality had been guaranteed in 1867, the duchy was occupied by Germany throughout the World War. It had been a member of the German Customs Union after 1842, and its railroads had been under German control. Both of these conditions are now set aside by treaty. The country is rich in iron and has some coal. France, to which the upper classes of the duchy have been very partial, has also been interested in the possession of Luxemburg. A plebiscite held on 28 Sep-

[1] The left bank of the Scheldt in Dutch possession covers an area of 275 square miles and has a population of about 80,000, practically all of whom are Dutch.

tember 1919 favored a customs union with France and a continuation of the rule of the reigning family. Similar customs arrangements were concluded with Belgium in 1922 when the customs frontier between the two was abolished. The grand duchy is a little smaller than Rhode Island, having an area of 1200 square miles. It has about 230,000 inhabitants.

EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL ACQUISITIONS

Belgium's territorial gains as a result of the World War were not extensive:

(1) Small additions of territory along the German frontier, in the Eupen, Malmédy, and Moresnet regions, with an area of 382 square miles and a population of 64,000 (Fig. 60).

(2) Under mandate, Ruanda and Urundi, a minor but agriculturally valuable part of former German East Africa (Fig. 62; also page 640).

The additions on her eastern frontier were made in order to strengthen Belgium from a military standpoint. The defensive strength of her frontiers was not thought a matter of great importance in 1839; but the invasion of Belgium by Germany, one of the powers that had guaranteed her neutrality, made it clear that the country is not safe as a neutral and must be given the means of defending herself in case of attack. Before the war Germany had built military railways leading to the border and along it that were a menace to Belgium's security. One of Germany's famous concentration camps was at Elsenborn, near the Belgian border.

Strong dissatisfaction was expressed in Germany with the terms of the treaty of Versailles that provided for the disposition of the Eupen and Malmédy districts. Under Belgian supervision, all voters were



FIG. 60. Eupen and Malmédy, districts gained by Belgium in 1920 under the treaty of Versailles. With these two industrial districts there was included the small tract of Moresnet, overlooked in the treaty of 1815 and thereafter subject to international administration. The railway loop eastward out of Eupen and southwestward into Malmédy was given to Belgium, thus creating two curious enclaves of German territory between the railway strip and the boundary.

permitted to express a preference for German ownership, but because voting took the form of signing an open register, with penalties expected by those who did sign, the arrangement prevented the free expression of opinion. Only a few hundred persons registered, and most of these were former German officials. Malmédy, with a population of 9400, is Walloonish and French in speech and is more naturally affiliated with Belgium than with Germany. Eupen has timber resources of value in restoring what was destroyed during the German occupation. In addition it gives Belgium control of the headwaters of the Vesdre, an advantage in operating the canals of eastern Belgium.

BELGIAN TERRITORY IN AFRICA — THE BELGIAN CONGO

Belgium is one of the few powers whose colonial holdings are chiefly in one large continental region. The Belgian Congo and the mandated districts of Ruanda and Urundi constitute a territory about eighty-five times the extent of Belgium in Europe.

The economic value of the Belgian Congo is still unrealized. Most of the territory lies far inland, and this location has imposed a handicap upon both settlement and trade. The white, or European, population numbers about 18,000 persons, having increased from 6000 since the World War. Of these 12,000 are Belgians, many of them officials. The region is in great need of additional white colonists, chiefly planters and traders; and it also needs capital to develop its resources. Its native population is variously estimated at from 7 to 15 millions, chiefly negroes in a low state of social and economic development.

Taken as a whole, the colony now puts upon the home government no expense over revenues, which have been greatly increased through an improved but still unsatisfactory census that has extended the application of the native tax. Cotton planting is done on a growing scale and has only begun to be developed in large regions favorable to very extensive production. The chief item of export is copper, the annual export having risen to 90,000 tons. The reserves of copper are among the largest in the world. Katanga, the comparatively healthful upland rim of the basin in the southeast, is highly mineralized. Rubber, palm oil, and palm nuts are the leading items in the export list in order of value, with copal and cacao next in order.

The state-built roads now aggregate more than 7125 miles. More than 1200 miles of railway have also been built. The railways are supplemented by navigable waterways many thousands of miles long, upon which ply over one hundred steamers and barges. A series of



FIG. 61. Rail and water transportation in the Belgian Congo. Railroads from 1 : 2,000,000 map of Africa, and later official sources. Data on navigability of rivers from G. Kaeckenbeeck, *International Rivers*, Publications of the Grotius Society, I, 1918.

wireless stations at Boma, Stanleyville, Albertville, Kilo, Kindu, etc., link the coast with the more important inland towns. A pipe-line for transporting crude oil for the use of river steamers runs from Matadi to Leopoldville, a distance of 246 miles. An air service is in process of extension.

The Congo is to Belgium what the Dutch East Indies are to the Netherlands, a tropical empire, huge in area, with a large native population, and with only partially developed resources capable of supplying to a much greater degree what highly industrialized western European countries need. In both cases a high level of administration is maintained. It is also true of both that there is no active rivalry for possession by great powers, whatever desire there may have been to own regions valuable alike for their export of tropical raw materials and as a market for manufactured wares. From the time that the Congo Independent State was placed under Belgian sovereignty in 1885, through its annexation by Belgium in 1907, down to the present, there has been acceptance of Belgian responsibility by the interested powers but severe criticism of the exploitative measures once employed.



FIG. 62. The northwestern corner of former German East Africa, allotted to Belgium. It is densely populated and has a considerable extent of upland suitable for white settlement (Fig. 220). The part ceded to Belgium (districts of Ruanda and Urundi) has an area of 21,200 square miles and a population estimated at 3,500,000, about half of the total of former German East Africa. Agriculture and grazing are the chief native occupations.

Ruanda and Urundi

The Ruanda and Urundi districts in eastern Africa, formerly a part of German East Africa, were assigned to Belgium in return for the help given by Belgians in the conquest of German East Africa (1917). Belgium is to act as mandatory of the League of Nations. In ceding the two districts, Great Britain[1] reserved small portions on the eastern side in order to have a practicable route for a railroad which shall join Tanganyika Territory (as former German East Africa is now designated) to Uganda. This portion of the line is a link in the Cape-to-Cairo railroad (Fig. 20). In return for these important concessions to the British, Belgium obtains valuable economic advantages, as follows:

(1) A free outlet for the produce of the east-central portion of the Belgian Congo by way of Lake Tanganyika to Dar es Salaam on the Indian Ocean.

(2) Concession areas at Kigoma (on Lake Tanganyika) and Dar es Salaam on the eastern coast for the storage of goods.

(3) The right to transport merchandise from Lake Tanganyika to the Indian Ocean in Belgian freight cars.

[1] In 1923 Great Britain ceded another small portion of the northwestern corner of Tanganyika Territory to Belgium. It lies west of the Kagera River except that a small area at Bugufi remains in Tanganyika Territory. This substitutes a geographical boundary for an artificial boundary and restores the integrity of Sultan Musinga's territory, which will now be wholly under Belgian mandate.

Belgium thus gains in former German East Africa 21,000 square miles of territory of great economic value, to be added to the 1,000,000 square miles she already possesses in the Belgian Congo. Ruanda and Urundi are high plateau regions, the former culminating in the volcanic mountains northeast of Lake Kivu, the latter bordering on Lake Tanganyika. The region is climatically suitable as a white man's country, for most of its area lies from 2500 to 6000 feet above sea level. There is a rainfall of about 40 inches a year and occasional droughts affect only the upland pastures. The territory has a dense native population, intelligent and independent. The soil is fertile and native agriculture is well developed; it is one of the most important cattle regions in Africa. Its mineral wealth is still unexplored.

(B) The Netherlands (Holland)

The Netherlands can never rival Belgium in industrial production, but the Dutch have the navy, the colonial sources of raw material, and the thrift to develop their natural resources and maritime trade to a high degree. In the past half century industries have grown rapidly in response to the desire to be more nearly independent industrially, a desire the more easily satisfied because of an abundant colonial supply of raw materials — sugar, hemp, vegetable oil, and rubber.

To secure sufficient soil, the Dutch reclaim the shallow sea floor and marshes of the coast. They have a saying: "God made the sea, but man made the land." Vast sums have been expended on reclamation projects and more will follow if the plan of reclaiming part of the Zuider Zee is continued as begun in 1924 (Fig. 63). These efforts have induced an appreciation of land that makes the

Fig. 63. The struggle for land in Holland. After R. Schuiling, *Nederland: Handboek der Aardrijkskunde*, 5th ed., 1915, p. 6.



FIG. 64. The trade hinterland of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. After Oxholm, *Lumber Market in the Netherlands*, U. S. Department of Commerce, 1925.

loss of it, in whatever form, appear to be a calamity. Practically the whole of Holland represents reclamation work of one sort or another since the beginnings of civilization in that country. Throughout the centuries the maps of the "Low Countries" show more frequent changes in the position and area of tilled land, towns, and hydrography, than those of any other country. From 1901 to 1923 about 435 square miles of waste land was transformed into arable land or forest. A third of the land of the Netherlands is pasture in a high state of development.

The conditions of life in the Netherlands have created an intense interest in the principle of the freedom of the seas and the security of distant colonies held by the smaller powers. Threatened by the growth of Germany's submarine fleet, the Dutch could scarcely hope for German success in the World War. At the same time, Holland could not forget her historic naval defeat at the hands of the British, the colonies in South Africa that she had lost to Great Britain, or the kinship of the Boers who had fought in vain against British domination. As long as she was not directly threatened, she did not wish to disturb her profitable trade as a neutral with needy Germany. Allied victory meant the safeguarding of colonial titles. Her shipping and commerce had suffered by submarine sinkings and by American and British internment, but she had escaped the huge debts of the belligerents and their loss of man power.

A source of security for the Netherlands is its position on the North Sea between Germany and England. While this is commonly described as a source of peril, it is really an advantage, for neither great power would permit encroachment by the other. The example of Belgium in 1914 is eloquent in this respect. It has been a fixed article in England's maritime creed that no change in territorial status must take place on the coast opposite her, and so near her commercial lanes, without her consent and that in any event the present balance must not be thrown out of adjustment. This traditional view, coupled with a strong British navy, is a surer guarantee of independence than Holland

and Belgium could themselves provide.

We have already reviewed the claim advanced by Belgium at the expense of the Netherlands upon Dutch Limburg and the left bank of the Scheldt (page 199). However desirable these additions might be for Belgium, their loss was not to be thought of by the Dutch. Limburg contains coal deposits, and the Netherlands is poor in mineral resources of every sort. The Dutch have a remarkable maritime and commercial history, and they could hardly be expected to advantage a neighbor at direct loss to themselves. Antwerp may need the lower Scheldt, but its welfare is not a responsibility of the merchants of Rotterdam. That the policy of the Dutch might lead to Belgian enmity was a difficulty hardly to be avoided in any case, seeing that Belgium had revolted from the Netherlands in 1830 and that Belgium's foreign policy favors France while the Netherlands is commercially and politically more closely allied to Germany.

FIG. 65. The field of dispute between the Netherlands and Belgium. Only those canals are shown that are involved in the present negotiations. For the whole canal system, see Figure 91. Belgium advanced a claim to the Wielingen Channel (Dutch) because part of it lies within the three-mile limit of territorial waters. This claim was dropped in 1925 when the two countries discussed the mutual improvement of their connecting canals (as shown in the map) and the Scheldt channels. The treaty embodying these conditions was rejected by the Dutch First Chamber in 1927. From map in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1927.

The lower Scheldt is also vitally related to the whole matter of Dutch frontiers. On every side the strategic value of water is obvious. A belt of marshes forms the northern third of Holland's eastern frontier. The long and indented coast is fringed with shallow water easy to defend. Much of the reclaimed land is pasture and, by cutting the dikes, could be flooded, if the national defense required it, without de-

stroying the principal towns. The area that can be inundated swings around and almost encloses the western more densely populated section of the country. Holland's army of scarcely less than a half million when effectively mobilised is no small addition to her national defence even in the eyes of a great power.

It is noteworthy that Holland's welfare and indeed its fate are closely related to waterways. In Figure 91 is shown the position of the country within the network of canals that cross the Rhine economic region. It is a transit land for the exports of the great industrial region of the Ruhr and for Swiss and German imports of raw materials and food stuffs. Most of the grain consumed in Holland is imported from overseas and likewise colonial raw products in so far as Holland absorbs them. Food, home commerce, transit trade, defense, and even soil itself as a basis of country, are won by unceasing use and control of rivers, canals, and salt water.

THE COLONIES OF THE NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands, with 12,582 square miles of territory, is a mere spot on the map in comparison with her colonies, whose total area is 783,000 square miles (Fig. 47). Of this area, 737,000 is in the Malay Archipelago of the East Indies. The Dutch West Indian possessions, including Dutch Guiana on the mainland of South America, have an area of 46,000 square miles and a population of 90,000. The Netherlands has a population exceeding 7,000,000, while her East Indian colonies have 47,000,000. The island of Java is the most intensively cultivated land in the tropics and has the highest population density in the world among countries depending almost entirely upon agriculture (35,000,000 upon 50,750 square miles, or 678 per square mile).

It is noteworthy that all of the Dutch colonies are in the tropics. They thus supplement the products of the Netherlands and have long formed the basis for an important trade with Germany and Great Britain. Through their use of cheap Malay labor and their development of the plantation system in the East Indies, the Dutch laid the foundations of colonial success. In recent years the British restriction laws on rubber production (Stevenson Act), designed to hold prices up to profitable levels, caused an immense stimulation of competitive Dutch rubber interests not subject to British regulation. Thus the Dutch East Indies have become an established factor in the world's rubber trade, their production in 1924 amounting to 45 per cent of the total for the Middle East (British, 53 per cent).

Coffee and sugar culture in the Dutch East Indies have long had a

vital relation to Dutch prosperity. More recently the production of plantation rubber has brought huge amounts of foreign capital and a fresh hold upon international trade. As far as treatment of natives goes, the Dutch "culture" system was at first absolutely ruthless and native exploitation became a highly developed art. The natives gave time and a part of their land for the growth of crops of high export value, but the proportion of time given was the subject of widespread abuses and equally vicious were the effects of a continued land tax. Famine and pestilence resulted, and at last the system, which was virtually slavery, was abolished and one was substituted that provided for at least theoretically free labor. After the middle of the 19th century liberal tendencies became more marked. Native services were regulated and the administration of the land tax was revised. By 1870 the old culture system was condemned in favor of free labor. Local councils were instituted in all the larger towns in 1903, some composed entirely of natives, others of Europeans and natives. The plan worked so well and the impetus of reform was so great, as a result of education and the desire for higher standards of living, that a Volksraad, or popular assembly, was convened in 1918 with the announced policy of setting up responsible government in the colony. Finally, by the Act of 1925 the constitution was still further changed and a broader representation secured in the Volksraad. Of sixty members, twenty are natives and thirty are Netherlanders. The local councils elect thirty-eight out of the sixty. Provision is made, however, for the exercise of wide powers by the Dutch governor-general in times of emergency or disagreement and the reference to the crown or to the Dutch parliament of questions that cannot be settled in Batavia. Still further extensions of political power to native representatives are now under consideration.

The results of Dutch activity in the East have been excellent. The topographic surveys are of high grade and, along with scientific expeditions to little-known interior regions, have opened up valuable lands to future development. Telegraph lines, cables, lighthouses, and free harbors have promoted trade. Piracy has been all but suppressed, and the benefits of orderly government have been extended to peoples once lawless. In recent years the government has given support to the colonization of Javanese in southern Sumatra, first, to relieve the overpopulated condition of Java, and second, to open up unused arable lands elsewhere in the Netherlands East Indies.

CHAPTER SIX

THE DEMOCRATIC DRIFT IN SPAIN

Though Spain neither gained nor lost territory as a result of the World War, her international relations took on new aspects by reason of her participation in the fulfillment of the treaties that closed the war. She was for a time a member of the Council of the League of Nations and her representatives sat on several important commissions. She also enjoys a new status in the Spanish Zone of northern Morocco. Her financial condition was so greatly improved as a result of her active trade as a neutral during the war that she entered upon a new period of industrial development. The features of Spanish life that may counterbalance these favorable conditions are (1) the social instability of the people and (2) the political instability of the state. In recent years there has been a rapid development of the radical, or socialist, movement in Spain, and the revival of a separatist tendency on the part of the provinces, a tendency which has manifested itself repeatedly in Spanish history, despite the unifying influence of the long struggle against the Moor. Finally, we have the severe test of dictatorship, which threatens to end party government and even constitutionalism itself. "Strictly speaking, we have no public opinion," is a conclusion drawn by a King whose continued support of the dictatorship helps to block the free expression of whatever public opinion may remain.

RADICALISM IN SPAIN

The period of recent socialist activity corresponds roughly with the reign of Alfonso XIII, since his coming of age in 1902, though the impelling causes of unrest do not lie in the character of the King. There were serious riots at Barcelona and Saragossa a few months before his coronation, and again in 1903 at Salamanca, Barcelona, and Madrid. A crop failure and a famine in Andalusia were followed by rioting in southern Spain in 1905; disorders led to the proclamation of martial law in Catalonia; Seville, Granada, Oviedo, Bilbao, and Valencia were centers of serious disturbance. In 1908 martial law was proclaimed in Barcelona, and the restoration of order was followed by the passage of laws that improved living conditions — at least to a modest degree — in the industrial regions.

The more liberal policy of the government following these various disorders might have had a happy outcome had it not been for native

troubles in Morocco, which required the increase of the Spanish military forces and the calling out of the reserves. In Catalonia there were strikes and disorders as a protest against the government's policy in Morocco. These had their center at Barcelona, where in July 1909 a revolutionary mob, consisting among others of Spanish workmen and disorderly spirits from South America and eastern Europe, attacked the convents and churches and engaged in three days of street fighting. Martial law was established throughout the whole of Spain on 28 July, and for two months the country was kept in order only by military means. Ferrer, an anarchist and leader in the disorder, was tried by court martial and shot.

On top of these difficulties came the news of the defeat of the Spanish forces in Morocco by the Rif tribesmen, who were subdued only after six months of hard fighting. Thereupon trouble broke out afresh. Constitutional guarantees had to be suspended in 1911, owing to a general strike on government-owned railways. Another strike was avoided in 1912 only by putting the military in control of the train service. To the opposition elements the government had become the symbol of inefficiency.

That Spain should have continued its traditional form of government without a general revolution is a tribute to the personal popularity which the King so long enjoyed, for the liberal agitation that started before the beginning of his reign has never ceased. While the loss of the last of her American and Asiatic colonies, in 1898, might have enabled her leaders to turn their attention to domestic problems, the action of the radical elements in industrial regions hastened the country into a series of bitter contests, the end of which is not yet in view. The effect has been to keep the extremes of opinion far apart, with little desire anywhere for a moderate program.

In November 1919 a lockout was put into force at Barcelona by the employers, and the threat was made by the Spanish Employer's Association to extend the lockout to the whole of Spain if the government did not treat more fairly the two parties to the quarrel — employers and employed. Each accused the other of political motives. By January 1920 terrorism and bitterness had greatly increased, and strike agitation had extended from Barcelona to Madrid, Valencia, Vigo, and other cities. Closely connected with these disturbances were the perils of the army juntas, which exist for political and illegal as well as for professional purposes. Growing in power, they have repeatedly menaced the security of the state in times of internal disorder.

SEPARATIST TENDENCIES AND THEIR HISTORIC CAUSES

The World War of 1914–1918 divided Spain. The liberal and many of the intellectual elements favored the Allies; the conservative elements were in sympathy with Germany. Many Spaniards are jealous of French cultural influence in Latin America and resent French pressure on Spain in Moroccan affairs. Gibraltar is remembered against Great Britain.

Running like a thread through all the political turmoil and the disturbed social and financial conditions of Spain is the vexed question of the relations between church and state, which reached its climax in the attempt of the government to control the religious orders. It was during a period of general protest against the corruptions and privileges of the ecclesiastical bodies, and specifically in the year 1836, that religious congregations had been banished from Spain. But in 1851 the law of 1836 was so far altered as to permit the reestablishment of certain orders. From that time down to the present, the growth in the number and power of the orders has been rapid, and their political and social influence is formidable. Every attempt to tax or control them has been met by violent clerical agitation. Exempted from taxes, they have been enabled to engage in commercial projects and industrial work in such a way as to compete unfairly with lay rivals. Protagonists of the church reply to these strictures by recounting the violence and cruelty done the religious orders in 1856 and 1909, and by claiming that the enemies of Catholicism are alone responsible for the charges of ecclesiastical corruption. Said the King in a speech at the Vatican a few years ago: ". . . if the cross of Christ should ever for a moment cease to throw its beneficent shadow over our land, Spain would no more be Spain."

Troublesome as it already was, the problem presented a more serious aspect with the change from a monarchist to a republican form of government in Portugal in 1910, when the religious congregations expelled from Portugal came to Spain. There were also ecclesiastical refugees from France that came to Spain at the time of the separation of church and state in France (1905). Equally important is the effect of the political refugees from Portugal and the example of revolution near at hand.

In addition to the political factors, there are geographical conditions that make it difficult to maintain the territorial integrity of Spain. The Spanish peninsula is broken up into a number of natural regions separated by formidable barriers which, in the past, exercised a strong

influence upon the local inhabitants, and later, upon their social and judicial systems as well as upon their political forms and solidarity. The great extent of the interior plateau, the broken character of its borders, and the ruggedness of the more prominent sierras, have made it more difficult to diminish those diversities of speech, political thought, and social character which for a long time kept the regional population groups apart and which still threaten to turn the country back into the state of disunion that has repeatedly prevailed. From the earliest times down to the union of Castile and Aragon late in the 15th century, as well as in the period following, provincial rivalries have disfigured the political life of Spain.



FIG. 66. The greater part of the plains and valley country of Spain is dry. The boundary between arid and humid regions is after Brunhes, *La géographie humaine*, 1917; the limits of the steppe regions are from E. Reyes Prósper, *Las estepas de España y su vegetación*, 1915. Each steppe district has a local name; e.g., the one about Saragossa is called *Estepa ibérica*, the one about Granada, *Estepa granadina*.

The population of Spain numbers about 22,000,000 and occupies only a small fraction of the land that could be cultivated. Considering its geographical position and its natural resources, the country is very thinly populated as compared with the rest of Europe. Military expeditions against the Moors no doubt decreased the native population, and the country never recovered from the loss sustained by the expulsion of the Moors in 1609. Though Spain had borrowed cultural elements from the Romans long before the Moorish invasion, she had also developed a culture of her own and a spirit strong enough to endure tragic defeat. What she has always lacked is the practical element, and this was supplied by the Moors who, bred in a desert environment, were masters in the reclamation of arid lands. They built irrigation works in Spain and applied a system of cultivation far superior to that formerly in vogue. The Moors introduced sugar cane, extended the cultivation of cotton (a product already known to the Spaniards for centuries), and in general improved the breeds of live stock. Another considerable factor in holding back the growth of the country was the expulsion of the Jews late in the 15th century. The whole colonial period was marked by emigration and heavy loss of life

Fig. 67. The numbers represent the dates on which Spain and Portugal were reconquered from the Moors by Christian forces, in each case up to the limit shown by the broken line on which the date stands. It was only in 1492 that Granada, the last stronghold of the Moors, was retaken. The dots represent the locations of towns and geographical features that still have Moorish names. After Reclus, *L'homme et la terre*, Vol. III, p. 448; IV, p. 159.

in military expeditions and in the struggles of the pioneers in new and unhealthful conditions. It must be remembered that there was no such thing as a science of tropical medicine in the days of Spanish colonial expansion.

The earlier history of Spain has some striking modern parallels. Spain made great progress during the period of the Roman occupation and possessed a certain unity, owing to the general use of the Roman law and the organization and almost universal influence of the Christian church. When the Roman Empire fell apart with the onset of the barbarian invasions, the accustomed routes of commerce were broken, and the invaded country dissolved into its component fragments.

The success of the Moorish invasion of 711 lay not in the political organization or military strength of the invaders, but in the social and regional disorganization of the people of Spain. The northward progress of the Moors was almost unobstructed. By 718 they crossed the Pyrenees and invaded the country of the Franks, only to meet with defeat at the hands of Charles Martel at the battle of Tours in 732. Monasteries and cities, landowners and local rulers, paid tribute to the invader. Some of the people even accepted the Mohammedan religion.

The invaders had come from the desert. They were the last western extension of the great Arab wave that swept from east of the Red Sea over northern Africa. Their Mohammedanism was hardly orthodox; their blood was extremely mixed. The "Moors" were a sort of loose confederation of Arabs, Berbers, Syrians, and others, and they quarreled among themselves. The Berber revolted because to him was

assigned the barren central plateau. The various Arab tribes quarreled as a result of rivalries and disunion at the heart of the Arab world. Only by maintaining a mercenary army of African negroes were the Moors able to keep their Spanish possessions. At that they were never able completely to subjugate the peninsula: the Basques and other isolated groups in naturally strong positions on either side of the Pyrenees and in northwestern Spain maintained their independence throughout the long period of Moslem occupation.

We may summarize the greater part of the period of Moorish occupation by saying that it was thoroughly confused; and when order and organization developed in the Christian portions of Spain not occupied by the Moors, the long strife began which ended in the reconquest of the land. As military inefficiency and corruption increased among the Moors, the Christian kings advanced into the Moorish country with well-disciplined cavalry belonging to the great monastic military orders. Córdoba was conquered in 1236, Seville in 1248, Valencia in 1237, and in 1340 at the battle of the Río Salado the African invaders suffered a critical defeat, after which they were only occasionally a dangerous factor in Spanish life. Their last stronghold, Granada, fell in 1492.

From 1340 forward, Spanish history records a long and painful process of unification. It was not until the early years of the 18th century that a really ardent spirit of nationalism was displayed. Except for a common religion and a common throne, there would hardly have been any progress at all. For patriotism in Spain is a local thing that reflects the geographical division of the country; a man says he is a Galician, an Asturian, a Castilian, an Andalusian; he rarely thinks of himself as a Spaniard. While Castilian is the literary language of Spain, the people of each great region have a distinctive speech. The people of Catalonia speak a dialect similar to that of southern France; the Basques have a distinct language of their own, and both Catalan and Castilian have several important dialects.



FIG. 68. The generalized language boundaries of Spain. From Agostini, *L'Europe ethnique et linguistique*, 1: 10,000,000, 1917.

Locally, Spaniard is separated from Spaniard by mountain barriers, by tradition, by

FIG. 69. Spanish possessions in Africa. The shaded zone south of Gibraltar is the northern Spanish Zone. The southern Spanish Zone is similarly shaded. From Andree's *Handatlas*, the *Geographical Journal*, June 1920, and later sources.

language, by grades of society. Spanish life is regional in spirit, customs, and history. "The local legend is the center and source of spiritual life." Cities were long arrayed against cities, and villages against villages. There was unequal distribution of the taxes; there were special privileges to this and that city or monastery, and the nobles were exempted from taxation. With the increase of landed possessions by the nobles and monasteries, a heavier burden of taxation was thrown upon the towns. These difficulties have their effect even in our own time. The present contest between church and state reaches back to the time of the Christianization of Spain. In Spain as in France and Italy, and almost every other European country, the fortunes of the country are strongly affected by the complications of history. If society is steadied by age-old customs, it is also thwarted at times by the power of historical fact and precedent.

Though it had its glorious days, Spanish colonial history is remarkable not only for the great extent of its field, but also for its rapid decline after reaching a brilliant climax. The last stage of the process came in 1898, when, as a result of the Spanish-American War, Spain lost to the United States all but a few of her Pacific possessions, which few she later sold to Germany (page 287). Her West Indian possessions also were lost, and nothing now remains to her in the way of colonies except Río de Oro, Spanish Guinea, a few small islands in the Gulf of Guinea, and small portions of Morocco — the northern and southern

Spanish Zones (Fig. 69). The causes of Spanish colonial losses are many, and some of them are still embedded in the national life. Heavy emigration during the colonial period, the expulsion of Jews and Moors in the 15th and 16th centuries and also earlier, special exemptions from taxes, government interference in trade, a lack of industry among some classes, and an exceptional number of convents and monasteries, are among the chief causes. Government intervention in trade became a habit, and yet the government, until quite recent years, has never done anything constructive in modifying geographical conditions and increasing productivity. On the contrary, chiefly through the institution known as the Mesta, an organization of the pastoral interests, it long favored grazing at the expense of agriculture and forestry, and it did not adequately maintain the irrigation systems developed by the Moors in the south of Spain.

PRESENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION

To break up along lines of race and local interest would be greatly to the disadvantage both of all Spain and of the smaller units, and one of the problems of the day is to accomplish a change toward democratic rule and yet hold the country together so that the different parts may have the benefit of free exchange of products in a fairly well-balanced state. The setting up of a number of independent states, with the resulting increase in boundary lines and the creation of boundary disputes, would complicate the social and commercial life of the Spanish peninsula and weaken the Spanish people.

The Catalan separatist movement is the most serious one of its kind at the present time. It is not a movement to separate from Spain but one to secure local autonomy, such as Catalonia once enjoyed. By the beginning of the 18th century her character as a separate political entity had changed completely. Her leaders were not made a part of the Spanish administration in either colonial or domestic affairs. Catalonia had suffered also in the colonial period by a change in the shipping trade as commerce progressively left the Mediterranean and became focused on the Atlantic. Following the disastrous Spanish-American War of 1898 and in common with all parties and regions in Spain, there was much criticism in Catalonia of the central government, and at the same time an increasing regional consciousness. Since then the trend of events in Spanish Morocco has pushed the government from one untenable position into another with respect to both domestic and foreign issues.

THE DIRECTORY

It was the great military disaster of 1921 in Morocco that first revealed the weakness if not the paralysis of the central government. The disorganization and corruption of the army was in part responsible for the crisis; it was also brought about by a horde of parasitic office holders, by agrarian difficulties, and by the socialist activities of labor unions. At this juncture Primo de Rivera issued a manifesto on September 1923 from Barcelona, demanding that the King dismiss the cabinet. The result was a royal invitation to come to Madrid and form a provisional government. A directorate was appointed, with Primo de Rivera at the head. The directorate is a device frequently employed throughout Spanish history. It has the advantage that the King may exercise his powers with a directness that is impossible under a parliamentary system. It sweeps aside troublesome opposition.

Under Primo de Rivera, the directorate put an end for the time being to the political activities of the army, responsible in past times for many ministerial crises. At the same time, government by dictatorship tends to break down the party system, which was already weakened in Spain by the disorganization of the World War, when Spanish interests were overshadowed by war issues and a provisional regrouping of political forces took place into francophiles, germanophiles, and neutrals. The promise of a return to civil government means nothing whatever unless there is a rebuilding of the party system and an encouragement on the part of the central government of provincial participation.[1] It is true that the directorate established order at a time when life and property were becoming more and more unsafe. It is also true that provincial parliaments were encouraged to take hold of that part of government which most directly affects them. Whether the central government can be the product of public action is a question for the coming years. The device of an appointed executive leaves in the hands of the King that power which is apparently needed to hold in check the army juntas, the clericals, and the political extremists whose acts directly or indirectly menace the public security.

Obstructive in other ways is the attitude of the nobles, the landed proprietors, and the capitalists. Their philosophy is frankly that of a privileged caste. They see no good whatever in labor movements,

[1] The Advisory Assembly opened in October 1927 is a substitute for the Parliament dissolved in 1923. Its members are appointed, not elected. Half of them were chosen by Primo de Rivera, half by the mayors of municipalities, themselves appointees. The government initiates legislation and is free to reject measures approved by the Assembly.

they oppose wider responsibilities on the part of the electorate, they are so strongly entrenched in power that popular movements cannot make headway against them. Between the labor unions and the conservative Spanish elements are the coöperative associations, or Catholic syndicates, first organized in 1918. They urge the arbitration of labor difficulties rather than a resort to strikes. They assert themselves to prevent oppression, and they serve as employment bureaus and centers of social welfare.

EDUCATION AND LAND

A fundamental cause of the low state of Spanish life today is the lack of educational facilities. The percentage of illiteracy in the various provinces runs from 26 to 82, and it would be still higher if it were not for the large expenditures upon private schools. The government spends three times as much upon the army and navy as it does upon education. Railway communications are wholly inadequate either to offset by travel and commercial exchanges the disadvantages of limited education or to equalize production.

The land question remains to be considered. Much of the arable land is held in large estates isolated from national life and immune from government control. The landowning class, active in politics, is on the one hand indifferent to the welfare of the tenant and on the other opposed to schemes of land reform. In Andalusia the peasant population is at the mercy of landlords. It is true that a revolutionary mood has grown among the tenant classes because of the division of the landed estates elsewhere in Europe, but their condition cannot be corrected by the high-sounding land laws that have been passed. While abandoned, uncultivated, or inefficiently worked private estates are to be subject to subdivision, no such subdivision in fact takes place except quite locally. The system of agriculture is still notoriously primitive. There is no proper return from the soil. Internal commerce is in a low state. These two conditions combined mean a wretchedly low standard of living. Work has been started by the "Central Council for Land Settlement and Repopulation of Spain" whereby public lands and forests are to be colonized and settlers organized into coöperative associations. A score of colonies have been established in various provinces of Spain, but on a scale that alters by an insignificant fraction the agricultural economy of the country. Land division and colonization are mere palliatives; of far greater importance would be greatly increased production by

modern methods and the more economic distribution of agricultural products between the provinces of Spain.

Though Spain is but slowly gaining in industrial strength, population is moving toward urban centers at an abnormal rate. In a broad zone stretching from the Portuguese frontier to the Mediterranean, emigration is most active. While the total population increase during the decade 1911–1920 was a little less than 7 per cent, the increase of population of the provincial capitals was 17 per cent and for towns of more than 20,000 inhabitants 14.6 per cent. Southern Spain has a considerable area where the population increase has been more than 10 per cent. Most of the emigrants from Spain go to the Argentine, and there have been years when 100,000 have gone to that country. In 1910 Spanish immigration into the Argentine outnumbered even Italian. In general the coastal provinces contribute the largest quotas. This is particularly true of the northwestern part of Spain — Galicia, Asturias, and León. It is natural that Spain should wish to strengthen the commercial and political bonds between herself and her offspring. But her path in this direction is beset with many difficulties. In Mexico, for example, Spaniards are probably more disliked than Americans. The mestizo element of the population of Latin-American countries does not look upon Spain as the source of its culture. Moreover, the mestizo is not interested in cultural elements so much as in commercial advantages. If Spain were an industrial country and could offer him the solid realities of merchant ships, a coal supply, and cheap manufactured goods, a relationship could be fostered that might lead to predominance of Spanish influence in Latin America. Sentiment alone is but a broken reed. In spite of Spain's excellent maritime situation, her merchant marine does not supply even her own transportation needs. She exports her ores rather than manufactured goods.[1] She depends upon the United States for cotton and in part for coal, petroleum, lumber, and wheat; and her imports of these commodities are growing much more rapidly than her general trade. Her greatest economic deficiencies are in coal and in modern agricultural practice. Of her total consumption of 7,000,000 tons of coal, 3,000,000 tons are normally imported. Though she exports iron ore to England, English capital conducts the mining operations even in Spain, which increases city growth in England, not in Spain. If agriculture is to be improved it must be by a change in the Spaniard

[1] The leading items of mineral production in Spain for a single year (1923) are summarized as follows: Coal production, 6,263,000 tons, with practically no export; iron ore, 3,100,000, tons, of which 3,000,000 tons were exported; quicksilver, 2,522,000 pounds (second to Italy only); silver ore, 2,842,000 ounces (eighth in rank).



FIG. 70. The northern Spanish Zone in Morocco. The spelling of "Zafarin Islands" follows the United States Hydrographic Office charts; on some maps the name is spelled "Chafarinas." After map in the *Geographical Journal*, May 1920.

himself, who is in this respect the most important element in his own environment. He has been unable to cultivate his land like the other peoples of Europe. His standards are those of a century ago.

FOREIGN INTERESTS

With the opening of the Suez Canal, Great Britain more than ever desired to maintain a free passage into the western Mediterranean. So emphatically is this her position that the question of Gibraltar has passed out of the realm of practical politics and is brought forward by Spanish politicians only in occasional outbursts that soon subside. Of far greater importance to Spain are the commercial relations so long maintained and so actively growing between Spain and Great Britain. It is to England that a large quantity of the iron ore of northern Spain is exported; it is from England that most of the imported coal comes, a smaller amount coming from Germany. France being a nearer neighbor has a more vital interest to Spain, for French territory limits Spain not only on the north in Europe but on the south in Africa. If Great Britain holds a key point at Gibraltar, France holds encircling territory that means more frequent and more important contacts. Though the treaty of 1904 mutually recognized Spanish and French rights in Morocco, the two countries have repeatedly become involved in difficulties since that time, particularly in 1911. The differences

were harmonized by an agreement (1912) extending Spanish territory and giving to Tangier, with a district of nearly 150 square miles about it, an international status. Spain was to have 40 per cent and France 60 per cent of the stock of a railway to be constructed between Tangier and Fez.

The Spanish zone of Northern Morocco has proved a great drain upon Spanish resources. A huge army of occupation has been required to maintain order, and the expense has not been offset by any products of real value to Spain. It has been impossible to reconcile Spanish pride in owning possessions south of the Straits of Gibraltar with economic reality. The golden commercial advantages of the future which imagination invoked, the possibilities of a railway tunnel under the Straits as part of a line to the coast of Africa at Río de Oro, where Spain holds additional African territory, the hope that she might eventually possess Tangier in full sovereignty — these have kept the Moroccan question in a state of suspense and like a will o' the wisp have drawn Spanish leaders farther and farther toward disaster. Spain has nothing to gain by penetration inland from the coast forts, or *presidios*, originally established on rocky points to help protect her shipping from pirates. An almost incalculable amount of treasure has been poured out to maintain these precarious footholds, some of which have been established for centuries. Melilla has been held since 1497, Ceuta from 1580, and Alhucemas since 1673. Supplies for the *presidios* had sometimes to be brought from Spain and the garrisons had continuously to resist attacks from the interior. Nationalists point to the final subjugation of Spanish Morocco as a vindication of current policy. They overlook the fact that the piper has yet to be paid. And Spanish Morocco yields but little to apply to the bill. The cost of subjugation has been enormous. Put into the improvement of agricultural practice it would have advanced Spain immeasurably.

CHAPTER SEVEN

PORTUGAL'S COLONIAL POLICIES

Portugal was in the midst of a period of national and colonial reconstruction when the World War came in 1914 to add to her already complex problems. There had been grave dissatisfaction with the government, nominally a constitutional monarchy, but in reality a reactionary oligarchy headed by the king. In 1903 an insurrection of peasants took place at Fundão, and in the same year there were riots at Coimbra and a strike of weavers at Oporto. In 1908 King Carlos and the Crown Prince were assassinated and Prince Manoel succeeded to the throne, only to flee to England for safety in 1910. The corruption of the public service and the poverty of the overtaxed peasant and artisan classes had at last ended in revolution.

For many years the country had also suffered the difficulties of administering large and remote colonial possessions, which were so inefficiently managed as to require heavy annual subsidies for their maintenance. Portuguese administrators were weak; for the most part the colonies had an unhealthful climate; there was no capital for colonial development. The political and economic situation of Portugal was bad from every standpoint when the republic was proclaimed in 1910.

THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEW DEMOCRACY

Among the new policies of Portugal there are two items of special importance: (1) the separation of church and state, and (2) a large degree of autonomy for the provinces and colonies of Portugal. But the country is far from unity in the matter of general policy, being broken up into nearly a dozen political parties, all struggling for the success of special and, on the whole, narrow programs of political and economic reconstruction. No faction or party seems capable of working with any other. More than forty cabinets have essayed the task of government since 1910. From that time to 1927, eighteen revolutionary movements troubled the country. Lisbon has been repeatedly bombarded, mutinies have occurred in both army and navy, political assassinations have been frequent.

The leaders of the political parties and their principal followers have very little in common with the mass of the people. Each party includes only a small minority of the electorate. With 85 per cent of the 6,000,000 population living in the country districts, questions



FIG. 71. Portuguese navigators were the first to explore the west coast of Africa and to conquer the Arabs of the east coast, particularly at Zanzibar. They were also the first to plant European settlements in distant India, where they still have Goa, Diu, and Damão. Brazil was lost in 1822. Colonial administration was so inefficient as late as 1914 that Portugal was in danger of losing even Angola and Mozambique.

of taxes and wages, of the price of crops and the improvement of transportation lines, are of far greater concern than the political programs. The gulf between people and leaders is a matter of more importance by reason of a degree of illiteracy higher than anywhere else in western Europe. According to the census of 1920, the average is 71 per cent. Not by education alone but by every mark of culture, the population is of exceptionally low grade.

It has been said that Portugal's chief export is peasants. Emigration became a serious factor between 1890 and 1900, and even today adds 30,000 Portuguese annually to the population of Brazil. There is no money for the development of the land, and Portugal is chiefly agricultural. Capital cannot be made available for industries, of which the country has long felt the need and which would absorb the natural increase of population.

Only a quarter of the land of Portugal is cultivated. Much of it on the east, along the common boundary with Spain, is too rugged for extensive cultivation; elsewhere there are high moorlands too cold for agriculture and, in the south, regions too dry without irrigation. In all, 3 per cent is forest, 27 per cent pasture, 46 per cent unproductive.

It was natural that Portugal should join with the western Allies in the World War, for she is traditionally friendly with England and she is dependent to a large degree upon imported coal and wheat and upon her relatively extensive fisheries. She was not placed, like Switzerland and Holland, where a large and lucrative trade with Germany could be carried on. Nor did she care to lose her colonies, wherever placed, for in the future they may have more value to her than in the past, considering their supply of the raw materials needed by the industrial populations of the world. The pressure of Germany on the African colonies of Portugal had become

embarrassing before the World War, and it was feared that she was only waiting her time to absorb Portuguese East Africa. Indeed, Germany had already absorbed the Kionga triangle (Fig. 61) of about 400 square miles, south of the estuary of the Rovuma River. This danger is now removed; the Kionga triangle is restored to Portugal, and her ownership of her African colonies has been confirmed by the part which she took in the fighting in Southwest Africa and in East Africa and by the help, limited though it was, which she gave elsewhere through her small army and fleet.

THE EXPANSION OF PORTUGAL

There is thus brought to an end the long decline in the extent of the Portuguese overseas territories, which, at the beginning of the 19th century, formed a larger colonial empire than that held by any other European power except Great Britain and Spain. These are now her possessions:

In Africa[1]

Cape Verde Islands
St. Thomas (São Thomé) and Princes (Principe) Islands
Portuguese Guinea
Angola (Portuguese West Africa)
Mozambique (Portuguese East Africa)

In Melanesia	*In India*	*In China*
Eastern Timor, with tributary island and district	Goa Daman (Damão) Diu	Macao

The earlier history of Portuguese colonization illuminates the whole modern period of Portuguese colonial development. The Portuguese were the leaders in pioneering the sea road along the western coast of Africa, even before the discovery of America. By twice defeating the Mohammedan fleets, Portugal confirmed her hold upon the trade of India, which she had developed after Vasco da Gama completed his voyage to India in 1498. She had broken the old route between Europe and India by way of the Persian Gulf and greatly obstructed the commerce of the Red Sea; and she stood at the Atlantic gateway of the Mediterranean. With Spain she had divided the New World by the treaty of Tordesillas (1494) and subsequent agreements, receiving the lands east of a north-south line 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands; she thus acquired Brazil and confirmed

[1] The Azores and the Madeira Islands are considered an integral part of Portugal.

her right to her possessions in Africa and India, including Ceylon and Persia. In 1500 King Emanuel assumed the title, two years later confirmed by the Pope, of "Lord of the Conquest, Navigation, and Commerce of India, Ethiopia, Arabia, and Persia."

RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL

The relations of the Portuguese to their settlements in Brazil are of more importance today than all the colonial possessions of Portugal in Africa, for here we have real intimacy between a new country of 30,000,000 inhabitants and the home country with 6,000,000 inhabitants. From the late colonial period down to the present, there has been in general heavy emigration from Portugal to Brazil. Moreover, there is in Brazil a sympathy for Portugal that has important commercial consequences.

The colony of Brazil was not only the most important one that Portugal possessed; it was also the best founded of the Hispanic colonies, owing to the fact that agricultural products of a tropical variety, chiefly sugar, were the early economic basis of the colony, and not gold and silver, as in the case of some of the Spanish possessions.

It was an accident that led to the Portuguese discovery of Brazil in 1500. Cabral, a Portuguese navigator, in laying his course for southern Africa and India took advantage of the trade winds to go well to the westward, and thus came upon the Brazilian coast. Settlement was desultory and development neglected at first. At one time Brazil was thought worth so little that its abandonment was considered. The colony was held in light esteem because the tide of development set toward India during the period of the discovery and early settlement of Brazil. It was only after India had been lost to the Portuguese that they turned their attention to the development of Brazil.

For three hundred years the efforts of the colonists were confined almost exclusively to sugar growing. Interest in the colony increased very rapidly after the discovery of gold in Minas Geraes during the early years of the 18th century and of diamonds in 1730. The immediate effect on agriculture was bad, because men were drawn away from the plantations and their interest in agriculture was diminished. The ultimate effect was to broaden their outlook and open up the interior. The colony also gained great impetus in Napoleon's time, when the Portuguese crown was transferred to Brazil. Rio de Janeiro became the real capital of the Portuguese Empire, and the royal family arrived

there in 1808. But in 1822 the Brazilian leaders proclaimed the independence of the country, recognized by the mother country in 1825. Thereafter Brazil had an imperial form of government until the revolution of 1889 and the proclamation of a republic.

So closely connected were the peoples of Brazil and Portugal, and their differences of opinion had so much the character of a limited family quarrel, that there has been no real interruption of relations, either social or commercial. In fact, the relations would be far closer today if it were not for the fact that Portugal is economically weak and small, and cannot assist Brazil in the development of its resources. Such development has come from Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, all of which have made great demands upon Brazil's tropical and subtropical products for their industries.

THE AFRICAN COLONIES

To advance trade in eastern Africa, Portugal found it necessary to overcome the Arabs, who by the 10th century had occupied the seacoast as far south as Sofala. After the conquest of the Arabs, Portugal developed a trade between eastern Africa and Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and India. Like the Portuguese who came after them, the Arabs occupied coastal lands rather than inland points. By 1510 the Portuguese were masters of all that portion of the eastern African coast formerly held by the Arab sultans.

The contest between the Portuguese and the Arabs in eastern Africa but continued the struggle that had lasted so long in the Iberian peninsula and in Africa against the infidel Mohammedans. The historic city of Goa, a Portuguese settlement in India, stood opposed to Aden, which was in Arab possession. In the contest between these two central posts of rival religious and political faiths we have a repetition in Albuquerque's time (the first part of the 16th century) of the early struggles of Portugal and Spain against the Mohammedans in the west. By establishing themselves in India, the Portuguese made rich trade connections with farther India, China, and the Orient generally.

With the decline of Portuguese power at home and abroad, the Arabs won back, in the early years of the 18th century, all their African possessions as far south as the Ruvuma River, and the Dutch, French, and British invaded Portuguese territory in the south. Between 1737 and 1740 Portuguese commerce was practically swept from the sea by Arab pirates and rival European powers. A state of warfare among the inland tribes prevented effective Portuguese administration in the

region lying behind the coastal strip; and with the explorations of Livingstone in the Zambezi basin (1850–1865) the British were led to establish settlements in the interior at the southern end of Lake Nyasa and in the Shiré highlands. Thereupon the pressure became continuously greater, and when the scramble for Africa was over Portugal held only a part of her former domain.

On the west coast of Africa, however, Portuguese Angola was held with little serious rivalry from neighboring colonial powers. For one thing, the Portuguese were the first claimants, having discovered and explored the coastal region from 1482 to 1485. The natives were in part reduced to submission (a process that ended only in 1907); Loanda was founded in 1576, Benguella in 1617. Prosperity was dependent upon the slave trade with Brazil. The frontiers were vague and eventually caused disputes with Great Britain, France, and Germany, until the period 1885 to 1905, when successive agreements, treaties, and arbitral awards fixed the boundaries as shown in Figure 71.

THE COLONIAL POLICY OF PORTUGAL

Devoted to the maintenance of a powerful navy and an active commerce, Portugal's colonial activity was always governed by the principle that the seacoast should be held, rather than large territories that would require the sending of troops inland. Thus throughout the 16th century her settlements were confined to the coasts of Asia, Africa, and America, and the policy followed has had its effect down to the present time. There was no real development of the native and of the resources of the land.

Contributing to the loss of the colonial possessions was the weakness of the whole Portuguese economic system. The merchants and bankers of Portugal sought to increase the amount of gold in the country rather than to increase the industrial output. This type of economic theory led to a decline of agriculture and the increased importation of raw materials which might have been produced at home, at least in part. Portugal soon became, commercially, a mere appanage of England.

The home industries of Portugal have not grown at the same rate as those of other western European countries. Hence the colonies have been of less value to the people of Portugal itself than to other powers, particularly Germany, which had a large commercial fleet and well-established industries. Portuguese East Africa, for example, with its population of more than 3,000,000 and with the ports of

Lourenço Marques, Mozambique, and Beira, has great capacities for the production and export of sugar cane, rice, coffee, rubber, and tobacco, as well as cotton and coconuts, and a part of it is high enough to produce wheat and cattle. There are also large deposits of coal and some copper. The trade of the colony was artificially stimulated in 1909, when Portugal signed an agreement with the Transvaal government which gave Delagoa Bay more than half the import trade of the Transvaal; in return the Transvaal obtained the privilege of recruiting natives in Portuguese East Africa to work in the Rand mines. This convention is now in process of revision, the former arrangements with respect to labor being especially objectionable to Portugal.

Under the Portuguese the West African colony, Angola (Fig. 71), has developed but slowly. It is of small present importance, yet it may ultimately develop into a rich and powerful colony. Its population is estimated at 4,000,000 and its area (485,000 square miles) is as great as that of Texas, California, and Washington combined. The coastal belt, from thirty to one hundred miles wide, is in general dry. Then follows a relatively unproductive plateau that grades into desert on the south and into the forested basins of the Congo and the Zambezi on the east. Some rubber is gathered from wild rubber plants. Sugar, cotton, coffee, together with rubber, palm oil, cattle, hides, ivory, wax, and gum, are the chief exports. The two most important commercial towns are Loanda and Cabinda, the latter the outlet for an enclave of Portuguese territory, surrounded by French territory and the Belgian Congo. The completion of the Benguella railway, now at the border of the Belgian Congo (Fig. 61), to the Katanga mineral district (page 202), promises to promote development.

While the colonies have required a subsidy, there have been commercial compensations. By tariff and trade regulations much of the colonial produce was brought to Portugal, chiefly to Lisbon, and there reëxported. Two serious political and commercial difficulties were constantly confronted:

(1) The colonists wished to trade wherever they chose, and since their products were carried by the nationals of Great Britain and Germany, the home government feared that the colonies might be taken over by one or the other of these two powers.

(2) If the colonies were given self-government, foreign capital would increasingly divert the colonial products and Lisbon would lose a large part of its trade.

These dangers seemed the more real because the value of raw materials, such as the rubber, copra, cotton, and hides of the Portuguese African possessions, was increasing constantly with the rapid increase in world trade and industry. Neglected for a long time, Portuguese possessions had become an object of envy to stronger powers. Germany bought more Portuguese colonial produce than any other power, particularly cacao, coffee, and rubber (from São Thomé and Principe chiefly). And Germany still needs these things more than any other power, and now has no colonies of her own on which to depend for a supply. German financial influence in Lisbon is likely to continue.

The government of the republic has made "colonial self-government" a part of its program. This it had to do, for a revolutionary spirit was active in the colonies, especially in Angola; the colonists felt that their backward condition was due to political and economic dependence upon the home country. In 1912 each colony was given a separate budget and a separate subsidy, where a subsidy was necessary.

By a decree dated 10 May 1919, Portugal granted extensive autonomy to her colonies and promised administrative reform in continuation of her earlier declaration of 1914. State aid was promised to settlers, and expert agricultural and geological investigations were to be encouraged. These promises of reform and development were probably made to offset the desire of other states to benefit by Portuguese misgovernment. The Union of South Africa would like to hold Portuguese East Africa, or at least Lourenço Marques, and Belgium would like to secure northern Angola in order to lengthen the coast line of the Belgian Congo. Universal discontent in the colonies plays into the hands of outside powers. Certainly improvements in colonial management are much needed. The colonies could furnish food that Portugal lacks, if better transport by sea and land were available.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE ITALIAN SITUATION

To give cohesion, authority, prestige to the state. MUSSOLINI

In no other country of Europe, save Russia, has political and social revolution run so complete a course as in Italy since 1922. Take Germany for comparison. The shift from a monarchical to a republican government did not greatly change the social institutions of that country. Land holdings, trade unions, the representation of economic interests in the national parliament, the foreign program, the restoration of economic life — these have changed with the events of post-war years, but the change has been moderate and evolutionary. Not so in Italy. The adoption of Fascist principles has meant a complete change in many civil institutions, in foreign policy, in economic outlook. The structure of Italian life has been profoundly altered. The changes that have taken place in Spain have often been compared with those in Italy, because in each case there is, in effect, government by dictatorship. It is true there are some outward similarities, chief of which are the suppression of the right of free speech, government by decree, and the centralization of government authority by many devices, such as the power of appointment of the heads of municipal and provincial governments by the central authority. But here the resemblance stops. The object of the dictatorship in Spain is chiefly political, to secure the authority of the king and to increase the efficiency of government in the face of parliamentary division and military failure. In Italy, on the other hand, the imposition of Fascist principles has reached down into the lives of the lowest classes. Every industrial laborer, farmer, mill owner, capitalist, military or civil official of the government, and even Italian colonists, and emigrants living in foreign countries, have felt the shock of the Fascist "revolution," as Mussolini himself has termed it.

THE RISE OF FASCISM

Late in 1919 and during 1920 strikes became prevalent throughout the whole peninsula. The labor element of the cities, the proletariat, paralyzed the machinery of coal importation and reduced fuel production at home (thus making heavy inroads upon Italy's limited supply of available timber). In some cases revolutionary workmen took over the factories without opposition from the military forces, to the still further disarrangement of industrial life. Their purpose was to

bring about communism. Non-socialist elements were deprived of rights to property. Landowners found themselves unable to resist forcible and unlawful division by the peasants of some of the larger estates, or *latifundia*. Law and order broke down to such an extent that a state of civil war impended. ". . . a good third of Italy was red." Political parties disintegrated in a manner characteristic of Italian politics. Nowhere in Europe were the difficulties of government more menacing. By way of reaction there was organized the Fascist movement, under the leadership of Mussolini. Toward the



FIG. 72. Italy is about twice as large as the New England states and contains five times as many people. Only a few districts in the United States have a density of agricultural population as great as the cross-lined areas on the map above. From Agostini, *Atlante geografico metodico*, 3d ed., 1913. By the treaty of Rapallo between Italy and Yugoslavia, signed in November 1920, and a subsequent modification (1924), there was established a permanent international boundary, after a dispute that lasted for two years and frequently threatened war, owing to D'Annunzio's unauthorized seizure of Fiume. Total Italian gains in Europe as a result of the World War embrace an area of 8900 square miles and a population of 1,600,000. In addition, Italy has made small territorial gains in Africa (Fig. 76, page 241).

end of 1922 the movement was practically legalized by the king's appointment of Mussolini as premier.

If Italy had come out of the World War with large material gains, the national spirit might have been revived and the whole nation started upon a new career of work and economic restoration. But Italy received so little increase of national territory in proportion to area, population, national debt, and war effort that she considered herself defeated by her allies in the realization of legitimate national aspirations. She had lost material wealth, had incurred a great debt and had small means for paying it, was under the necessity of restoring her devastated region on the northeastern frontier, was faced by unemployment among the demobilized soldiers, and had to accept the fact that her people were no longer welcome in some of the overseas countries of heavy Italian immigration, chiefly the United States. In the past half century there has been a rapid growth of Italian population, which now numbers 42,000,000. In the years just before the World War 400,000 Italians emigrated annually, about 40 per cent of them going to the United States and about 12 per cent to the Argentine. This represented almost exactly the annual rate of increase. The United States Immigration Act of 1924 practically closed the door to Italian emigration. The population of Italy was thus thrown largely upon its own resources. Opportunities in the Italian colonies are not sufficient to attract a large European population. How to absorb the population surplus in home industries is a problem of the first magnitude.

The present purpose is not to pass judgment upon Fascist principles or the existing political régime. It is rather to examine the political and economic life of Italy in the light of its geographical situation. For it was not by accident that Italy came to her present state. As in all other countries of the world, her people have been confronted with certain physical conditions, and to these their spirit has reacted in ways unlike those that distinguish the people of France and Great Britain, for example. Their historical background is also quite unlike that of the countries of northern Europe. It is well for the people of our day to recall the inheritance of division and conflict in Italy that has come down from medieval times. The history of the city states of the peninsula is one long record of petty division and regional strife. The Italian nation is of quite recent development. The genius of the Italian people does not tend in the direction of self-government. Personalities figure more prominently than policies in local elections. The mass of the people are not trained to take an interest in public



FIG. 73. Compare with Figure 74 to see why Italian illiteracy has to be taken into account in framing the immigration laws of the United States. European neighbors of Italy get the largest number of emigrating literates. However, character and literacy are not necessarily related. Compiled from data given on sheet 15 of *Mori, Nuovo atlante de geografia fisica, politica ed economica*, Part I, 1918.

affairs. When the government of Mussolini extended its power over the local communes and limited individual rights, the explanation was made that public business required trained men and could not be competent if it proceeded "on the erroneous presumption of administrative capacity in citizens who scarcely know how to read and write." By far the greater number of the Italian people are farmers who are on the whole without education and who take little interest in politics. In the southern half of Italy illiteracy runs from 50 to 70 per cent

(Fig. 73). Government has long meant merely a succession of struggles between determined leaders of small parties or factions. The mass of the people have had no voice in important decisions and it is doubtful if they desire to have.



FIG. 74. Average annual emigration of Italy's population for the years 1902–1906. Figures represent losses per hundred thousand. Below the lines A-A′ and B-B′ the emigrants went chiefly to the United States and South America. For the rest the emigrants went chiefly to European countries. There are also migratory elements that return annually to the homeland. Emigration from northwestern Italy is largely into France, where the Italian colonies have grown rapidly since the World War. From Guido Assereto, *L'Italia e le sue colonie*, 1912, Pls. 30–31.

GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION

As a peninsula in the Mediterranean, Italy has some favorable maritime associations today as in the past. In the 12th and 13th centuries Genoa and Venice were among the greatest of the Mediterranean marts. Oriental goods flowed naturally through the Italian cities on their way to the well-populated Rhine Valley and the north-European plain. A period of definite decline was entered only when the Turk reached the coasts of the Near East in the 14th century, and when the Portuguese in the early years of the 16th century developed the commerce of the route to India by the way of the Cape of Good Hope. In the long period from the 10th to the end of the 18th century, Venice held a large part of the Dalmatian coast and the islands that fronted it. But her principal object was trade, not territory. When the western European powers were pushing into new colonial fields in America, the Far East, and Africa, Italy still moved in a Mediterranean orbit. In modern trade, however, territorial ownership is a vital matter. Tariffs, consular service, coaling and cable stations, spheres of influence, capital investments, and emigration all have a relation to the actual ownership of land. Italy was slow and vacillating in building this idea into her national policy. France and Great Britain moved with greater foresight in the division of available territory, notably in Africa. Only poor territory remained for Italy to appropriate when at last she entered the colonial field. The comparatively populous possessions of France in northern Africa — Algeria and Tunis — would have formed

more natural seats of colonization for Italy overseas than barren Libya on the east, as witness the handful of Italians in Libya in contrast to the 100,000 Italians in Tunisia, whose status is a special concern of both France and Italy. The East African possessions of Italy have practically no importance for colonization.

Nearer home, Italians have but limited commercial opportunities.[1] Lying in a middle position on the Mediterranean coast, Italy's exchanges east and west provide her with part of her food deficiency; the rest comes from the Americas largely. A third of the total grain consumption is imported. Neither the Balkans nor Spain and Portugal have sufficient coal for their own needs. In fact, no Mediterranean territory is blessed with a coal supply sufficient for export. Italy, with a great natural deficiency in fuel, must find her coal in England, whence it comes by a sea route more than 2000 miles long, or in Germany, whence it now comes in large volume (1923, 1,500,000 tons; 1924, 3,600,000 tons; 1925, 1,720,000 tons). Sea transport from England is cheaper but German coal is received chiefly on reparation account. Fisheries are of minor importance only, because the waters of the Mediterranean are not the natural habitat of the chief food fishes. The importance of this fact is enhanced in the case of a Catholic population with a regular Friday demand for fish. Fisheries products are among the chief exports of England and Scandinavia to Italy, Spain, and Portugal. From Scandinavia comes most of the timber that makes good a national deficiency in forests.

Having no important coal deposits and no petroleum, Italy is handicapped in the development of industries that might absorb her surplus population. Her great problem is to feed her people and at the same time to maintain exports on a scale and of a type that will enable her to diminish her constantly unfavorable balance of trade. The greatest effort has been made to develop hydroelectric resources in northern Italy. Snowfields and glaciers in the southern Alps and large moraine-dammed lakes near the border of the plain of the Po tend to maintain the northern streams in more regular regimen than those about the borders of the Apennine chain enjoy. By developing their system of long-distance, high-tension transmission, Italian engineers have been able, to some degree, to balance the power supply as between the Alps and the Apennines and offset the handicap of summer drought in the latter region. Huge installations have been made possible since the World War by the importation of hydroelectrical machinery from Germany. But at the present rate of growth, only a limited expansion of

[1] The deficiency of exports as against imports is partly balanced by the annual "invisible" transfer of funds by emigrants to their less fortunate relatives at home.

hydroelectric power development can be made until the cheapest and economically most profitable sites have been occupied. Nor can Italy hope for a population outlet upon waste lands that might be reclaimed. For land reclamation has already gone so far that almost every available tract has been put to use. But 13 per cent of the land of whatever type is unproductive. Water and soil have been developed to their utmost capacity in some of the southern districts of Italy. Forests have been reduced to 16 per cent of the total area, to provide agricultural land. A quarter of the surface is best employed in pasture and meadow as at present. Streams have been put under severe control, their overflow prevented, and the remaining forests protected so as to prevent the otherwise rapid erosion of the slopes they cover. The growth of the merchant marine has been encouraged to enable Italy to diminish the payments to others for transportation services. In 1914 the total tonnage was 1,430,000; in 1926, 3,650,000. This is encouraging and it affects the national budget; but it supplies work or income for a mere handful of people, even if all its indirect effects be counted. Population continues to press upon the country's resources and upon the wholly inadequate material equipment now available.

THE QUESTION OF EXPANSION

The Italian people are poorer than before they entered the World War. The per capita wealth of Italy is lower than that of Great Britain, France, or the United States. Only by importing coal, iron, and cotton, in order to increase her industrial production, can she hope to pay her vast war debts and meet her current expenses. If her people cannot migrate overseas, and if instead of birth control the gospel of even larger families is preached, then there are only two known ways of escape: Italy must expand overseas or furnish cheap labor that is willing to live on a scale nearly as low as that of India and China. Even this can be done only by importing fuel that her industries require (over and above water power) in addition to raw material for her mills. And the standard of living is already fearfully low. What of the alternative of territorial expansion into central and western Europe? France and Switzerland are the seats of growing Italian populations (pages 163, 298), and they have brought special problems to the governments of those two countries. But no one supposes that Italy has territorial designs upon either neighbor. Italian leaders have closely studied the outlets toward the east and the south, — the Balkans, Turkey, Syria, and North and East Africa, — with what results later sections will show.

ITALIANIZATION OF THE TIROL

When Italy entered the World War in 1916 it was with the distinct understanding that she was to gain large territories. On the north she wanted to remove the historical menace of Austria, where German-speaking people had crossed the great mountain wall and crept down into the valleys of the Italian Tirol. Italy's expectations were here realized. She secured all of the territory south of the Brenner Pass and at once began the active Italianization of the people, a process that



FIG. 75. The disputed territory of the southern Tirol. Austria made two offers in 1915, the second of which would have given Italy most of her "unredeemed" people in the Trentino. Austria refused to make further concessions, and at length Italy went to war. By the treaty of St. Germain (1919) between Austria and the Allied and Associated Powers, Italy was given what she called her natural, or geographical, frontier in the Brenner Pass region; but it should be noted that she thus gains nearly 230,000 German-speaking people who have created an irredentist problem of the first rank. From C. Battisti, *Il Trentino*, 1917, Pl. 3; O. R. Torniolo, *L'Alto Adige*, 1917, Pl. 1. Legend applies only to that portion of the map included within the limits of the Italian Tirol.

really got under way only when extreme Fascist methods were adopted. Italian became the official language; the name of South Tirol was prohibited; German place names and family names were Italianized. Italians were encouraged to purchase land and migrate to the Tirol. The abuse of individual rights was carried so far as to cause (1926) a sharp exchange between Italy and Germany, a state of tension that was only partly and probably temporarily relieved by a conciliation treaty between Italy and Germany late in 1926, followed by the release of Tirolese political prisoners, and the restoration of the privilege of publication to two German language newspapers.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DALMATIAN COAST

The Adriatic is considered by Italians to be in a peculiar sense an Italian sea. On the basis of historical control and the need for population outlets, they believe that their claims overbalance those of Yugoslavia, Greece, Austria, and Hungary. This explains the long struggle with Yugoslavia over the port of Fiume, a struggle that was ended in 1920 by agreements embodied in the treaty of Rapallo (page 352). Italy obtained the peninsula of Istria, the islands of Cherso and Lagosta, and the port of Zara. Still later (1924), when Yugoslavia and Italy signed a treaty of collaboration and neutrality, Italy was given complete sovereignty over Fiume and only the small port of Baros at Sušak (a suburb of Fiume) was left to Yugoslavia.

Restricted by France, Great Britain, and Yugoslavia in carrying out plans for an eastward advance along the Dalmatian coast, Italy turned her attention to the territory at the narrow entrance of the Adriatic where Albanian peninsulas reach westward to within 45 miles of Italy (Fig. 72). Unable to secure a protectorate over Albania in 1919 or to obtain a division of that country, Italy withdrew temporarily after making sure of the island of Sasseno at the entrance to the harbor of Valona.

As the map on page 350 clearly shows (Fig. 117), the total of Italy's gains along the eastern Adriatic coast was painfully small from the standpoint of Italian pride or Italian need. It was therefore natural that Mussolini, in advancing his program of national expansion, should turn his attention once more to weak Albania as a possible field of exploitation and penetration. In 1926 advantage was taken of disorders on the Albanian frontier to press for signatures to a new treaty between Albania and Italy. The most intense feeling was created by this treaty because it violated the provisions of the treaty of 1924 between Yugoslavia and Italy, by which it was agreed that the

two countries should mutually consult before making any future treaty. France and Great Britain were troubled hardly to a less degree, the one because she supported the members of the Little Entente (page 331), the other because of the threat of war between Italy and Yugoslavia and the danger of a wider conflagration with growing rather than lessening disturbance to trade. By this means Italy gained what amounts to a protectorate over Albania. Already in 1925 the National Bank of Albania had been established with Italian assistance that took the form of control over Albanian finances. Several years before, a treaty of commerce and navigation had been signed and money loaned under conditions that practically assured political intervention. Under these conditions there is a certain grim quality to Italian guarantees of Albanian political, juridical, and territorial *status quo*, "within the framework of the treaties to which both parties are signatories and of the Convention of the League of Nations." [1] As an answering gesture to the treaty of 1927 between France and Yugoslavia pledging mutual assistance in case of attack by a third power, Italy signed in the same year a new treaty with Albania, reaffirming her special relations to that state.

For the Albanian démarche, Italy has been severely criticised in international circles. How does this step and the absorption of the Italian Tirol look in Italian eyes? The Italian leaders have steadfastly held that they had nothing tangible to show their people for the sacrifices of the World War. Though they were on the side of the victors, it was a moral victory that they had won, and this will not buy coal and raw materials for factories nor will it build machinery and ships. The Italian mind dwelt on the practical rather than the idealistic aspects of victory. The Allies, whether rightly or wrongly, came to distrust Italian political judgment and capacity to rule unwilling aliens of different speech and race. They became anxious about Italian influence in Turkey and North Africa. To these arguments Italy replied by pointing out that both England and France hold unwilling peoples under military control and that she has conducted her colonial enterprises as honorably and successfully as those of her neighbors. She could not see why she should be requested to give up the things she coveted. On the other hand, it must be remembered that Italy abandoned her allies in the Triple Alliance and stood aside until, through the secret treaty of London of 1915, her aid was obtained on the side of the western powers practically by purchase. She agreed to come in only after she had been promised a protectorate

[1] Preamble to the treaty of Tirana, 27 November 1926.



FIG. 76. Except for the Dodecanese archipelago, Italy's overseas possessions are exclusively in Africa. In Libya and Somaliland Italy gained territory at the expense of France and Great Britain respectively, in fulfillment of the treaty of London, 1915.

over central Albania and a sphere of influence in southern Anatolia, as well as additional territory in Africa in case Great Britain and France also gained territory there. Although she agreed to fight all the enemies of the western allies, she did not make war upon Turkey; and she declared war upon Germany only after she had been fighting with Austria for a year. Though Fiume was outside the line of the treaty of London, she claimed that city also in 1919. Finally, she landed troops in southwestern Anatolia in the face of strong protest from her associates and only agreed to stay behind a demarcation line there when obliged to do so. Her aim was to obtain a share in the division of the Turkish Empire when its collapse seemed imminent. Thus with territory on the mainland she could make good use of the Dodecanese, a group of islands off the coast of Asia Minor which she had taken in 1912 at the close of the war with Turkey. Just as the Dalmatian coast is solidly Yugoslav, so the inhabitants of the Dodecanese

are Greek in speech and race, and the Allies were no more willing to have Italy keep them than Yugoslavia was to have Italy obtain a permanent foothold on the Dalmatian coast.

It is significant that in spite of the pressure of population in the Italian peninsula, the Italian people have not gone into the regions which Italy claimed. They have gone to countries overseas and they have been drawn by the labor demand of prosperous countries that required unskilled workmen such as Italy can supply in almost unlimited numbers. The Tirol on the north, Dalmatia on the east, the Dodecanese in the Ægean off the Anatolian coast, all have non-Italian populations.

INTERESTS OUTSIDE EUROPE

Outside of Europe Italy has made small gains of territory. In Libya (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) she has obtained additional territory: on the west by agreement with France and on the east by agreement with Great Britain. These concessions are of little consequence. The total area involved is less than 50,000 square miles and includes desert country of no practical value in solving the population problems of Italy. The total population of Italian Libya is 750,000, the import and export trade $17,000,000, or less than 1 per cent of Italy's total foreign trade. By contrast, 52 per cent of the white population of Tunis, under French control, is Italian.

Two other Italian colonies, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, offer no outlet for population. The Italians in Eritrea number not more than 5000, and Italian Somaliland contains still fewer. Italian trade with these colonies is slight, and the possibilities of increasing it are strictly limited by the fact that white colonization can make little headway because of the arid climate, the limited water available for irrigation purposes, and the restraints put upon Italy in attempting further territorial expansion at the expense of Abyssinia (page 653).

Italy's East African interests led her in 1926 to take a new step with respect to Arab territory on the east side of the Red Sea. Finding her overseas territories and commercial interests so limited as to be a handicap in negotiations with the British, Italy has sought to entrench herself in the Yemen. This ill-defined country has a low-grade Moslem population of mixed Arab and negroid stock, numbering about 1,500,000, that has maintained its independence since the lapse of Turkish authority during the World War, an authority that was itself merely nominal. This is a mountain country difficult of access, and when fighting upon its own soil its primitive army has the power

to maintain an effective defense, as Turkey discovered to her cost in times past. Italian credits and material supplies to the Yemen have given that country a momentary advantage in its watchful attitude toward the new kingdom of the Nejd, so lately entered upon a wide extension of power — especially in the Hejaz — under the leadership of Ibn Saud. It is commonly understood that Italian interests in the Yemen are temporary and solely for the purpose of obtaining better territory or commercial privileges nearer home, possibly in Syria, in the improbable event that French hold should ever relax.

THE FASCIST PROGRAM

We have reviewed the geographical situation of Italy, outlined its chief centers of colonial interest, and measured the dissatisfaction of the Italian people with the limited gains that resulted from the great sacrifices of the World War, in order to furnish an adequate background for the revolutionary events that followed the Fascist march on Rome in October 1922. Fascism has presented a challenge to the principles of representative government no less vigorous than that presented by Communism in Russia, whose methods in some respects it closely resembles. On the other hand, men of good judgment outside Italy, no less than large numbers of Italians, consistently praise Fascism for having saved the Italian nation. A judicial view would probably see benefits on both sides. Few have denied the claims of the Fascisti that they saved Italy from the gravest disorder, if not from anarchy and disunion. It may also be argued that what form of government the Italians have is largely their own responsibility; that the objects of liberty and democracy may possibly be won in different forms in different countries; that Fascist principles seem to fit the fundamental character of the Italian people, their state of education and their degree of interest in politics, better than the traditional system associated with democratic forms of government. Local responsibility for matters of local concern and a system of parliamentary government, with all its obvious faults, has been made to work in Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States; but it may be wholly unsuited to the Italian temperament and traditions.

There are two main principles in the Fascist program. The first has to do with the internal workings of the new system of government, the second with foreign policy. We have said that what happens within Italy is more immediately her concern. But it is equally true that what happens outside Italy is of international concern, and Fascism has an international aspect that is disquieting, if not threaten-

ing. Finding his country in a state of disintegration, Mussolini came into power by a march on Rome under conditions that gave him practically complete control over the Italian government. He holds the four portfolios of Foreign Affairs, War, Navy, and Air.[1] By the law of 1925, anyone who offends the premier by word or act may be punished by imprisonment and fine. While the premier is nominated by and is responsible to the king for the direction of the government, this has no meaning whatever in reality under the existing form of control. The government prohibits freedom of speech and of the press, and it has now reached out to control local government through the institution of the *podestà*, the name given to the executives appointed in communes of less than 5000 inhabitants by the central government to take the place of elected executives. Thus about 7000 out of 9000 communes in Italy have come under central government authority: ". . . . to increase the vigilance and strengthen the control of the executive over every kind of provincial activity." The prefects of the various provinces, all appointed by Rome, are instructed to stimulate Fascist party activities, rigorously curb disorder and even demonstrations, devote attention to social problems such as housing and the high cost of living, and provide coördination and leadership. The whole tendency of government has been first to extend the powers of the premier in relation to the king, the ministers of government and the legislature, and then to extend the powers of the central government over local governments even at the expense of civil rights. In developing the prefect's duties in 1927 Mussolini declared, "Elections are now a thing of the past. . . ."

On the other hand, by an enforced system of coöperation between capital and labor under state supervision and by insisting upon compulsory arbitration, the government has quieted labor agitations and has put the nation to work, an achievement of the first order. Thus Mussolini in 1926: "Italy finds again her strength of discipline and of work . . . in the emblem of the lictor's fasces." The national confederation of Fascist unions does not proceed on the theory of the extension of labor union power in government or society, but on the basis of a development of all categories and classes of society in order that a well-balanced social and economic development may take place. Instead of leveling all classes to the lowest rank, as in the Soviet scheme, Fascism encourages the maintenance of existing classes, but provides for their representation in government by means that will cause government to be the well balanced and representative thing

[1] Since the above was written, he has added several more!

that it is sought to make of society. The entire population is thus brought into the scheme of Fascist trade unions. All classes are welcomed as necessary to increase productivity. Instead of a social struggle leading to class warfare, a beneficent struggle is encouraged in the search for ability from whatever class it may come. Each art, craft, trade, or profession has its own union, and all are subject to state supervision. Labor disputes are solved by appeal to labor magistrates whose decisions shall be binding for both sides and who may back up their decisions by force if necessary. Strikes and lockouts are prohibited, and assurance is given on the one hand to employers that workers will not abandon their work, and on the other hand to labor that employers cannot bring them to terms by the pressure of unemployment. This is the ideal! In attaining it the government has resorted to violence at times; it has destroyed parties and party power; it *enforces* rather than *invites* patriotic activities and is itself the judge of what is patriotic! Italy will be fortunate if she escapes the outcome predicted in Lammenais' oft-quoted remark, "Centralization is apoplexy at the center and paralysis at the extremities."

If one decries the arbitrary methods of the present government of Italy on the ground that it affords no opportunity for the expression of public opinion, one must first make sure that the people have a desire to express it. Fascism believes that there is not and cannot be a public opinion on account of the low level of education of the masses.

If one were disposed to argue in favor of Fascism, he would find most of its salutary effects in Italy itself. In the field of foreign policy an assertive, strongly centralized government not responsible to the public and conscious of the advantages in the domestic scheme of a strong army, may be a source of danger. This was amply shown in 1923 when the Italian navy took Corfu, claiming that the murder of the Italian contingent of the boundary commission working in southern Albania had been the result of Greek intrigue and hostility. Mussolini immediately laid down most severe conditions of evacuation, and these were so abruptly given that international opinion at once opposed their execution. Chiefly through the work of the League of Nations, Italy was persuaded to evacuate Corfu within a few weeks and to drop or modify most of the conditions except the payment of 50,000,000 lire by Greece to Italy. Happily the incident was kept within local bounds and happily also it revealed early in the period of Fascist rule the danger in the international field of an ambitious government not responsible to an electorate. One can sympathize with the problem of population confronting Italian leaders without believing that they must do violence

to neighbors in order to afford that population an outlet. If Italy were able to dominate the eastern Adriatic, it is still a question how much of her population would choose to live there, and without colonization Italian control would mean only Italian exploitation. The leaders of government in Italy might well address themselves to a study of the colonizing spirit in order to learn for what social, economic, and geographical reasons Italian emigrants do not go to colonies under Italian control. It is in the highest degree significant that all of Italy's territorial claims involve an alien population and not Italian irredenta.

It should also be noted that Italy's imperial policy shifts with every breeze of suggestion. In truth, the country cannot be said to have a policy at all, and it is difficult to see how one could be framed that would meet the expressed need for additional territory when all the territory that could possibly be obtained is not worth obtaining from an economic point of view. Directly after the World War, Italy sought a reorientation of her Moslem policy, first in Libya in dealing with the Senussi and the newly organized Cyrenaican parliament; again in Albania and in dealing with Turkey also. A second change was made when Turkey ceased to be a Moslem power. The Balkans lay invitingly near, but economic penetration was delayed by political differences with Greece and Yugoslavia. Italy could see but one opportunity — to control the finances of Albania and thus make it an economic if not a territorial adjunct. That this involved violence to the treaty of 1924 with Yugoslavia seems not to have been taken into account, nor was heed given to the objections of either France or Great Britain.

The Italian colonies in Africa are relatively poor and unimportant. Every step in their development has been costly and disappointing. Colonial receipts as a whole are still far below expenditures. It costs Italy almost precisely four times as much to manage Libya (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) as the receipts amount to. The expansion of Italian population into the African possessions has been wholly artificial. The government is without colonial experience, lacks capital for the development of colonial enterprises, and yet entertains the hope of revival of military powers and the ancient glories of Rome. Italy's pride in tradition is strong, but she can take only feeble steps along the road by which Great Britain and France have passed to power. A poor late-comer in the colonial field, Italy has had only the crumbs that fell from British and French tables. Roads have been built in Eritrea and Libya as well as in Somaliland, but these countries have an arid climate and a poor soil. The Italian people pay for the roads,

the artesian wells, the schools, the encouraged immigration, the regulated water supply, but they receive little in return. No stream of Italian emigration to African colonies takes place, no diversion of Italian energy into colonial channels. Libya has received most attention because it is nearest, but its interior is not capable of important development. In some places it is difficult to build railways or construct roads because of desert conditions, and even when built the resources of the country will not sustain them. Agriculture is limited to a few oases. It is true that a far larger population once dwelt here, but even if the present population were increased by Italian immigration to the full capacity of the land it would still offer Italy no real relief from the increasing pressure of her crowding millions.

CHAPTER NINE

THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

Separately the three Scandinavian countries are small in area and in population; together they have the strength of a first-class power and could put into the field armies aggregating a million men. During the World War they carried their dependence upon each other to the significant point of making an agreement to take no part on either side unless the three of them unanimously approved such action in advance, an agreement similar to others that at times have marked their relations in the past. Because of their small size they were unable to do more than protest against the loss of lives and ships by German submarines; yet because of their persistent neutrality and the large supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials that found their way through them directly into Germany near by, they were able to support their protests by practical means and keep safely out of the conflict.

International agreements respecting the North Sea, and more particularly the Baltic, are the natural consequence of the grouping of so many nations about a single deep embayment with fertile lands along its borders. The Baltic gains special importance in political geography because of its narrow outlet and the strategic position of Denmark in relation thereto.[1] With the addition in recent years of new states along its eastern coast, the Baltic Sea rises in geographical interest to a level that recalls its earlier rôle in the affairs of the Hanseatic League (page 272).

COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS

The commercial interests that converge on the Baltic are now both complex and far reaching. Russia exports chiefly to Germany, whereas among the new Baltic states (page 442) it is commerce with the English that in general holds first rank, while that with Germany comes second. There is a significant trade between Sweden and Germany, based on the need in German economy of heavy importations of iron ore. Because of the nearness of Sweden and the fact that her ore is of high grade and requires comparatively less coal, German imports of Swedish

[1] From 1430 to 1857 Danish rulers collected dues on cargoes passing through the "Sound," as the passage is called, an act that was always protested by other countries — in the 15th and 16th centuries by the Hanse towns, in the 17th century by the Netherlands and Sweden, and in the 19th century by the United States. For relinquishing the privilege Denmark was paid $20,000,000, of which sum more than a fourth was supplied by Great Britain.



FIG. 77. The total water power of Norway is 12,000,000 H. P., of which over 8,000,000 are made up by sites having 10,000 H. P. or more. In this class 44 per cent of the power is on or within 30 kilometers (19 miles) of the seashore. Sweden is next to Norway, among European countries, in available H. P. per inhabitant. Of a total of more than 8,000,000 H. P. that can be practically utilized about 15 per cent is now actually utilized. It is estimated that not more than 3½ millions H. P. will be developed in Sweden in the next fifty years. Norway has the advantage of great concentrations of power at a few places (79 per cent of the power is generated at 24 per cent of the plants). The water power of Sweden is not concentrated but must be developed with relatively low static head at many points. (The shaded sections represent developed power.)



FIG. 78. The population of the Scandinavian peninsula is largely limited to a seacoast belt, except in the southern portion. The capital city of each of the three Scandinavian countries and of Finland is a salt-water port. Danzig is now Poland's chief maritime outlet. Riga is the capital of Latvia. Memel, between Danzig and Riga, is Lithuania's only port. Sea-borne trade is of interest to all, and Baltic agreements are likely to be made in the common interest.

ore have trebled in the last fifteen years and the importations are still increasing. Germany, the leading industrial nation of the continent, lost nearly 75 per cent of its iron ore resources as a result of the change in boundaries effected by the treaty of Versailles and now has only 7 per cent of the total European supply. Sweden, with large reserves and a population hardly exceeding 6,000,000, is able to export 90 per cent of its iron-ore production.

In earlier years such large economic interests as those of today would have meant war among the Baltic states. One nation after another among the Baltic powers sought a dominating position on that sea. Four hundred years ago Denmark was the leading power; later Sweden won preëminence, only to lose it to Russia. With the rapid increase of naval power in the 19th century Germany held a superior position. Mutuality of interest was recognized by the Baltic Conference of 1908, at which Denmark and Sweden were represented together with Germany and Russia. The Baltic Declaration of the conference provided mutual guarantees for the maintenance of the territorial status as between the four states concerned. A Baltic and White Sea Conference was held at Copenhagen in 1920, eleven nations participating. The conference dealt with working hours, rebates, and equality of trade privileges in Baltic and North Sea shipping.

The power of the three Scandinavian countries does not depend chiefly upon armies and navies but upon kinship of race and language, geographical proximity, and the frequent necessity for joint consideration of problems of common interest. Their power depends also upon their moral strength, which grows out of their high cultural attainments and the desire of their far stronger European neighbors to have their good will. Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish statesmen have been represented in increasing numbers on international commissions where a detached attitude is required. Each country is commercially associated with neighbors that are likely to share a desire for protection in time of difficulty. Thus Sweden leans toward Germany, Norway toward England. To such a degree does Denmark recognize the limitations of small size and so socially minded are its people that it has under consideration a policy of complete disarmament. It has a coast line longer than that of France, which it can under no circumstances hope to defend against its continental neighbors, for it has but 3,435,000 inhabitants. A growing element prefers that the state should confess its helplessness from a military point of view and throw itself upon the mercy of the larger powers.

The populations of Norway (2,700,000), Sweden (6,054,000), and Denmark (3,435,000) are predominantly rural. They have long been overshadowed by rapidly increasing industrial populations on the continent. The growth of industrial cities has absorbed a large part of the increase of population in France, Belgium, Germany, and England. Without a corresponding increase in industries, it has resulted that the Scandinavian peoples have migrated overseas in proportionately large numbers and the power of the home countries has grown slowly (Norwegian emigrants to the United States in 1923–1924 numbered 12,200). Were there resources to support a balanced industrial development, Scandinavia would now form one of the major economic and political regions of Europe. In common with other countries of Europe, Norway and Sweden are seeking to become more nearly self-supporting. This it is difficult to accomplish. Forests, fisheries, and mines are the sources of the principal exports and their products are far in excess of domestic needs. Alternative products of the soil as a basis for a larger population and a more nearly balanced economy are limited by the small extent of cultivable and cultivated land. In Norway only 2.2 per cent of the total is arable land, in Sweden 9.3 per cent. Pasture and forest occupy 24 per cent of Norway, 62 per cent of Sweden. Minerals, metals, wood, pulp, and paper con-



FIG. 79. The Swedish state at the time of its greatest extent. The first date in each case represents the year in which the district was won; the date in parenthesis, the year in which it was lost. After Putzger, *Historischer Schul-Atlas*, 1906, Pl. 25.

stitute more than 80 per cent of all Swedish exports. In like degree Norway provides exports of fish, timber, iron ore, and aluminum and nitrates dependent upon a rapidly developing use of water power of which there is an abundance (Fig. 77). Both countries in this way pay for the heavy importation of raw and manufactured cottons and wools, corn and flour, oils, coal, and machinery, imports that keep them tied to world trade, dominated by the commerce of the leading industrial countries — Germany, United Kingdom, France, and the United States. It is true that Norway's shipping is developed on a larger scale, relative to population, than any other country in the world: 1,700,000 tons to 2,700,000 population. The whole nation could be taken aboard its own ships. The Norwegian mercantile marine works for the rest of the world more than it does for Norway. By exporting this form of energy Norway is able to import more goods and foodstuffs.

Before the industrial period the Scandinavian countries counted for much more in the economy of Europe than they do today. They were powerful enough to leave their mark in history. Norwegian kings once ruled the northern Scottish islands, the Danes once held nearly all of England and the lowlands of Scotland. The English and the French prayerbooks long contained an echo of those far times in the petition, "From the fury of the Northmen, good Lord, deliver us." The Swedish realm at the time of its greatest extent in the 17th century is shown in Figure 79. The colonial enterprise of the Danes led to the establishment of colonies in Greenland, the Faeroes, Africa, and the West Indies. It was only in 1917, through the sale of the Virgin Islands to the United States, that the Danes gave up the last of their possessions in the West Indies.[1]

[1] By virtue of explorations by Peary and Greely, the United States had certain vague rights in Greenland, which were given up when the Virgin Islands were acquired.

POPULATION AND LAND

The geographical distribution of the population of Scandinavia may now be viewed in its relation to maritime interests and to commercial exchanges. The main topographic axis of the Scandinavian Peninsula lies close to the western side. Between the cold, rocky highlands of Norway and the sea is a narrow fringe of country with very little cultivable earth. It is from 20 to 40 miles wide, a labyrinth of fjords, passages, valleys, headlands, and terraces. The fisheries have attracted a part of the population far beyond the Arctic Circle. Along 1700 miles of coast one cannot find a ten-mile stretch without inhabitants except in the farthest north. All are attached to the coast. Only about Christiania Fjord and adjacent regions in the southeast are there continuous tracts of tillable soil with an extent as great as 100 square miles. Here half of the population of the country is concentrated. Oslo, the capital of Norway, has 258,000 inhabitants, the only city exceeding 100,000. There are but five cities with a population exceeding 20,000. Toward the extreme north Finns and Lapps increase in relative numbers. Nowhere do they form a majority of the population except in a few small districts, mainly inland. Since a large group of Lapps are nomadic and drive their herds of reindeer indifferently across the frontier, Norway and Sweden have had to come to terms with respect to their boundaries in Lapland, Norway agreeing to give special grazing rights to Swedish Lapps in a long strip



FIG. 80. Map illustrating present status of reindeer grazing in Sweden: (scale approximately 1 : 10,000,000); generalized from Bergstrom's map. Key to legend: 1, Limit of agricultural settlement; 2, Lapp domain; 3, Area of woodland reindeer grazing; 4, Extension of woodland grazing under special circumstances; 5, Extension of mountain reindeer grazing under special circumstances; 6, Norwegian districts where Swedish Lapps have special grazing rights.

of territory extending southward from Tromsö and eastward to the international boundary.

The arrangement of population in Sweden (Fig. 78) may be considered in three divisions from south to north. Central Svealand is the most densely peopled part of the country, 80 per cent of the land on the southern coast and the central plain being cultivated. Next comes Götaland, where agriculture is supplemented by mining and manufactures. A third district is Norrland, a region of forests and waterfalls. North of the 64th parallel the agricultural population is closely confined to the coast and the lower stream valleys. In general, the towns of Sweden contain only a little more than one quarter of the population. Sweden has but three towns that exceed 100,000. The greater number of its cities lie on or near the sea or near great lakes accessible to the sea. Of all the countries of Europe only Norway and Finland are less densely populated than Sweden. It may be said of the Scandinavian Peninsula as a whole that nowhere else in the world does a permanent population live in so high a latitude. Products from the most distant parts of the world — fish, timber, ores — are now drawn to the great commercial and industrial centers. Sweden has an abundant supply of wood. A strip of birch forest of limited commercial use surrounds, belt-like, a high mountain zone (Fig. 77). The dominant tree below the birch forest and south of the tundra is the white pine, which constitutes three fourths of the merchantable stands.

In all three countries and particularly in Sweden and Denmark social questions are of immediate interest, largely in relation to land and coöperative enterprises. This is particularly true of Denmark. By the act of 1919 Denmark provided for the conversion of landed estates into freehold properties, the state to have the right thus to transform holdings to the extent of one third of their area, provided compensation be made. More than two thousand small holdings have been granted, of which the greater number are chiefly from entails and family estates. The government has also actively concerned itself with the acquisition and distribution of small parcels of land to increase small holdings. Sweden, troubled over the depression in agriculture following the World War, has also studied the land question, but with much conflict of opinion as to whether agriculture may be improved through small holdings or by a system of government tenure. Up to the present the government has made practical provisions mainly in the way of farm loans. Continued heavy overseas emigration and what amounts to a rural exodus have given the govern-

ment of Norway its own particular agricultural problem. Here the law of 1857 seems to bear heavily, for it has too rigorously maintained the principle of the undivided inheritance, that is, next of kin becomes possessed of the land of a deceased person without dividing it with the co-heirs, who have only the right of indemnity. Finally, the state in 1920 began direct subsidization of private individuals, associations, and communes that proposed to carry out land settlement plans. By these measures not only is emigration diminished but the state turns favorably situated waste land into productive soil.

The commercial welfare of Denmark depends largely upon the growing export of dairy products and the facilities offered by the free port and bonded warehouses of Copenhagen. The free port of Copenhagen has been doubled in size, larger warehouses have been constructed, and every effort has been made to take advantage of its position as a port of call for steamers in the Baltic trade. Denmark's geographical position fosters close relations between its merchants and those of Germany and the United Kingdom. In contrast to conditions in Sweden and Norway, nearly 70 per cent of the land of Denmark is arable. Its agricultural products find a ready market in the cities of its large industrial neighbors. Danish colonies were never commercially of high rank.

POLITICAL CHANGES

Like most of the people elsewhere in the world, the Scandinavians have undergone a marked change in their political attitude since 1914. Old problems seem small and remote and new problems are pressing upon them. Their occasional estrangements have been of far less present importance than the common benefits which they enjoy through standing together during the past few years. The relations of Sweden and Norway are excellent, despite the sharpness of feeling in 1905 when a long-standing dispute over Norwegian rights led to the dissolution of the union of the two countries which had lasted since 1814. Prior to that Norway had been joined to Denmark for more than four hundred years (1397–1814). The severance of Norway from Denmark and its union with Sweden was in the nature of compensation to the latter country for joining the European powers against Napoleon (with whom Denmark had become allied). These historical facts seem like echoes from a great distance. Norway is now but little concerned over her relations with Sweden as compared with her desire to see developed practical international guarantees for the freedom of shipping. Imperial Russia, once Sweden's Nemesis, has dropped out

of the scene, and with the formation of a line of small and necessarily neutral states on the eastern side of the Baltic between Sweden and Russia the former has no cause to fear conquest from the east. Long apprehensive of German encroachment, Denmark has won back territory in the Slesvig district. She sees her powerful neighbor deprived of all but the nucleii of army and navy. Her chief concern is the strengthening of an international order in which guarantees will be given for existing boundaries and for equality of trade privileges.

TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

Only Norway and Denmark have overseas territories, the one in Spitsbergen (Svalbard), the other in Iceland and Greenland. There is no coal in Norway and no fuel except wood, hence no native source of power save the white coal of her waterfalls. All of her consumption has to be imported — chiefly from England. The coal mines of Spitsbergen are of sufficient value to have caused Norway to claim these distant islands. The general fisheries and the whale oil industry are supplementary resources. Though the islands lie halfway between Norway and the North Pole, the average summer limit of pack ice is far enough north to permit transport during four months of the year. Norway's economic claims were strengthened by the record of explorations in Spitsbergen waters by Norwegian navigators. It is to them chiefly that we owe our knowledge of the geography of the islands. Ever since 1261 Norway has periodically asserted her claims, as in 1608, when the British began whaling thereabouts, in 1666 when France did likewise, and in 1679 in opposition to Sweden. Wireless and meteorological stations and fur stations have been established and there has been regular navigation between Spitsbergen and Norway since 1911. In confirming Norwegian claims (1919), the Allied and Associated Powers laid down certain specific conditions: There is to be no naval base on the islands and no use of Spitsbergen in time of war. The ships of all signatories to the Spitsbergen treaty are to enjoy fishing and hunting privileges in territorial waters. All ships are to be enabled to touch at some point in Norway on the way to or from Spitsbergen, and the wireless stations are to be at the service of all.

Between Norway and Denmark a dispute arose in 1921 respecting claims in Greenland. Denmark claimed the right to extend her long-established monopoly in Greenland and provide commercial, missionary, and shipping stations along the entire coast. Norway replied by denying the Danish claim to suzerainty; she claimed that her sealers

Fig. 81. Spitsbergen (official name, Svalbard) in relation to Norway and Greenland.

had prior rights of hunting and fishing on the unsettled eastern coast. For Greenlanders themselves the matter was serious because the number of seals they were able to catch had been decreasing to an alarming degree, partly because of the general use of firearms and chiefly because of ruthless slaughter by Norwegian whalers in the East Greenland breeding grounds of the seal herds. By treaty between Norway and Denmark in 1924 the eastern coast of Greenland was opened up to Norway, except for two tracts which were to be reserved for Greenlanders if they populated it. This explains the present experiment in settlement on Scoresby Sound, where colonization began in 1925 with the double object of providing an outlet for a



FIG. 82. Language boundaries in Slesvig according to Danish authority (Clausens, 1912). The southern plebiscite zone (between the dotted line and the solid one, except where the latter is bordered by dots) voted to remain German.

pauperized population and protecting the economic interests of South Greenland by a northerly station on the east coast.

DANISH GAINS IN SLESVIG

The principal Danish-speaking portions of Slesvig were returned to Denmark by the treaty of Versailles. They were lost in 1864 following an invasion by Prussia and Austria. Two years later Prussia and Austria came to blows over the disposition of the territory. Victorious Prussia forthwith annexed the duchies and began a campaign of Germanization that continued without cessation until the beginning of the World War in 1914. Between 1867 and 1895, there emigrated from the small territory of north Slesvig 57,000 persons. In 1898 about 1000 persons were expelled from the country. Even purely Danish parishes were obliged to adopt German church services and much land was forcibly colonized by Germans under discriminatory conditions.

A plebiscite in two zones, provided by the treaty of Versailles, resulted in a three-fourths majority for the union of the northern zone to Denmark and an even more emphatic majority for union of the southern zone to Germany. Neither side, of course, is completely satisfied. The Danes would like to have Flensburg, and the Germans want Tondern, a small district in the northern zone which voted for Germany, but which is now assigned to Denmark. The southern boundary of Denmark as finally drawn is shown in Figure 82. This marks the end of a dispute that has lasted since 1866, when, by the treaty of Prague, the inhabitants of North Slesvig were promised reunion with Denmark "if they should express such a desire in a vote

freely given," — a promise that was abrogated in 1878 by Prussia in agreement with Austria.

ICELAND

After Greenland, Iceland was long Denmark's largest possession. For more than five hundred years it was under the control of Danish kings (1381–1918). A monopoly of the trade of Iceland, not finally abolished until 1854, kept it a mere commercial appanage of Denmark. In 1918 it became a sovereign state. Under the terms of the Act of Union of that year Iceland may demand a revision of its status, which is now confined practically to the single fact that the King of Denmark is also King of Iceland. The change was brought about without war; in fact, Iceland has not even the nucleus of an army. All important in government is the Althing or Parliament, for to it the ministers of state are responsible. More than half the population is rural, and more than a fifth lives in the single capital city of Reykjavik. The economy is similar to that of Norway and Sweden — an export of fish and oils, an import of coal and petroleum, grain and flour, and textiles. Spain takes most of the fish; Great Britain leads in total trade, taking the dairy products, wool, and meat, and supplying coal, machinery, and clothing. The population of 100,000 occupies the coastal fringe and the floors of a few short valleys. The sea and the land roads are the highways; there are no railways, a condition shared by no other people of equally high cultural rank. With immense water power resources available throughout the year, there is no reason why Iceland should not follow the example of Norway in nitrate production.

CHAPTER TEN

PROBLEMS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE

(A) Germany as An Industrial Power

In the national consciousness of a people, political policies and acts are often rationalized to conform with the physical or geographical situation. German geographers speak of the German plain as a *Durchgangsland*, or transit land, between eastern and western Europe. It derives this quality not from military episodes like that of the crossings by Napoleon at the time of his Russian campaign, but more particularly from its relation to the principal streams of European commerce. The north German plain is provided with two sets of natural depressions along which commerce has flowed in the modern era; an east-west set of old river valleys, some of them now canalized or equipped with small misfit rivers like the Spree; and a north-south set of streams that form the natural lines of water communication today. The grid-like relations of the two systems make cheap canalization feasible, and by this means, as well as the improvement of the rivers, Germany drew to her ports on the Baltic and the North Sea a large part of the commerce of northern Austria-Hungary. Emphasizing the east-west grain of the country marked by coastline and mountain foreland are lines of morainic hills that, like the old east-west river valleys, register stages in the pre-historic occupation of north Germany by a continental ice sheet.

Germany has been advantaged by her position as transit land between east and west, and north and south. She has been disadvantaged by the fact that there is no great convergence of streams upon a single port, no natural focus of national life. The drainage lines diverge, scattering the maritime interests among a number of coastal centers. Berlin is not devoid of advantages. It is central, it is the seat of government, and it is well placed with respect to surface and river gradients, canals, and railways. On the other hand it has no inheritance from the past to lend it romantic or political interest. Hamburg, to take a second example, is less a port that has been favored by nature than one that has been developed artificially.

Of the territory of Germany more than half is under cultivation, a quarter in forest, another quarter in pasture. There are marked dissimilarities from region to region. The sandy soils of fluvio-glacial origin along the Baltic coast diminish the agricultural productivity of the region, and this poverty is enhanced by a severe climate. The

harbors of the Baltic coast are closed by ice for a part of each year (Lübeck, 32 days; Stettin, 61; Neufarhwasser entrance to Danzig, 81), while the northwest coast has a January mean of 32° F. The farther eastward one goes, the lower the mean temperature. The Rhine region is in the midst of spring while snow still lies upon the plains of East Prussia. Western Germany, being nearer the Atlantic, has a greater average rainfall than eastern Germany. The effect of these conditions is well shown in Figures 83 and 84. The density of the agricultural population increases toward the Rhine, while the estates become larger and the agricultural population smaller in the opposite direction (northeast) where the sandy soil is less fertile. It will be noticed that the Elbe is roughly a dividing line between these two regions. "Ostelbien" is a common regional designation.

It is of fundamental importance in the study of Germany's position in relation to her neighbors to look at the geographical distribution of her heavy industries, her agricultural population, and her centers of coal production. If France claims that her industries, her canals, and her large cities lie dangerously close to the German frontier, so also may Germany point to a similar concentration, both east and west: Silesia no less than the Saar and the Ruhr are dangerously near an international boundary. Recognizing her precarious position, Germany provided herself with two advantages: (1) an excellent network of railroads upon her frontier to facilitate troop movements, and (2) a highly organized military establishment to defend the frontiers. Predominance in artillery became an established part of her military creed, and this required great iron and steel works behind it. The wisdom of the policy from the German standpoint was shown by her impregnable position for four years of the World War (1914–1918), no less than by the great disproportion between her losses and those of her enemies. In the development of national policies, German leaders have long made much of the disadvantages imposed by geography. "Germany is the center of all European problems . . . by geographical fate," was printed in 1927 (Jäckh).

It is equally true, however, that Germany enjoys many advantages of position. Right at her portals, east, west, north, and south, are good traders: Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Switzerland, France, the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and the Baltic States. In war she may be "ringed about by enemies," but in peace she is ringed about by customers. A short haul and her products are in all the markets of central Europe. Thirteen nations touch her borders. There are 18 cities with a total population of 4,000,000 in a belt of



FIG. 83. After Scheu, *Deutschlands Wirtschafts-Geographische Harmonie*, 1924. One hectare is approximately two and a half acres.

country 300 miles wide outside the German frontier. Nearly half of them lie within a belt 150 miles from the German boundary. Germany's resources give her a commanding position with respect to many of the vital wants of these cities and their supporting country — fuel, textiles, fertilizers, iron and steel goods. France is not nearly so well placed as Germany from the standpoint of trade. Italy, with few minerals and a southern location, is barely on the fringe of west European industry. No other country of Europe has so inviting a situation as Germany for conveniently reaching profitable markets or so large an endowment of natural resources.

The dispersion of German cities and the peripheral position of German industries would naturally lead to a strong system of internal communications. That more than half of Germany is plain and that the cities lie for the most part on the plain or near its borders are added advantages for transport. By the time that Germany was in full industrial development and its population had reached fifty millions, a centralized railway system came into being. In 1881 the Prussian railways were bought by the government and have since been under government management. Likewise, most of the waterways are in the possession of the state. The great economic power of such a concentration of authority may be appreciated when we realize that a population of 63,000,000 is disposed over territory only 181,000 square miles in extent, a density of nearly 350 to the square mile. The total railway mileage of Germany is in excess of 34,000, of which more than 32,000 miles are state-owned. But small portions of the United States can show so close a network. No other country in the world has developed such highly organized air-transport lines as Germany (Fig. 85). There is hardly a German city of consequence that does not have its airport with full meteorological and radio or telephone and telegraph equipment. In addition to railway and air routes Germany has 5800 miles of rivers or

canalized rivers and 1370 miles of canals. To be sure almost all the rivers have natural deficiencies such as shallowness or irregularity of flow, but these are removable by capital and engineering skill. Only the Rhine has the required continuity of water supply and virtual freedom from ice; and Germany controls neither sources nor mouth.



FIG. 84. After Scheu, *Deutschlands Wirtschafts-Geographische Harmonie*, 1924.

THE INDUSTRIAL ERA AND THE GROWTH OF CITY POPULATIONS

The 19th century witnessed a phenomenal growth in Germany's industrial power. Like England, Germany came to have a fairly well balanced tonnage in its export and import trade. Heavy exports of coke supplied full cargoes for ships of foreign destination and facilitated heavy importations of raw materials. The latter especially provided a means for distributing freight rates to the advantage of the overseas competing trader. By these means Germany was constantly obtaining larger ratios of world trade. German wares were carried into every trading realm, and the trader meant political as well as commercial penetration. Colonies had been acquired in Africa and the Pacific and concessions in China. The products of German industry were of high grade and they were cheap. In central Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey, German political influence was dominant and trade was rapidly increasing. Supporting these advances in trade and colonies was an intelligent and industrious people, trained in the arts, and possessing enviable resources of mineral wealth, especially iron and coal.

By 1880 the movement of German population from country to city exceeded the volume of emigration overseas. By 1895 there were more Germans living in the cities than in the rural districts and by 1900, 54 per cent of the German population was urban. Berlin doubled its size in the 30 years following the Franco-Prussian War, reaching the 2,000,000 class in 1900. Between 1871 and 1910 cities of 100,000 and more had increased their share of the total population from 4.8

FIG. 85. Germany has the best air-transport service in the world. From *The Approach towards a System of Imperial Air Communications*, Air Ministry (British), 1926.

to 21.3 per cent. In the face of continued emigration German industries required more labor than they could get, not only for the factories but for the fields as well. Before the World War several hundred thousand Polish workmen were annually employed upon the estates of eastern Germany, to make good the labor deficiency caused in large part by a steady rural exodus (under way as early as 1850, when the large-scale capitalization of agriculture produced its first marked effects). The trans-Elbien provinces of East and West Prussia, Pomerania, and Posen doubled their population in the 19th century. Agricultural production increased even faster than population as a consequence of the widening use of commercial fertilizers and the augmented acreage of farm lands. The wheat acreage had doubled by the end of the century and the production per acre in different crops was from 70 per cent to 170 per cent greater. Thus was met the heavier demand upon German land for food to supply the increasing city population. German soil was so scientifically managed that the country was from 80 to 85 per cent self-sufficient in the matter of food. The process of domestic development came into full swing with the extension of German commerce and investments overseas. By the beginning of the 20th century Germany had extracted from her own mines and soil so vast a quantity of minerals and foodstuffs, her industrial life was so efficient and close-knit, that she was regarded as the very type of modern industrial and scientific organization.

At this stage German philosophers and geographers found a ready means for explaining German expansion. It was conceived that a nation had an inherent right to the space (*Raum*) required by its expanding population and industries. There was much speculation as

FIG. 86. Distribution of industrial and agricultural population of Germany in 1895. The map represents Germany in a period of transition. In the decade from 1880 to 1890, German pig-iron production increased 100 per cent. The same rate of increase was maintained during the two succeeding decades. Note the belt of industrial population along the French and Belgian frontiers. Compare this map with Figure 83. The territorial losses on the east involve chiefly agricultural population, except in the case of Upper Silesia. From maps in *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich.*

to the relation between the total material culture of a people and the geographical area suited to its development and welfare. This manifested itself not merely in German ideas respecting colonization overseas but also in a new attitude toward the territory of neighboring peoples (page 266). In German political philosophy the state was conceived to be the guardian and custodian of culture and civilization and as such to deserve all that its citizens could give of allegiance and support. There is little room for individualism in such a scheme of thought. It is but a step to the conclusion that the state can do no wrong. But another step and all its acts are glorified. The Hamburg-to-India route was a product of this period. The Baghdad Railway became the chief symbol of eastern ambitions. Germany essayed to bring within her political circle the Near East, Austria-Hungary, the

Balkan states. The Turkish policy was to be related to the German with the purpose of permitting advance to the Indian Ocean and an ultimate share in the rich trade of the Far East.

In all times large and small states have existed side by side, and their inequalities of size, strength, and function are the result of many forces and conditions — varying topographic layout, unequal resources, different stages of development, inequality with respect to dominant economic centers. Curiously enough, it is the large states that require the most elbow room and seek most aggressively for increase of space and power, often to the point of weakening the central state and government. There is no such thing as an "organic boundary" in a territorial sense. The philosophy of *Lebensraum* is open to abuse like the arguments based on history and military necessity. Even if boundaries were adjusted to national needs and if proper economic advantages were given to every nation, the equilibrium would last but for a moment. Inequalities would at once appear just as they would among a whole population in case of an equal distribution of wealth. National power, like individual power, is composed to a marked degree of intangibles not susceptible of statistical expression.

EASTWARD ORIENTATION

German economists, before the World War, saw three chief possibilities of economic expansion open to their country. The first would be realized with German control of the seas, for that is what freedom of the sea meant in German thought. It meant, further, that at the end of each one of the principal German sea lanes there would be an extension inland of German economic power and measurable control of wharves and warehouses. The second possibility lay in the founding of an economic empire in the Near East, of which the Berlin-Baghdad Railway was to be an element and beyond which there should be tributary regions of vast extent. The third possibility was the economic domination of Russia, which was to provide not only a vast market for German industrial products but an equally vast reservoir of raw materials to feed German industries.

The full measure of Germany's desire was first officially disclosed when, in 1918, Germany and Russia signed the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Through the terms of that treaty and otherwise, it was planned to create seven states on the western border of Russia, thus breaking up into manageable units a broad belt of territory through which the products of western Russia would have to pass. From north to south the states were as follows: Finland, Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, White Russia, Poland, and the Ukraine. Lithuania was to be virtually confederated with Germany through German control of the army, railways, customs, and currency, and by the selection of a German prince as king of Greater Lithuania. It was conceived that popular acquiescence to the German program would follow naturally, because only with German help could the string of nations on Russia's western border hope to oppose themselves successfully to Russian force. Vast colonization schemes were devised to increase the eastward flow of German settlers, and especially German goods.

Indeed, the process would not have stopped with the Baltic Provinces. The Bolshevists were at first subsidized by Germany and were favored by the German higher military command. But for the defeat of Germany by the Allies and the re-creation of the Polish buffer state, we should have seen in time a strong welding of Russian commerce with that of Germany and the development of close political relations. German industrial power drawing upon Russian raw materials would create an economic realm of unprecedented scope and consequence. If direct and indirect political influences had been added, eastern Europe would have become an irresistible military force.

Though the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was repudiated in the armistice terms of November 1918, it is still possible for Germany to advance her former program to a measurable degree. Whether as a result of the military and political policy of the Allies or because of a conflict in ideals of government, there has been brought about a state of open hostility between Russia and the "capitalistic" western powers, including the United States. Brest-Litovsk is now all but forgotten so far as it made any unfavorable impression upon the Russian mind. The practical questions of economic development press the Bolshevist leaders on every side. Vigorously opposed by both Poland and Rumania, and isolated from the rest of the world by persistence in communistic doctrines steadily imported into Russian foreign relations, the leaders in the Soviet régime naturally turned to Germany. The Russo-German treaty signed at Rapallo, during the Genoa Conference (1922), calls for economic interchanges that tend to draw the principals closer together. German trade with Russia is growing rapidly, German credits being sufficiently abundant to sustain an eastward flow of merchandise and a westward flow of Russian raw materials. The political arrangements under which these commercial exchanges may thrive have still to be made and the difficulties in the way are formidable, the Soviet government being unwilling to trade except on the basis of an alarming extension of German credit.

FORMER GERMAN INFLUENCE IN NEIGHBORING STATES

Besides the islands and peninsulas of German-speaking people in Europe (Fig. 87), there are important German "colonies" in southern Brazil, Chile, Colombia, China, and especially the United States. Upon this wide dispersion there depend political relations and influences of direct value to the German state. The following table gives the geographical distribution of the German-speaking population of the world outside of Germany itself.

GERMAN-SPEAKING POPULATION OUTSIDE GERMANY [1]

EUROPEAN COUNTRIES		NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES	
France [2]	1,500,000	United States	9,000,000
Belgium	115,000	Canada	100,000
Italy	250,000	Brazil	400,000
Czechoslovakia	3,500,000	Argentina	100,000
Rumania	900,000		9,600,000
Yugoslavia	700,000		
Hungary	250,000		
Poland [3]	2,200,000		
Baltic States	270,000		
Russia	1,600,000		
	11,285,000		

Note: These figures do not include 6,000,000 German-speaking Austrians, 2,600,000 German-speaking Swiss, and German settlers in former German colonies.

In Austria-Hungary the Germans were so numerous, — about 11,000,000, — so compactly situated, and so conscious of the German origin of the Hapsburgs, that they exercised a dominating influence on the political life of the empire, and at the same time served in part as a basis for the political views and ambitions of the Pan-Germans. The policies of Berlin were to a large degree reflected in the policies of Vienna. Moreover, the rulers of both empires had a cynical view respecting the rights of minority subjects of non-German race and speech.

Among the other groups of Germans outside the German Empire, the two most important were those in Russia and the Baltic Provinces. In southern Russia they comprised in large part the artisan classes, the merchants, and engineers with technical skill. Important German settlements were scattered eastward as far as the middle Volga. In

[1] After Walter Gerbing, *Das Erdbild der Gegenwart;* Vol. I, *Die Länder Europas*, 1926, pages 306–307. Gerbing's estimates are higher than those given in later chapters on the states of central Europe and derived from separate nationalist sources.

[2] Including the Saar. [3] Including Danzig.

FIG. 87. German-speaking peoples in central and eastern Europe. The scattered "islands" came into being as the result of many causes — religious differences and the desire to avoid military duty, crusades in the Baltic region, settlements of frontier guards against Turkey in Transylvania, artisan groups invited into southern Russia. After Debes, *Handatlas*. See also the map on page 72 of *Kartographische und Schul-geographische Zeitschrift*, Vol. 8, 1919, for recent German opinion on the subject.

the Baltic Provinces Germans formed the land-owning class, the so-called German barons, or *Balts*, who formed a small percentage of the population and held about three fourths of the land. In both districts the German element was politically powerful, that of the Baltic Provinces being especially influential at the court of St. Petersburg (Leningrad). Libau and Memel are peopled chiefly by Germans, not Slavs. Riga had a powerful German commercial community with business connections that penetrated far into Russia.

Wherever the Germans have gone in eastern Europe they have carried the German tongue, German culture and political ideas, and German industrial power. They have their own schools and trading associations; many maintain their citizenship in Germany. German colonists west of Kiev, in northern Ukrainia, owned the steel mills and many of the large landed estates; numbers of them entered the army and became celebrated officers. The Saxons of Transylvania, in the midst of a Rumanian peasantry, were given a privileged position by Hungary.

One can hardly understand Germany's present eastern boundary and her relations with the Polish and Russian branches of the Slavic

FIG. 88. The contest between German and Slav at the beginning of the 15th century. Based on Putzger, *Historischer Schul-Atlas*, 1923, and Droysen, *Hand-Atlas*, 1886.

race without recalling that the Slavs seven hundred years ago wrested parts of eastern Germany from the local princes of that day. The frontier between Slav and German was then the Elbe valley. In the 12th century the Germans began energetically to drive out the Slavic peoples and occupy the country with colonists from the Netherlands and Westphalia. In the 12th and 13th centuries a string of cities (Fig. 89) came into being: Lübeck, Wismar, Rostock, Stralsund, Greifswald, Wolgast, Stettin, and Kolberg. With a religious purpose

(a reflection of the Crusades), the Teutonic Knights won all of East Prussia between the Vistula and the Niemen. Under their protection and with the encouragement of traders from Bremen and Lübeck there arose still other cities: Danzig, Dirschau, Culm, Thorn, Elbing, Königsberg, Memel, and others. Riga, founded in 1158 by Bremen merchants, passed into the hands of the Teutonic Knights, who also conquered Tartu (Dorpat) and Tallinn (Revel).

While the interior, or landward, advance of the German against the Slavic host was steady, it was slow, whereas the coastal advance was rapid, owing to the enterprise of the merchants of the time and the flexibility of communication and support by sea when all the land roads were primitive and much of the soil was covered with forest. Soon all of the east Baltic coast was included in the German trading scheme. The strength of the new German colonies along the Baltic was assured by the vigor of the trade that called them into being. The Low Countries and Germany west of the Elbe and in the Rhine Valley formed a commercial region of growing power, seeking East Baltic products, building up a carrying trade between east and west. England likewise was demanding in increasing degree the products of the Baltic. Danzig became great largely because of English trade. From Russia came furs, skins, leather, tallow, and wax. Sweden sent copper and crude iron, lumber, potash, pitch, and tar. The looms of Flanders, Germany, and England supplied cloth. Silks, linen, metal wares, beer, and other products of city industry were among the western wares supplied in exchange for Baltic raw materials.

The German coast cities of the Baltic, making a great commercial thoroughfare, profited also from the trade of the Black and Caspian seas. They were indeed the northern termini of that trade. Though related to interior towns by geographical position along common river courses and by commercial agreements, they were the dominating partners. The rivers tributary to the Baltic are divided by low watersheds from those of the Black Sea (Fig. 89). Eastward by way of Riga, Pskov, Smolensk, and other cities a commercial chain was forged to Novgorod, the portal to a vast region that embraced not merely the Caspian and Transcaspian territories and trade routes, but even the Orient. Two streams of commerce, one from the east and one from the south, converged upon Baltic watersheds and became connected by river and sea with the rising industries and the rapidly growing towns that marked the period in western Europe.

All this meant a prolonged period of frontier trading with grave risks in transport. Pirates abounded, not even the lords of the castles



FIG. 89. The principal towns that at one time or another were members of the Hanseatic League. The Duna, Niemen, and Vistula rivers were among the chief trade routes from the Black Sea region to the Baltic.

in coastal Denmark and Sweden being above a little freebootery when adventure or gain called. Ships and cargoes cast up on the Danish coast were confiscated after the manner of "wreckers" on many another coast of the seven seas. Behind the rest of Europe in civilization, the cities had to offset the individual danger by union. Thus came into being in 1358 the powerful Hanseatic League, a league of cities, the outgrowth of still earlier merchant (not city) associations, or guilds, called Hansas. At one time or another seventy towns were included in it, though Lübeck was always the leader, with Cologne, Brunswick, and Danzig not far behind. "Their ships sailed out in fleets under the protection of a man-of-war." The League defeated a king of Denmark; it declared war and brought England to terms. It declined only when new routes by land and sea switched trade from those natural grooves along which it had first developed. The new routes to the East in the Age of Discovery gave further impetus to the decline of the Hanseatic towns. Baltic and Mediterranean alike became "mere sluggish pools." In the 16th century the Dutch forced the free navigation of the Baltic and ended the Hanseatic monopoly.

Teutonic knight, Hanseatic trader, German outpost on the Slavic frontier, — these in succession set up traditions of conquest, stamped

the towns of the eastern coast of the Baltic with the German character, and formed an historical background of superior culture. From the German point of view the mere loss of territory to Poland on the east is easier to bear than the severance of East Prussia by the device of the Polish Corridor (Fig. 90). No German believes that such a territorial contrivance can long stand. Already German scholars are at work to find every historical, political, economic, and ethnological fact favorable to the argument for a return of the corridor to Germany. In a general European struggle it would be a first object of attack by Germany, of defense by Poland. It is the one of the present centers of that conflict between Teuton and Slav that has come down undiminished in intensity from distant centuries.

CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT IN THE WORLD WAR

The treaty of Versailles took away large territories from the former empire and laid heavy servitudes upon the new German state. Germany was stripped of her overseas possessions, her merchant fleet was largely confiscated, her navy was reduced to the limits of protective need alone. Good will toward the German trader was gone. The following table lists the European territorial units lost to Germany.

EUROPEAN TERRITORY LOST TO GERMANY AS A RESULT OF THE WORLD WAR

	POPULATION (CENSUS OF 1910)	AREA (IN SQ. MILES)
Alsace-Lorraine	1,874,014	5,607
Saar Basin (under League of Nations for 15 years)	713,105 [1]	744
To Belgium (Eupen and Malmédy)	60,003	400
To Poland	3,854,971	17,816
Memel	141,238	1,026
Danzig	330,630	739
To Denmark (Slesvig — northern zone)	166,348	1,542
To Czechoslovakia (part of Upper Silesia)	48,446	122
Total	7,188,755	27,996

The loss of Alsace-Lorraine meant not loss of territory only, and a prosperous population, but a yearly production of more than 20,000,000 tons of iron ore, and potash deposits now exploited at the rate of more than 200,000 tons a year. Control of Rhine River traffic passed out of German hands, though Germany has representation upon the

[1] Census of 1922.

Fig. 90. Changes in the boundaries of Germany as a result of the World War.

existing commission (page 280). In Slesvig, Germany lost, besides population and territory, a part of a strategic barrier. Small territories on the west — Eupen, Malmédy, and Moresnet — are strategic rather than serious economic losses; and the trans-Niemen territory on the east is populated chiefly by Lithuanian folk. The loss of Danzig, on the other hand, meant the relinquishment of an old Hanseatic town, a leading Baltic port. The territory lost to Poland includes the rich industrial province of Posen, besides mineral, forest, and agricultural land, and about one tenth of the former German production of grain and one sixth the production of potatoes. The loss of most of the Upper Silesian coal fields[1] to Poland was the hardest blow of all (Fig. 148). One of the great unitary economic fields of Europe was divided. In order that the division should not be fatal, control of this mining and metallurgical region was placed in the hands of a mixed commission. The coal mines of the Saar (annual production 12,400,000 tons before the World War, 13,000,000 tons in 1925), were allocated to France. All told Germany lost 12.4 per cent of her former area, about 12 per cent of her population (of which 58 per cent spoke German), from 12 to 15 per cent of her agricultural production, 10 per cent of her manufacturing, and 74 per cent of her iron-ore production.

REPARATION DIFFICULTIES

The heaviest immediate burden of the war was not loss of territory but reparations. To make Germany pay the total war damage as originally planned was impossible even if the whole of German assets in land, goods, and works had been liquidated and the German nation destroyed. In fact, without a nation *at work* those assets were unrealizable in practically any form. There was the widest difference of opinion, however, as to the amount that could be extracted and yet leave German economic machinery intact. There would have to be improvement also, because that is the basis of hope and without hope a people lives in slavery.

We have already described the reparation difficulties (pages 152–157); the invasion of the Ruhr; the slow realization by Germany that she must pay, by France that payment must be regularised and accommodated to actual economic conditions, not demanded inexorably according to the letter of a treaty that could not take account of the future. The Experts' Plan in 1924 brought into view for the first time since 1914 the possibility of peace (page 10).

[1] Total German coal production in 1913 was 43,000,000 tons, Upper Silesia producing 23 per cent.

THE EXPERTS' PLAN FOR GERMAN REPARATION

Germany's achievements since the Experts' Plan went into effect are impressive. The two chief objects of the plan — economic recovery and the stabilization of the mark on the one hand and steady rather than irregular and disquietingly small reparation payments on the other — were at once put in the way of fulfillment. Germany was allowed to reëstablish herself "under conditions of security and mutual confidence." Quoting further from the Agent-General for Reparation Payments, she has "promptly and loyally discharged all her obligations." Budget problems remain, and the distribution of tax funds among the several states is still in a problematical state; but taken as a whole, and despite temporary crises, the process of restoration appears to be in full swing.

The actual operation of so comprehensive a scheme for raising revenue within one state and making it available in other states is a matter of special interest because it does not rest on a basis of ordinary commercial exchange. The world has never before witnessed its like. How can it be done? The annual reports of the Agent-General for Reparation Payments answer this question and show the inner workings of an international agreement whose effects reach into a vast number of international transactions.

First of all, the government-owned railways were converted into a joint-stock company called the German Railway Company, which received the railways in 1924. Government mismanagement after the World War showed heavy deficits; under the company there was at once a surplus after allowance had been made for reserves and exceptional expenditures. Out of this surplus there was paid the first year 200,000,000 gold marks, the second year 595,000,000 gold marks on reparation account, and 660,000,000 gold marks are now paid annually (since 1927–1928). From German industry there is derived (since 1927–1928) 300,000,000 gold marks annually. The German government itself makes regular monthly payments for reparation out of its budget (1,250,000,000 gold marks annually beginning in 1928–1929). There is also an annual transport tax of 290,000,000 gold marks whose receipts are credited to reparations.

How are these large sums paid over to the Agent-General of Reparations actually made available to the creditor nations? How does their payment affect German national life? If all the money were to be paid out in actual cash the German currency system, long paralyzed following the World War, would be thrown into disorder. Reparation

money can be more effectively employed in Germany itself. The Experts' Plan has three supreme merits:

(1) It minimizes direct negotiation and quarrelling between creditor and debtor.

(2) It provides large sums from devised financial operations that bear as lightly as possible upon German life.

(3) It pays over the sums collected by means which lay the lightest possible penalty upon German industry.

By business contracts of the usual kind all sorts of goods are made deliverable to the nationals of those countries that receive reparation payments. To take a specific case, such goods in the period September 1925 to May 1926 include the following: 148,500 tons of fertilizers, 47,600 tons of metal goods, principally iron and steel, 257,000 cubic meters of lumber, 108,000 telegraph poles, 175,000 tons of pulp and other paper materials, nearly $1,000,000 worth of sugar, besides more than $100,000,000 worth of coal and nearly $2,000,000 worth of dyestuffs. The distributions are as follows:

France receives nearly all of her reparation through deliveries in kind.

Great Britain has been paid chiefly at the Bank of England through sterling equivalents of gold marks reparation credit.

Italy is paid in coal, dyestuffs, etc.

Belgium takes coal, dyestuffs, chemical fertilizers, timber.

Yugoslavia takes all of its reparations in deliveries in kind, some manufactured, some raw materials, such as she would normally import.

France, Great Britain, and Belgium cover the expenses of their armies of occupation in the Rhineland by mark payments made by Germany and credited to reparations.

The rising exports, reported by the Agent-General for Reparation Payments, reflect the sound state of the German industrial plant undamaged by war. It must also be recalled that the huge industrial debt of pre-war Germany was virtually discharged in depreciated currency and industry freed from the burden normally carried by rival industrial countries. It shows a tremendous productive energy traceable not merely to natural resources and machine organization but also to hard work. By employing the net surplus of railroad operating receipts and a scheme of industrial debentures, the payments are hidden or indirect in large part. This is good for the spirit as well as for business. It disposes of the troublesome present and paves the way for better understandings like Locarno (page 8) and the entry of

Germany into the League of Nations. When these have borne fruit the armies of occupation will be progressively withdrawn and thus no longer divert credits in large amounts from reparation to unproductive military costs.

THE ECONOMIC REGION OF THE RHINE

Pre-war Europe was highly organized, its smooth-working arrangements respecting capital, transport, metal and chemical industries taking but little account of international boundaries. The new boundaries in part, the disrupted economic organization in larger part, have made reorganization a difficult, prolonged, and politically dangerous process. High tariffs built walls about each nation. Nationalism itself rose to chauvinistic pitch. All frontiers in Europe gained new economic significance. The Rhine region is of particular interest because the new boundary between France and Germany divides Lorraine iron from Ruhr coal. Before 1919 they were united by a highly efficient railway system that largely cancelled the 150 miles of distance that lay between (Fig. 91). The Ruhr basin has the largest reserves of coal and the highest level of production in all Europe and its coking coal is without rival. The Lorraine region includes 47 per cent of the metallic iron reserve of the continent and 42 per cent of the known available ores of Europe (including Great Britain). Germany had the larger part of this field before the World War. France now has 95 per cent of it.

Neither the Rhine nor the Moselle is naturally suited for cheap transportation between the Ruhr and Lorraine. Rhine transport would require costly transshipment or immense canals and a slow rate of transport. The Moselle, despite local canalization, is tortuous and shallow and ill-suited to heavy ore boats. Railroads with efficient terminal facilities and cars specially adapted for cheap loading and unloading formed the connecting link. Since about 4 tons of coke are required to smelt 10 tons of Lorraine ore (3 tons of pig iron), the railroad cars that hauled ore to the Ruhr carried back, if fully loaded, an excess of coke. This excess was used to smelt ore on the spot, so that both Lorraine and the Ruhr were producing at an efficient level. Their plant facilities were in full economic use. About 76 per cent of Lorraine coke requirements were supplied from the Ruhr and Rhineland and Lorraine sent to the latter about 28 per cent of its ore. Nearly the whole export of iron and steel from Germany, France, and Belgium originated in the Ruhr-Lorraine system. These two regions

FIG. 91. Compiled from many recent sources. Compare with Figures 83, 84, 92, and 93, and note the importance to industrial Germany of water communications through the Netherlands.

became united by capital combinations and formed the greatest industrial center in the world.

New political values may grow out of French possession of the iron ore of Lorraine and her reparation coal deliveries from Germany, but their effect upon Europe must be a problem for the future. France is struggling for economic independence. At present she is doing so largely by the use of reparation coal. When that is discontinued, France will be in a bad way unless her industrial leaders have worked out on their own account, with their equals in Germany, thoroughgoing reciprocal arrangements that disregard boundaries. Of this type are the international steel syndicate of 1926 and the chemical trust of 1927.



FIG. 92. After Scheu, *Deutschlands Wirtschafts-Geographische Harmonie*, 1924.

It is arguable that the closer the union between industrial France and Germany the less danger there is of future war. France holding the iron and Germany the coking coal is different from Germany holding both as in 1914. Military strategy in each country would be centered upon the holding of the one possession vital to the other. Artillery would not have at once a complete metallurgical outfit behind it. Each generation would thereby be taught that war is unprofitable, a conclusion that provides a clearer view of questions that involve national honor and that are always obscured by hope of gain.

The importance of the Rhine in western European economy received early recognition. Freedom of river navigation was one of the principles of the French Revolution. The first treaty of Paris of 1814 declared Rhine navigation to be free, thus recognizing the economic value of the river. After the Convention of Mannheim (1868), Germany virtually controlled the Rhine. The treaty of Versailles in 1919 provided for the regulation of the economic life of the river by an international commission composed not alone of the riparian states, Netherlands, Germany, France, and Switzerland, but also of the more distant states, Belgium, Italy, and Great Britain, who also feel the effects of Rhine navigation policies.

Traffic on the Rhine reflects the dominantly industrial character of the country bordering the river. It is a mining region in which coal and iron are the leading products. Coal and lignite lead in river freight. Vast deposits of lignite occur on both banks of the Rhine and since the World War they have been in process of much greater development than before. Lignite production in Germany now exceeds by nearly 10 per cent the tonnage of coal. The most important single industrial region is that of the Ruhr. Its western end is marked by a great transportation portal (Ruhrort and Duisburg) through which are sent coal and coke and iron in various forms and where



Fig. 93. After Scheu, *Deutschlands Wirtschafts-Geographische Harmonie*, 1924. The stippled areas represent the territory lost by Germany.

grain, wood, and iron ore are received. Canal and river connections are maintained with Holland, Belgium, and the upper Rhine. Ruhr coal normally enters Holland by way of the Rhine, where it meets English coal. The same is true of Belgium. Southward the Ruhr coal reaches Switzerland and Italy after transfer to the railways at Mannheim (Fig. 91).

Next in importance to coal and lignite in Rhine traffic is iron in many forms. In part it is Lorraine and Westphalian iron. To a less extent it comes from abroad, — Sweden, Spain, and even Russia, Algeria, and Tunisia. The Lorraine ores are transported by railroad. If the Moselle were canalized, this traffic could be carried by water and coke exported from the Ruhr as a return cargo. Imported cereals — food for the dense Rhine population — form the third most important freight element following iron and coal. The United States and Argentina have long supplied the largest imports. Before the World War, Rumania and Russia also contributed, Russia supplying 40 per cent of the total cereal imports. To summarize: fuels, ores, and cereals

constitute four fifths of the Rhine freight, since they are heavy commodities that, economically speaking, prefer water carriage to rail carriage.

The very dense population of the Rhine Valley at the present time reflects the wealth of the mineral resources rather than the fertility of the soil, though the soil is highly fertile. At every twenty miles on the average there is a city of 100,000 inhabitants on the banks of the river or near them. This is one of the most densely populated regions of Europe. From the Swiss frontier to the North Sea there is along the Rhine a population density three times that of the average for France (Fig. 58, page 196).

Looking at the river from the standpoint of Germany, it is noteworthy that neither the source nor the mouth is in German hands. From an industrial standpoint the control of the source is not important except with reference to water power, and of this Germany has an abundance upon her own territory. The control of the mouth of the Rhine by the Netherlands is more serious. To offset the commercial and strategic deficiencies which this entails, Germany built the Dortmund-Ems Canal (Fig. 91), thus reaching the North Sea through her own territory and providing a shorter route for the import of cereals and timber (for the mines of the Ruhr), since the timber is of German, Scandinavian, and Baltic origin. Another canal, the Mittellandt, branches from the Dortmund-Ems and connects the Weser with the Ruhr region.

Rhine traffic during the past ten years has suffered severely from rivalry between the French and German railway systems. In order to capture Rhine traffic these systems have offered extremely low transport rates from the Rhine commercial region to their salt-water ports, with the effect that commercial companies operating on the Rhine have been enfeebled and expensive installations at terminals and elsewhere are not economically employed. The Saar territory and Alsace and Lorraine, which formerly dispatched their raw materials and finished products largely by way of the Rhine, now ship them by rail, and the same is true of imported cereals. Switzerland's transit traffic has been diverted to Belgian and French railways operating between Switzerland and Antwerp. German railways have sought to divert traffic from Belgian and Dutch ports to Hamburg and Bremen. To favor Belgian interests at the expense of the Dutch, special rates are given by France to traffic that moves down the Rhine to Antwerp, while a surtax is levied upon freight that passes to and from Rotterdam.

Further disabilities have been laid upon German Rhine traffic by the German policy of extremely low railway rates on freight to Hamburg and Bremen, while special pre-war rail tariffs favorable to Rhine shippers have been discontinued. Long-distance shipments also receive preferential rates, and this puts a heavier burden upon rail shipments to Rhine ports from territory near by. Rhine commercial agencies and shipping interests have suffered accordingly and will continue to suffer as a result of policies adopted by both Germany and France, policies of wide scope and related to general or national rather than regional benefits.

(B) Colonial Interests

Germany entered the field of colonial activity late in her national career, her first essay in colonial expansion in the Pacific coming in 1884. It was only after much vacillation that she finally established herself in Africa in the same year. Her leaders had been opposed to colonial expansion in the first instance. Their sense of economy was shocked by the large expenditures that were necessary to keep distant and undeveloped territories under control. As a consequence, Great Britain and France had a full half century and more of advantage in time and experience. Between 1876 and 1884 these powers had laid claim to some of the choicest areas in Africa. The field of colonial expansion had been greatly narrowed.

Rivalry, Gain, and Loss in Africa

When Germany awoke to a full realization of the value of colonial raw materials to her magically expanding industries, she found that she could gain important advantages only by pursuing an exceedingly active policy. What she had lacked in initiative she now made up by aggression and skill. Wherever her colonies touched the territory of other powers, she made the fullest possible use of any differences of opinion regarding the location of boundary lines or the extent of her concessions or the terms of her treaties with native chiefs. This is not said by way of condemnation. It was the accepted political technique of the period. Her merchants had established trading stations on both the east and the west coast of Africa. In 1859 Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck had made a commercial treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar. By 1884 about sixty German trading posts and a hundred or more of missionary stations were located on the west coast. The field of

FIG. 94. General map showing the location of the former German colonies in Africa with names and boundaries as of 1914. For their disposition and for present names and boundaries see Figure 20, page 83, and Figure 52, page 184.

Germany's activity was limited to regions having vague boundaries, where control might be gained without resort to war.

German Southwest Africa was the scene of the first struggle. Fearing the results of the activities of German traders and missionaries in the Walvis Bay region, and yet momentarily timid about extending frontiers, the British government in 1878 took possession of the bay and the territory for fifteen miles round about. Germany responded (1884) by taking Angra Pequena, and with it that part of the west coast between Portuguese Angola and the Orange River, save the small tract at Walvis Bay. In the same year Togoland was declared a German protectorate, on the ground that German trading stations had been established; definite claims to it had not been made by either France or Great Britain. Also in the same year, German political agents concluded treaties with some of the native chiefs of the Cameroons and the German flag was hoisted over the third of the newly won African colonies. The map in Figure 94 makes evident the substantial progress of Germany in the African realm.

There followed, in 1885, British acknowledgment of German commercial claims over East Africa. By 1888 some thirty coffee and tobacco plantations were in operation. Arab slave traders fomented a rebellion which was speedily put down, and in 1889 the German East Africa Society bought out the claims of the Sultan of Zanzibar to the coast strip, then under German control. Subsequent agreements with Great Britain in 1886 and 1890 fixed the boundaries of German East Africa and closed the first chapter of German colonization there.

Germany's ambitions looked not only toward the development of the African colonies, but also to the acquisition of other colonies near those already established. Her political moves in East Africa led rival nations to believe that she wished to acquire Portuguese East Africa as well as portions of French and Belgian territory. That the trade of the African colonies of Portugal was carried largely by German ships and that the Portuguese colonial administration (page 228) was weak, were conditions that favored a new colonial alignment in Africa. Had Germany been victorious in the World War, a German-African colonial empire would almost inevitably have followed. Fate was to eliminate her altogether from Africa, to the advantage of her neighbors there.

Two of the four African colonies of Germany — German Southwest Africa and German East Africa — came under British administration, the former as a mandate of the Union of South Africa, the latter, except for a small portion assigned to Belgium (page 204), as a separate mandated possession. In theory neither is held in full sovereignty, but as a mandated region under the authority of the League of Nations, to be administered primarily for the benefit of the natives (page 20). Togoland and the Cameroons are divided between France and Great Britain (Figs. 224 and 225) for control in the same way. This is a new departure in colonial government. It makes the details of administration in these areas matters of public knowledge and approval. It also makes it possible in the future to return the colonies to Germany, though such a step is most unlikely in view of the flow of capital from the mandatory powers into the colonies and the strong objection of business to the unsettling effect of changes in political status. The growing colonial literature in Germany and the announced determination of not a few public leaders, make it equally clear that German efforts will not cease until some of the colonies are restored (page 22).

FORMER GERMAN COLONIES IN THE PACIFIC

Four stages may be recognized in the development of German ambitions in the Pacific. The first was purely commercial; the second was annexation — to extend the German Empire; in the next stage the islands of the Pacific were regarded not merely as additions to empire or as commercial assets, but as naval bases from which the power of the German government could be extended to rich and populous countries; the fourth, or present, stage is one of complete elimination of Germany from the Pacific.

International Rivalries in Samoa

Germany's first colonial activity in the Pacific was due to the effort of a Hamburg merchant prince — Godeffroy — who sent agents to Fiji and Samoa to establish cotton plantations. This was just after the American Civil War, when the European cotton famine turned the minds of merchants and statesmen to the necessity of producing at least a part of their raw cotton within their own empires. Later the schemes of Godeffroy's company won a subvention from the German Reichstag.

But the field was not entirely open in Samoa; for the United States had had since 1839 the exclusive right to establish a naval base in the harbor of Pago Pago at Samoa, and the British colonies of Australia and New Zealand had developed an important trade in Samoa. In order to adjust the conflicting claims, the three powers — the United States, Great Britain, and Germany — sent representatives to a conference in Berlin which resulted in the Berlin General Act of 1880, providing a government for the kingdom of Samoa, the condominium, which existed down to 1899. In that year the three powers signatory to the Berlin General Act jointly agreed to annul the act and distribute Samoa. Tutuila was allotted to the United States, Upolu to Germany, and Savai'i to Great Britain. No sooner was this done than Great Britain gave Savai'i to Germany in return for concessions made by Germany to Great Britain in the Tonga and Solomon Islands. In former German Samoa the native population is about 44,000, and the annual trade has a value of $3,500,000. These islands are administered by New Zealand as the mandatory of the League of Nations.

New Guinea

In 1884 Germany annexed the northern shore of New Guinea, from the Dutch boundary eastward to Dampier Strait, and inland as far as the supposed crest of the central range of mountains. Almost immediately thereafter she annexed the whole of the New Britain Archipelago (renamed Bismarck) and the northern Solomon Islands. Before this, Queensland had annexed the eastern half of the continental island of New Guinea (1883); but the British government disavowed the act on the ground that it gave sovereign rights to a colony. It was in the face of this disavowal that the German annexation of the northeastern part of New Guinea (Kaiser Wilhelm's Land) took place. But the British government, yielding to popular sentiment, then annexed the southern shore of New Guinea (Papua) and turned it over to Australia

for administration, at the same time establishing a protectorate over the southern Solomons and Santa Cruz (Fig. 213, page 613). The area of former German territory now assigned to Australia as the mandatory power is nearly 90,000 square miles, and the population numbers about 700,000.

Two years after the acquisition of northeastern New Guinea, Germany hoisted her flag over the Marshall Islands, to protect the commercial rights of a German company; and in 1899, the year after America had acquired the Philippines and the island of Guam from Spain, Germany bought from Spain the rest of her holdings in the Pacific — the Carolines, the Mariannes, and the Pelew Islands. These territories have an area of less than 1000 square miles and a native population of 70,000. All of them were assigned to Japan as the mandatory power except Nauru, which is south of the equator and is included in the New Zealand mandated region (Fig. 218, page 625).

GERMANY'S POSITION IN OVERSEAS TRADE

With all colonial possessions lost, German merchants are limited in their efforts at reviving overseas trade to general trading conditions like those that affect, say, the foreign merchants of Sweden or Switzerland. Germany's trade can be recovered only so far as tariff arrangements and good will permit, though there is formal equality of status of traders in mandated territories. France, Great Britain, and the United States have preferential rates in their colonial trade; Italy, though her colonies have small interest to Germany, has restrictive shipping laws in force in Libya; Portugal puts all foreign traders under a handicap in her African colonies. Tropical raw materials will be less easy for Germany to obtain.

Why does a government want colonies when colonial budgets rarely balance? It is because colonies are believed to be an indirect benefit. They increase the prestige of a sovereign because they are accepted as emblems of power. Popular interest in them is sentimental largely, but sentiment is a soil in which politicians as well as idealists plant their seeds. National soil is sacred soil — "not a foot of it must be given up" is the cry always raised before the evidence is heard. We see the germ in virulent form in the unnecessary truculence that litigants display in boundary disputes. Growth is generally regarded as a sign of progress. It gratifies vanity. Even the names of new possessions are subtly pleasing. So too the thought of inferior peoples to whom the blessings of our civilization have been vouchsafed. Naval and military strategists set themselves new problems with an additional equipment

of fortifications on distant bases. The whole industrial and commercial system of a colonial power busily calculates the material value of the cheap labor supply from low-grade peoples and of undeveloped natural resources. These are some of the parts in the complicated mechanism of colonial expansion. Let us see what supplies the energy.

Somebody must do the hard manual labor. We pass it on in increasing degree to machines. We also pass it on to the man whose daily food is a few pounds of rice, whose clothing is the cheapest cotton, and whose home is a hut. We tap the bountiful climate and soil of the tropics. *Thought* is also a part of the process, one of the assets, and we do the thinking. The machine and its efficient operation express thought and so does business organization that makes production, transport, and distribution a vast world enterprise. It pushes out the boundaries of knowledge, bringing within the circle of world-coöperation resources that would never be recognized but for technical skill and intelligence.

Every industrial nation has a superabundance of the energy of thought. The cities select the best minds and promote them. The winnowing process is endless. The national "machine" is able to operate on an increasing scale. Industrial power extends itself into the farthest corners of the world. So-called "exploitation" in colonies as elsewhere can be stopped only when all peoples are alike in power and intelligence and promise to stay alike. This is the millennium.

Germany had before the World War (1914–1918) a commercial and industrial machine that operated on a high level of efficiency. Actual possession was not the measure of German colonizing or trading power. German settlers in southern Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and the United States extended the commercial range of German industrialists and merchants. The high birthrate in Germany was often given as a cause of colonial expansion, but in fact settlers did not flock to the colonies. Rather they gathered in the cities, or occupied the better lands of the climatic zones to which they were adapted, or entered the competitive societies of North and South America and the world markets everywhere. The common people had a sentimental interest in colonies, but it was a group of industrial, commercial, political, and military leaders who struggled most for colonial expansion. Why? Money flows more readily into resources that are protected by national control of the land. Special trading privileges are granted to nationals — low tariffs, priority in the use of terminal facilities, government protection of the charters or concessions of trading companies, guarantees for railroad constructors and operators, readiness in approaching influ-

ential government officials who can be made to adopt policies and laws that better commerce, that is, make it profitable or increase the profits. Raw materials under government control in war and exploited in peace by the nationals of the owning power are a great objective in the case of tropical colonization. Capital wants to be sure that the government will not change for the worse in the country where it is employed. A local government can always repudiate the acts of predecessors as unrepresentative of the people or as exploitative, if not dishonest. Colonial investments are always endorsed by the political commitments of an expanding empire. Germany's situation today, without colonies, is intolerable to her on all these grounds, no less than as a matter of national pride.

(C) German Minorities in the New States of Europe

With the fall of German rulers in 1918, the democratic era, foreshadowed by the Revolution of 1848, and in the 20th century by the steady increase of the Social Democrats in the Reichstag, at last began. There came also the final liberation of peoples who, by gaining independence, took away substantial portions of Germany, as well as the greater part of Austria and Hungary. Additional losses of population were incurred through the treaty of Versailles (page 273), which included many Germans in the new states, on the ground that the colonization methods of Germany and the forced ethnic penetrations of Austria and Hungary had put the former minority populations of these countries under a handicap. While each one of the three great eastward-reaching prongs of German population, shown in Figure 87, is often described as the result of a war of conquest against Turks and Slavs, it should not be forgotten that these wars were in the main a part of the general and commendable process of eastward expansion of the higher civilization of western Europe against the lower civilization to the east that long threatened to overwhelm it.

The exclusion of large numbers of Germans from Germany raises one group of problems while temporarily settling another. There is no more effective cry in the world than the cry of oppression. What if these excluded Germans persistently complain of their lot, as did the peoples once held in their grasp? In general, western peoples were not sympathetic toward France in 1870–1871; but by 1914 they had become educated to the wrongs done by the German overlords in Alsace-Lorraine. The Poles and Czechs run grave risks if they choose the way of the oppressor.

The largest group of Germans outside of Germany is that in Austria (Fig. 87). To join this country to Germany would give the latter a total population larger and much more homogeneous than that which she had before the World War. It would also throw the frontiers of Germany eighty miles nearer the head of the Adriatic. While German Baltic and North Sea coasts have been diminished at Danzig, the end of the Polish Corridor, and along the territory between Memel and the Niemen, there remains a solid block of German territory that has no counterpart in resources, technical skill, and efficiency of population in all Europe. To add to its strength by union with Austria might revive Pan-German plans. With this possibility in view the makers of the treaty of Versailles forbade union, or *Anschluss*, though its feasibility was discussed, especially by Austria, immediately thereafter. The question is revived almost annually. Italian oppression of the German-speaking population of the Italian Tirol has furnished a steady supply of motives. Austrian fiscal and industrial troubles have tended to keep the subject in the public mind. Were the Allies convinced of the reality of German democracy, a union that seems almost inevitable would no doubt be hastened.

The limits of the German Empire as drawn in 1914 show that the largest linguistic or "racial" minority within it was the Poles. These have now joined with the Poles of Austria (Galicia) and of Russia (Congress Poland [1] and a strip of territory adjoining it on the east) to form the new Polish state. In Poland about 2,000,000 Germans are included, but they form almost everywhere the minority of the population. About 3,500,000 Germans were assigned to Czechoslovakia. Many citizens of that country regret their inclusion as a minority group with the power of obstruction in national affairs. The German-speaking Austrians of the Italian Tirol (page 238) are in the same situation with respect to Italy.

The protection of minority rights is one of the great problems of the time. It cannot be solved by splitting up the world indefinitely, or by making national boundaries fit every irregularity of ethnographic distribution. Not every tiny group can have its own flag and place in the family of nations, nor can every group as a matter of political expediency be associated with its homeland. For the weakest peoples there is only one practicable alleviation — that minorities shall have a court of appeal and certain broad guarantees of personal rights of

[1] Name given to a political division of Russia (created a kingdom under the Czar by the Congress of Vienna) which includes chiefly Polish populations. Its boundaries on the west and south were the former German and Austrian international boundaries.

speech and religion. Those with able advocates — and in this class are the various German groups of central Europe — will be heard by the League of Nations through the operation of the minorities treaties (page 27).

(D) The Economic Outlook

Apart from the heavy annual payments which Germany is required to make under the Experts' Plan, she had already surrendered to the Allies several billion dollars' worth of materials — railway rolling stock, mercantile marine, industrial machinery, live stock, coal and coke, dyes, overseas cables, and property left in occupied territory. It is remarkable to what an extent and how rapidly recovery has been made, in the face of these great losses and the subsequent heavy payments for reparation. Partly this is due to the liquidation of internal debts, both public and private, through the depreciation of the mark. The agricultural class prospered because mortgages virtually disappeared. The new industrial class prospered because, like the farmers, they had sources of real wealth left in their hands in the form of undamaged plant. There was an immense post-war organization of domestic industrial business, striking developments in electrification, and amazingly rapid restoration of shipping through government subsidies to shipbuilders, and above all, a determination to work back to a state of tolerable living.

While all the other states of central Europe are in an era of reform as respects land tenure, Germany alone pursues her former policy. Her leaders are persuaded that division of landed estates would weaken rather than strengthen the realm. They believe in a balanced agricultural system — large, medium, and small holdings suited to the prevailing type of culture in a given region, to the natural capabilities of the soil, to the fertilizers necessarily employed, and to situation with respect to city markets. The energies of government, in this field, are spent upon the clearing and redemption of waste lands, the organization of efficient units of area, and a scientific rather than a purely social approach to agricultural improvement. Internal "colonization" has taken the form of state-aided settlement on a small scale, chiefly of swamp or low-grade forest land, heath, or sterile sandy soils capable of production under special farming methods.

A single illustration will suffice to show the German point of view in industry and agriculture. During the World War the accustomed supplies of Chilean nitrate had been cut off. It was necessary to manufacture synthetic nitrate, which requires, above all, a cheap power supply. This was found in the immense, indeed almost inexhaustible,

lignite resources of Germany, which were rapidly developed and are now used on an unparalleled scale (1913, 87,000,000 metric tons; 1925, 140,000,000). The deposits lie near the surface and are handled chiefly by steam shovels working in open pits. Light, cheap railways serve the lignite fields; the briquettes are carried cheaply by water. Among a limited number of essential plant foods the rarest are nitrate and potash. The potash deposits of Germany are the largest in the world, the nitrate production through the use of lignite as a cheap fuel is the largest in the synthetic field (1913, 91,500 metric tons; 1926, 661,500!) Given these two rarest plant foods in abundance, Germany can manage to feed herself while expanding industrially. If she can do so to an increasing rather than a decreasing degree she will have made herself economically independent upon her own soil and will solve a problem that is troubling England more and more (page 49). A further effect in another half century will be to make Germany (eventually freed of reparation payments) far stronger, relative to her neighbors, than she was before the World War.

Though Germany's losses are heavy and though they include not only iron and coal but arable land, forests, railroads, and the like, it is also true that the loss of population was roughly proportional to the loss of territory and resources. This means that what is left is in a state as well balanced as it was before the World War. From a national standpoint the losses mean diminished strength to the military arm, and from the standpoint of large business corporations the field of activity is diminished. On the other hand, losses of population are being made up, and it will be but a few years until the former degree of disproportion will again exist between Germany and her neighbors. The disproportion will be not merely in relative densities of population, in the number of large cities and the like, but also in the absolute totals of population. The present birth rate is close to that of France, but 50 per cent more people are concerned; and the death rate is lower (13 per thousand per annum against 18 in France). Moreover, the return of German trade is inevitable, as the workings of the German commercial system clearly show in the last few years of steadied production under the present reparation scheme. Highly significant is the penetration of the Russian trade realm by Germany on a scale quite disproportionate to that of the other European countries. This means that German industrial plant and Russian raw materials are related in a way to increase still further the population of German industrial cities.

The German people are too intelligent and hardworking not to overcome their present handicaps and to emerge strong and resourceful.

When that time comes, few things can be more certain than the return to Germany of commercial advantages now denied her. The present political alignment is one between nations opposed to Germany for the time being. France and Great Britain do not work together because they have common commercial aims, but because both desire security and peace. Germany is so much stronger than either of her two principal rivals in the military field that they must ally themselves to offset her greater power. It is hard to see how such a combination can endure. Differences between France and England will ultimately arise which the opinion and the strength of Germany will be called upon to decide or at least to influence. When that opportunity confronts her, Germany will seize it to her own advantage, to diminish obligations to her creditors, to secure a return of some of her colonies, to win special trade privileges, to make friends where she has had enemies.

These circumstances bear in a most critical manner upon the internal political situation. It is true that a new constitution was framed and adopted in 1919, that it provides for a democratic government, and that it has many excellent features, such as liberty of speech, of the press, and of association and religious freedom, and that it makes provision for representative legislative bodies and an elected president. On the other hand, it should be remembered that it was not through the spontaneous act of the German people that the old imperial government was abolished. That was done in 1918 in the face of impending defeat and through the declaration of President Wilson that he would refuse to treat with Germany's old masters. It was no popular uprising that brought about a republic. That form of government was, in a sense, imposed on Germany by the Allies. In consequence it is still a question how far Germany has become a real confederation of states determined to foster and enlarge republican institutions and how far republicanism was considered a device to escape the penalties that might follow defeat. German leaders asserted that the Allies were doing everything in their power to discourage German democracy. But the Allies could hardly do less without having tested the spirit of new Germany. They had to be sure that the change from a monarchical to a republican form of government was sincere and lasting. The monarchical spirit is by no means dead. It gives, from time to time, evidences of real strength. No matter upon what its strength depends, the Allies, and France in particular, are bound to take account of it, to study its manifestations in voluntary training organizations that might be used for military purposes, in plans for revenge, in persistent attempts to

revise the treaty of Versailles, principally through the denial of war guilt.

There is also the question of political resourcefulness on the part of the people of the present régime. The German people had never been able by peaceful processes to join together in a union the various small Germanic states that had arisen during the centuries before Napoleon's time. The strength of the German empire formed in 1871 is not a measure of popular interest in government or of the solidarity of the German people. The growth of Prussia and the absorption of the smaller states of the German union was almost uniformly effected by military means, and when in 1870 France was conquered in a brief and spectacular campaign, military autocracy was confidently crowned with glory by the German people. Thereafter the government was supreme and molded public opinion to its will, instead of drawing its inspiration from public opinion. The growth of the empire had indeed been marvelous, but the principle of growth had been one of dependence upon military autocracy; and the spread of German culture implied the control, by that autocracy, of peoples who cherished liberty far more dearly than any benefits which German culture might bring.

Opposed to this point of view is the fact that Germany came through the period of the armistice and of the blockade without falling apart politically and socially, as did Russia. There was no basis for foreign trade; the colonies were lost; the shipping was surrendered; there was a vast number of unemployed; and above all, there was needed a complete and extremely difficult reorganization of life to absorb the returning army and the hundreds of thousands that had their work and place altered by the coming of peace. To have held together despite local and temporary disorders, — above all, to have resisted the monarchist attempt to overturn the republican government, — has been to reveal political capacities of a high order. The most severe test of republicanism was the occupation of the Ruhr by the French in 1923. The steady demands made by the Experts' Plan upon German productive capacity is hardly less severe. It does not seem possible, after years of trial, that a return to a monarchical government can be brought about. The recovery of Germany has now progressed so far that the political reasons for change are weakened. In addition, Germany has won a place as a permanent member of the Council of the League of Nations, where she enjoys advantages of constantly growing import. If she complains of being restricted to a small standing army, she must admit that she is saving enormous sums formerly spent upon a military establishment.

Finally, there is a fundamental change at work in the philosophy of Europe. Side by side with the ideals of democracy that dominated the French Revolution and that have grown steadily in Europe, there grew up another incompatible set of ideas — that is, that power and the balance of power were the prime objects of political life. The World War was an almost inevitable outcome of such a policy. However heavy her handicaps may be, Germany at least has the supreme advantage of escaping the burden of excessive armaments which the maintenance of a balance of power imperatively required. Though Germans point out the disparity in military strength as between themselves and their neighbors, it is inconceivable that any neighbor would think of attacking Germany. Such a theory can have only political reasons for its promulgation.

Perhaps the most important element in the situation is the momentum of peace itself. In both camps there is a profound distaste for war and a *desire* for peace. Unfortunately, the distaste is likely to disappear in the next generation, which has not experienced the horrors of war. The relations of the political leaders themselves are improving. It would be easy to attach too much importance to the cordial exchanges of Stresemann and Briand, for example. Yet it is an event with possibly extraordinary consequences upon the spirit of both France and Germany that a German political leader, in less than ten years after the close of the World War, could write the preface to a French foreign minister's book of speeches!

At the same time, business interests are working for peace. A business combination that has traversed international boundaries is of special note. It is the formation of a syndicate of German, French, Belgian, and Luxemburg steel makers. The agreement is to run for five years from 1 April 1926. It affects four countries that contain the largest combination of closely associated and high-grade iron ore and coal supplies in Europe, with a steel capacity of nearly one third of the world's total. A committee of four, one from each country, is to serve as an administrative board, and each country is assigned a quarterly production quota based on a percentage of an assumed annual output. Any country that exceeds its quota pays a penalty; any country that falls below its quota receives a rebate that may not exceed 10 per cent of the quota. How markets will be divided between the four powers, how prices will be controlled, are matters of current discussion, though there will probably be little or no interference by one country in the markets of the other. Naturally, the members of the syndicate will work together in the division of the foreign markets or work together in

competing against other countries. Provision is made for the enlargement of the syndicate through the admission of other states. Since Europe is not a normal outlet for more than a very small part of the American product, the organization of the syndicate is not of importance to the United States so far as European markets are concerned. The agreement has possibilities of value to all of the parties to it, because it will tend to eliminate unprofitable competition and reduce the cost of production, with benefits to all concerned. At the same time it will encourage an enlargement of the principle of coöperation between the compensatory French and German iron and coal industrial fields separated by the Rhine.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE SPECIAL POSITION OF SWITZERLAND

The life of the Swiss people bears the stamp of a mountain environment. It was their geographical situation coupled with their own peculiar spirit that enabled them to win and keep their independence. The natural division of the country into small physiographic units is reflected in the large measure of local government enjoyed through the centuries and just as important today as it was in the heroic age of Swiss history, when political life was in a most precarious condition. The federal system of government is itself a peculiar adaptation of national aims to accord with firm local control over local affairs. The Swiss are conscious of inequalities imposed by nature and make allowances accordingly. For example, eight mountain cantons receive a larger grant than the rest from primary school funds, on account of the special difficulties of their situation. The twenty-five cantons are widely divergent in position, size, trade routes, resources, and character of population. Some are predominantly agricultural, others industrial. Geneva and Basel are virtually city states. All of the cantons and cities have an individualistic and colorful local life.

ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The economic organization of Switzerland involves a relationship to neighboring states that emphasizes her landlocked position. In the order of importance the three chief groups of imports are: (1) food; (2) textiles, which include raw and manufactured or semi-manufactured cotton, woolen, and silk goods; and (3) coal, iron, and chemicals. Cotton and silk manufactures and clocks are the leading export items. They are the products of industry, of work on imported materials aided by energy derived in part from imported coal. The nature of Switzerland's trade difficulties was thrown into high relief at the time of the World War, when it had to import its grain chiefly from America on the one side; its iron and coal from Germany on the other. Live stock and dairying supply three fourths of its total annual production. More than half of its population is supported by agriculture; and the number of peasant holdings (more than 200,000, with an average of about 20 acres) has given the country a large agricultural population. The wide diffusion of agriculture and of industry among the population has given Switzerland an unusually stable citizenship. Yet its city population includes four cities of more than 100,000, a proportion



FIG. 95. The place of Switzerland with respect to the railway net of Europe. Railways with more than ten freight trains daily are shown by heavy lines. Railroads from *Atlas géographique et statistique de la Suisse*, 1915, Pl. 48, and *Documents cartographiques de géographie économique*, No. 1913.

comparable to that of France and Germany rather than Norway and Sweden. There are a number of reasons for this state of affairs. Though nearly a quarter of the land is unproductive and half of the total is in pasture and forest, it has the asset of exceptional mountain scenery that draws the heaviest and most profitable tourist travel in Europe. More than 43,000 persons are employed in hotels and the gross receipts of the business are in excess of $50,000,000 a year.

So limited are the resources of Switzerland that the population as a whole grows but slowly. In the period 1920–1925 the increase was but 56,000, and the total is still under 4,000,000. The rate of emigration is from 4000 to 8000 a year, chiefly Swiss citizens of the older stock, while the immigrants are principally Italians. Between 1880 and 1925 the number of Italians increased from 41,000 to 238,500. They congregate in cities, live in insanitary surroundings, and increase the social problems of the government. They have notably displaced Swiss labor in the textile mills and are largely employed in hotels and in railway and tunnel construction. They live in separate colonies, reluctantly send their children to school, and furnish a greater number of criminals than any other element of the population. The birth rate among them is high while among the native Swiss it is declining.



Fig. 96. The characteristic population bands of Switzerland conform to the Alpine valleys and represent in many cases the extremities of similar though broader bands of population in adjacent countries. With such a distribution of population, railways are peculiarly important (Fig. 95). From *Schweizischer Schulatlas*, 1924.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL LIFE

Switzerland is commonly described as a buffer state between more powerful nations. Its greatest security is held to be its position on critical transalpine routes and passes that no one power would wish to see in the hands of a possible rival. While these things are measurably true, it is of equal importance to recall that Switzerland has not left its fate to chance. Whatever help the country may have received from the outside in enlarging its domain, it is the spirit of the Swiss people as well as their excellent strategic position that has enabled them to become an important nation. Without being warlike, they have always maintained a strong and efficient military force, their peace establishment at the present time numbering 46,000 men under training. There is a national militia in which service is compulsory and universal. So thoroughly are the various services organized that Switzerland could mobilize on short notice a quarter of a million men.

Switzerland has never had a seaport or overseas colonies and it has nearly always avoided coalitions or associations that might bring it into conflict with a powerful neighbor. The people of Switzerland won



FIG. 97. Distribution of language elements in Switzerland. In the past the German-French boundary has moved slowly westward.

and maintained independence under conditions far different from those surrounding the rise of the other states of Europe. The control of the Alpine passes was a matter of importance to the dynasties and kingdoms that were organized upon the surrounding plain, for not only in the modern era but in the centuries past some of the most important of the main thoroughfares of central Europe have run through the valleys of Switzerland. The first Swiss confederation was formed in central Switzerland, where a group of valleys became the seat of a relatively dense population. The ambitions of the Hapsburgs, their attempt to exercise jurisdiction and to collect taxes, led to conflict. In the face of invasion, the German-speaking cantons of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden (Fig. 98) framed the Pact of 1290, by which they agreed mutually to assist each other. A year later they made a perpetual alliance and bound themselves to resist all outside interference. When the inevitable conflict with the armies of the Hapsburgs took place, the geography of the region made successful resistance possible, and there was sufficient knowledge of the art of war as a result of the Swiss mercenary levies during the 13th century to put to favorable use the advantages of the terrain. Following victory for the Swiss, Lucerne joined the confederation in 1332 and Zürich in 1351. By 1353 eight cantons, including the whole of central Switzerland, were within the confederation. Of advantage in the process was the fact that unity of race and language aided the spread of national spirit: all were German by birth. Whatever difficulties the cantons had after this time, not only in their internal organization but in their external relations, were insufficient to destroy the confederation. In 1481, by the Convention of Stanz, it was agreed to discontinue internal strife if necessary by joint action; for all sides had recognized the perils of chronic rivalry. The Swiss have never forgotten the lessons of that time. City and country, east and west, French-speaking and German-speaking popu-



Fig. 98. Distribution of Catholics and Protestants in Switzerland.

lations, Catholic and Protestant, were all united in opposition to the Hapsburgs and in devotion to the federal principle. By practice the several cantons acquired the habit of coöperation, of sacrifice for the federal state, of collective resistance to outside dangers, of fundamentally democratic government. Though "a narrow cantonal spirit" has at times retarded national progress, it should not be forgotten that the sense of union has been strong enough to meet every crisis.

In the development of the Swiss confederation the German-speaking population at first played the chief part. The French-speaking population now numbers 21 per cent, the German 71 per cent. The difference on religious grounds is less wide, Protestants numbering 57 per cent of the population, Catholics 41 per cent. Only to a limited extent have these contrasts of language and blood on the one hand and of religion on the other affected international relations with neighboring states. Foreign questions have but rarely divided national sentiment, as in 1914 at the outbreak of the World War and several times thereafter. On the whole the ties of language and blood seem not strong enough to weaken the ties of nationhood. This is owing partly to the heroic back-

ground of the Swiss people when by their own acts, not through political alliance with outsiders, they were able to take their first successful steps towards independence. Without a general education, the great historical traditions of the Swiss people might not become effective in political life today. An excellent school system has furnished a rich soil for the growth of public spirit. Literacy is higher than in most other states of Europe. Instruction in geography, history, and languages is of the highest type. Happily the forms of civil government permit the wide enjoyment of the suffrage and enable the individual to sense his responsibility to the state.

Swiss foreign policy has still further elevated the country's prestige. Switzerland is not a member of any European alliance. This does not mean that her people are pacifistic. The sense of public duty permeates all classes (except recent foreign elements), and were Swiss rights invaded there is little doubt that as strong a defense would be offered as Belgium offered in 1914 and as Holland offered to Spanish invasion in the 16th century. The peculiar position of Switzerland among the countries of Europe is further emphasized by the fact that she has long been the refuge of exiled scholars and scientists from less liberal neighbors. It must be said, however, that at times she has also been a center for political plotting aimed by exiles at their enemies at home. Switzerland has consistently preserved the rights of asylum. She has encouraged the founding of international organizations within her borders. Geneva is the seat of a large number of international organizations and the place of assembly of more international meetings than any other city in the world. Here are the central offices of the Postal Union, the International Red Cross Society, the League of Nations.

COMMERCIAL EXITS

As one would expect from a widely felt sense of public duty and of national solidarity, the question of state socialism (as in Denmark), has been agitated and has affected national policies somewhat. This is seen in the attitude toward railway control. For nearly thirty years the state enjoyed a high revenue from customs duties. As late as 1913 these duties met 84 per cent of the expenses of the state. With the receipts the government bought five great railways and sought to establish compulsory sickness insurance. Though the scheme was approved by popular vote, money has been lacking to give it effect, owing to the heavy increase in government expenses and the later decline of customs receipts. But railway control by the state is not the result

merely of the power of social ideas. It is a measure of national defense. For the independence or sovereignty of Switzerland is in actual practice limited by economic servitudes which her more powerful neighbors have sought to impose upon her. In the Convention of 1909 between Germany and Italy on the one hand and Switzerland on the other, the two former protested against the purchase by the Swiss government from private owners of the St. Gotthard railway system. This is part of the through rail route between Germany and Italy under the famous St. Gotthard Pass in the Swiss Alps. Switzerland could only protest; it could not secure the convention without promising to allow traffic over the railway to be carried at the same rate as over other parts of the system in Germany and Italy. To be sure, its sovereign rights could have been exercised, but under economic penalties which it chose not to incur, since its trade with Germany and Italy, its use of their railway systems, were considered to be of greater importance than the assertion of right. Late in 1919 railway conferences held at Heidelberg, Germany, enabled German-Swiss-Italian traffic — deranged for three years by the World War — to be normally resumed in the summer of 1920. The Swiss want freedom to tax traffic across their territory as they see fit: their views change when maritime outlets are considered.

The Swiss believe that they can secure free access to the sea only by defense of the principle of free traffic on international rivers. The Rhine and the Rhone are the great water outlets. If Switzerland, lying between Italy and Germany, had for a long time to pay the penalty of her position and her one-sided economic life, at least the free use of the Rhine from Basel to the North Sea had been guaranteed by the Rhine navigation treaty of 1868 (Convention of Mannheim). By its terms all nations had free use of the river without the payment of tolls. The World War, however, brought to an end these arrangements. Swiss commerce is now guaranteed freedom of access to the sea over all desirable routes. In return it was stipulated that there was to be freedom of transit across Switzerland (for goods and persons of neighboring states) in the sense that rates should be equal for all. Switzerland has two representatives upon the Central Commission governing the Rhine, and the privilege is accorded to her of enjoying the same rights as France is given for the part of the Rhine River forming her frontier with other riparian states. France is given the right to take water from the Rhine for any purpose and to construct on the German bank all necessary works for the exercise of this right, provided she does not interfere with the navigability of the river or diminish the facilities for commerce established thereon. Like France,

FIG. 99. Switzerland and the western provinces of Austria. L. stands for Liechtenstein (independent since 1866) and V. for Vorarlberg (Austrian). The latter sought unsuccessfully to secure union with Switzerland that she might escape the fate of Austria under the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye.

Switzerland has rights to the use, under appropriate conditions, of the right bank for works of improvement. It is the portion of the Rhine between Basel and Strasbourg that particularly interests the people of Switzerland. In this part of the river there are steep gradients and swift currents, and the improvement of the river itself does not seem feasible to French engineers. They propose instead to build a canal parallel to the Rhine on the plains of Alsace, the intake to be constructed in French territory, which is below Basel, with a large dam to be constructed across the Rhine at the point of intake. The Swiss think that a canal can never become an efficient substitute for a natural waterway. On the other hand, the Alsatians favor a canal because they want traffic to converge at Strasbourg. Artificially to bring about such convergence is to block Rhine traffic south of this point. In the view of the Swiss people this would mean the destruction of the present character of the river as an international trade route. The matter is of greater consequence to Switzerland because the center of gravity of the economic life of the state lies in the Rhine region (Fig. 91, page 279). Here three quarters of the total population has its natural outlet to the sea.

TERRITORIAL CHANGES AND THE SWISS FREE ZONES[1]

Some of the territorial problems of Switzerland have been settled as a consequence of the World War; others remain in a state of suspense. While the country has had no change in boundaries, it has had a political problem on the eastern frontier. Here, in the province of Vorarlberg, are about 140,000 German-speaking people whose addition to Switzerland would increase the heavy German majority. They sought union with Switzerland (1918–1919), desiring to sever their connection with the Austrian republic. Switzerland has opposed the union on the ground that it would increase her debts; for to absorb

[1] The long-standing claim of Italy to the Ticino (Fig. 98), based upon an Italian population, will probably not be revived owing to ample satisfaction of strategic needs in the Tirol.

the territory would be to accept its share of the obligations of the monarchy of which it was a part. It would also mean an increase in the number of Roman Catholics, and this influences the Protestant majority.

Liechtenstein, an adjoining principality, and one of the smallest political entities in Europe, has been admitted into the Swiss postal, telegraph, and telephone system.

One effect of the World War upon Switzerland has been the closer restriction of trade frontiers in Savoy. This region has long had a peculiarly close commercial and political relationship to Switzerland.

FIG. 100. The customs Free Zones of Gex and Upper Savoy and the neutralized zone of Upper Savoy.

As early as 1603 there was established (treaty of St. Julien) freedom of trade between Geneva and the Duchy of Savoy, the Genevans being exempt from all taxes, tolls, and customs duties. By the treaty of Paris in 1815 the free zone of Gex was reëstablished after having been suppressed during the period of incorporation with France, and thereupon the line of French customs posts were moved back to the west of the Jura. A similar free zone between 4 and 5 kilometers wide was established on the left bank of the Rhone by the treaty of Turin, 1816. When Savoy was ceded to France in 1860, Switzerland protested against the annexation of the three small districts of Chablais, Faucigny, and Genevois because by the Congress of Vienna (1815) they were guaranteed neutrality like Switzerland, and that country was authorized to occupy them as a neutral zone in the event of war. A plebiscite showed a majority in favor of France, though preferring a free zone nevertheless. The result was that France established a new free zone (Fig. 100), and under that arrangement affairs continued until 1914, when the political frontier was policed under special emergency regulations. France and Switzerland agreed in 1919 that the neutral zone of Savoy, as established in 1815 and 1816, was no longer consistent with present conditions and should not be recognised. Thus there was inserted in the treaty of Versailles a provision for the abrogation of the stipulations of earlier treaties respecting this zone. The same treaty left to the two countries concerned the settlement of the status of the territories in question. This they tried to do by the Convention of 1921, whereby the line of customs posts is carried to the political frontier; thus the free zones were suppressed, though Switzerland was to enjoy special but limited advantages of transportation and supply for ten years within parts of the old zones.

In putting the agreement into effect a difference of opinion arose that it was sought to resolve in 1924 by a treaty which provided for the arbitration by the International Court of Justice at The Hague of all questions raised by the interpretation of article 435 of the treaty of Versailles. The Swiss contend that the system in vogue rightly gave neighboring territory the benefit of a special régime, appropriate to the geographical and economic situation and well proved by practice and time. France replied by claiming the right to adjust her boundary line in conformity with her frontier as elsewhere throughout France and as was done by Switzerland in times past within her own boundaries. A definitive solution of this old problem has been delayed by the French Senate, which has not ratified the treaty of 1924 submitting the question to arbitration.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE NATIONAL EXISTENCE OF AUSTRIA

When the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy fell apart in 1918, there was formed, out of the chief German-speaking element, the Republic of Austria, with Vienna as its capital and with a provisional democratic government. Eight principal national groups were freed of the bonds that long restrained them, to form themselves as parts of six different states. The northern Slavs organized the Republic of Czechoslovakia. The southern Slavs united in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes — a sort of Greater Serbia. The Magyars, always loosely joined to Austria, adopted a separate national program. The Rumanians of Transylvania (page 367) became part of a Greater Rumania. Galicia was included within the frontiers of Poland. These changes brought about a reduction of population from 51,000,000 for the whole Austro-Hungarian realm before 1914 to 6,500,000 in Austria and 8,000,000 in Hungary.

By the terms of the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye (1919), Austria was reduced in area from 116,000 square miles to 32,000 square miles.

Fig. 101. Division and allotment of territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

Before the World War she had an outlet on the Adriatic at Trieste and Pola, and she also owned Dalmatia. With Hungary she controlled Bosnia and Hercegovina and thus held that long stretch of the eastern Adriatic coast that extends from the southern border of Montenegro northwestward for nearly 400 miles. With Hungary she controlled more than 700 miles of the course of the Danube. Her frontier ran for more than 1000 miles coterminous with that of Germany. She held the strategic passes in the mountains lying near the Italian frontier. East and west the country had a maximum breadth of 750 miles in a straight line. North and south it extended for 625 miles, thus spanning a section of territory that extended from the plains of northern Europe to the Mediterranean lands on the shores of the southern Adriatic, and from the heart of the Alps on the borders of Switzerland in Vorarlberg to the plains of the Vistula and the Dneister on the farther side of the Carpathian Mountains.

The northern and southern Slavs (Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs respectively) lived chiefly in Austria-Hungary. There was in addition a large block of Rumanians, a smaller block of Italians, many Poles in Western Galicia, and 4,000,000 Ruthenians in Eastern Galicia and on the southern side of the Carpathians. There remains to mention a large number of Mohammedans, many of Slavic race, in the provinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

THE BASIS OF POLITICAL DIVISION

The empire was geographically compact; ethnically it was highly heterogeneous. It was long customary to call Austria-Hungary the polyglot empire; but it should be remembered that within the Russian realm and the present British Empire there are many more ethnic complexities than Austria-Hungary had. Those of Austria-Hungary appeared the more prominent because the various elements were far more self-conscious politically and some of them had had at one time or another a national life that formed a strong basis of continued agitation for independence.

The centripetal tendency among the component peoples was aided by the fact that civic education was confined largely to the glorification of the ruling dynasty and of the feudal class as the basis of society. The social and political status of the non-Austrian and non-Magyar groups could not improve under this confining condition. The irredentist movements were strengthened by a customs policy framed not to benefit the whole country but to favor the large landed proprietors. Only confederation could possibly have saved the day; and autonomy

was feared by the leaders of the monarchical régime, for they believed in force, not compromise such as autonomy implies.

Viewing the Austrian realm with Hungary excluded, we find it to have been a fringe of country semicircular in form (Fig. 102). The



FIG. 102. The population densities of former Austria, census of 1910. After Wallis, in the *Geographical Review*, July 1918. For the break-up of Austria-Hungary and the relation of its parts to the denser nuclei of population shown above, see Figure 101. Note the denser population centers of Bohemia, the band of denser population in Galicia, and the great contrast between the Viennese district and the western part of Austria proper. The heavy line encloses present-day Austria.

length of this fringe exceeds 2000 miles; its average width is variable, exceeding 200 miles in Bohemia and Moravia, and falling to 10 miles in southern Dalmatia.

Within this area there is great diversity of relief, of ethnography, of density of population, of products, and of means of access to the sea. Neither the courses of the rivers nor the trends of the mountains justified so extraordinary a layout of the national domain. The various fragments of larger physical and commercial regions that formed Austria were held together by no natural bonds. The southern Tirol was united to Italy by the treaty of St. Germain (1919). Portions of Istria being Italian, the whole of that peninsula was added to Italy by

the treaty of Rapallo (1920), which fixed the boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia. Except for Zara, the Dalmatian mainland fell to Yugoslavia. Bohemia and Moravia, populated chiefly by branches of the northern Slavs, became a part of the Czechoslovak republic. Poland obtained practically all of Galicia. There was added to Rumania the former Crownland of Bukovina, except for a small salient on the northern frontier, which Poland gained.

The fragments that have thus gone to a new or a rival power are in general in more natural relationship today than under the former system. The Bohemian plateau and its adjacent valleys have marked geographical unity. Galicia has a natural southern border — the Carpathians — and a southeastward-trending valley lowland that contains a belt of dense population, a lowland which is continuous with the plains of the Vistula drainage basin. In sympathy with the main outlines of the physical system was the distribution of the linguistic groups within Austria.[1]

Owing partly to the conditions of life under an autocratic government and partly to the general economic tendencies of the time, including growing industrialization, emigration from Austria rose to higher and higher figures in the years before the World War. From 1910 to 1913, the total net emigration from Austria to the United States averaged more than 80,000 a year, of which 36 per cent were Poles, 24 per cent Ruthenians, 10 per cent Czechs, and 7 per cent Germans. For many years 75 per cent of the overseas emigration from Austria has been to the United States, with 12 per cent to Canada and 4 per cent to South America, chiefly Argentina and Brazil.

Within Austria itself there was a tendency toward migration of the people from the country to Vienna and other large towns. In the period from 1880 to 1910, twelve towns had increased between 60 and 120 per cent, including such places as Vienna, Czernowitz, and Innsbruck among German towns, Lemberg and Cracow among Polish towns, Pilsen and Budweis among Czech towns, and Trieste among Italian towns, to mention the best-known places on the list. Of the present population of Austria, a third are engaged in industry, a third in agriculture and forestry, an eighth in commerce. Forests are a principal source of income. They occupy 39 per cent of the country. The land under cultivation forms 24 per cent of the whole.

Among the cities Vienna had the largest growth, partly because, as

[1] Up to this point we have been dealing chiefly with western European peoples. We now have to deal with new national and linguistic elements. Here we face the problem of the Magyar and the Slav. The reader should turn to Figures 102, 107, and Plate II, opposite page 360, for a general view of the population elements that former Austria comprised.



FIG. 103. The new boundaries and principal cities of Austria. Note the Klagenfurt plebiscite area, all of which fell to Austria (Fig. 105). Note also the addition to Austria of the Burgenland district in western Hungary (Fig. 104). L is for Liechtenstein.

the capital of an empire of 51,000,000 people, it attracted thousands of officials, soldiers, and tradesmen, and had a number of imperial institutions, and partly because of the forced growth of industries and a reputation as a center of culture. It now contains 2,000,000 people out of a total Austrian population of 6,500,000, a disproportion in population between capital and country greater than that of any other state in central Europe. Merely to exist requires of Vienna an economic and industrial reorganization of the most extreme kind. The hard conditions of life in Austria after the World War and the hopelessness of the future led to a separatist movement in western Austria among the people of the Tirol and Vorarlberg (page 304).

BOUNDARY CHANGES

Figure 102 shows the former distribution of Austrian territory and Figure 101 the division (1919) of the greater part among Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The detailed descriptions of the lost territories are to be found in the chapters that follow.

In view of the clearly defined ethnic frontier between the German Austrians and the Hungarians in western Hungary, this frontier, with slight rectifications, was taken as the international boundary between the two states as recognized in the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye. The change in boundary in western Hungary transfers a population of 218,000 in the Burgenland district to Austria (Fig. 104), the only case in Europe where an enemy power was given additional

FIG. 104. The shaded area represents the territory that was transferred from Hungary to Austria after a plebiscite had been held in the Sopron region. It is occupied by German-speaking people.

territory, though it is to be noted that the gift was made at the expense of another enemy power — Hungary — and that Austria lost elsewhere much more than she gained here.

Only a small portion of the Austrian frontier was left to a decision by plebiscite — the Klagenfurt basin (Fig. 105). It would seem wise to treat as a unit a region so well-marked by nature and by commercial relations. But the southern part of the basin is peopled by Slovenes, the northern by Austrians. The city of Klagenfurt, with a population of 29,000, has a German majority, though this condition is of recent development. In accordance with the terms of the treaty of St. Germain (1919), a vote was taken (October, 1920) in two zones, a northern and a southern. The people of the southern zone decided to join Austria. This made it unnecessary to take a vote in the northern district, which automatically became Austrian territory.

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE ALLIED POWERS AND AUSTRIA

By the treaty of St. Germain, Austria agreed to the following conditions, among others:

(1) To abolish universal military service; not to maintain an army of more than 30,000 men (under conditions laid down by the Allies); to surrender all her war vessels and aircraft; and to submit to limitations respecting the manufacture of war material or trade in it.

(2) To acknowledge obligation for part of the costs of the war and to engage to pay reparations to an amount to be determined by the Permanent Reparations Commission, payments to ex-

FIG. 105. The Klagenfurt plebiscite area. District I voted in October 1920 to remain with Austria on the north rather than be transferred to Yugoslavia on the south. As a result of this action, district II avoided a vote and automatically remained with Austria.

tend through a period of thirty years and to begin 1 May 1921. (As an immediate advance she agreed to deliver live stock to Italy, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, during a period of three months after the coming into force of the treaty.)

(3) To grant freedom of transit for goods and persons passing to or from the territories of the Allied and Associated Powers, who are to enjoy most-favored-nation treatment. The Danube from Ulm is declared an international river, together with all navigable parts of its system. This provides for equality of transportation privileges and dues. A new International Commission administers the Danube system with respect to those provisions of the treaty not within the competence of the European Commission of the Danube. The latter resumes its pre-war functions but with an altered membership. Austria in turn is assured free access to the Adriatic, and freedom of transit for postal, telegraphic, and telephonic services.

Thrown back upon her own resources, Austria at first lived on borrowed money without devising a program of reconstruction. When all sources of help had become exhausted and the Austrian crown had dropped to one-fifteen thousandths of its gold value, when government expenses were double the receipts and starvation and revolution were imminent, the help of the League of Nations was invoked (1922). It was in fact a beneficent form of receivership to which Austria resorted to avoid anarchy. An independent bank of issue was created as part of a plan to stabilize the currency. Customs and tobacco receipts were pledged as security for a loan (£25,000,000) underwritten by Great Britain, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia, thus providing Austria with the means for maintaining political and economic inde-

pendence. A Commissioner General administered the receipts of the loan and collected the revenues assigned as security. A Committee of Control continues to safeguard the interests of the guaranteeing powers.

Once set going on the road to recovery, Austria helped herself by internal loans, by making the most of the meager resources left to her within her greatly restricted boundaries, by inviting confidence in the long-established business and particularly the banking facilities of Vienna. The interruptions to recovery have been serious. Strong socialist elements with a communist admixture appeared in the population of Vienna. The German bourgeois and dynastic elements had so long dominated Austrian affairs, the social and political status of landless peasants and city proletariat had changed so radically with the erection of a republic, that all social and political relations underwent a revolution. Actual hostilities broke out in July 1927, when socialist forces attempted by strike tactics to gain the control of government. A veritable rising took place among the rural bourgeois to keep communication lines open and even besiege Vienna if the government gave way. The immediate collapse of the strike should not be too lightly regarded, for the disorders reflect an extraordinarily difficult situation which it seems almost impossible to resolve. With city and country living in a hostile rather than a coöperative relationship, a national parliament is broken into unworkable blocs. The division is all the more extreme because of the persistence of outworn social and political views among a strong element that vigorously opposes the new European order.

THE ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF THE COUNTRY

Turning to the distribution of the crops and other resources as a basis for understanding the present condition of Austria with its non-German elements excluded, we find the country left in a strikingly helpless condition. Unnatural as the population distributions appear in Figure 102, the region had one great advantage over its present condition — it was economically strong. If it did not produce all that it needed, at least it had the means to import and pay for what it lacked. There was coal and iron in Bohemia, grain in Hungary, live stock especially in the southern provinces. Railway systems were laid out with regard to the trends of trade, and the fact that they are now crossed by international boundaries results in great inconvenience. In principle, the relocation of a boundary always seriously disturbs custom, a powerful force in economic life.

Let us see what Austria has lost by the setting up of the new nations formed in part from the several fragments of former Austria-Hungary. The Czechs are the chief producers of sugar beets. Moravia is the most successful farming province, standing ahead of Bohemia in this respect. Maize and wine are produced in the Slovene region of Alpine forelands; barley is produced chiefly in Bohemia and Galicia. Istria is famous for its maize and wine; Goritzia yields wheat and maize. If we now exclude Hungary in addition to the subtractions already made, the situation of present-day Austria from the standpoint of food will be still clearer. She must now import corn, barley, wheat, rye, and other supplies from Hungary, Bohemia, and Rumania, by way of poor railroads and along the Danube and connecting canals.

Since Austria has been set up as a separate state she has found great difficulties in starting her industries because she must import so large a part of the raw materials that her mills require. These include rubber, chemicals, fats, oil, wool, copper, and petroleum. She has very little iron ore. Formerly an industrial country with a wide variety of resources to draw upon, Austria has become chiefly an agricultural country. Her coal reserves are sufficient to last only twenty-five to thirty years if she satisfied her needs within her own boundaries. A total consumption of nearly 10,000,000 tons per year is balanced by 3,000,000 tons of native coal and the import of the remainder, though the development of hydroelectric works has now made such progress that Austria is able to export electric current to Germany. Larger schemes of power development are in process of realization, their development depending upon foreign capital chiefly.

To create a trade balance, Austria must manufacture and export, and if she is to become a strong nation, she will have to do this more efficiently than in the past. Working to her advantage is her position in central Europe and the short hauls required for most of her trade. Nearly half of her imports are supplied by her immediate neighbors,—Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Hungary,—and these countries take a third of her exports. Canals, waterways, and railways provide adequate transport facilities. On the other hand, Austria's sea outlets are no longer open to unrestricted use and development; they are in the hands of other powers. Only the Danube is left as a water connection with the commercial highways of the sea. It is impossible for Austria to create a commercial fleet under these conditions.

It is natural that, confronted by these difficulties, the Austrian leaders should have turned more and more to the possibilities of a union (*Anschluss*) with Germany. In March 1919, the National

Assembly framed a constitution of which one article declared that German-Austria was part of the German Republic. But the Allied and Associated Powers required Austria to remain a separate country. Again in October 1920 and May 1921 the project was revived by the Austrian National Assembly, which directed the government to carry out a plebiscite on the union of Austria with Germany. Such action had the special support of the Pan-Germans or German Union Party. A vote was actually taken in Salzburg (90,587 for union, 797 against), but further action was stopped by threats from the Allied Powers, France has resolutely opposed the project because she fears the increased strength of Germany. For the same reason the project will be opposed by the small and newly created central European states, who are naturally against any augmentation of German power. Austria joined to Germany would mean a nation of 70,000,000, as compared with the 64,000,000 in Germany before the World War.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE PLIGHT OF HUNGARY

When a state that has existed for a thousand years is suddenly reduced to one third of its former area and population, it is natural to inquire what social, political, and geographical causes have wrought such disaster. The inquiry into causes is in large part historical; for the present problems of this dismembered state have their roots in the past. Yet the present leaders of Hungarian life are little concerned with the faults of a régime that many of them have repudiated; they are much more concerned about the conditions which they deem essential to viability. Of all the countries of Europe that have suffered loss of territory, none has so bitterly assailed the peace treaties as Hungary, and none has so emphatically declared that whatever the terms of peace it was obliged to sign in 1919, it retains an inherent right to alter those terms by force as opportunity may arise in the future. In the political life of central Europe since 1919, Hungary has been the most disquieting element.

Hungary suffered equally with Austria in the settlement that closed the World War, because it was one of the principal enemy powers. From 1867 to 1918 it formed one of two independent units of Austria-Hungary, the Dual Monarchy, and close relations with Austria had been maintained since 1526. The chief bond of union between the two states was the Emperor-King. Each country had a separate parliament, and while there was a unified tariff system and joint consent was required to commercial treaties with foreign countries, there was the most violent difference of opinion between the two kingdoms in many matters of common interest, such as customs, army, and foreign affairs. The recognition of economic interdependence, the gravitative power of the capital, Vienna, tradition—these helped to prevent the rupture of the monarchy and the political independence of Hungary. The two countries agreed only as late as 1907, and after a bitter contest, to improve railway transportation conditions for their mutual benefit.

THE NEW BOUNDARIES

During the World War, Hungary, in common with her allies, met with a certain measure of misrepresentation; and as one of the defeated powers she had practically no hearing for her claims at the Paris Peace Conference. That is, peace was imposed on Hungary in terms that were drafted by the Allies opposed to the Central Powers. The proceeding has been characterized as an "enforced" peace, but it should



FIG. 106. The shaded rectangles represent the share of Hungarian foreign trade for 1925 that fell to the different detached portions of former Hungary. The numbers near the squares indicate millions of metric quintals. In all, these portions supply nearly half of the total. After Illés and Halász in *Hungary Before and After the War in Economic-Statistical Maps*, page 33, 1926.

be noted that it was not arbitrary force exercised without cause. The Allies were guided in their consideration of her case not by Hungary's needs as an enemy power but by the needs of Rumania and Serbia, who had fought on the side of the western powers.

Newly-created Czechoslovakia on the north was given equal consideration for the part its democratic leaders played at the close of the World War in bringing the Dual Monarchy to an end and setting up a republic. Each of these three neighbors of Hungary wished to have as much territory as it could get, and above all each wished to include within its extended boundaries all peoples of like or related nationality or race. It was just as natural for them to pursue this end as it was for Hungary to object to a restriction of territory. Considering the time at which the treaty of Trianon was drawn (1919), considering the four war years of loss and anxiety that had passed, and considering also certain social and historical conditions to which we will now turn, it can hardly be expected that human nature could do otherwise than greatly restrict the boundaries of Hungary and confine Hungarian power closely within ethnic limits. Where ethnic limits have been exceeded at Hungary's expense, Hungary now claims a readjustment of boundaries. Even if one admits that the ethnic boundaries were not followed closely enough and that it would be better for central

Europe today if ethnic rather than strategic principles had been given precedence, it is hard to see how a readjustment of boundaries can now take place. There has been a decade of peace. Commercial life has made many modifications to accommodate trade currents to new frontiers. A change in boundaries so long after adjustments to them have begun would mean the unsettlement of the whole of European life. War would inevitably follow. The bordering states will not consent to a loss of territory that involves also the loss of commercial centers or railway routes or population which they deem essential to them in their none too strong position.

Adjustment of boundaries can be made in central Europe today only by compromise: force would bring down the whole political structure in ruin. The substitution of force for compromise, which is the method that Hungary invites, is first of all to bring into play the economic and moral power at the command of the League of Nations. It means also that Hungary would face a special group of allied nations, as described at greater length in the following chapter on Czechoslovakia. The two most important alliances are the Little Entente, consisting of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, and the group of alliances perfected by France in central Europe and now embracing Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The Little Entente is aimed directly at Hungary; the French alliances are aimed at Germany and Austria, with Russia in the not too distant background. Though the League of Nations provides a clearing house for political troubles and for public opinion, and though a group of treaties signed at Locarno in 1925 provides mutual guarantees for the security of some of the new boundaries of Europe, European governments do not rely on these safeguards alone: the French alliances to a greater degree and the Little Entente to a lesser degree are designed to guarantee the present boundaries of Europe in any event and especially if the League of Nations should fail.

By the provisions of the treaty of Trianon, the Hungarian army is limited to 35,000 men, and limits are set upon the proportion of officers, the number of machine guns, guns, and howitzers, and the number of civil officials, such as foresters, customs officers, and municipal police, that might conceivably be employed in larger numbers than normally in evasion of restrictions upon military strength. The manufacture of arms and munitions of war is controlled by the state and the output is limited to the requirements of military forces. Thus, in common with Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria, Hungary has her military strength reduced to the point at which it constitutes no danger to her neighbors.

FIG. 107. Something less than ethnic Hungary was allotted that state, thus creating a situation that may lead to dangerous irredentism. Compare with Figure 110. The discrepancy between ethnic and international boundary lines was due on the east and north principally to the awkward positions of the railways and the desire to assign them to Allied states. This and similar maps for the countries of central Europe are generalized and modified from the ethnic maps of central and eastern Europe by the British General Staff (1:1,500,000, 1918). Key to numerals: 1, Hungarians; 2, Czechs and Slovaks; 3, Germans; 4, Yugoslavs; 5, Italians; 6, Rumanians; 7, Bulgarians; 8, Ruthenians (Ukrainians); 9, Poles. For the Teschen, Orava, and Spiš settlements see Figure 151, page 415. For the Burgenland transfer see Figure 104, page 312.

THE MAGYAR RULE OF SUBJECT NATIONALITIES

The opposition between Hungary and her three strongest neighbors has its roots in the social and political conditions of the past no less than in the treaty arrangements that so sorely vex Hungary in the present period. Rumanians, Serbs, and Czechs are of one mind as to the rule of the Magyar. What are their claims? Hungary is bracketed with Austria in criticisms of the former monarchical régime, during which the two states maintained close political affiliations. To what extent did Hungary share in culpability from the standpoint of subject nationalities? Above all, we should inquire to what extent blame is unfairly assigned to the Magyar element solely because it was in the saddle. The weak sometimes fear and hate the strong without reason. It is also true that subjection wears many different aspects. Not every minor ethnic or social group in the world can justify the claim of oppression. Nor is it true that an oppressed people is always large enough for self-government or so situated as to maintain it. From the beginning of time the strong have usually ruled the weak, the large have controlled the small. It is hard to see how any other scheme will work. To impress social and political equality upon all classes is not to raise the lower but to pull down the higher, and this is no less true in spiritual and political life than it is in economic affairs.

When the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy took place in October 1918, the minor nationalities determined to seek political independence, whatever the economic cost. Rumanians in Transylvania, Ruthenians in the Carpathian foothills, Slovenes in Carniola, Serbs in the Banat of Temesvár and elsewhere — all sought a change of political life, just as Hungary herself welcomed the recovery of her rights as a separate state when Charles I (Charles IV of Hungary) on 16 October 1918 proclaimed the end of the monarchy and the beginning of a federal state. Hungarian leaders had been able to maintain association with Austria throughout the World War, believing that by standing together a better peace could be secured. Above all, they believed implicitly in the solidarity of the Hungarian nation. This had been almost a religion with the ruling class even before the World War; it was steadfastly maintained during the war; it is inherent in Hungary's present-day claims. Hungarian leaders hold that a people accustomed to living together within long established boundaries should not be torn apart; for organized life, long in developing, is thereby destroyed. The Magyars had for centuries based their political philosophy upon the idea that the strongest nationality should

hold the reins of power. Some Hungarian leaders were in favor of liberal treatment of non-Magyar populations, but they could not conceive of a federated state divided by ethnic lines, for that to them meant an end of nationality. Whatever concessions they were willing to make with respect to suffrage or political representation or schools, they yet maintained — and it is hard to dissent from the view — that the Magyar element, as the most numerous one, should be responsible for the political institutions and the culture of the nation as a whole.

How far these policies led to the oppression of subject nationalities is a debatable question. The subject nationalities asserted that they were oppressed through the centuries, that they had suffered under a system of land tenure that did not provide them with sufficient land. Magyar leaders maintained, on the other hand, that they freed the serfs in 1839; that changes were repeatedly made in land laws in favor of the peasant; and that the most that the peasant could say was that land was provided perhaps too slowly for his needs. Questions arose respecting schools, the distribution of school funds, proposed laws with reference to language restriction distasteful to the subject nationalities, and, last and most important of all, the extension of the suffrage. It is not argued here that the claims of the subject nationalities were justifiable nor that the measures undertaken by the Hungarian government to meet these criticisms were either beneficent or oppressive. It is desired only to set them forth as conditions upon which there was a violent difference of opinion. This is all that is needed to make possible a new program that conforms to public opinion. Thus changes have been brought about throughout the world's history. Historians are still discussing in many cases whether a change of action brought about by public opinion has been proved by time to be wise or unwise. The change follows, nevertheless. It is almost as inevitable as a law of nature. It was the fate of Hungary to be caught between the effects of defeat on the one hand and of claims of oppression on the other and to suffer in consequence.

In establishing causes, this however may be said, that in the midst of the World War the Hungarian government saw fit to make concessions that it had long denied. Three months after the opening of war the wearing of the colors and emblems of the various nationalities was authorized by decree; a reform of the school laws of Transylvania was promised to meet the wishes of the Rumanians; the use of the mother tongue was made legal in direct intercourse with state officials; and the Rumanians were promised reforms of the franchise. The gospel of force has its complete justification in the minds of its pro-



FIG. 108. Population densities in Hungary. (After Wallis.) Of more than one hundred principal centers of population (solid black) in Hungary as formerly constituted, about 12 are now transferred to Yugoslavia, 25 to Rumania, more than 30 to Czechoslovakia; about 35 remain in Hungary. New boundaries are shown by solid heavy lines; the outermost line (broken) represents the former boundary of Hungary.

ponents in the quick collapse of a political structure the moment that force is withdrawn. What the advocates of force do not see is that it was the exercise of force in the first instance that brought about the need for its continuance. Concessions made during the World War did not deceive the subject nationalities; in fact, it encouraged them to seek relief elsewhere. When the World War ended, the principle of union or confederation of subject nationalities under Magyar domination within the boundaries of old Hungary had been abandoned by everyone except the Magyars. It was useless to attempt to restore it. The most that the Magyars could expect was to be constituted a new Hungarian nation to include all territories upon which they were in the majority. How far the new boundaries met their expectations the following figures will show. Of the total population of 20,000,000 of Hungary in 1914 about 10,000,000 were Magyars. The total population of Hungary today is just over 8,000,000. Of this number almost 7,200,000 are Magyars, leaving only a little more than 800,000

non-Magyars. Of Magyars and closely related groups of former Hungary, 3,000,000 have been left outside the present boundaries. Among them is the large compact group known as the Szeklers of Transylvania. Another large group lies just outside the northern boundaries of Hungary and reaches from close to Bratislava (Pressburg) on the west, to and beyond the northeastern corner of Hungary (Fig. 107).

The Szeklers are too far from Hungary to warrant the hope that they may be again united with the main body of Magyars; but those that fringe the northern boundary could be included by moving the boundary northward so as to follow the line of Magyar majorities. To this Czechoslovakia would interpose the most violent objections: first on the ground that her long and narrow territory would be still further narrowed; second on the ground that she cannot afford to lose taxable land and other property; third because to follow the ethnic line would be to rob her of a most important rail connection between Slovakia and Bohemia. These arguments are met by Hungary with the contentions that a mere railroad line should not decide nationalities; that the ethnic principle is far more important than the strategic; and finally, that the name *Czechoslovakia* is a misnomer, seeing that the Slovaks are in fact unwilling subjects of the Czechs (page 334). They assert further that of all the subject nationalities the Slovaks were on friendliest terms with the Magyars, that there had long been established a relationship between them that was harmonious in most respects. Slovaks preserved their nationality in Hungary, whereas they lost it in Germany or in Moravia. There was no forced colonization in Slovakia, and attempts were made by Hungarian leaders to raise the standard of living among the Slovaks. What the Magyars did watch closely was Russian influence among Slovak adherents of the Greek Catholic Church, for this was designed to serve the claims of irredentism. It was long an open question whether the Slovaks, if given a free choice, would not have elected to enter the Hungarian state rather than remain associated with the Czechs. Their complaints and differences under the present arrangement are of lessening magnitude and a change of sovereignty today would hardly be welcomed (page 336).

In common with other states of central Europe (Fig. 8, page 29), Hungary subscribed to the minorities clauses embodied in the treaty of Trianon. These provided for the free use of the language of minor nationalities and for the equality of such nationalities before the law in the enjoyment of civil and political rights. Adequate



Fig. 109. Hungary lost chiefly mountain country as a result of the World War, but she also lost the richest plains country, the Banat (Fig. 125), which went to Rumania and Yugoslavia.

facilities are guaranteed to Hungarian nationals of non-Magyar speech for the use of their language before the courts, and for the management and control of their own charitable, religious, and social institutions, schools, and religion. School funds are to be applied equably, without distinctions of race, religion, or language, and facilities are to be provided in the primary schools for instruction in their own language of the children of non-Magyar elements.

ECONOMIC CHANGES

It was a matter of the gravest doubt in the first instance whether Hungary within its reduced frontiers could survive. The first effect of the change of boundaries was paralyzing, for the new boundaries cut across railways, water courses, roads, and long-recognized administrative districts. They required the creation of scores of new customs houses and railway stations. Food and fuel could not be distributed promptly and evenly. It took time to produce live stock, cereals, minerals, and manufactured goods in properly related quantities; for

production in former Hungary was organized in a balanced way in accordance with a tendency shown in many long-established states, one part producing timber from its forest lands, another an excess of grain from rich and arable soils, another part minerals from the special endowments of nature. The new Hungary is essentially a plain. The former mountainous border has been assigned to adjacent countries. There is almost no wood and practically no water power. The country has neither sufficient fuel nor the raw materials with which to produce an adequate supply of manufactured goods. Even before the war it imported one third of its coal consumption.

It will be seen from Figure 106 to what degree these currents of trade have persisted in spite of the change of boundaries. In the total external trade of Hungary, Austria ranks first. The two next important elements are supplied by the territory ceded to Czechoslovakia on the north and to Rumania on the east. First in the list of exports are cereals and flour, animal products, sugar, etc., — all products of agricultural industry. Hungary always imported a substantial part of its manufactured goods and now imports nearly the whole of them, the three leading items of import being cotton fabrics, timber, and woolen fabrics, in the order named. Coal is fourth on the list of imports, the production of good quality coal in Hungary being limited to two districts, of which the most important is Pécs. There are no precious metals in Hungary. Of her former iron-ore deposits those left to her represent but one fifth of her former production. All the salt deposits are in the ceded lands. Wheat, oats, maize, sugar beets, and potatoes are grown extensively both east and west of the Danube. Though she has lost cereal lands about her borders, the area remaining to Hungary is excellent agricultural land for the most part and the ratio of acreage of arable land to population is higher now than formerly. While this is favorable in one sense, it should be remembered that bulky agricultural products now form almost the only source of exports available in exchange for imported goods. Before the World War, Hungary had 3750 large manufacturing establishments and of these she retained more than 2300. The grazing lands have been reduced to one fourth of their former capacity to support sheep, and wool production has fallen off accordingly. Two thirds of the flax lands are gone and nearly three quarters of the glass works. In addition, Hungary has a pre-war debt to pay, a war debt, and an indemnity bill.

These handicaps are all of an economic nature. There should also be considered the political trials that afflicted Hungary because of the swift social and political evolution that she was called upon to make.

POLITICAL CHANGES SINCE THE WORLD WAR

Just before the end of the World War and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Hungarian political affairs reached a state of crisis. The failure to achieve the war aims and the growth of social democracy during the war, when the government's policy was challenged by all classes, led to the growth of a revolutionary spirit. On 16 November 1918 a national council, composed of the forces that had overthrown the monarchy, proclaimed Hungary a people's republic, with Count Karolyi as provisional president. In March 1919, only a few months afterward, a soviet government was organized under Béla Kun. It was a period of great social and political disorder that threatened the entire collapse of Hungarian society. There was bitter feeling among the peasants and on the part of the trade unions there was an effort to secure control. In this soil Bolshevist doctrine flourished for a time, supported by Russian funds and sympathy. There was public disorder. People's commissaries were organized. All private property was declared to belong to the state. Manufacturing establishments were taken over by councils of workmen, industries declined, landed property was claimed for the state.

The end of Bolshevism in Hungary came after the Rumanian invasion. Rumanian troops occupied Budapest, following the dispersion of the Red army. After withdrawal of the Rumanians a national army under Admiral Horthy maintained order. This was the easier to do because the people, taught by experience, wished to end Bolshevist doctrines and dictatorship. The authority of the law was restored by armed forces. Elections held in 1920 resulted in a new parliament that resolved to continue the monarchical constitution, the powers of the monarch to be exercised by a regent. It is under this plan that Hungary operates today, the dynastic question being left open for decision at a later time. Admiral Horthy continues to act as regent, though the real master of Hungary is Count Bethlen, the Prime Minister.

FINANCIAL RECOVERY

The new boundaries of Hungary left her agricultural resources so large in proportion to population that the country was self-sufficient with respect to food. To recover herself economically, Hungary had only to enter into commercial agreements with neighboring countries, to start her agricultural export to its destination across the common boundaries of her neighbors, and to refrain from attempting the

impossible by setting up high tariffs for the protection of industries whose product could be more cheaply obtained from abroad. This it was difficult for Hungary to do because the political attitude of the government of the Right and the fear that it would reëstablish the Hapsburgs naturally led to a delay on the part of her neighbors in making new commercial arrangements that brought Hungary into a bad situation. The budget was impaired, the money inflated, the trade balance adverse. Beginning in 1923 the Hungarian government appealed to the League of Nations for assistance similar to that which had been rendered Austria. It was concluded by the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia that they could not undertake a scheme of reconstruction similar to that put into effect in Austria; the economic policy to be followed, they saw, was not to provide a guaranteed loan but simply to apply remedies that would result in the attraction of money through normal economic channels. Hungary agreed to the conditions laid down whereby an independent bank of issue was created to have a monopoly of note issue, and to accept control of the agreed scheme by a Commissioner General. A loan of $50,000,000 was raised in the international money market, the four leading sources being Great Britain, the United States, Italy, and Switzerland. At the same time both voluntary and forced loans were made by Hungarian banks and industries. By these means the Commissioner General was able to balance the budget, reform the currency, encourage the making of commercial agreements, increase the level of taxation, and accept a scale of living which, while not painfully low, permitted wide economic recovery. By 1926 the receipts from revenue had increased to such an extent as to exceed expenditures, currency was on a sound basis, the loans that had been made were adequately guaranteed by revenues from customs, the sugar tax, and the tobacco and salt monopolies, and by June, 1926, the Commissioner General could report matters so far stabilized that he was able to relinquish his office.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE DOMAIN OF THE CZECHS AND SLOVAKS

The country of the Czechs and Slovaks runs in an east-west direction athwart a network of railroads that carry most of the commerce of central Europe. It is bordered by five nations, of which three (Rumania, Poland, and Germany) touch seas, and of which two (Austria and Hungary) are, like itself, landlocked states bordering the Danube River. Of its 14,000,000 inhabitants 35 per cent are neither Czechs nor Slovaks: about 3,200,000 Germans, of whom 1,700,000 are in western Bohemia, other large groups living in Silesia, Moravia, and the larger cities; 750,000 Magyars in Slovakia; 460,000 Ruthenians in the eastern districts bordering the Carpathians; and 75,000 Poles. The printed matter upon the banknotes of Czechoslovakia is in six languages, — Czech, Slovak, German, Magyar, Polish, and Ruthenian, — an acknowledgment of the existence and rights of substantial minorities.

The state is a peninsula of Slavdom thrust westward into the heart of Europe, a long and very narrow strip impossible to defend in its entirety against powerful neighbors, should it ever come to blows with them. Two long pincers of German population press upon it, the Germans of Silesia and the German-Austrians northeast of Vienna (Fig. 110). Magyars long pressed upon it from the south in like degree. Five nations, all at one time or another hostile, stand about its borders. It has no seaport, and its people own no railroad to the sea,[1] from which it is distant more than 200 miles (Bohemia to Trieste or Stettin). Its central part is only from 50 to 125 miles across from north to south, yet from east to west the country extends 600 miles. Its area is 55,000 square miles, or slightly more than that of the state of New York. Its population density is also not far from that of New York. From whatever angle we view the foregoing facts, we are forced to conclude that the welfare of Czechoslovakia is to an extraordinary degree dependent upon its international relationships. From the first, the statesmen of this new nation have had to face political questions of the gravest character.

Together with Yugoslavia and Rumania, two states that had gained territory at the expense of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Czechoslovakia was determined to prevent the return of the Hapsburgs

[1] The rights of Czechoslovakia on the internationalized Elbe and Danube and at the ports of Hamburg and Stettin are outlined on page 340.

FIG. 110. Czechoslovakia, showing the relation of its speech boundaries to its political boundaries. For relation of speech boundaries to iron and coal deposits see Figure 114. For detailed maps of Upper Silesia and Teschen see Figures 148 and 152. Generalized from ethnic map of central Europe. 1 : 1,500,000, British General Staff, 1918. Key to numerals: 1, Czechs and Slovaks; 2, Germans; 3, Magyars; 4, Ruthenians; 5, Rumanians; 6, Poles.

to power in either Austria or Hungary. By treaty between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in September 1920 a defensive alliance was made against Hungary, where certain reactionary and military elements were then working for a restoration of the monarchy and of sovereignty over lost territories. The same object was covered by treaty with Rumania in April 1921. In settling the Teschen dispute (page 415) between them, Czechoslovakia and Poland further agreed to recognize each other's "territorial rights" as defined in the several peace treaties. Following closely upon these treaties there were signed commercial agreements also, and it hardly admits of doubt that these mutual reassurances prevented both the political and the economic difficulties of central Europe from reaching much larger proportions.

Related to these events was a common and grave concern for commercial exits. Before the World War the Danube was largely in the territory of Austria-Hungary. Shipments upon the river were affected by a single customs arrangement for the whole territory. Commerce up and down stream for a distance of 700 miles had no frontiers to cross, no delaying formalities to observe. At the present time a shipment down river over this distance must pass out of Austria into Czechoslovakia, thence successively into Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Rumania; and at each boundary there are distinct formalities, different customs rates, varying degrees of delay. It is all very well to recommend closer economic union between the several Danubian states, but experience shows that such a union implies also close political relations. Here we touch upon a wide circle of interests. France, Germany, England, and Italy would be seriously concerned as to the form of those closer relationships. Had a scheme of confederation come into play before the World War, and had the minor nationalities engaged to live under autonomous forms of government, nothing could have been simpler to arrange than a Danubian confederation. Nationalism has now gone too far for that to take place in the present period. Such an event will be almost inevitably associated with some new alignment of political and commercial interests in central Europe whose beginnings we cannot yet discern.

THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES

What we might call the literature of oppression is already so abundant in central Europe as to supply quite formidable documentation in appeals and petitions to the governments concerned and to the League of Nations. We have already noted that more than one third of the population of Czechoslovakia is neither Czech nor Slovak. It is a



FIG. 111. Slavs in Europe outside Russia. The key to the numbers is as follows: 1, Poles; 1*a*, mixed Poles and Ruthenians; 1*b*, White Russians; 2, Czechs, Moravians, Slovaks; 3, Ruthenians; 4, Serbo-Croats; 4*a*, Slovenes; 5, Bulgarians (originally Finno-Ugrian but now principally Slavic); 6, Macedonians (see page 398). Boundaries of 1914 shown by fine dotted lines.

striking fact that only 10 per cent of the international boundaries of Czechoslovakia coincide with the limits of occupation of Czech-Slovak peoples. It is fitting to inquire whether the minority problems that have inevitably arisen are being settled upon a just basis, or whether mere Czechasization, so called, has been substituted for Magyarization, thus providing a source of irredentism. Noteworthy in the first instance is the Organic Law which secures, to each minority, education and the free use of the vernacular in courts and in Parliament. Each autonomous body may employ its own language. But the Germans who had dominated Bohemia and the Magyars who had ruled

Slovaks and Ruthenians had no desire to exchange places with their new masters. The German-speaking population, forming the largest element, at first presented serious difficulties, though a harmonizing factor has been the long-standing economic interdependence of Czechs and Germans in the principal towns of Bohemia. Like the other ethnic elements, the Germans could not form a solid opposition bloc in Parliament because they differed so greatly among themselves as to the social order, land tenure, religion, and degree of opposition to the Czechs. Their opposition was further weakened by the clever foreign policy and internal administration of the Czechoslovak government. Minister Beneš supported the just aspirations of the Germans and his colleagues provided the Germans of Slovakia with German schools. The majority of the Germans accepted the realities of the situation and a few of their representatives even came into the government as cabinet ministers.

The Ruthenians south of the northern arm of the Carpathians (Fig. 111) number 460,000. Their geographical position increases their difficulties of adjustment: it is farther from Prague to Ruthenia than from Prague to Hamburg. Ruthenia has been called a piece of the outer shell of the former Hungarian globe. The land belonged to the Magyar nobles and ecclesiastical dignitaries, Magyar was the language of the schools and courts, and an illiterate peasantry tilled the soil of its masters or engaged in seasonal migration of labor, coming down to the Hungarian plain for the harvest and returning with food for the winter. When treaties were framed at the close of the World War, it was concluded that the region was essential to complete a territorial ring about Hungary and provide Czechoslovakia and Rumania with direct connections in case common military action were required. By the treaty of St. Germain (1919), the Czechoslovak government promised to grant autonomy to the Ruthenians. Before effect was given to this promise, the approval of the League of Nations was sought to provide the Ruthenians with schools and land. In both matters, Ruthenians and Magyar landowners had raised difficulties. The Orthodox hierarchy wanted Russian to be approved as the teaching language, whereas the few educated laymen insisted upon the Ukrainian. The government sought to comply with the wishes of the latter and thus lost the support of the church hierarchy, who thereupon joined the Magyar landowners in opposition to the expropriation and division of the large estates. Hierarchy and landlord class tried to have the League of Nations expedite the grant of the promised autonomy, since in an autonomous assembly they hoped to be strong enough to hinder both

land reform and the expansion of the national school system, though each of these appears to be essential to real democracy and autonomy.

The Magyar population in southern Slovakia constitutes a third highly important minority element that affects the stability of the Czechoslovak state. Czechoslovakian leaders soon found that these minorities insisted on being heard and that the League has provided them a forum. Hungary has never ceased to point to the fact that an extension of Czechoslovakia southward along the border of Slovakia was made for military and strategic reasons and that the present boundary is not in harmony with the geographical situation or the ethnic composition of the people. The Slovaks, however, assert that fifty years ago the majority of the towns and villages now Magyar were Slovak, and that there are large Slovak minorities which must be saved by Slovak schools and societies from long threatening Magyarization.

THE SLOVAK ELEMENT

A reference to the historical relations of Czechs and Slovaks will supply a needed basis for an opinion on the present status of Slovakia in the new republic. As the smaller of the two chief population elements the Slovaks have felt obliged at times to protest the action of the Czechs. The enemies of the new state make the most of these domestic complaints. Especially has this been true of the Magyars, who claim southern Slovakia. What cultural ties make Czechs and Slovaks natural political companions?

After Czechs and Slovaks had lived within a single state, the southeastern part was subdued by Magyars and transformed into a Hungarian province. The inhabitants continued to participate in the national life of the Czechs of Bohemia, attended the Czech University of Prague (founded in 1348) and employed the same literary language. These bonds were not severed until the beginning of the 19th century when the Magyars, alarmed at the awakening of Czech sentiment, insisted on replacing the Czech literary language in churches and district schools by the Slovak dialect. After 1848 Slovak grammar, normal, and secondary schools were founded in Slovakia, but the language of instruction was still the Slovak dialect, which thus became established as a literary language. After 1868 the Magyars abolished all Slovak schools, replacing them with Magyar schools. They sought to drive a wedge between Czechs and Slovaks by permitting the use of the Slovak dialect only in the churches and private district schools. Declarations and manifestoes during 1917 and 1918 envisaged a political

Fig. 112. Regional divisions of Czechoslovakia (light broken lines), present international boundaries (heavy solid lines), international boundaries of 1914 (light dot-and-dash lines). For the disposition of Teschen and the two enclosed areas southeast of it, see Figure 151, page 415.

order following the World War which would give the minor nationalities of Austria-Hungary essential independence, though the trend of Czech and Slovak leaders was steadily toward complete independence. In August 1918 the "Czechoslovak nation" was recognized by the British government, and in September 1918 the United States and Japan issued endorsing declarations. On 28 October 1918 the Czechoslovak government came into existence on the day following the request of the Austro-Hungarian government for an armistice preparatory to peace. The declaration of independence of the Czechoslovak state had been signed by representatives of Slovakia, the Slovak National Council subsequently issuing a statement to the effect that the Slovaks were a part of the Czechoslovak nation by ties of blood, language, and civilization. The National Council of the Ruthenians, meeting in May 1918, unanimously adopted, with similar intent, a resolution of incorporation within the Czechoslovak state on special terms of autonomy. These citations are from the account of President Masaryk himself of the rise of the Czechoslovak state. They indicate the beginnings of an alliance that came to be irksome for a time. Some Slovaks recalled that in the "Pittsburg Declaration" of 30 May 1918 Slovak autonomy was promised, whereas in 1922 President Masaryk, who had written the text of the Pittsburg Declaration, declared to a delegation of Slovaks that the unity of the state could not be altered.

The subsequent elections to the National Assembly at Prague proved that the majority of the Slovak people accepted the unity of the state. The only group which insisted on autonomy was the Catholic Popular Party, which regarded the Czech government as too liberal. It abhorred the unsectarian state schools, though these were welcomed by

the Protestant clergy and many of the laymen of Slovakia. The opposition of the Catholic Popular Party was weakened by certain administrative reforms and by Magyar propaganda. Since 1926 the Catholic Popular Party has been supporting the government, in which it has been represented by two ministers.

The Czechs, supported by the educated majority of the Slovak politicians, minimize their difficulties with the Slovaks, charge incitement of Slovak provincialism by Magyar agitators, and see the Slovakian question bound up with the attempt of Hungary to restore her former frontiers. Probably no single event in Europe has done more to allay such regional difficulties than the pledge which Hungary has made, in connection with her financial reconstitution under the auspices of the League of Nations, that she will respect the peace treaties and the present territorial arrangements in central Europe. At the same time, the division of the landed estates of Slovakia among the peasants has had a marked political effect. Both Slovak and Magyar peasant would rather keep their present political affiliations than return to Hungary and again find themselves deprived of land by the reconstitution of the large estates.

Working against Slovak separatist tendencies is the nature of the country. The people live in valleys separated by ridges that run southward to the edge of the Hungarian plain. It is a rough country with a relatively scattered and thin population. Physically the country faces south; politically it faces west. There is but limited railway communication with Moravia and Bohemia. It is a land of small towns, farmers, and lumbermen, rather than a land of mills, shops, cities, and railroads.

A final word on certain critical historical relationships between Czechs and Slovaks may make their present problem somewhat clearer. When Austria was defeated by Germany in 1866 after three weeks of war, the peace of Vienna (Königgrätz) provided for a new relation of Hungary within the monarchy. Prussia did not wish to see a strengthening of Slav solidarity nor did she welcome a too powerful Austria. Hungary thus came to be a counterpoise to Austria, and each now sought to make the most of a new situation. Magyarization of Slovakia kept pace with Germanization in Bohemia. Both used the church, civil officials, and schools as media. A Slovak was not required to send his children to school, but if he chose to do so they could receive instruction only in the Magyar tongue. Czechs had to attend German, and Slovaks Magyar universities, if they wished to obtain a higher education. In Slovakia there were no Slovak grammar, second-

ary, or technical schools. The feeling of the Magyars toward the Slovaks is reflected in the Magyar proverb, *Tót nem ember*, —"A Slovak is not a human being." Slovaks were prohibited by the Magyar authorities from attending Czech schools, which began to be established after 1866. The Charles University, a Czech institution, founded in 1348 and Germanized in 1623, was restored only as late as 1882 and later a Czech Academy of Sciences was permitted to be organized.

At the beginning of the 19th century a few Czech patriots revived the almost forgotten Czech literature, thus stimulating the consciousness of nationality and the hope of freedom. Jan Kollár (1793–1852) inspired his people by a collection of poems called *Slavy Dčera, or Daughter of Slavia;* Šafařik (1795–1861) wrote *Slavic Antiquities* and *Slavic Ethnography;* Palacký (1798–1876) was the author of *A History of the Bohemian People.* Archæological facts were brought to light proving that Czech culture had an independent or autochthonous origin; manuscripts were discovered which revealed a literary culture unmarked by German influence; every distinctive social and political phase of the past was set in high relief by the intense patriotism of Czech scholars.

THE CHURCH QUESTION

One of the most extraordinary events that occurred within the new Czechoslovak republic was the change that took place in the character of the church. The long conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Bohemia is so complicated by dynastic questions, by nationalist movements, by conflicts between crown and nobility, that in presenting the background of the developments of the past few years it is difficult to avoid wearisome detail. It is perhaps sufficient to recall for our present purpose that the adherence of an overwhelming number of the people of Bohemia to the Roman Catholic church did not mean simply that it was a profoundly Catholic country, like Poland or Spain. At the beginning of the 17th century the Bohemians were overwhelmingly Protestant — it is said that 90 per cent of them were. Religious persecution under the Hapsburg dynasty is the cause to which the reversal of this condition is ascribed. We see the artificial character of the former accepted statistics of religion [1] when we learn that between 1918 and 1921 about 1,000,000 Czechs left the Roman Catholic church, and of this number about half united to form a separate "Czechoslovak National Church," founded in January 1920. The

[1] Protestants number about 1,000,000 in the new state, the Evangelical Church of Slovakia possessing a membership of more than 400,000.

impressive title of this church is misleading. It is not in any sense a national church and it is not composed of strong elements that imply permanence. The chief religious change is within the Roman Catholic church itself. Under the Hapsburgs the prelates of the Roman Catholic church in Bohemia were of German origin, not Czech, though 70 per cent of the communicants in many congregations were Czechs. This meant that German, not Czech, was employed in a part of the services. The hierarchy of the church, the dominance of the Hapsburgs, discrimination against men of Czech speech, all came to be associated as parts of a single unjust and oppressive scheme. When Czechoslovakia came into being, the lesser clergy, overwhelmingly Czech, were provided with the means to resist the church hierarchy. Ninety per cent of the priests joined an association called the "Union of Catholic Clergy." By this means a deputation was sent to Rome, asking for a revival of the Czech liturgy and for a restoration of the right of promotion, which the lesser clergy had lost. They also wished the privilege of examining the properties of the church in order to secure a more equitable distribution of income and a better living. While Rome insisted on abolishing the Union (1921–1922), it did grant the privilege of employing the Czech language in singing the Epistle and Gospel in the service of the sacrament, and in the afternoon benediction. The lesser clergy are represented on committees dealing with church properties, not as representatives of the Union, now nonexistent, but as appointees of the higher ecclesiastical authorities. These later stages in church evolution in Bohemia are of great interest because of their historical associations, the church itself having to make adaptations to diminish that antagonism which it invited by being made a political instrument of the old order.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND POLAND

The political and economic relations that Czechoslovakia has sustained toward Russia have been a matter of interest and even of anxiety to the western powers. "Race" may be a powerful factor in political affairs and is still more powerful in the field of economic development. A Czech leader, Kramárz, stated (1920) that the war could not be said to be over until the Russian question had been settled, that the Czechs should remember that they also were Slavs, and that they should remain faithful to Russia so that Russia might not have to seek alliance with Germany. He added that future relations with Russia would depend largely upon general European conditions. Beneš, the Czech foreign minister, likewise favors closer relations with Russia, but never

on a visionary basis. He says, "The individual states . . . are not self-sufficing, and in the Europe of the future they cannot be."

The Czechs were for some time ambitious to have direct territorial connection with Russia. It is for this reason that they have opposed the Polish ownership of Eastern Galicia. In the summer of 1919 there was organized in Prague a Ruthenian society which has for its object the promotion of the interests of the Ruthenians of eastern Czechoslovakia and of Eastern Galicia. Czechoslovakia and Poland, in spite of minor differences, are likely to become good neighbors, because they are similar in "race" at least, and they are both opposed to Germany. Moreover, their frontiers are exposed to German attack, and each must be able to rely upon the other.

Like all the other new states of Europe, Czechoslovakia will run the risk of becoming militaristic. It would be possible for an ambitious military man to throw the Czechs into a state of nervous disorder and feed the spirit of war; he could point to long and exposed frontiers; he could dwell upon the greed and ill will of unscrupulous neighbors. It was the "exposed" position of Germany that was the theme of her Junkers for a generation. The idea of the menace of the slow-encroaching Slav became fixed in the minds of the German people. Following this line of reasoning, every people in the world should have a powerful and aggressive army and navy and be prepared for war at any minute, even though the cost of such preparation be staggering.

As seen by its leaders, the first and principal task of the new state is in the field of social reform. This is conceived not as a revolutionary but rather as an evolutionary process, not a radical break but a gradual development. In this view the efficiency, the enterprise, and the brains of capitalism are to be continued (not destroyed or discouraged, as in Russia), that there may be wholesale production of goods for consumption and export. In the Czechoslovak view, socialization does not mean a radical change whereby the state expropriates private property in order to set up state capitalism. With Russia's example before them, the Russophile Czechs might have been thought capable of uncritical acceptance of the Russian program. Even with so radical a difference of political and social views between the Russian and Czech leaders, the relations might have been far closer — to the detriment of the latter — had there been better means of communication. It is noteworthy that the communist party of Czechoslovakia is third in the number of representatives in Parliament and is composed of German, Czech, and Slovak elements, so that it is not without real vitality.

THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

As an interior state, Czechoslovakia was provided at once with facilities, or at least guarantees, for exit to the sea. It had no long period of struggle and negotiation, and it had no serious servitudes to lift as had Switzerland. The peace treaties of 1919 provided for the export of Czechoslovakian goods over German rivers (chiefly the Elbe) and from German ports, where it is stipulated Czechoslovakia shall have the privilege of making installations and shall enjoy the right to import and export without the payment of duties. Though Czechoslovakia enjoys the use of all facilities such as warehouses, wharves, and loading apparatus, it pays for such use and for the charges incurred in maintaining the internationalized rivers in a navigable condition. Two Czechoslovak representatives sit on the international commission of eleven members that administers the Elbe; and one representative sits on the Oder commission of nine members. The importance of Czechoslovak privileges in German ports and on the Elbe is seen in the fact that before 1914 three times as much Austro-Hungarian commerce flowed through Hamburg as through Trieste, though special customs arrangements were responsible for part of this result. To improve the facilities for water transportation, the Moldau and other tributaries of the Elbe in Bohemia have been canalized, although a great commerce cannot be developed on the Elbe until a deeper channel is provided in Saxony and Bohemia. With these and other improvements, the cheaper export of goods could be accomplished.

If the Allies can enforce the international agreements they have signed respecting freedom of transit from one state across the territory of a neighboring state, the interior nations will not suffer because they do not themselves own ports and railways to them. It is stipulated that "goods and persons and means of transport" shall have free passage to the natural outlets of each country. This means in a sense a limitation of sovereignty of the state that owns such an outlet port; but the alternative would be annoying servitudes imposed upon interior states by stronger neighbors holding the coastal outlets.

Through the arrangements of the conferences on communications and transit (page 23) Czechoslovakia has full rights of transit on the Danube, on the canals joining its streams to the Elbe, and on the Elbe itself, and the reasonable use of the ports of Danzig, Trieste, and Fiume, as well as port privileges in special zones of Hamburg and Stettin. The trade of the country is chiefly with (1) industrial Germany, (2) agricultural Hungary and Rumania, whence must come much

of Czechoslovakia's deficit in cereals and meat, and (3) Poland and the United States.

The position of Czechoslovakia, as well as her industrial power, makes her one of the most important of the states of central Europe. She is near agricultural nations like Hungary and Russia; she can supply many of the needs of the Balkans for manufactured wares; she was not ravaged by the World War like Poland, Belgium, and Serbia. She has from 85 to 90 per cent of the soft coal and 60 per cent of the iron ore of former Austria. She made three fourths of all the shoes manufactured in the whole of Austria-Hungary, exporting largely to the Balkans and Russia. Moravia produces wheat in quantity; Slovakia is rich in agricultural and forest resources; the Teschen mines supply an excellent coking coal. Prague and Pilsen (Plzen) are among the great industrial centers of Europe. Banks have been reorganized and new ones opened in almost every large town; unemployment was a temporary condition; the people have accepted the new government and loyally uphold its laws.



FIG. 113. Details of boundary arrangements in the region of Bratislava (former Pressburg), Czechoslovakia's port on the Danube. For general relations see Figure 114. Germans constitute 42 per cent of the population of Bratislava, and Magyars 40 per cent.

Bohemia, Moravia, and Lower Silesia (that is, Austrian Silesia) together formed about one fourth of Austria, not including Hungary. Yet they produced 35 per cent of the wheat, 59 per cent of the barley, 48 per cent of the rye, 90 per cent of the sugar beets, 32 per cent of the potatoes. If we consider acreage, we find that these three regions produced from 10 to 100 per cent more of a given crop per acre than the rest of Austria. Bohemia alone produced 80 per cent of the former yield of hops in Austria, half of the flax and textile fiber, and 75 per cent of the fruit. Among these products sugar is one of the most important from the standpoint of international trade. Czechoslovakia was the only sugar-exporting country of Europe in 1919. In 1912–1913 (a normal year) Bohemia and Moravia had, the one 5 and the other 7 per cent of its cultivated soil in sugar beets, and together they



FIG. 114. The boundaries of the coal and iron districts are the limits of the present productive basins. Both Czech and German spellings of place names are given. The term "racial" in the legend is employed in the popular sense to denote linguistic or ethnic differences. Strictly speaking, there are no well-defined racial boundaries, owing to the mixing process that has everywhere modified original types. True racial differences exist, but they are demonstrable only between widely separated centers of dispersal.

produced 8 per cent of the world's total. About four fifths of the industries of former Austria-Hungary fell to Czechoslovakia. The addition of Slovakia to the Czechoslovak republic greatly increases the national wealth. What is equally important, it provides industrial Bohemia with raw materials and food supplies and makes the country a more nearly complete economic unit. Of the whole Czechoslovak production, Slovakia provides 39 per cent of the wheat, 35 per cent of the barley, 87 per cent of the maize, 32 per cent of the potatoes, 86 per cent of the sheep, and 26 per cent of the cattle, besides important crops of tobacco, flax, and wine. Considering area, however, Slovakia, with far rougher land, has a lower per acre production than Bohemia.

Several of the chief railways of Europe cross Czechoslovakia. The lines from Berlin to Vienna, from Warsaw to Trieste, from Switzerland to Poland, all pass through certain larger towns. She uses both the Elbe and the Danube and connecting canals. Prague has become one of the great cities of central Europe. But as a whole, and especially in its eastern part, the country is still in need of railways to develop its varied natural resources. The external economic arrangements of the state are in process of rapid adjustment. By treaty with Poland the regular delivery of petroleum is assured, and commercial arrangements have also been made with Hungary. With Germany a treaty has been concluded which provides for the exchange of potash salts, delivered to Czechoslovakia, and coal, delivered to Germany. Commercial treaties have also been arranged with Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Austria, to mention only the nearer countries.

THE DIVISION OF THE LAND

In Bohemia, especially in the southwest and the Bohemian portion of the valley of the Elbe, were many huge estates, some of which went back to the days of Czech expulsions after the battle of the White

Fig. 115. Important railways in Czechoslovakia. The heavy black lines indicate the chief railway connections with other countries.

Mountain (1620). Thirty-three noblemen at one time held one sixth of the land of all Bohemia. As a step in the direction of land reforms, the National Assembly in 1920 ordered the expropriation of all estates of more than 475 acres if under cultivation and of 350 acres if uncultivated. Under this law the state has taken 3,250,000 acres of cultivated land and 7,500,000 acres of woodland, or enough for nearly 500,000 families. It was a severe test of social and political strength to carry the process of land division to its logical end within six years in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and western Slovakia.

The following table gives the proportion of former holdings in the three principal political divisions of Czechoslovakia that fell above or below a given size — three hectares or seven and a half acres:

Countries	Farms of 3 Hectares (7½ Acres) or Less		Farms of More than 3 Hectares (7½ Acres)		Total Number of Farms
	Number	Percentage of Arable Land	Number	Percentage of Arable Land	
Bohemia . .	580,073	23.5	1,890,405	76.5	2,470,478
Moravia . .	340,585	29.6	810,774	70.4	1,151,359
Silesia . .	42,805	25.2	126,979	74.8	169,784
Total . .	963,463	25.4	2,828,158	74.6	3,791,621

A third of the peasant holdings of Bohemia ranged from fourteen to seventy acres. Many thousands of the farms had less than three acres. Some were as small as one acre apiece. In the expropriation of large estates small landholders, disabled soldiers, and legionaries[1] and their dependents, were given preference and received farms that range from fifteen to twenty-five to thirty-seven and a half acres, the size depending upon the value and quality of the soil. The best arable land went to actual farmers; municipalities, corporations, and scientific institutions might acquire non-arable allotments, such as forest lands, pasture lands, and ponds. As a result of agrarian reform about 40 coöperative societies have been established that have to do with the holding of land for collective cultivation or the cultivation of expropriated estates. A social problem resulted from ownership of the new land, in that wage earners on expropriated lands had to be provided for. Of the 31,800 involved, about a quarter received land, a third kept their old positions by agreement with coöperatives or otherwise, about 40 per cent received a money compensation, and a few received pensions.

[1] The Czechoslovak troops who fought their way across Russia and Siberia in 1918–1919 after the opening of the Russian Revolution. They had deserted in large numbers to Russia during the World War.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

YUGOSLAVIA[1] AND THE ADRIATIC

The Balkan countries as defined down to 1914 — Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania, Montenegro, and Albania — were long under the control of the Ottoman Empire. By a series of wars against Turkey, in which at one time or another all of them participated, the Balkan countries gained first partial and at length complete independence. The next act in the historic drama of the freedom of the Balkans was opened by the two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 and followed by the World War. The Balkan states now have an independent status,[2] unfettered by either Turkish rule or the protection of the greater European powers, save as to control of racial minorities (page 27) and freedom of transit across their several territories.

For our immediate purpose it is not necessary to trace the history of each country in detail, but only to point to those recent events and conditions that affect the national life of today. The so-called racial characters are of special significance.

POPULATION ELEMENTS OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES

The people of Serbia are Slavs whose language is but slightly different from that of the Bulgars. However, the latter were originally Finno-Ugrians of a later period of migration as contrasted with the early invasions of the Slavs farther west. Mixture with the Slavs already established in the region and with those who came later has quite changed the original Bulgar stock. Slavic populations also extend through Croatia and the eastern Adriatic region to the gates of Trieste. Northward, Slavic communities live beyond the Danube and the Sava (Fig. 111). A broad belt of population of Slavic speech thus extends across the Balkans and includes one of the farthest outposts of the Slavs in Europe. In Rumania there is a distinct Ruman population that has marked Slavic elements as reflected in the roots of the language, and in many place names and customs. There are also Bulgars, a high proportion of Jews, and small colonies of Germans. In Greece there is a distinctive racial contrast to the Slavic belt of the middle Balkans; but here also strong Slavic infusions took place.

Throughout the Balkans the Greek Orthodox Church represents the prevailing religion, with a belt of Roman Catholic population in

[1] The official title of the state is "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes."

[2] Except Montenegro, which is now included in Yugoslavia; and Albania, which is virtually a protectorate of Italy.

FIG. 116. For description see opposite page.

northern Albania and in the centers of Italian culture on the Dalmatian coast. Other exceptions to the predominance of the Greek Orthodox Church are the central block of Moslem Albanians, — the Moslems (Serbs chiefly) of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Moslems of Thrace, the Pomaks (Moslemized Bulgars and Turks) of Bulgaria, and the Protestant and Catholic Saxons and Szeklers of Transylvania.

THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY

The Balkan states finally threw off Turkish control in 1912. They had then resolved to make a combined military effort because the war between Italy and Turkey (1911–1912) had greatly weakened Turkey and proved her to be incapable of holding in check the Balkan powers. Montenegro first declared war against Turkey, and was supported by Bulgaria and Serbia, who had agreed before the war to a secret treaty establishing new frontiers should Turkey be defeated. Shortly after, Greece joined them and the four conducted an intensive campaign that drove the Turkish armies out of the Balkans, except for a mere patch of territory within the Chatalja line of defenses (Fig. 133). Greek troops besieged and finally took Salonika. The Serbian army defeated the Turkish army in Macedonia, and the Bulgarians captured Kirk Kilisse, Lule Burgas, and Adrianople. With these three regions in their hands, the Balkan allies made peace with Turkey at Adrianople in 1913, and then proceeded to divide amongst themselves the territories and peoples that they had liberated.

Fig. 116. This map (on the opposite page) should be freely consulted in the reading of the chapters relating to the different Balkan countries. The characteristics of the regions shown are briefly summarized as follows:

1. Mediterranean climate and vegetation; population restricted to small cultivable areas and pastures; trading cities with maritime traditions.
2. Some rain in summer, in contrast to 1; better access to interior; a transition zone with respect to vegetation, climate, and population.
3. Continental extremes of climate; fertile loess soil, but wheat harvests apt to be affected by summer drought; Balkan Range on south, though easily crossed, a cultural boundary.
4 and 4*a*. Mingling of Mediterranean and steppe characteristics; diversified relief, climate, and agricultural resources.
5. Elevated deforested country with small resources.
6 and 6*a*. Terraced plateau with abundant rain; modified central European type of climate; large maize and prune crops; home of main body of Serbian population.
7. Series of tectonic basins with fertile soil, graded river outlets, fine bordering pastures; center of ancient Serbian state.
8*a* and 8*b*. Cultivated basin floors; winter pastures supporting herds of migratory shepherds; climate and products reflecting Ægean influences.
9. No unifying centers of life and culture, yet markedly uniform linguistic and ethnic characters; absence of deep transverse valleys; upland pastures separated by barren broken zone from low littoral belt with Mediterranean climate and products.
10. Deep transverse valleys and high mountains bordered on seaward side by marshy coastal plain; difficult relief reflected in tribal life and general backwardness of people, though the region is well endowed with natural resources.

A bitter quarrel over the division led to the Second Balkan War, in which Greece and Serbia, joined by Rumania, defeated Bulgaria. By the treaty of Bucarest (1913) that closed the war, Rumania obtained from Bulgaria a part of the Dobruja containing 250,000 Bulgarians; Greece received Salonika and a part of western Thrace; and Serbia extended her southern boundary to meet the boundary of Greece, thus dividing Macedonia. By a subsequent treaty with Turkey, Bulgaria returned Kirk Kilisse, Lule Burgas, and Adrianople to Turkey.

To drive out the Turk was for years the common ambition of the Balkan states. But Serbia had a special aim, that of uniting to herself the Slavic groups outside her limits, to form a Yugoslav state; for Serbia included within her frontiers only a third of the total Yugoslav population. "Only ten years ago the Yugoslavs were living under six different governments; and their deputies sat in fourteen different parliaments, national or provincial. To attain their unity they have had to disrupt two such empires as Austria-Hungary and Turkey."

In her struggle to effect the union of the Yugoslav groups, Serbia was opposed by Austria-Hungary, a far stronger power than Turkey. This opposition came not merely from the fact that hundreds of thousands of Yugoslavs lived north of the Danube in old Austro-Hungarian territory, but chiefly from the fact that the main mass of Yugoslavs in Austria-Hungary lived in the provinces across which that country had its only direct and unrestricted outlets to the sea; that is, in Bosnia and Hercegovina,[1] along the eastern Adriatic coast, and about Trieste and Fiume.

Behind Austria-Hungary stood a still stronger power, the German Empire. These two great powers, together comprising 115,000,000 people, were not willing to foster Balkan nationalism at the expense of their own political plans for creating a Central Europe under German domination. They did not hope to win the allegiance of people conquered in the process. Their political philosophy consisted chiefly of one element — force. Their aim was not only to invade and seize Balkan lands or limit the sovereignty of the Balkan peoples, for the Balkan lands are in general poor. Their object was more far reaching: it was to use the Balkans as a passageway to the Ottoman Empire; to build the Baghdad road to the head of the Persian Gulf; to win the subtropical products (chiefly raw materials) of Mesopotamia; and, from the Persian Gulf, to invade the great trading marts of the Orient, principally those of India and China.

[1] Occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1878 and annexed to the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1908. See the shaded area west of old Serbia in Figure 101, page 307.

RESOURCES AND COMMERCE OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES

We have referred to the low commercial rank of the Balkan countries. The point will be clearer if we look at the outstanding economic features of the Balkan Peninsula. The four largest Balkan countries in 1914 had a total trade (combining imports and exports) of $400,000,000, or less than 1 per cent of the world's total. Together they had a commercial importance that outranked that of Portugal or Norway and was less than that of Sweden, or Spain, or even Denmark. Of the total Balkan trade Rumania supplied half.

Agricultural products are of chief importance in the export trade of the Balkans, forming three fourths of the whole. The industrially undeveloped state of the region is shown by the fact that products of the forest, the mine, and the factory form only from one fifth to one tenth of the total trade. They consist mainly of the lumber and petroleum of Rumania and the mineral ores of Greece.

In more highly developed industrial countries with exports like those of the Balkans, the imports would include raw materials for manufacture. Not so in the Balkan countries. For example, imports of raw cotton form but a fraction of one per cent of the total value of imported goods. Greece alone among the Balkan countries has a deficit of cereals and must import grain. Even sugar and coffee are imported in very small quantities; the consumption of coffee is less than one pound per person a year and of sugar eight pounds, or about one tenth the per capita amounts used in the United States. The exports of the Balkans have long been sent chiefly to the industrial districts and cities of central and northern Europe. Of Germany's total commerce with the principal Balkan states before the World War, 50 per cent by value was with Rumania. One half of the total imports of the Balkans then came from Germany and Austria-Hungary.

POPULATION AND BOUNDARIES OF YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia consists of the former kingdom of Serbia, to which are joined the former kingdom of Montenegro and the provinces of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, and parts of Styria, Carniola, the Banat, Baranja, and Bačka, and three salients in western Bulgaria. The total number of inhabitants is 12,017,000 (census of 1921), divided as follows: Serbs, 6,000,000; Croats, 2,600,000; Macedonian Slavs, 500,000; Magyars, 450,000; Slovenes, 1,100,000, Albanians, 250,000; Moslem Serbs, 625,000; Rumanians, 150,000; Germans, 400,000; others, 175,000. Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes together number nearly 10,000,000, or 83 per cent of the total.



FIG. 117. Stages in the settlement of the Fiume dispute, 1918–1924. The "Wilson line" was proposed to provide Yugoslavia with a suitable outlet at Fiume. See Figures 119 and 120 for details in the Fiume region.

The distribution of these population elements is shown in detail in Plate II, opposite page 360. The same maps show the distribution of religious elements, density of population, and relief. A comparison of these elements region by region will assist the reader in understanding both the internal problems of Yugoslavia and her international relations. The denser populations of higher culture live upon the valley floors, in local basins, and upon the plains that form the northern part of the country. The mountain populations, especially those of the Dinaric barrier, still keep their old traditions, customs, and language. Their most characteristic social organization is the *zadruga*, the name given to a large kinship group living under the same roof or in the same village and cultivating lands in common. Of the foreign language elements in Yugoslavia the Germans, Hungarians, and Rumanians live in the north and northeast, the Turks and Albanians in the south. The population densities range from 100 to 250 to the square mile upon the cultivated lands, the densest agricultural population being found in the Morava valley on the east and in the Sava and Danube valleys on the north. In these northern valleys agricultural and pastoral industries are highly developed; there the best coalfields are situated and some manufacturing is carried on.

Low population densities mark the rougher and higher country where pastoral pursuits predominate.

It will be noted that peninsulas of Slav population interlock with those of other nationalities in a way that leaves any boundary location open to criticism. A sufficient number of non-Yugoslav populations have been included to constitute centers of irredentism, as in Serbian Macedonia. The occupation of Montenegro by Serbia and the absorption of that country have not been followed by permanently serious effects, partly because of likeness of language and race and partly through the fact that the Montenegrin people are both small and weak.

Fig. 118. Minority groups that may become irredentist centers: (1) Albanians; (2) Macedonian Slavs and Bulgarians; (3) Magyars and Germans.

The rivalry with Italy at Fiume was greatly diminished by the after-effects of the treaty of Rapallo (1920), when Yugoslavia definitely abandoned her long attempt to secure Fiume and accepted instead the small suburb of Sušak as a commercial outlet for northwestern Yugoslavia, the boundary line running down a small stream called the Recina River (Figs. 119, 120.)



Fig. 119. A stage in the absorption of Fiume. The broken line at Lenci is part of the boundary of the former "corpus separatum" of Fiume; the remaining part is the solid line northward and eastward terminating on the coast between Fiume and its suburb, Sušak. From Lenci westward to Rubesi is the "strip" added to the Free State of Fiume by the treaty of Rapallo (1920) to provide direct territorial connection between Fiume and Italy. The area of the Free State of Fiume as thus defined was 11 square miles, and its population 53,000. Spellings follow the 1:75,000 Austrian General Staff sheet.

COMMERCIAL OUTLETS

But neither the treaty of Rapallo in 1920 nor the subsequent Italo-Yugoslav treaty of friendship and conciliation (1924) could halt an inevitable clash over Albania (Figs. 118, 121). The northern part of that country is marked by a topographic depression which includes Lake Scutari and the



Fig. 120. The Fiume region. The organized character of the port is in contrast to the backward state of the ports of the Dalmatian coast. Back of the town are rugged hills, and the railway is necessarily near the shore. By the treaty of Rome (1923), the delta of the Recina River and the Baros mole (shaded area) were ceded to Yugoslavia, and Fiume was annexed to Italy. This action abolished the Free City of Fiume as established in 1920 by the treaty of Rapallo (Fig. 119).

Drin outlet to the Adriatic, together with lowlands and fertile valley floors roundabout. Here is Scutari, one of the largest cities (22,000). Not merely Yugoslav and Italian rivalries are to be considered. Serbs and Albanians are themselves traditional enemies, the former being Greek Orthodox, the latter in part, at least, Moslem. A large number of Albanians live on Serbian territory, about Prizren and Üsküb, and desire union with Albania. Yugoslavia has no intention whatever of relinquishing them; in fact, she would like to absorb all of northern Albania in order to have a railway outlet by low gradients to the Adriatic and at the same time protect the naval defenses at Cattaro.

The four small districts on the eastern boundary (Fig. 133) that Yugoslavia gained at Bulgaria's expense (Timok, Tsaribrod, Bosilegrad, and Strumitsa districts) were taken for strategic reasons. They have practically no Serbian elements and comprise a total population of nearly 70,000. Their possession is regarded as necessary to protect the main railway line running from Belgrade to Nish southward through the Vardar-Morava trench to Salonika, one of the main commercial outlets and seaports for Serbia.

To provide suitable facilities of trade for the populations of the

hinterland of the northern coast of the Ægean, the Bulgarian treaty of 1919 (Neuilly) stipulated that a free zone was to be set aside by Greece in the harbor of Salonika. Finding the Yugoslav Free Zone too small and congested for trade movements, the Greek government declared a part of the port next to the Yugoslav Free Zone a Greek Free Port, and it has equipped it so well as to deprive the Yugoslav concession of a considerable part of its value. The matter was resolved in a manner satisfactory to both parties by the extension of the area of the Yugoslav Free Zone and the improvement of the port of Salonika, at the same time that a treaty of friendship and conciliation between Yugoslavia and Greece in 1926 gave the connecting railroad (from Salonika to the Yugoslav border at Ghevgheli) to Greece in return for 20,000,000 French francs. The line is controlled by the Greek director of Macedonian railways in coöperation with a representative of the Yugoslav state railways. By these means and by freedom of navigation on the Danube, which Yugoslavia borders or includes for at least 400 miles, and by railways to the seacoast, the country is provided with improved though still deficient economic outlets.



FIG. 121. Drainage relations in the Scutari region. The broken line is the boundary between Albania and Yugoslavia. Both Albania and Yugoslavia wish to control the Drin Valley and Lake Scutari. Note the two outlets of the Drin and the Boyana outlet of Lake Scutari.

The much needed railway lines to the Adriatic are still in course of development. A loan was obtained in 1922 and a much larger one in 1928 from American and European sources for building a railway to Cattaro and improving the port there. Denied a natural outlet at Fiume, Yugoslavia hastened the completion of the connection that gave railway communication from Zagreb to the port of Spalato (Split), now the most important city in Dalmatia. Back of the coastal towns is difficult mountain country, but farther inland are the most fertile valleys and plains of central and northern Yugoslavia. The cereal products exported by way of the Adriatic to the Mediterranean commercial routes will help support whatever railways are built. Cattaro on the

south has many advantages in its favor in addition to being one of the best harbors in the world. The line to it would be 60 miles shorter than the Spalato line and would have lower grades. The route has the disadvantage of running through less densely populated country where the standard of living is low and more primitive means of communication and exchange would serve for the time being. The difficulties of internal communication are not nearly so serious as the questions that arose over Yugoslavia's outlets for external trade. The routes to the exterior involve regional susceptibilities and ambitions and their terminals are of concern to neighboring powers, principally Italy, who watches with the minutest care the growth of ports, railway outlets, and naval stations, upon the eastern side of the Adriatic.

POLITICAL UNITY OF THE STATE

The political foundations of the present Yugoslav state were laid in the Pact of Corfu (July 1917). Representatives of Serbia and of the Yugoslav Committee of London among others, then adopted the following resolution: "The territory of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes will comprise all the territory where our nation lives in compact masses and without discontinuity, and where it could not be mutilated without injuring the vital interests of the community. It desires to free itself and establish its unity."

The principal items of the Pact of Corfu are as follows:

(1) The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes shall be a democratic, constitutional, and parliamentary monarchy whose three co-national parts shall have a single allegiance.

(2) The equality of three chief religions within the new state — Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Mohammedan — shall be guaranteed.

(3) The Latin and Cyrillic alphabets shall both be used. (The Croats and Slovenes use the former, the Serbs the latter.)

(4) The territory of the new state shall be extended over all areas where Yugoslavs live in compact masses — which involves the union of Montenegro and Serbia.

(5) The Adriatic Sea shall be kept free and open to all.

In spite of these liberal provisions, the different parts of the state have not yet become amalgamated. Croatia has been in a separatist mood, owing at first to the uncertainties arising from the Fiume situation and to the failure of the Yugoslav government to oust the Italians,

settle the foreign policy of the country, start railroad trains, supply coal, and defend the frontier against Italian aggression. The tendency toward disunion at one time (July 1919) was marked by the proclamation of a Croatian republic, which proved to be short-lived. The interests of all the peoples making up Yugoslavia are so closely related and their neighbors are so formidable in size and strength that a confederated union, economic as well as political, is required.

Though all three main ethnic groups of Yugoslavia are Slavs in race, there are strong provincial differences of custom and speech among Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. Some of the Slovenes and Croats — and their number is considerable — object to locating the capital at Belgrade, where, they feel sure, Serbian influences dominate the councils of the nation. All parties outside of old Serbia are watchful of the growing power of Belgrade. Finding themselves placed athwart the highways leading out of the densely populated hinterland of central Europe, the two northern elements (Slovenes and Croats) see many advantages in independence. To add to the difficulties, schools and newspapers are few throughout most of the country, illiteracy is high, and the various sections have a quite independent point of view, a reflection of the long struggle against the Turk. From 80 to 85 per cent of the people are peasants, and those of Serbian Macedonia and the highland regions everywhere are self-contained and almost without commercial or political apparatus.

Related to the separatist problem is uncertainty as to the outcome of the long struggle which Yugoslavia has made, and through which it has not yet passed, to decide whether its government shall be strongly centralized or whether there shall be a high degree of local autonomy. In the Pact of Corfu, as we have seen, a strongly centralized government was proclaimed, and this was reaffirmed by the Act of Union (1918), when the Prince Regent proclaimed the "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes." At that time the Croatian national assembly voted for the union. Later, in 1919, there was a sharp struggle, owing to the inability of the various political parties to agree on a cabinet which the national assembly could support. This struggle has been repeated again and again in the years that have followed. The ordered life of the period before the World War is contrasted with the harder life of today. A centralized government at Belgrade is asked to explain why the millennium is still so far off. That government, seeing aggressive and powerful Italy on the west, resentful Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria on the north and east, regards a union of South Slavs as a first condition of survival. A Croat Peasant Republic was again

envisaged by the separatists following the elections of 1923; and their leader Raditch appeared to play with communism for a time. Yet Yugoslavia has not disintegrated; it has improved its economic condition; it has maintained above all a vigorous foreign policy. Though weaker than Italy — it has little more than a fourth as many people — it steadfastly resisted Italian aggression with a coolness that only the greater powers are supposed to show. A few Serb leaders have proved themselves to be great men with extraordinary resource in diplomacy and politics, determined to weld into one nation elements too weak to stand alone. If the immediate neighbors of Yugoslavia have provoked trouble, it is also true that Great Britain and France have recognized the high qualities of Serbian leadership. The treaty of 1927, whereby Yugoslavia becomes practically an ally of France, and the trade agreements and loans of both France and Great Britain, have gone far to stabilize both commercial and political processes.

Having passed in review some of the outstanding current problems of Yugoslavia, we shall now return to each principal item and discuss it in greater detail in connection with the maps in Plate II, opposite page 360, before passing to the study of the economic strength of the new state and the character of its people.

THE ADRIATIC DISPUTE

Yugoslavia has inherited from the period that closed the World War a situation that appears to be insoluble. It concerns not merely the question of commercial outlets, ports, and naval stations on the Adriatic, as noted above, but the relations that Yugoslavia and Italy are to maintain toward each other in working out a rival program of penetration in Albania and along the eastern Adriatic. During the armistice that began in October 1918, Italy was permitted to maintain armed forces up to a demarcation line corresponding roughly with the line of the secret treaty of London (1915), which was designed to satisfy Italian territorial aspirations in the Adriatic. When the Yugoslav state was formed, with Serbia as a nucleus, all the Yugoslav peoples — that is, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes — were united; but many Croats and practically all the Slovenes had fought on the side of the Central powers and had faced Italian armies. Yet when the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy fell apart these people were thrown by a mere political term (Yugoslavia) into the ranks of the Allies. Serbian statesmen were provided a basis for extending Yugoslav territory to include Croats and Slovenes. This disregarded the treaty of London, which was drawn on

the assumption that Austria-Hungary would remain a political entity and that the territory in question would be gained at the expense of an enemy. Italy was asked to give up something that had been promised to her and to give it to a greatly extended state.



Fig. 122. The field of trade rivalry between Trieste and Fiume before the World War. From *Meereskunde*, Vol. 5, 1911.

In all the discussions the Yugoslavs themselves never denied the right of the Italians to enjoy naval supremacy on the Adriatic; but they pointed to the fact that Italy no longer need fear attack from the eastern Adriatic shore, for the former overwhelming strength of Austria-Hungary on the northeast had ceased to exist. Italy's long and vulnerable seacoast was no longer in danger. In harmony with this view the Yugoslavs were content to see Trieste in Italian possession and Pola, on the Istrian Peninsula, made a great Italian naval base. On the other hand, they wished to retain Fiume. This in the end became the chief focus of difficulty. Counting the suburb of Sušak, the city has a Slav majority (26,000 Yugoslavs to 25,000 Italians) and the country roundabout is solidly Yugoslav. In the hands of Yugoslavia, trade would grow and the town might become a rival of the port of Trieste. If Italy owned both ports, Fiume would stagnate, — so ran the argument of Yugoslavia, — and time has confirmed this belief. But Italian claims did not stop with these key situations. The Dalmatian coast was a prime objective, especially the hinterland of Zara and Sebenico, where the line of the treaty of London ran far inland.

The difficulties between the two states arose in large part because the ethnic, cultural, and military lines do not coincide. It is hard to select a line that fairly balances these three conditions. The physiography of



FIG. 123. Centers of Italian culture in Dalmatia. The broken line represents the line of the treaty of London, 1915. However, Spalato and Zara are the only cities which have an Italian population in excess of 1000. From Giotto Dainelli, *La Dalmazia*, 1918, Map 11.

the eastern Adriatic coast is totally unlike that of the opposite Italian coast. The commercial relations have been Italian, and the people have always had a seafaring element. So much at least depends upon the geographical situation. But the stage of civilization and the mode of occupation also count for much. The Italians along the eastern Adriatic coast are city, not country dwellers; traders, not farmers. Italian cultural influence is seen in all the coastal towns, for Italy was historically and culturally far advanced when, behind the coastal fringe, the uplands of Yugoslavia were a primeval wilderness. But cultural considerations are here a weak basis for national claims because the ties of race, language, and political faith are stronger than the ties of culture, even when long established. The people do not wish to accept Italian sovereignty. The relations with Italy, sustained in a former age, were localized and on a small territorial scale. Today, with large interior populations and trade organized on a world scale, the coast has to be considered, not from the standpoint of ports and overseas trade alone, but from the standpoint of the hinterland, its peoples, and their need for coastal outlets. Dalmatia, with a population of 635,000, contains only 18,000 Italians, and of these 11,700 are in the Zara district alone, with the result that in the final settlement Zara was placed under Italian sovereignty. Though Fiume was at first made a free city with direct territorial connection with Italy, it passed under Italian sovereignty by special arrangement in 1924. Italy also obtained the Pelagosa Islands in the mid-Adriatic and the island of Lagosta at the southern end of the Dalmatian chain (Fig. 124), as well as the northerly Dalmatian islands of Cherso, Lussin, and Uni (Fig. 117, page 350.)

Thus Italy's long deferred hope to secure complete control of the Adriatic was realized. The Adriatic is in truth *mare nostro*, or "our

sea," as the Italians have been accustomed to call it; for Yugoslavia's fleet is almost negligible in size, her hold upon the sea feeble. Only a few naval bases are available as rendezvous for the armed ships that control Yugoslavia's fishing industry, supervise the customs arrangements, and protect the wharves. Italy gains predominance in the Adriatic in fulfillment of a principle that has won general consent — that it would be unwise to have two equally strong navies on opposite sides of the narrow Adriatic Sea.



FIG. 124. The Italian approach to Yugoslavia at Lagosta near the southern end of the Dalmatian Islands (treaty of Rapallo, November 1920.) The land mass at the upper right-hand corner is a part of Dalmatia; that in the lower left-hand corner is a part of Italy. The width of the Adriatic is here only 60 miles.

Italy's latest démarche in Albania (second treaty of Tirana, Italy-Albania, 1927) has again brought the Adriatic question into prominence (page 394). Following upon the first treaty of Tirana (1926) an Albanian National Bank was set up, virtually as an agency of a group of Italian banks; and a Society for the Economic Development of Albania under Italian control has since lent money on terms that give Italy a permanent mortgage on Albania and a firm hold on current revenues. A road-building program followed that has no conceivable object to serve except military convenience. In view of the poor roads and few railways in Yugoslav territory east and north of Albania, Italy has in effect extended her military power across the Adriatic right to the Yugoslav border. In addition she has armed, uniformed, and officered the Albanian forces as an adjunct of the Italian Army. This succession of events leaves Yugoslavia as hard pressed as if already in a state of war. Italy has by every act invited resistance. Without the intervention of the great powers a Balkan conflict cannot be long delayed.

INTERNAL COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL PROBLEMS

We turn now to the domestic economy of Yugoslavia. Its resources are poorly balanced. The northern half, like Hungary, has an excess of food supply over consumption. The Danube offers a means for local commerce; but for export other than to Bulgaria and Rumania its course is too roundabout, and it leads away from rather than towards the great industrial centers of Europe. It strengthens the capital to have streams converge upon it, but the economic life of the whole country would be better served if the streams ran toward the Adriatic

instead of away from it. Yugoslavia is poor in coal; the production does not exceed 4,150,000 tons a year. Of other commercial minerals, Yugoslavia has important deposits of manganese and iron. Slavonia has lead mines capable of further development. There are extensive forests and water-power resources; but neither of these can be utilized effectively without an extension of the present railways.

Like all the other new states of central Europe, Yugoslavia has its share of land problems, owing to the dissatisfaction and poverty of the peasantry, who suffered terribly in the war. In Hercegovina the farm holdings as a rule are uniformly small. In Bosnia, Croatia, and Slavonia the land not held in common by villages or by landowners of moderate means was possessed largely by the nobility. The new land laws of Yugoslavia have distributed the hereditary estates of the new territories and the crown and communal lands of southern Serbia among nearly 350,000 landless peasant families. There is now a great deal of discontent among former owners as well as among dissatisfied peasants who want still larger holdings. As a result the farmers as a class have sought to form a separate political party for the extension of their rights.



FIG. 125. The complex ethnography of the Banat and the Bačka districts, according to Cvijić, *Carte ethnographique des régions septentrionales Yougoslaves*, 1 : 1,000,000, 1919.

PLATE II

KINGDOM OF THE SERBS CROATS AND SLOVENES

SCALE 1:3,750,000

50 25 0 50 100 150 KILOMETERS

25 0 50 100 MILES

GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS

ALTITUDES

Meters: 1500, 500, 200, Poljes and Basins

I Agriculture of Mediterranean type

II Mountain Pastoral

III Agriculture of Central European type

IV Pannonic wheat-growing area

1 Coal

2 Bauxite

3 Copper

4 Zinc

5 Iron

A. Hoen & Co.

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The Geographical Review, Vol. XV, No. 1, 1925, Plate II

KINGDOM OF THE SERBS CROATS AND SLOVENES

SCALE 1:3,750,000

50 25 0 50 100 150 KILOMETERS

25 0 50 100 MILES

DENSITY OF POPULATION

By arrondissements, Census of January 31, 1921

PER SQUARE KILOMETER

under 15	15 - 25	25 - 40	40 - 55	55 - 70	70 - 100	over 100

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The Geographical Review, Vol. XV, No. 1, 1925, Plate II

SE

RELIGIONS

By communes, Census of January 31, 1921

PERCENT	GREEK ORTHODOX	ROMAN CATHOLIC	PROTESTANT	UNIATE	MOHAMMEDAN
75-100					
50-75					
Under 50, plurality in population					

KINGDOM OF THE SERBS CROATS AND SLOVENES

SCALE 1:3,750,000

50 25 0 50 100 150 KILOMETERS

25 0 50 100 MILES



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KINGDOM OF THE SERBS CROATS AND SLOVENES

SCALE 1:3,750,000

50 25 0 50 100 150 KILOMETERS

25 0 50 100 MILES



LANGUAGES

By communes, Census of January 31, 1921

PERCENT	SERB CROAT SLOVENE	OTHER SLAV	ALBANIAN	GERMAN	RUMANIAN	MAGYAR	TURKISH
75-100							
50-75							
Under 50, plurality in population							

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The Geographical Review, Vol. XV, No. 1, 1925, Plate II

THE TREATMENT OF MINORITY POPULATIONS

Like the other Balkan states, as well as Poland and Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia was required by her associates at the Peace Conference of Paris to sign a separate minorities treaty with the Allies. It was the thought of the Allied powers that the signing of such a treaty would help to establish liberty of speech, press, and religion, and remove one of the causes of war. The minorities treaties are alike in all essentials. They differ from state to state only in that special provisions are made for special cases. Since Poland has many Jews and the others a relatively small number, special provisions were made for the Jews in Poland. In Yugoslavia special provisions were made for the Moslems (who may have a head of the church within the state), and for the special protection of cemeteries and religious establishments. The minorities treaties remove all restrictions upon the use of languages, upon the exercise of any religion not injurious to public morals, and upon the press, public meeting, etc. All racial, linguistic, and religious minorities have the right to establish, manage, and control at their own expense charitable, religious, and social institutions, schools, etc. The national government may make the official language obligatory in all the schools, if it provides adequate facilities for other languages used by its constituent peoples.

Among the minority populations, only the "Macedonians" have given serious trouble. A Bulgar element, turned outlaw, fled to Bulgarian soil, whence raids have been made upon Serbian Macedonia. Repeated difficulties between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria have resulted in grave threats of wider international complications; for Bulgaria continues to press for boundary alterations that will return to her a part of Macedonia. The Magyar element in the country north of the Danube likewise provides Hungarian nationalists with an argument for a revision of the boundaries (Fig. 125). But the whole tendency — as the Locarno and later treaties indicate — is now to accept the boundaries established in 1919. Commercial relations and minority rights are being worked out in a manner that will steadily diminish the inevitable difficulties that arise where the boundaries sever peninsulas of population that would like to keep their old cultural and political associations.[1]

[1] In this connection one should note the treaty signed at Sèvres (10 August 1920) between Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania on the one hand and the Allied powers on the other, which assured sovereignty to the former group over the territories "recognized as belonging to them." This was done to complete the settlement of territorial problems in southeastern Europe, upon which they were all then engaged, in opposition to Turkey.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

RUMANIA WITHIN ITS NEW FRONTIERS

The life and history of the Rumanians is closely associated with the Carpathian valleys and bordering plains. Their settlements extend from within the edge of the Hungarian plain eastward to the Black Sea, and throughout the valleys of the southern Carpathians as far south as the Iron Gate of the Danube. Farther north they have long occupied the Bessarabian foothill region of the Carpathians. In the Timok valley in Serbia south of the Danube river, there is a small area of Rumanian speech. In Transylvania, a region that is deep notched by rivers, the inhabitants live in farms and villages on the narrow valley floors and on flat-topped ridges and spurs where pasture abounds. Most of the Rumanian folk live on the Moldavian-Wallachian plain between the Carpathians and the Danube.

More than 80 per cent of the population live on farms. In the whole of Rumania (Fig. 129) there is a population of 16,000,000, and so completely do Rumanians occupy the land that there are only about 3,750,000 non-Rumanian peoples included within the present boundaries: 1,500,000 Magyars, 400,000 Germans, 1,100,000 Ukrainians, and 750,000 Jews. It is a compact and virile nation, ranking (roughly) with Czechoslovakia in present economic power.

THE ORIGINS OF THE RUMANIAN STATE

The rise of the Rumanian nation is an event of recent times. When the Turk occupied southeastern Europe, the ultimate defeat of the Rumanians led to the acknowledgment of homage to Turkey on the part of the ruling princes, but not the complete subjugation of their people. The nominal overlordship of the Turk continued until 1829, when, by the treaty of Adrianople, Czar Nicholas I of Russia obliged the Turkish government to grant practically complete autonomy to Moldavia and Wallachia, the two chief provinces of modern Rumania.

That the country of the Rumanians was never overrun by the Turk was due to the defensive wall of the Carpathians, rugged and forested, with few defiles, which kept the invader from entering Rumania by the Carpathian passes after his conquest of part of Hungary. And the broad and then unbridged Danube, its lower course bordered by wide, impassable reed swamps, was a protective moat at the edge of the fertile plains. After long effort the Turk gained access to the Rumanian plains, only to find the population fleeing before him to the



FIG. 126. Ethnography of the Rumanian region. From the British General Staff ethnographic maps of Europe, scale 1 : 1,500,000, with modifications from De Martonne, *Annales de Géographie*, March 1920. Key to numerals: 1, Rumanians; 2, Yugoslavs; 3, Bulgarians; 4, Turks; 5, Greeks; 6, Germans; 7, Ukrainians (Ruthenians); 8, Magyars; 9, Czechs, Slovaks; 10, Poles. Bessarabia was made a part of Rumania by treaty with the powers, but final settlement depends upon further negotiation with Russia (page 371).

mountains. Thus the infusion of Tatar blood in Rumania is very small. Thus likewise the Rumanians were spared those religious and national antagonisms between the various Christian populations which the Turk always stirred up in order to strengthen his own hold on subject races. The Rumanians therefore have had a greater national and cultural solidarity than any other Balkan people except the Greeks.

Russian political influence in Rumania is a condition of long standing. Peter the Great made a southwestward advance an object of imperial policy in the late 17th century, and it was Russian "protection" of

FIG. 127. The shaded areas are: 1, territory to be ceded to Austria-Hungary according to treaty of Bucarest signed by defeated Rumania with the Central Powers (1918) but never ratified; 2, to Bulgaria; 3, to the Central Powers. Carpathian boundary of treaty of Bucarest of 1918 according to 1918 edition of Stieler's *Hand-Atlas*. Oil localities after Draghicenu, *Geologische Übersichtskarte des Königreiches rumänien*, 1891; Redwood, *Treatise on Petroleum*, Vol. I, 1913; *Deutsche Rundschau für Geographie*, Vol. 24, 1901–02, p. 418.

Rumania following 1850 that led France and Great Britain to fear that Russia would take the place of Turkey in Balkan politics and the eventual control of the Dardanelles. Under Napoleon III, France began to work for the independence of Rumania and to thwart the ambitions of the Czar. To this day French cultural influence is strong in Bucarest. The Crimean War, which grew out of these rivalries, ended with the treaty of Paris (1856) by which Moldavia and Wallachia were freed from Russian influence. The two provinces were at last united (1861) under a common ministry and had thereafter one national assembly. The independence of the Kingdom of Rumania from both Russia and Turkey was finally acknowledged, but only after the loss of Bessarabia (formerly Rumanian) to Russia, following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878.

During the years from the Congress of Berlin (1878) to the period of the Balkan wars (1912–1913), Rumania was occupied in part with

questions of internal administration, and especially with difficulties relating to land tenure. There was also recurring fear that Russian domination would become overwhelming, and there were flurries of feeling against Hungary and Greece. But on the whole, Rumania was a spectator of the Balkan turmoil rather than a participant in it. She stayed out of the First Balkan War (1912); but she joined the coalition against Bulgaria which fought the Second Balkan War, and by the treaty of Bucarest (1913) acquired from Bulgaria the Dobruja, on her southeastern border.

Rumania entered the World War on the side of the Allies in 1916, and for a time her fate was in doubt. When German troops under Von Mackensen defeated the Rumanian army in Transylvania in December 1916, German armies streamed through the Carpathian passes and held a line athwart the Rumanian plain. By the terms of the treaty of Bucarest (1918), Rumania was to lose a strip of territory averaging five miles in width along the Carpathian frontier, including all the passes, observation posts, and valley heads that looked down upon the fertile plains and the capital city; and also valuable oil concessions (Fig. 127). Her losses were to include the Iron Gate of the Danube. All this would have made her defenseless in a future war with the Central Powers. By the armistice of 11 November 1918, Germany was forced to denounce the treaty of Bucarest. Thus Rumania had restored to her the Dobruja up to the boundary of 1913, and the way was opened for broad extensions of territory on both her eastern and her western frontiers.

THE PEOPLE OF RUMANIA

The Rumanians, or Wallachs

The Rumanians, or Wallachs (hence Wallachia), are of mixed race but of distinct speech, the Ruman, which is based on Low Latin. They claim to be descendants of the ancient Roman inhabitants of the frontier province of Dacia in the days of the Roman Empire.[1] They have absorbed Gothic, Tatar, and Slavic invaders, but pride in Roman ancestry has led Rumanian authors to eliminate Slavic words from their vocabulary and to make their language resemble the

[1] Scholarly opinion is divided on the subject, some holding that "the name Daco-Rumanians is nothing but a fiction." (*Peisker.*) Mussolini's apostrophe on the subject well expresses the sentimental point of view: "If the Column of Trajan which stands in the midst of our city is a living testimony of indestructible Roman remains in the Orient [Trajan's wall in Wallachia] the wolf of the Capitol, placed in the center of old Bucarest, attests with what filial love this glorious posterity still and ever regards the great Latin Mother."

FIG. 128. The Vlachs, or pastoral nomads of Rumanian affiliation, in the central Balkan lands. From British General Staff ethnic map, 1 : 1,500,000, 1918.

Latin more closely. Words relating to agricultural pursuits are generally of Slavic origin — an indication of the large amount of Slavic blood in the peasantry. Rumanian origin is less closely related to Roman legionaries and officials that once dwelt in the province or to nomad herdsmen of earlier times than to the early Slavs that swept westward over the plains in successive waves of migration and established a land-tilling peasant population. Latin influences among the people are still marked, however, although their form of Christianity is Byzantine, not Roman: they are nearly all adherents of the Greek Orthodox Church.

The mountains of Rumania are celebrated in Ruman verse and romance no less than in history. This is clearly understood if we but remember that for a time they were a place of refuge when Slav and Tatar successively held parts of the plain. The Rumanian shepherd folk came to know the passes, the mountain pastures, the secluded valleys, and the defensible gateways. Ever since they have kept their spiritual as well as their material connection with the mountains. Every summer cattle still are driven to the high, rich mountain pastures. Every winter many of them are driven down again to the shelter of the deeper valleys and the plain. Some Rumanians have a plains residence and a mountain residence, to fit their twin occupations of farmer and shepherd.

The Vlachs

Rumanian nomadism is seen in its purest form among the detached bands of people of Ruman speech that inhabit parts of Macedonia, Albania, and Thrace — the Vlachs, or Kutzo-Vlachs. Many of their villages are inhabited only in winter; in summer they roam the mountain pastures with their herds and flocks. Colonies of them, each with its own dialect, live in the Olympus ranges, in the upper Semeni and Devol valleys and at Frasheri in Albania, at Okhrida and Krushevo

and Monastir, in the Vardar valley in Macedonia, and along the Greco-Bulgarian frontier. Several times in the first decade of this century they were the cause of disputes between Rumania and Greece, when vigorous campaigns of Pan-Hellenism were waged in the Macedonian region.

Rumanians and Magyars in Transylvania

Their close historical association with the mountains has helped to weld together the Transylvanian peoples and those of Wallachia and Moldavia. In later years an irredentist movement arose, stimulated by Magyar oppression. The Rumanians of Transylvania were at length joined to their kinsmen on the eastern side of the mountains to form greater Rumania (1919). They constitute half of the population of Transylvania and are the largest single ethnic element there, the others being Magyars, Jews, Ruthenians, Slovaks, and Germans.

Transylvania has a population of 2,700,000, for the most part agricultural and pastoral, with a relatively small city element. The Rumanians of Transylvania are chiefly illiterate peasants, hillmen, and herdsmen whose permanent homes and villages are scattered along the narrow valley floors or in a belt of plains population just west of the mountains, at the eastern edge of the plain of the Tisa. Their western limit is marked by a number of important towns — Arad, Oradia Mare, and Temişoara in the Banat. It also corresponds closely to a belt of dense population (dense in contrast to the light population of the rest of Transylvania) which has increased the difficulty of separating these Rumanians from the Magyars of the plains. Travel and transportation from one valley to another proceeds, not over the intervening forested ridge, but down the valley to the plain and back again to a neighboring valley. The new boundary, established by the treaty of peace with Hungary, includes in Transylvania — that is, in Rumania — the railroads and towns at the edge of the plain. It should be noted that this arrangement has withdrawn from the commercial life of Hungary essential towns that still keep up their close relations of the past (Fig. 126). Magyars are here placed in great numbers under the rule of a people of lower culture. In some districts, especially in the towns, they are locally in the majority. Irredentism will almost surely follow, unless more good comes from the application of the minorities treaties (page 27) than can now be foreseen.

The antagonism between Magyars and Rumanians has been increased by religious differences, which always tend to reënforce differences of "race" and speech. Most of the Magyars are Roman



FIG. 129. Population density and boundaries of Rumania. The boundary of 1914 was on the Prut River, but Rumania now holds Bessarabia, a former province of Russia. The western boundary of Rumania as in 1914 is shown by a solid line. Her position there has been confirmed by treaty with Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, but not with either the United States or Russia. Adapted from De Martonne, *Annales de Géographie*, March 1920, supplemented by *Petermanns Mitteilungen*, 1913, Vol. I, Pl. 2. Key to place names not spelled in full on the map:

B.	Bender	I.	Ismail	T. M.	Târgul Mureș
Bi.	Bistritsa	K.	Kolomea	T. S.	Turnu Severin
Bo.	Botoșani	M.	Munkács	V.	Vidin
Br.	Brașov	S.	Satmar	Ve.	Versecz
C. M.	Carei Mari	S. M.	Sighetul Marmatsiei	V. K.	Velika Kikinda
H.	Hatseg	Su.	Sulina		

Catholics; the Germans are Roman Catholics or Lutherans; while the Rumanians are predominantly Greek Orthodox.

THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES

There are more than 750,000 Jews in Rumania, and there would be many more but for anti-Jewish laws that have led to a steady stream of emigration. In the past hundred years these laws, to the number of several score, have denied equality to the Jew in trades and handicrafts and in landholding, education, the professions, etc. To the Rumanian the problem looked much as the Japanese problem appears to a Californian. There was an underlying fear that most of the land would be owned by Jews unless restrictive measures were enforced.

The expulsion of Jews from Rumania and their persecution, induced the makers of the treaty of Berlin (1878) to demand of Rumania full citizenship for the Jew. Less than a thousand Jews were then naturalized, but in a few years the treaty provisions were abandoned altogether. One restriction after another diminished Jewish rights until all Jews were practically without standing under the law.

The Jews of Rumania offer a problem that has taken on an international character, now that Rumania has signed a minorities treaty with the Allied and Associated Powers (page 27). Mindful of the servitudes of the treaty of Berlin, she long refused to sign the treaty, and the utmost diplomatic pressure was necessary to secure the signatures of her representatives at Paris in 1919. Equality of treatment to the degree specified in the treaties places restrictions upon the action of a people in making laws or modifying their constitution that are really a limitation of national sovereignty respecting internal affairs. They are justifiable only if the League of Nations will see that the minorities do not become a privileged class and do not carry on ceaseless and unwarranted agitation. Linguistic differences will be perpetuated and even increased, for the state is compelled to countenance and even to develop the language of minorities. Irredentism cannot fail to be continued in these circumstances.

THE BORDER REGIONS [1]

There remain to consider certain other areas where people mainly of Rumanian speech have now come under one national flag—Bukovina, the eastern Banat, and Bessarabia. There is also to be taken into account the Dobruja region, in Rumanian possession since the end of the Second Balkan War (1913).

Bukovina

Bukovina, with an area of 4000 square miles, was a crown province of Austria at the opening of the World War. Though Austria held it after 1777, its people are chiefly Rumanians, Ruthenians, and Germans. Rumanians spread northward from their plains country, which is continuous with that of Bukovina, until they came to number a third of the population, about 275,000 out of a total of 800,000. The Ruthenians spread southward from Galicia and now constitute more than a third of the total, or about 300,000. The Germans, about 170,000 in number, came as artisans and traders from Transylvania and Galicia.

[1] In addition to the territorial gains mentioned in this section, Rumania receives by treaty the island of Ada-Kalessi in the Danube, a condition being that the island be demilitarized.

The treaty of St. Germain (with Austria) allotted to Rumania all of Bukovina except the territory crossed by the railroad running from Zaleszczyki to Kolomea; but the allotment is made on condition that Rumania keep faith with the Allies. The small portion of Bukovina left out of Rumania is given to Poland, to include an important railroad junction on the Polish frontier.

Fig. 130. Bukovina is now part of Rumania, except for the northwest corner, allotted to Poland.

The land is densely populated — at least 300 to the square mile of cultivated land — but the cultural level of the people is low. According to Austro-Hungarian statistics, illiteracy was higher here than anywhere else in the monarchy except Dalmatia. A third of the land is arable, rich in agricultural and pastoral resources; half of it is forested.

The Eastern Banat

In the territorial settlements of Europe, the disposition of the Banat was a question in which Rumania and Yugoslavia had an equal interest with Hungary (page 361). It seemed impracticable to assign the whole region to any one of the three claimants; yet to separate the Rumanians of the eastern Banat from the Serbs, Magyars, and Germans, who live in the western half of the district, in a measure disorganizes the commercial life of the region.

The Banat is a rich farming country, with many railways and towns. It is just such a region as a rough hill country, like Serbia, would wish to obtain to supplement a deficiency of cereals. The language distributions are shown in Figure 126. They indicate clearly that Rumanian speech is dominant in the two eastern counties of Krassó-Szörény and Temes, while Torontál on the west is chiefly Serb. It should be noted that the new north-south boundary in the Banat cuts across all the westward-flowing streams and also the railways and irrigation canals. Agreements between Rumania and Serbia are intended to maintain and develop the canals for the benefit of both countries.

The Dobruja

The Rumanian occupation of the Dobruja, the southern part of which is almost exclusively Bulgarian in population, invites future trouble. Rumania got control of a large part of the Dobruja region in 1878 (treaty of Berlin), and thereafter expropriated land on a large scale for the benefit of Rumanian colonists, making the peasants pay for what was left to them. Many property owners were reduced to poverty; others emigrated to America, Bulgaria, Russia, and Turkey, and a country theretofore prosperous was thrown into disorder. The same methods were followed after 1913, when, by the treaty of Bucarest which closed the Second Balkan War, Rumania won a slice of Bulgarian territory in the Dobruja.

Bessarabia

Bessarabia is the region between the Prut and the Dniester. Its population of 2,700,000 is composed of more than 1,000,000 Rumanians, 900,000 Ukrainians, scattered German colonists (Fig. 128), and 300,000 Jews. The Rumanians live in northern Bessarabia, on the broad hilly spurs of eastern offshoots of the Carpathians between the Dniester and the Prut. The flat, marshy, treeless tracts along the Prut and at the mouths of the Danube are occupied by Cossacks and Tatars. The mixture of races and the historical changes of ownership record the repeated migrations that passed over Bessarabia on the part of Huns, Slavs, Bulgars, Magyars, Tatars, and others as they pushed into central Europe along the coast of the Black Sea. It was long the seat of rivalry between Russia and Turkey, and in 1812 at the close of a six years' war between the two countries Russia obtained Bessarabia, which then formed the eastern part of Moldavia. It is asserted by Rumanians that the country was overwhelmingly Rumanian in language and sympathy in 1812 and that it would still be so had not Russia begun a process of Russification, including colonization by Russian folk.[1] If Russia had possessed the land for centuries and if Russians formed the undoubted majority of the population today the question of title would wear a wholly different aspect. Rumania declares that her people were divided by the cession of Bessarabia to Russia, that the nationality of Bessarabians was altered by force, and that Rumania's claim to the territory on grounds of race and self-determination is far clearer than the claim of Russia based on the exercise of political sovereignty during the past century.

[1] In the order of their size the five leading population elements of Bessarabia are Moldavians, Little Russians, Jews, Great Russians, and Bulgarians.

FIG. 131. Ethnography of Bessarabia. From *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 2, 1924, page 663.

The problem is further complicated by events that followed the outbreak of revolution in Russia in 1917 and 1918. Like other Russian border elements to be described on later pages, the Bessarabians wanted an autonomous government, and early in 1918 there was organized and continued for a few months the "Independent Moldavian-Bessarabian Democratic Republic." This hastily assembled and short-

lived government was at once faced by division. Bolshevist elements leaned toward Russia or wished Bessarabia to be an independent republic; opposed to them were conservatives who sought to unite or ally Bessarabia with Rumania. Eventually the Bessarabian Diet adopted a resolution providing for a provincial autonomy, respect for the rights of minorities, representation in the Rumanian Council of Ministers, personal liberty, etc. Thus Bessarabia became a part of Rumania and was occupied by Rumanian troops, who still patrol the Dniester. Under the terms of a covenant between Rumania and Russia, signed in November 1923 and providing for relations between the opposite banks of the river, mixed commissions settle conflicts, pending a final settlement of the boundary question.

Naturally Rumania sought to validate her title to Bessarabia by securing the recognition and support of her allies, principally Great Britain and France. To that end a treaty was signed in 1920 by Rumania on the one hand and Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan on the other. By its terms Rumania receives Bessarabia, minority rights are to be safeguarded, boundary questions are to be settled by the Council of the League of Nations, and upon Rumania falls the responsibility for the Bessarabian share of the Russian public debt and other debts allotted to Bessarabia. It was provided that Russia would ultimately be invited to sign the treaty, and that if questions arise in consequence of the transfer of territory they are to be arbitrated by the Council of the League of Nations, though Rumanian sovereignty is not to be called into question. But Great Britain did not ratify the treaty until 1922, for there were delicate Russian negotiations to be considered. France delayed still longer, and ratified in 1924 only in the face of vigorous protest from Russia and after reminding Russia that the latter had always been the first to declare its adherence to the principle of the self-determination of peoples, the Bessarabian case in the Rumanian view being comparable to that of Estonia or Finland. Before the Bessarabian treaty came into effect it was necessary to secure an additional signature, since it was provided that the treaty was valid only after three ratifications had been deposited. Italian ratification, the third in succession, was delayed until March 1927. Thus Rumania had to wait seven years for ratification of a title which Russia refuses to recognize and which certainly will become the object of dispute in the future.

The Bessarabians themselves are far from being of one mind concerning their relations with Rumania. Of the total population of possibly 2,000,000, Rumanians number probably more than half, the

remainder being Russians, who form possibly a fourth of the population, Jews, Bulgars, Germans, and Turks. When a change of régime comes into effect people look for immediate results. They expect their economic situation to be improved, for their chief concern is personal liberty, the opportunity to possess and cultivate land, railroads and markets that will provide them with necessary supplies. Unfortunately a number of dry years in succession severely limited Bessarabian crops. The Rumanian administration was at first confused, and the Rumanian government was naturally blamed for resulting hardships. The costs of living rose and interest rates also. The division of the large estates among the peasants reduced production in spite of government efforts to encourage coöperative societies that might take the place of the marketing system of the more efficient landlords of former times. Meanwhile Russia was not inactive. A Moldavian Soviet Republic was organized in 1924 just east of the Dniester. The object of this wholly artificial creation was to advertise the blessings of autonomous government to the Bessarabians west of the Dniester and to establish close by a center of Soviet propaganda. Only by agreement between Russia and Rumania can the Bessarabian question be settled; for the country is now held not by the stronger but by the weaker power, and the stronger power insists that sooner or later it will take by force what diplomacy cannot yet obtain.

Rumanian relations with Russia are colored by the fear of weaker Rumania that invasion will come, not merely because of the occupation of Bessarabia but because of the threat of Russian invasion from which Poland suffered in 1920. Realizing their mutual interest in limiting Russia on the west and safeguarding their extended eastern frontiers, Rumania and Poland mutually engaged by treaty in 1926 to assist each other in maintaining the territorial integrity and present political independence of the two countries. They engaged to come immediately to each other's assistance in case one or the other is attacked without provocation, and they are not to conclude a separate armistice or peace in such an eventuality. To coördinate their efforts in respect to Russia the two countries agree to consult each other on questions of foreign politics of interest to both and not to make an alliance with a third party without consulting each other. In similar fashion Rumania and France in the same year provided by treaty for mutual assistance in case of danger or unprovoked attack by a third party and agreed to consult each other in case there is before them *a threatened modification of the political status of present-day Europe*. Russia has

protested vehemently against the treaty, since it permits Rumania to prolong its possession of Bessarabia; for France made no reservation in the treaty concerning that province. To Russia the action of France encourages the aggressive tendency of Rumania and lessens the chances of the pacific settlement of the Bessarabian dispute.

THE LAND QUESTION

As in all central-European countries, the peasant class of Rumania is concerned about new privileges in the occupation and use of land once held in the form of large estates. A limited number of landlords long kept the farming peasantry in virtual slavery as in Hungary and Russia. The system began to be undermined in 1864 when many large estates, among them the holdings of the monasteries, were confiscated and peasant families were given farms between $7\frac{1}{2}$ and 15 acres in extent. More than 400,000 peasants shared in the distribution of 4,000,000 acres. But the farms were still too small, in general, for the needs of peasant families, and in 1889 the government divided all the state domains — about one third of the total area of the country — into small parcels which were sold to peasant families. In 1907 the peasants still felt themselves so poor that they broke into revolt, and at the beginning of the World War the disorders were again repeated, each revolt ending in new action by the government to divide some of the remaining estates and better the lot of the farmer. In 1912 there were 3755 estates, while the peasant holdings, numbering more than 1,000,000, were still too small for the needs of the population. Nevertheless, the process of land division had gone so far that the Rumanian rulers were justifiably confident of an orderly people when Bolshevism overran the countries on either side.

By the law of 1918 all cultivable lands held in large estates, whether by private individuals, corporations, or the Crown, were to be expropriated in their entirety.[1] A similar fate befell the rural properties of subjects of foreign states and absentee landlords. By the law of 1921 these provisions were extended to the newly added territories of Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina. A sliding scale was adopted: the larger a man's estate, the more he could keep. In Transylvania the minimum that a proprietor may be allotted is less and the maximum

[1] An exception to the general rule of land distribution in Rumania is found in the area inhabited by the Szeklers, where small landholdings are the rule, and have been so for hundreds of years. In the 12th century free Magyars colonized the region. There came a first liberation of serfs in the same region in 1848, a process that was completed in 1861. Altogether, about 1,200,000 acres, or one half the arable land in the possession of big landowners of the region, was divided among the peasants.

that he may claim is more than in the old kingdom, and the peasantry had smaller assignments. Preference was given to those peasants who had served in the Second Balkan War of 1913, or those who had served in the World War, and to small cultivators with properties less than 2 acres in extent. Colonization zones were authorized for those who could not be supplied with land by other means. Thus Rumania has been put in the way of rapid evolution in its system of land ownership with less disturbance than in many other sections of central Europe, because not more than half the land that came into the hands of the peasant was acquired at the expense of large estates. The rest had been previously worked by peasants, as tenants, who continued to operate the same ground though under a change of title. Not more than 14 per cent of the total agricultural area of the old kingdom of Rumania will still be in the hands of the large proprietors when the present process of expropriation has been completed. The maximum area that an owner can retain under most favorable considerations is 200 acres. The reduction of the large estates cannot go below a minimum of about 40 acres. The government announces increased general prosperity on the whole, partly as a result of land division, partly as a result of the post-war development of agricultural coöperative societies for the improvement of cultivation and the joint purchase of implements, seed, live stock, etc.

The new land laws have created a political problem of magnitude in Transylvania. The government of Hungary has come to the support of the large Magyar landowners of Transylvania, who have been obliged almost as a class to relinquish their holdings in favor of a Rumanian peasantry. The Magyars see only political discrimination in this act, whereas Rumania views it as merely the uniform and logical administration of agrarian land reforms, such as it has put into effect in principle throughout the Rumanian realm. The dispute would have less violent results were it not for the fact that former landowners are compensated on a low scale and by government bonds that have very low market value. Rumania opposes the principle of arbitration or of reference to the League of Nations, since it considers agrarian reform to be a domestic matter and maintains that to submit its system to outside judgment is to qualify its own sovereignty. Hungary asserts that its chief complaint is not the land law itself but the illegal confiscations and unjust appraisals of Rumanian officials. The recent recommendation of the League of Nations in favor of the Hungarian landowners clearly shows the discriminatory nature of recent Rumanian land legislation in Transylvania.

RUMANIAN AND MAGYAR

Relations between Rumania and Hungary are not guided solely by considerations of territory lost by Hungary in the Transylvania region. They also reflect the contrast between the Magyar industrial, landholding, and former governing class and a relatively low-grade Rumanian population that now has political ascendency. Finally there is recalled the effects of mutual invasion. Béla Kun, the Bolshevist leader at Budapest in a short-lived Red régime, crossed the Allied demarcation line in 1919, in violation of the armistice terms, and attempted to regain Transylvania with the object of establishing direct communication with Russia. The Rumanians assert losses of 5000 killed in the short period of fighting that followed on the Rumanian side of the demarcation line. Rumania feels that Europe owes her a debt of gratitude for having destroyed Bolshevism in Hungary when the western powers did nothing to stop the advance of Béla Kun. When the Rumanian army drove back the Hungarian army Budapest was taken and a large section of the country was swept of railway rolling stock, food, live stock, and war materials, as partial compensation for war losses and for the cost of the immediate campaign. In justification of their acts the Rumanians point to the contrast between Rumania and the other central states of Europe, maintaining that only by helping themselves could they have avoided either calamitous internal disorder or foreign invasion.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE

Confronted by hostile states both east and west, Rumania sought aid not only from France and Great Britain, powerful though distant allies, but also from Poland and Yugoslavia as well, since the latter were threatened equally by Hungary with possible division following the restoration of Hapsburg rule. An alliance (the Little Entente) of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia was the natural outcome. The conditions surrounding the entente, its development during the years that followed, and its present degree of effectiveness are discussed in the chapter on Czechoslovakia, for it was owing chiefly to the activity of Premier Beneš of that country that the alliance came into being.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

BULGARIA UNDER THE TREATY OF NEUILLY

In spite of a deficiency of mineral wealth, the Bulgarian nation had risen notably in the twenty-five years before the First Balkan War (1912). At least some coal and iron mines had been opened, a few industries had developed, railways had been extended, the commerce of the state had increased 500 per cent. A population of more than 3,000,000 in 1888 had grown to 4,300,000 by 1910. To this number, Bulgaria added 374,400 people as a result of the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913.

From the time when the Turk overran Bulgaria, even before the capture of Constantinople in 1453, down to 1885, the northern Bulgars in the principality of Bulgaria, beyond the Balkan Range, were separated from those in the southern province of Rumelia. The inhabitants of northern Bulgaria obtained their autonomy in 1878 by the treaty of Berlin, which ended the Russo-Turkish War; but their national history in modern times may be said to date from 1885, when by the revolution of Philippopolis they were joined to eastern Rumelia. From that time onward, though the Bulgars were still under the suzerainty of the Turkish sultan, the growth of national feeling was rapid. Finally, in 1908, taking advantage of the Young Turk Revolution in Constantinople, the Bulgarian prince proclaimed himself Czar of the Bulgarians, and the country became completely independent of Turkey for the first time since the Turkish occupation.

BULGARIAN AMBITIONS AND THEIR OUTCOME

When Bulgaria became independent she was in an excellent position for growth into a modern state. The problem of the great landowner had never vexed either the peasant or the government; small farmers had always been in possession of the soil. There had consequently grown up a spirit of independence that in turn developed intense patriotism and willingness to sacrifice for the national security and power. All would have been well but for the growth of an excessive nationalistic ambition. Bulgaria wanted to control the whole Balkan peninsula. Had her expansion been only at the expense of the Turk, the world would have applauded; but it was to be also at the expense of neighboring powers as worthy as herself. It was inevitable that such a course should end in disaster.

The next step in the Bulgarian drama was taken in 1912, when Bulgaria made a secret treaty with Serbia, which was soon followed

by similar treaties with Greece and Montenegro. The object of the four states was to drive the Turk out of the Balkans and if possible into Asia, and thus not only liberate the persecuted Christian populations of Macedonia but also end the Turkish menace at their own doors. Each state agreed to put into the field a given number of troops and faithfully to play its part in taking the military strongholds, closing the ports, and facing the main Turkish armies that were concentrated in and about Constantinople.

The First and Second Balkan Wars

These arrangements were made when Turkey was embarrassed by the war with Italy (1911–1912). That war ended with Turkey enfeebled and discouraged. Disorders broke out again in Macedonia and Albania. In October 1912, hostilities were begun by the Balkan states. The armies of Turkey, poorly equipped and disease-stricken, numbered less than 500,000; those of the Balkan allies were nearly 800,000, of which number Bulgaria alone had 350,000 and Serbia 250,000. The Balkan states had elements of strength not revealed in the muster rolls: their people were fighting upon their own soil for an independence that had become a primary patriotic object.

The first contest came at Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse. The latter was captured, the former besieged. Farther south, on the line from Lule Burgas to Bunarhissar (Fig. 181, page 498), came the decisive battle of the war, a fierce four-day contest on a front of more than twenty miles, with losses of 50,000. The power of the Turk was broken. He retreated to Chatalja, twenty-five miles from Constantinople, and there fought out the winter, while the Montenegrins captured Scutari in northern Albania, the Greeks captured Yannina, and the Serbo-Bulgar armies took Adrianople. Earlier in the war, the Greeks had captured Salonika and the Serbs had overrun Macedonia. The Turk retained only a toe-hold in Europe.

In the ensuing treaty of peace (London, May 1913), Turkey relinquished all territory west and north of a straight line from Enos on the Ægean to Midia on the Black Sea (Fig. 132). She also gave up Crete to Greece and permitted the great powers to determine the final disposition of the Ægean islands and of Albania. The first object of the war had been attained.

The whole world had recognized the heroic work and brilliant success of the Balkan armies. There was therefore general dismay when the


RUMANIA
BULGARIA
SERBIA
MONTENEGRO
ALBANIA
GREECE
TURKEY
BUKHAREST (BUCAREST)
BELGRADE
SOFIA
SALONICA (SALONIKA)
CONSTANTINOPLE
Constantza (Constantsa)
Silistria (Silistra)
Varna
Burgas
Midia
Brusa
Panderma
SEA OF MARMARA
Dobrich (Dobrich)
Shumla (Shumen)
Tirnovo (Trnovo)
Plevna
Vidin
Nish
Philippopolis
Mustafa Pasha
Adrianople
Enos
Dede Agach (Dedeagach)
Thasos
Samothrace
Imbros
Lemnos
Hagios Strati
Serres (Serres)
Kavalla
Monastir
Prisrend (Prizren)
Scutari
Tirana
Durazzo
Berat
Valona
Yanina (Yannina)
Arta
Corfu
Cattaro
Antivari
Novibazar (Novi Pazar)
Serajevo (Sarajevo)
Morava R.
Danube R.
Drina R.
Vardar R.
Struma R.
Maritza R.
Tunja R.
Black Drin R.
White Drin R.
Lake Ochrida
Lake Prespa
Lake Janina
Mt. Olympus
Mt. Athos
Mt. Pelion
Mt. Ossa
Mt. Pindus
Mt. Golem
Mt. Tomor
Mt. Lovcen
Mt. Rhodope
Mt. Despoto
Mt. Perister
Mt. Kaimakchalan
Mt. Shar
Mt. Korab
Mt. Dibra
Mt. Lubetrn
Mt. Mokra
Mt. Kom
Mt. Kapaonik
Mt. Kopaonik
Mt. Rudnik
Mt. Avala
Mt. Cer
Mt. Fruska Gora
Mt. Vlasina
Mt. Suva Planina
Mt. Rtanj
Mt. Kucaj
Mt. Kraljevica
Mt. Ibar
Mt. Ivanica
Mt. Zlatibor
Mt. Tara
Mt. Maglic
Mt. Volujak
Mt. Prenj
Mt. Cvrsnica
Mt. Cabulja
Mt. Orjen
Mt. Durmitor
Mt. Bjelasica
Mt. Prokletije
Mt. Sar
Mt. Kozjak
Mt. Kitka
Mt. Kajmakcalan
Mt. Nidze
Mt. Paiko
Mt. Belasica
Mt. Pirin
Mt. Rila
Mt. Vitosha
Mt. Ossogovo
Mt. Balkan
Mt. Stara Planina
Mt. Sredna Gora
Mt. Rhodope
Mt. Despoto
Mt. Perister
Mt. Kaimakchalan
Mt. Shar
Mt. Korab
Mt. Dibra
Mt. Lubetrn
Mt. Mokra
Mt. Kom
Mt. Kapaonik
Mt. Kopaonik
Mt. Rudnik
Mt. Avala
Mt. Cer
Mt. Fruska Gora
Mt. Vlasina
Mt. Suva Planina
Mt. Rtanj
Mt. Kucaj
Mt. Kraljevica
Mt. Ibar
Mt. Ivanica
Mt. Zlatibor
Mt. Tara
Mt. Maglic
Mt. Volujak
Mt. Prenj
Mt. Cvrsnica
Mt. Cabulja
Mt. Orjen
Mt. Durmitor
Mt. Bjelasica
Mt. Prokletije
Mt. Sar
Mt. Kozjak
Mt. Kitka
Mt. Kajmakcalan
Mt. Nidze
Mt. Paiko
Mt. Belasica
Mt. Pirin
Mt. Rila
Mt. Vitosha
Mt. Ossogovo
Mt. Balkan
Mt. Stara Planina
Mt. Sredna Gora
Boundaries before the Balkan Wars
Boundaries after the Balkan Wars (Treaty of Bucharest, Aug. 10, 1913)
Contested zone according to the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty Feb. 29, 1912
Territory acquired after the Balkan Wars by
Rumania
Bulgaria
Serbia
Greece
Montenegro
ceded by Bulgaria
ceded by Turkey
Railroads: 1914; added since 1914
50 M.
ADRIATIC SEA
IONIAN SEA
AEGEAN SEA
ITALY

Balkan states began to fight over the division of former Turkish territory. The situation may be summarized thus:

(1) Bulgaria wanted and had been promised most of the captured territory.

(2) Serbia, blocked in Albania by the action of the great powers (they set up an independent Albania in 1913), had there lost a chance of access to the sea, and now wanted an outlet at Salonika. She therefore claimed a part of Macedonia.

(3) But Greek armies had captured the town of Salonika; Greece also wished a part of the Macedonian coast.

(4) Montenegro felt that she had received no substantial reward.

(5) Seeing Bulgaria gain territory elsewhere, Rumania urged that she be given the southern Dobruja at Bulgaria's expense.

Thereupon followed the Second Balkan War, in which Turkey joined Greece, Serbia, Rumania, and Montenegro against Bulgaria. The Turks retook Adrianople; the Rumanians seized the Dobruja and advanced to within twenty miles of Sofia, and Greeks and Serbs closed in on the west. After a two months' war (June–July 1913), Bulgaria was obliged to sign the treaty of Bucarest of 1913, whereby:

(1) Bulgaria gave up northern Macedonia to Serbia, including Üsküb and Okhrida.

(2) Salonika and southern Macedonia were given to Greece.

(3) Bulgaria retained the town of Strumitsa in eastern Macedonia and about seventy miles of the Ægean seacoast west of the Maritsa River, but not including the port of Kavalla.

(4) Montenegro got the western half of Novi Pazar.

(5) The southern Dobruja was ceded to Rumania.

Bulgaria made a separate treaty with Turkey, and the line between them was drawn along the west bank of the Maritsa as shown in Figure 134, thus shutting off Bulgaria from direct rail connection with the Ægean coast, except through Greek or Turkish territory.

But the losses and gains in territory were a small matter compared with the bitter hatreds that the war had caused. Each of the Balkan states was even more jealous of the others than before, and the Bulgar felt himself humiliated and outraged. The nation had lost the flower

FIG. 132. Changes of territory in the Balkans as a result of the First and Second Balkan wars. The Enos-Midia line, occasionally mentioned in the text, is merely a straight line joining Enos on the Ægean and Midia on the Black Sea. By the secret treaty with Serbia before the First Balkan War, Bulgaria had been promised Macedonia south of the contested zone shown on the map, which zone was reserved for eventual arbitration by the Czar of Russia. Note the additions to the railway net since 1914.


THE TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT OF BULGARIA, 1878 - 1919
1 : 15,000,000
1878
(July 13)
Creation of the Principality of Bulgaria under Turkish suzerainty.
Proposed boundary according to Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878)
1885
Union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria
1886
Recession of (1) Rhodope district (upper Krichma valley) and (2) Kirdjali district to Turkey.
(Bulgaria independent kingdom since Oct. 5, 1908)
1913
Acquisition of (1) Strumitsa valley, (2) Rhodope Mts. region, (3) access to Aegean Sea, (4) basin of Golyema R.
Loss of (5) southern Dobrudja.
1915
Acquisition of (1) Adrianople district and (2) left bank of Maritsa R.
1919
Loss of (1) Timok, (2) Tsaribrod, (3) Bosilegrad, (4) Strumitsa, (5) Adrianople districts, and of (6) access to Aegean Sea.
THE GEOGR. REVIEW; APR-MAY-JUNE 1920

FIG. 133. Note the expansion of Bulgaria toward the Ægean and her final exclusion therefrom by the treaty of Neuilly, 1919.

of its manhood to win Adrianople and Lule Burgas in 1912, and now these strongholds were again under Turkish sovereignty. Bulgaria sullenly waited for a chance to retaliate.

Bulgaria's Part in the World War

The opportunity came in the World War. In October 1915, after negotiations with both sides in an effort to sell her alliance to the highest bidder, Bulgaria joined Turkey and the Central Powers. Her active part in the war was confined to military operations near the Serbian and Greek frontiers. She became also a thoroughfare between the Danube and the Bosporus for German artillery, ammunition, and reënforcements for the Turks. German officers controlled her armies on the Salonika front. When the final Balkan drive of 1918 was carried out by the Allied armies, the Bulgar troops fled in disorder.

According to the terms of the treaty of Neuilly between Bulgaria and the Allied and Associated Powers (1919), Bulgaria:

(1) Renounced all rights to territory formerly held by her outside the boundaries shown on Figure 134.

(2) Agreed to protect alien minorities within her realm under terms laid down by the Allied and Associated Powers, and was assured like protection of Bulgarian minorities in neighboring states.

(3) Promised to reduce her army to 25,000 men, to destroy her vessels of war, to maintain no air forces, and to submit to restrictions laid down with respect to war materials.

(4) Agreed to pay 2,250,000,000 francs gold ($450,000,000), and acknowledged her obligation to contribute to the liquidation of the pre-war external Ottoman debt.

(5) Allotted to Greece, Rumania, and Serbia live stock to the number of 70,000 head by way of restitution for animals taken by Bulgaria during the war.

(6) Gave the Allied and Associated Powers most-favored-nation treatment and freedom of transit for goods and persons. She was guaranteed like freedom of transit to the Ægean.

WHAT BULGARIA NOW FACES

Like Germany and Austria, Bulgaria had the enormous task of meeting the conditions of peace after a military defeat and after the surrender of a great quantity of war material in compliance with the terms of the armistice; and this she had to do in the face of economic disorder that everywhere, even in the Allied countries, has followed hard upon the long and terrible strain of war. The treaty of Neuilly resulted in grave difficulties for her. Her people were profoundly discouraged.

Bulgaria is a country agriculturally well-favored, a land of farms, with no great mineral deposits, no large manufacturing towns. The population of the largest city, Sofia, hardly exceeds 100,000. The chief seaport, Varna, has about 40,000. The greater part of the population lives in a strip a hundred miles wide, south of the Danube. Aside from the fertility of the soil, coal is the chief natural resource. There are also small amounts of iron, copper, and zinc, though the deposits have been but little developed.

Naturally poor in resources, Bulgaria lost man power rapidly in the six years following 1912. The Balkan wars took tens of thousands of her best men. These wars and the World War piled up a huge national debt, which is now equivalent to the entire wealth of the country. It is impossible to calculate and impose revenues that will pay off this sum. Bulgaria is essentially bankrupt. Only the industry of her people and the fertility of the soil are left to her out of which to make a nation. The cost of her aggression at the end of the First Balkan War, and of her union with Germany from 1915 to 1918, was the complete failure of her unwise plans to dominate the Balkans, a terrible loss of life and property, and a heightened reputation for cruelty to non-Bulgarian people in territory occupied by her troops.

Bulgaria's neighbors have been given important groups of Bulgarian people: Greece in Thrace; Serbia in the Tsaribrod, Strumitsa, and Bosilegrad districts; and Rumania in the Dobruja. The case of the southern Dobruja is especially important. It became Bulgarian in 1878, is inhabited by Bulgarians and Turks to the number of 273,000, and was lost in 1913 owing to Rumanian aggression, against which weakened Bulgaria could not offer resistance. Rumania wished thus to obtain the included port of Balčik on the Black Sea.

On the other hand, we must remember:

(1) That in September 1915 Bulgaria agreed to join Austria-Hungary against Serbia, and in return was to receive a certain share of Serbian land and people.

(2) That Bulgarian authorities at one time declared that Serbia no longer existed, that it had become Bulgarian; closed schools and churches and even burned them; compelled the people to speak Bulgarian; and, like the Germans in Belgium and north-eastern France, levied fines and contributions, took away food, and ruined the country.

(3) That out of tens of thousands of Serbians interned in Bulgarian camps, at least half died.

(4) That Bulgarian outrages upon Greeks and Serbs — men, women, and children — were among the most hideous of the war.

An unexpected difficulty for Bulgaria comes from the large number of refugee Bulgarians from Thrace, Macedonia, and the Dobruja that fled when those regions were occupied by Allied troops. They feared heavy reprisals. And some of them well deserved punishment. They have not yet established themselves in Bulgaria, and their unsettled life, their restless mood, has affected their political and social views. They form one of the gravest of the internal problems of Bulgaria and even affected the carrying out of the provisions of the peace treaty, since it is from their ranks that lawless bands have been recruited for raids upon Serbian Macedonia. The Greco-Bulgarian conflict of 19–30 October 1925 had its cause in part in cattle thievery and boundary raiding. While the immediate difficulty was promptly handled by the League of Nations, the trouble can be permanently cured only by settling these refugees (at one time they numbered more than 200,000) on the land.

ACCESS TO THE ÆGEAN

By the treaty of San Stefano in 1878 there was to be created a greater Bulgaria, including most of Macedonia and a section of Ægean coast whose ownership has recently become a matter of intense interest to the Balkan powers. Fearing that the admission of Bulgaria to the Ægean would increase Russian control at Constantinople, the Congress of Berlin set the treaty of San Stefano aside. Turkey remained in possession of the Ægean coast. Though Bulgaria thus lost an outlet, she regained it through the First, only to lose it in consequence of the Second, Balkan War. By the treaty of Neuilly (1919) the Allied and Associated Powers insured an economic but not a territorial outlet to Bulgaria on the Ægean. When in 1920 the Allied powers turned the territory over to Greece, there was drawn up a so-called Thracian treaty, by the terms of which Bulgaria was to have free transit over the territory and through the ports of Thrace. Of that part of the coast which Bulgaria had formerly held, Bulgaria was also to have a permanent lease of a zone at Dedeagatch, declared a port of international concern. The government of the zone is in the hands of a mixed commission that administers Bulgaria's right of free transit, a right enjoyed also by Greece and the nationals of other powers associated in the League of Nations. At the Lausanne Conference of 1923, Bulgaria's rights in the Ægean were again discussed, and it was proposed by Bulgaria that she be allowed to build her own railways and develop her own port at Dedeagatch or at Makri close by. She declined the proposal that it become a free port with a railway administered



Fig. 134. Territorial losses of Bulgaria as a result of the World War. From the *Geographical Review*, June 1920.

by an international commission. The Greek offer of a Bulgarian zone in Salonika was also declined. Dedeagatch has direct railway connection, Kavalla has none, and the only other port on the coast is Porto Logos (Karagach), with no railway connection. All three ports need dredging. At present the matter is in a state of direct negotiation. On 19 October 1925 there was inaugurated at Salonika the Greek Free Zone, designed to give the other Balkan states, including Bulgaria, access to the Ægean Sea without restriction as to duties and with guarantees against seizure or search. To make use of the privilege there would be required the construction of a short link connecting the Greek and Bulgarian railway systems.

THE PRESENT BOUNDARIES

Bulgaria has also lost four areas on her western frontier: the Tsaribrod district, with 21,000 Bulgarians and practically no Serbs; the Bosilegrad district with 22,000 Bulgarians and no Serbs; the Strumitsa district, which is occupied by 25,000 inhabitants predominantly Bulgarian, mixed with Macedonians and a small number of Serbs; and the small area in the Timok valley on the northwest (Fig. 134). These areas were cut off on the ground that their possession by Bulgaria would threaten the railroad from Nish to Salonika in time of war. Cession of them brings the new boundary within thirty-five miles of Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, and puts the frontier just west of the Dragoman Pass.

In several instances the new boundaries of Bulgaria illustrate the local difficulties that may be caused by the passing of territory from one nation to another. For example, in western Thrace the Greek boundary runs along a line of hills north of Xanthi and Gümüljina, including the Karluk Mountains. It seems the best frontier if we start with the assumption that Greece must have the coastal strip. The region being mountainous and partly forested, it would appear to separate the people in the valleys on either side of the mountains. But it happens that the mountains provide valuable summer pastures for the herds and flocks of the plains dwellers to the south. Every autumn several hundred thousand head of live stock, chiefly sheep, are driven from the mountains to the plains. The new boundary breaks up this movement.

The political boundaries of the Balkans having been drawn reasonably close to the ethnic boundaries, a movement of population to make the correspondence still closer would seem to have a wholesome effect. To put people of the same race and religion under a common flag is

to prevent the starting of irredentist movements that arise in islands and peninsulas of people separated from their kinsmen on the other side of the boundary. The extraordinary hatred of one Balkan people for another, following two regional wars and the World War, will most surely be lessened only when sound economic revival adds its beneficent effects to those of migration. Hatreds are difficult to maintain in the face of profitable trade. Unless tendencies mitigating hatred are cultivated, the minorities treaties will be worthless; if natural tendencies towards friendship can be created, the minorities treaties will become obsolete.

There is being carried out in the Balkans an experiment in the transfer of peoples which will be of great practical interest as a means of reducing the problems of irredentism. By treaty between Greece and Bulgaria (1919), provision was made for the reciprocal and voluntary migration of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities. This has enabled Greeks living in Bulgaria, who desired to move into Greece, to do so under favorable conditions; and the same opportunity has been given to Bulgarians living in Greece, who desired to return to Bulgaria.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

THE ALBANIAN REGION

Albania is a mountainous country deep-cut by streams that flow out to the Adriatic. The mountain slopes are furrowed by sharp ravines, the streams run in entrenched valleys. The slopes are more rounded toward the south, more wall-like in inner Albania, where the highest mountains rise to more than 6500 feet. Flat lands or moderate slopes are confined to local basins, to old valley floors now left as benches and terraces on the higher slopes, to narrow sea-coast plains and deltas. Southern Albania is a region of ancient settlement with a once higher culture. Here a pastoral Illyrian people were driven toward the interior by Greek colonists in the 7th century B.C. Later came Romans who built a few walled cities near the sea. It is owing to Greek and Roman occupation, chiefly the latter, that roads were first built northward through the mountains and eastward into Macedonia. But the impassable nature of the country made foreign occupation a slow, difficult, and irregular process. With the downfall of the Roman Empire, city culture in Albania declined. Roman and Hellenic elements were displaced by Slavic intrusions. In the 14th century began the Ottoman invasions and a long struggle about the borders of Albania which ended in complete Mohammedan conquest in the 16th century.

The population today bears the stamp of its historic past. The primitive folk of early times has been largely submerged under Hellenic, Roman, Slav, and Ottoman influences. The language of the people shows hardly 10 per cent of pure Illyrian roots. Greek penetration on the south, Roman on the west, Slav on the north, and Ottoman over the whole country have given the population a varied ethnic character. Two chief groups of Albanians may be discerned, with marked differences in language and customs. North of the Semeni River are the Ghegs, an independent and physically well-formed element. South of the Semeni are the Tosks, of shorter stature and showing Greek characteristics in physique and temperament. Owing to the prevalence of malaria in the marshy lowlands of the coast, there is physical degeneration of the coastal folk of both groups. The most unsettled part of the country is northern Albania, whose scattered tribes are unruly to a high degree. Because of the broken character of the topography and the separation into isolated groups, organized life centers in the clan. As elsewhere in such an environment, there is a marked



FIG. 135. Albanian ethnography, religions, and boundaries. The region north of the Shkumbi River is typically Albanian. Note that all the principal towns, of which Koritsa is the largest, lie near the border of the country and have been occupied one after another by foreign powers most of the time since the First Balkan War (1912), despite the fact that Albania won its independence from Turkey in 1912.

spirit of local independence and a perpetuation of the ancient custom of the feud. Until recent years there were practically no roads except on the borders of the mountains and in the valleys. The only highroad in the country before 1914 was the one connecting Tirana, with a population of 14,000, with the port of Durazzo, with a population of 5000. Now there are 300 miles of roads serving 820,000 people in a territory a little smaller than that of Vermont and Connecticut.

Ruling an independent mountain people in a roadless country, the Turk made but poor progress in his five hundred years of control. The period of Mohammedan occupation is commonly described as one long process of decay, in contrast to the rise of Hellenic and Roman cultures. But in truth Greek and Roman influences were limited in their spread. Certainly Turkish control meant no progress, which is relatively the same thing as decline. Yet the Turks left their mark upon the whole country. In the interior of southern Albania a minaret rises in every town. Of the total population 66 per cent is Mohammedan, 12 per cent Roman Catholic, 21 per cent Greek Orthodox. However, the smaller non-Mohammedan elements have a political power far greater than their numbers might imply.

ECONOMIC STATUS

In a mountainous country with few roads, with no great cities (the largest, Koritsa, has but 25,000 inhabitants), and where a scattered and illiterate population is chiefly engaged in pastoral pursuits and a very primitive agriculture, we should expect a low order of economic development. Only 13 per cent of the people live in cities, 87 per cent in the country — not country closely tied to city as in a region of made roads and railroads, but country that must be traversed mainly over tracks and where cargoes are carried by animals. Most of the farming land is in the hands of a few wealthy proprietors and the tenure of the small farmer is insecure. Wool and skins, dairy products, olive oil, tobacco, and timber are the raw materials that constitute the basis of Albania's export trade. The country has practically no industries and no demand for imported fuel. Its imports are naturally manufactured goods of all sorts and food as well for the city populations. There is a growing trade with the United States, but Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia, in the order named, have far higher rank as sources of imports. In the case of exports the order is Italy, Greece, and the United States. Of goods imported into Albania, Italy supplies more than three fourths. Of the exports Italy takes more than one half.

It is the trade as well as the position of Albania that makes that country of outstanding interest to Italians. It will be seen from Figure 72 that Albania is just opposite the heel of the Italian boot. To Italians the Adriatic is an Italian sea. This is not to be thought of as evidence of Italian ambition only. We have noted former Roman influences on the eastern side of the Adriatic, and the marks of Italian culture are evident today in most of the coastal towns. It is as natural for Italy to claim predominance in the Adriatic as it is for the United States to claim primary interests in the Caribbean or Japan in the Far East. The United States declared in 1898, and has since maintained, that the affairs of Cuba are of vital concern to her, Cuba being a small and relatively weak country only 100 miles from Florida. Albania is about half this distance (45 miles) from Italy.

ALBANIA AS A POWER

The present political situation of Albania is the outgrowth of a rapidly moving series of events that began at the time of the First Balkan War, when the centuries-old grip of Turkey was loosed. The victorious Balkan allies divided between them the Turkish possessions up to the Enos-Midia line, shown in Figure 181 (treaty of London,



FIG. 136. Various proposed boundaries of Albania. The present boundary was demarcated in the field by an international commission. For detailed map see *L'Universo*, November 1926, page 915.

May 1913). At that time Albania was an ill-defined region, and the great powers insisted that they should determine its boundaries and its status. Austria wished to be free from the menace of Russian intrigue on the Adriatic; she feared the possibility of Serbia's gaining access to the Adriatic by absorbing Albania (with Russian support). But this was precisely one of the reasons why Serbia had been tempted to join Bulgaria and Greece in the First Balkan War for the overthrow of Turkish power in Europe. She was landlocked, and she wanted a window on the Adriatic or on the Ægean at Salonika. The dream of a Yugoslav state, with Dalmatia and Montenegro to furnish the desired outlet, had not then attained the shape of reality. The other great powers confirmed Austria-Hungary in her position, kept Serbia out of Albania and Dalmatia, and furnished her with an additional reason for embarking on the Second Balkan War.

Various boundaries were proposed for Albania in 1913, some widely extended to the eastward, others narrowly confined to a small tract near the coast with a center at Durazzo. All the lines were drawn from the standpoint of international interest rather than on the basis of tribal ties and economic needs. The powers concluded at that time that the

country was too small, its strategic value too great, to justify them in setting up an independent state. When they had attempted to do this in 1913 by putting upon the throne of Albania William of Wied, a German prince, it took only the outbreak of war in 1914 to bring about the flight of the monarch and a reversion to local government. The Austro-Hungarian armies overran Albania and for four years held a military line a little north of Valona.

In the midst of the World War the great powers planned to divide Albania, giving the northern part to Montenegro or to Yugoslavia (treaty of London, 1915); the central section was to become a self-governing Mohammedan state; the southern part, including Valona, was assigned to Italy. It was Italy who claimed a predominant influence, on grounds of strategy and national need. An Italian protectorate over Albania was announced in 1917 and forcible colonization, or Italianization, begun in southern Albania. The problem of relaxing the hold of Italy became of the first importance if Albania was to have an independent existence. After long negotiations between the powers allied with Italy in the World War, Italian claims were limited to the port of Valona and the island of Sasseno, at the mouth of the Bay of Valona. Thus Italy controls both sides of the narrow straits of Otranto and is enabled the better to protect her long coastline and to lessen the danger of attack by sea, a matter of acute interest to her, seeing that she has the densest population of all Mediterranean states and that her cities are largely on or near the coast.



Fig. 137. Schematic representation of proposed division of Albania according to the secret treaty of London, 1915, between Italy, Great Britain, France, and Russia.

It was impossible for Albania to contest the acts of her neighbors because she was not united. Her political institutions are elementary

and weak. She has no railroads to knit the country into a unit. There is no really strong national feeling on the part of the majority of the people. "Albania" still means territory, not a unified people or a government; and territory cannot have patriotism or devise a national program.

DIFFICULTIES OF MAINTAINING INDEPENDENCE

It is true that Albanian leaders have worked for the union of the Albanian people and that their efforts have resulted in the recognition of independence and admission to the League of Nations. But the process of making a unified state is extraordinarily difficult. In addition to the physical handicaps of nature, the cultural handicaps are severe. There are few newspapers. There is a high degree of illiteracy. Moreover, unifying processes are delayed in their action by the rivalries of bordering states, — Greece, Yugoslavia, and Italy, — who employ the traditional forms of political agitation. In the ensuing rivalry Italy has gained most. She has been aided also by the rival claims of local Albanian leaders, who have made many difficulties for the central government at Tirana. A change of government in 1924–1925 by revolutionary means put in power a former Prime Minister, Ahmed Zogu, who by borrowings from Italy (50,000,000 gold lire) permitted that country to gain a predominating influence in Albanian affairs. The proceeds of the loan are to be spent under Italian supervision by an Italian corporation. Albanian state monopolies came into Italian hands to secure the loan, and wide concessions were granted to Italian companies for the exploitation of forest and mineral products. An Albanian national bank was created with Italian capital. No one can believe that these economic advantages have no political import.

The treaty of Tirana between Italy and Albania preceded the economic and financial steps outlined above. It is dated 27 November 1926 and provides for mutual coöperation and the arbitration of differences that may arise. "Mutuality" is mere euphemism when one party is at least fifty times stronger than the other! Article I of the treaty contains possibilities so alarming that it is quoted in full, as follows: "Albania and Italy recognize that any disturbance whatsoever directed against the political, juridical and territorial status quo of Albania is contrary to their reciprocal interests." In November 1927, as an offset to the Franco-Yugoslav treaty of that month, a second treaty of Tirana was announced, Albania and Italy reaffirming thereby their earlier "alliance." The point of view of the Yugoslavs, who see these ominous events taking place on the Adriatic border of their newly extended realm, is discussed in a preceding chapter.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

GREEK LANDS AND PEOPLE

THERE are three salient periods of development in Greek history to which attention may be directed for an understanding of the new boundaries of Greece and the present situation of the Greek people:

(1) The early period of Greek settlement on the shores of the Mediterranean.

(2) The revival of Greek national feeling that led to the war of independence (1821 to 1829).

(3) The territorial growth of the immediate past (1912 to 1920) that has culminated in the Greece of today.

The first period spanned a space of many centuries, until Greek colonies were established along the thousands of miles of coast from the Pillars of Hercules (Gibraltar) to the eastern end of the Black Sea. By the 8th century B.C. the Greek people occupied an area far greater than Greece itself, and some of the larger and earlier settlements, particularly on the Ægean, "were ready to send out colonies in competition with those of the parent land."

The motive for emigration was at first the pressure of population in Greece. Later the Greeks invaded the Phœnician trading areas, their pirates preying upon the commerce of the Phœnicians. A spirit of adventure, travel, and foreign settlement marked the rise of Greek power upon the sea. The economic life of the Greeks was based on shipping. The ship was regarded as a sacred object, a gift of the gods. It was natural that conquest should go hand in hand with the development of maritime power, and at length in Alexander's time (331 B.C.) effective Greek control was extended as far as the Euphrates, which for many centuries was to mark the line between the enterprising, virile peoples of the west and the more static oriental culture of Asia.

The maritime traditions of the Greeks, their skill as traders, their occupation of the entire Ægean realm, their distribution throughout the Mediterranean and Black Sea basins as merchants and carriers, their hold upon the commercial outlets of the lands tributary to these basins, their settlement in patches and fringes of population on the seacoasts of lands inhabited by non-Greek peoples — all these factors converge upon the problems of the moment and rendered the tracing of Greek boundaries in 1919–1920 exceedingly difficult if justice was to be done to the nations that border Greece in the Near East.

FIG. 138. Greek territorial claims at the close of the World War. Ethnic distributions as of 1919. The expulsion of the Greeks at Smyrna (1922) and the Turco-Greek exchange of populations have altered the ethnic map greatly. Cyprus became a British crown colony in 1925.

Hand in hand with the rise of Greek power there went the development of the city-state, the first great milestone in the progress of liberal government. Attica became the symbol of democracy, and its history and traditions contributed to the political life and institutions of democratic governments everywhere throughout the world.

We shall not attempt to trace in detail the fortunes of the Greek people in the period of their long eclipse. In modified (Byzantine) form, Greek civilization survived during the interval between the conquest of Greece by the Romans in 146 B.C. and the ultimate winning of Greek independence in 1829 (treaty of Adrianople). At least in name, Constantinople was a Greek city for a thousand years. Here the Greek Orthodox Church took its rise, and from this and other centers of Greek life and culture there radiated the power of Greek ideals in literature, art, and government that for centuries profoundly affected the Roman world. Some of its impulses are felt even in the life and institutions of our own time. Yet in the long centuries of eclipse, profound changes were to affect the Greek people. The racial character itself was ethnically altered. Strong Slavic infusions took place. The genius of the people declined. Many of the modern Greeks, in-

cluding even those who live within sight of the Acropolis, are ignorant of the noblest traditions of Greek life. In place of the odysseys of ancient Greece, we have in modern times the sordid tale of petty trading and bartering in the ports of the Near Eastern realm.

In spite of the decline of the Greeks, they retained two qualities that kept them intact as a people. The first is their capacity to absorb peoples who invade their land. The invaders, whether Albanian or Slav, who penetrated the Greek peninsula came to have something more than a veneer of Hellenic culture; for it is difficult to resist assimilation into a mode of life and a regional spirit so distinctive as those of Hellenic lands. Something of this regional spirit may be at the bottom of the second quality — a never-fading desire for independence and for the reunion of Greek lands, at least about the borders of the Ægean. Doubtless there could more than once have been a realization of this aim if the Greeks had not lacked that vital thing necessary to national power and welfare — the unity of a people. Just as the city-states fell to quarreling with each other (for example, in the Peloponnesian War of 431–404 B.C.) and almost extinguished their national inheritance, so in the later history of Greece rival chieftains and the leaders of opposing factions have harmed Greece immeasurably.

Finally, through the bitter lessons of Turkish rule from 1456 down to 1829, Greek leaders, with encouragement and aid from American and English as well as other foreign sources, were taught the necessity of working for a common purpose, and in the Greek war of independence at last achieved freedom from the Turk. This had the further effect of stimulating all the other Balkan peoples to work for independence. By one great stride the cause of freedom in the Near East was carried forward. Its advance in Greece was slowed down in later periods by internal disorder and by the practical overlordship of the great powers of western Europe that always restrained Greece from independent action in the interest of Greek populations in Turkish territory. To mention only one episode in her foreign relations, the war with Turkey in 1897 brought upon Greece a heavy indemnity of $20,000,000; and in addition she lost territory on her northern frontier.

At the outbreak of the World War in 1914, the pro-German sympathies of King Constantine, who had married a sister of Emperor William of Germany, led to a long internal struggle, ending in 1917 with the flight of the king and the elevation to leadership of Venizelos, one of the most remarkable men of modern Europe. Thereafter Greece fought on the side of the Allies, and though her total war effort in 1917–1918 amounted to but little, she had participated heartily in the

Fig. 139. The territorial growth of Greece from the time of independence to the present day (Gerbing).

Balkan War of 1912 by which Turkey was all but ousted from Europe. She had still further extended her territory, at the expense of Bulgaria, in the Second Balkan War, and at the end of 1914 her frontier stood as represented in Figure 139.

In the new settlement of the Balkans and the Near East it was the Greek plan to lay claim to the most important Greek lands in the Near Eastern realm. These we shall now discuss in detail.

THE DIVISION OF MACEDONIA

Macedonia under Alexander became the heart of a great empire, and some measure of its greatness was retained by the country until the Turkish invasion of the 14th century, when, in common with other Balkan lands, it became a part of the Turkish Empire. With the revival of nationalities in the Balkans, particularly in the 19th century, the Macedonian question in its modern aspect took form.

The region has always had indefinite boundaries. It reaches the sea at Salonika on the south, extends westward to Lake Okhrida and the Albanian frontier, merges almost insensibly on the east into Bulgarian territory in the Strumitsa region, and on the north reaches as far as Üsküb. Within these limits the population was estimated in 1919 to be 2,000,000, of whom more than half were Christians and the rest chiefly Mohammedans, with some Jews in the towns, notably at Salonika. In population as in position the region was a transition land. Church membership in many cases classified a man "racially." From Figure 140 it will be seen that Macedonia lies at the meeting place of three Balkan states, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, and it was natural that each of these states should make an effort to impose its culture upon the people and develop a nationalist sentiment among them. Bulgarian claims rested upon one-time possession of the region and the racial character of the people. But the Serbs also held the country for a time and left a deep impress there, notably in architecture and literature.



FIG. 140. Conflicting views on ethnography of the Macedonian region by a Bulgarian, Ischirkoff (*Petermanns Mitteilungen*, 1915, Pl. 44), and a Serbian, Cvijič (*Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1915). Existing international boundaries are shown by heavy dash-and-dot lines.

The chief media of propaganda were the school and the church. Until her wars for independence early in the 19th century, Greece led in influence because of the strength of her church organization and her superior culture. Her hold was all the stronger because she operated chiefly in the towns, where powerful Greek merchants lived, and the towns in turn greatly influenced the country districts tributary to them. Even Rumania joined in the effort to penetrate Macedonia and win adherence to her program of national expansion. This she justified by the presence of nomadic Vlachs, who are related to the Rumans — probably between 75,000 and 100,000 in the whole of Macedonia (Fig. 128). In the struggle for supremacy Bulgaria was favored by the establishment of the Exarchist, or Bulgarian, church in 1870 by Turkish authority. The Exarch was head of the church and was able to further Bulgarian interests by impressing upon all members of his church the national, or Bulgarian, character of their religion.

By the secret alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria before the First Balkan War a detailed line was agreed upon, beyond which Serbia was "to formulate no territorial claim," and a contested zone which extended westward so as to include Üsküb and Dibra was reserved for arbitration by the Czar of Russia (Fig. 132, page 380). But Bulgaria made unexpected gains in eastern Thrace, and the powers decided to form an independent Albania in the region where Serbia had hoped to increase her territory. Thereupon Serbia denounced the territorial terms of the alliance, and the Second Balkan War resulted. With complete success in the war, Serbia and Greece divided the country as shown in Figure 132. Serbia obtained still more territory by the treaty of peace with Bulgaria which followed the World War, whereby the Strumitsa salient, with other bits of territory, was ceded to her (that is, to Yugoslavia). The local disarrangement of life which this brought about was very serious. Macedonians in large numbers had emigrated from Serbian territory into the Strumitsa salient at the close of the Balkan wars, and with the cession of this territory to Yugoslavia they were again required to move.

The Macedonian question, once the chief political problem of the Near East, has passed into an entirely new phase. The Macedonians have not had leaders of real ability, and the heterogeneous character of the population has made it impossible for them to have or to express a common public opinion. There are no resources of special significance. It is a poor country, largely deforested, and commercially tributary to neighboring communities. An independent Macedonia is neither possible nor desirable.

To resolve the Macedonian question the Balkan League of 1912 was formed, and out of it came various treaties for the partition of Macedonia. None of these had effect, for the Balkan wars and the World War, which followed each other in quick succession, caused the question of Macedonian autonomy to be overshadowed by larger issues. Except for the small Strumitsa area, the whole of the region was divided between Yugoslavia and Greece. Again the guerilla bands, or comitadjis, backed by the Macedonian Revolutionary Committee in Bulgaria, revived the old disorders. The Macedonians regarded themselves as a conquered people, seeing that their children were compelled to attend Serbian churches and schools. Those that spoke Bulgarian were required to speak Serbian. Emigration into Bulgaria was the only alternative to either submission or a life of lawlessness. Thus a small stream of Bulgarian population flowed toward Bulgaria and smaller streams of Serbian immigration into Macedonia.

Quite unexpectedly Greek Macedonia passed out of the realm of dispute with its almost complete Hellenization through the settlement of Greek refugees from Asia Minor. Following the expulsion of the Greek population of Smyrna as a consequence of the defeat by Kemal of the Greek army in 1922, space had to be found for those homeless Greeks who had fled "in a torrent and in complete disorder." Provision had also to be made for those who had been transferred from Asia Minor and Thrace in exchange for Turks (Lausanne, 1923). Macedonia alone was called upon to absorb 300,000 urban refugees, in addition to 116,000 agricultural families. A country of 5,000,000 had to absorb 1,500,000 fugitives. The world had never known so great a displacement of population. Macedonia is covered with new towns, new farms, and farmhouses clustered in villages, and the character of the population is completely changed.

THE QUESTION OF THRACE

While boundary modifications have been made throughout the Balkan Peninsula, it is in the region of Thrace that such changes have shown their widest effect. Elsewhere in the peninsula two (or rarely three) powers have been in conflict over disputed territory, whereas in Thrace five groups of interests are in conflict. Greece has sought to encircle Constantinople and shut off Bulgaria from the Ægean as well as Turkey from Europe. Bulgaria has persistently sought a territorial and commercial outlet to the Ægean on the south. Turkey has resisted both Greece and Bulgaria, and finally, in 1923, the powers agreed upon a special régime for the Zone of the Straits that introduced a fourth group of interests. The trade interests of Russia give her also a primary interest as a fifth power in the régime of the Straits, and therefore the right to be heard in a final settlement of the problems that focus there.

In laying claim to the whole of Thrace, with Turkey defeated in 1919, Greece advanced three principal arguments: first, she pointed to the thousand years of control of Constantinople by the Greek (or Byzantine) Empire; second, to the large number of Greek people in Eastern and Western Thrace; and third, to the fact that if she did not possess the whole of the region up to the Black Sea, any part of the coast left in the hands of Bulgaria or Turkey would furnish bases for submarine attacks upon the long coastline of Greece. The historical argument based on the extent of the former Byzantine Empire had the weakness that it disregarded the historical claims of other races or nationalities. The ancient glories of one nation can scarcely ever be restored without disastrous consequences to the ancient glories of adjacent peoples.

The ethnic argument presented equal difficulties; for the statistics so far as they went were of unequal value and many important towns and districts lacked any statistics at all. Greeks probably outnumbered the Turks in Thrace, but Greeks, Bulgarians, and Turks were so confusingly distributed that the ethnic map was little more than a mosaic of colors. The ethnic situation was further confused by the effect of the two Balkan wars and the World War, which displaced or destroyed whole sections of the population. The treaty of Neuilly had restricted Bulgaria to a line up to which the Greeks were permitted to occupy former Turkish territory in Thrace. The treaty of Sèvres was intended to complete the expulsion of the Turk from Europe, save for the city of Constantinople and sufficient adjoining territory to provide water and vegetable supplies. With the reconstruction of the Turkish army under Kemal (page 504), the Allies had to enter into fresh negotiations and to compromise with the Turks. The effect in Europe was to extend the area of Turkish territory northward to the boundary of Bulgaria as laid down in the treaty of Neuilly and westward to the Maritsa River, including Adrianople. A demilitarized zone was established on either side of the Thracian boundary between Turkey on the one hand, and Greece and Bulgaria on the other. This meant the destruction of all fortifications and the prohibition of the construction of new ones. Greek title to the islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Nikaria, was confirmed. The four last-named lie opposite the Smyrna coast of Turkey, and in ceding them to Greece restrictions were laid down. They are to be demilitarized and may not be used as a base for air craft to fly over the neighboring Anatolian coast. Turkey likewise agreed not to fortify the islands of Imbros and Tenedos near the entrance to the Dardanelles; she is also to furnish guarantees against the persecution of non-Moslem populations.

Greece has had a long-established interest in all the islands of the eastern Ægean, for the population is chiefly Greek. In the Dodecanese, for example, there are 100,000 Greeks as compared with 12,000 persons of other nationalities. By the treaty of Lausanne this group is ceded to Italy. It includes thirteen islands in the Dodecanese group in addition to the island of Castellorizzo, close to the Anatolian coast and due east of the island of Rhodes. It had been the original plan after the World War to have Turkey cede the islands to Italy, and the latter country was in turn to transfer them to Greece. But this arrangement was set aside in the later and definitive settlement, and Italy is now in the islands to stay. She occupied them in the first instance at the close of the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912, when rights

of occupation were acknowledged until such time as Turkey had withdrawn her officers, troops, and officials from Libya. The islands have little commercial importance, since they have only limited and local areas of arable ground, no industries of consequence, and only feeble maritime relations. Their chief value lies in their use as a base for the commercial or military penetration of Anatolia.

THE SMYRNA REGION

Among outlying territories the Smyrna region was of chief interest to Greece, for here lived 500,000 Greeks whose trade centered upon the city of Smyrna, the chief exporting city of the former Turkish Empire. With the Smyrna region, the land of Troy, are associated some of the noblest traditions of the Greek race. From the early days of Greek independence, one hundred years ago, down to the present, the union of the Smyrna region, of the islands of the Ægean, and of all of Thrace to the Black Sea has been the dream of Greek statesmen. Moreover, Smyrna, with 375,000 people, was the largest city in the Greek world. Athens by comparison has but 168,000. On the ground that the Greek population was in danger of attack by the Turks, the Allies permitted Greece to land troops at Smyrna, an action that was complicated by the presence of Italian occupying forces immediately to the south. The latter occupation was unauthorized by Italy's associates at the Peace Conference of Paris, and was further lacking in reason because there were no Italian populations or interests worthy of mention in the occupied territory. Although Greek control of Smyrna combined Greek elements of the Ægean and strengthened the Greek nation, its detachment from Turkey would have



FIG. 141. Map of the Smyrna region, showing the ethnic basis of Greek claims (1919) according to Greek statistics. The situation was completely altered in 1922 when the Greek armies were defeated by the Turks and the Greek people expelled. The treaty of Lausanne (1923) recognized Turkish sovereignty over the whole mainland

practically destroyed the economic life of that country. So clearly was the outcome seen by the Turks that there was a common desire to recover this essential outlet. Kemal made its possession one of the chief objects of his nationalist program. He was not content merely to defeat the Greek army and gain possession of the city, but forthwith expelled the entire Greek population.

THE OUTLOOK FOR GREECE

Under the leadership of Venizelos, Greece seemed to have for the first time in a hundred years the opportunity of uniting the Greek populations of the Ægean in a strong state. The two Balkan wars had advanced the frontiers of the nation, and the end of the World War saw Greece in high favor and the logical inheritor of the territory subtracted from Turkey. A population of 3,000,000 had added to it 1,000,000 at Smyrna and 1,500,000 in Macedonia, Epirus, and Thrace. With inspiring sea traditions, Greece seemed to be in the way of becoming one of the strongest minor powers of Europe. The Greeks are among the leading traders of the Near East. New harbors had been acquired — Salonika in 1912, Dedeagatch and Smyrna in 1920. There was no troublesome land tenure question, the proportion of small estates having increased rapidly in pre-war years. Greek credit was good in the international money market.

The disastrous defeat of the Greeks at Smyrna, the loss of Thracian territory east of the Maritsa River, the occupation of the Dodecanese by Italy, and Turkish confirmation of Italian title to this Greek archipelago, the necessity for providing for a refugee Greek population that came destitute and stricken to live upon Greek soil, and finally, revolt and internal dissension — these things have placed an overwhelming burden upon Greek leadership. The refugee problem was met by making the returning inhabitants self-supporting. The relief of suffering was accompanied by the administration of a plan for absorbing the refugees in permanently productive agricultural and industrial enterprises. The Greek people themselves contributed largely to the cost of the undertaking, and relief funds and loans from Great Britain and the United States made possible the conduct of the whole matter on business lines.

The political difficulties presented a problem of even greater magnitude. The shattered army that returned from Smyrna undertook government reform by drastic means. Civil war and dictatorship were the natural consequences, and only after several years of turmoil was it possible to elect a new parliament, organize a coalition government,

and restore parliamentary liberties. The Greek populations are now gathered with measurable completeness upon Greek soil, but they live in a country subject to severe restrictions. The arable land has been increased by heroic measures undertaken by the Greek Settlement Commission, 1924–1926, but only one fifth of the total area consists of cultivable soil. Agricultural products are many times in excess of other exports. Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and the United States are the principal receiving countries for Greek products. Though there is a great variety of minerals, metals and ores count only slightly in the export list. There remains trade and transport in the service of other people. Greek merchant ships are to be found in all the ports of the Near East, and their service in the trade of Balkan outlets is in process of rapid expansion. While Greece is primarily an agricultural country, the value of the output of Greek industries has nearly trebled in the past ten years. The artisans among the newly absorbed refugee populations are responsible for part of this effect; for the rest it is owing to private initiative mainly, to the special privileges (including monopoly rights) granted by government to new industries, and to the importation, free of duty, of machinery and raw materials.

CHAPTER TWENTY

POLAND AND ITS BORDERLANDS

In respect of both area and population Poland occupies sixth place among European countries. The census of 1921 gave a total population in excess of 27,000,000, upon an area of 149,000 square miles. This means that among European countries only Russia, Germany, England, France, and Italy have a larger population. From Figure 144 it will be noted that the greatest population densities are on the south and west, the least on the north and east. Of the 40 cities containing more than 25,000 inhabitants, 7 are on the banks of the Vistula, 7 lie near the border of the Carpathians, 6 are on the coal fields, and 5 depend upon industries supported by coal. But a fourth of the total population lives in cities of 10,000 or more.

By the treaty of Versailles, and subsequent agreements, the western boundary of Poland was drawn to include large and productive coal, iron, and zinc mines in Upper Silesia, in addition to coal, oil, and other mineral deposits in Eastern Galicia. Poland was thus enabled to rebuild the industrial establishments that were intended to provide a well balanced economic life. Because the Polish people inhabit territory that occupies an interior continental position, and because the creation of Poland (in part composed of former German territory) was expected to lead to grave and possibly insoluble political and commercial diffi-

Fig. 142. Percentage of Poles in the total population of Poland. Scale of map is 1 : 14,500,000.

Fig. 143. Numerical changes in total population of Poland during the period 1897–1921.

culties, Poland was provided upon her own territory (the Polish Corridor), with an outlet to the sea. Tracing the boundaries, we find that Polish territory borders six states, the longest boundary, that with Germany, being 800 miles. Within this framework nearly 68 per cent of the population is Polish, 14 per cent Ruthenian, 10 per cent Jewish, 3.7 per cent White Ruthenian, and 3.7 per cent German. Leaving aside Jews, Ruthenians, and Germans, the greater part of the Polish people is Roman Catholic.[1] Germany, the most powerful and least friendly of Poland's neighbors, has a dominantly Protestant population. On the whole the Poles represent a distinctly lower level of culture than the Germans on the west, while on the east the culture of Russia is equally below that of Poland. One can hardly draw conclusions as to the importance of religion in the long political conflict between these three states — Poland, on the one hand, Germany and Russia on the other. The religious difference undoubtedly increases the political difficulties, for it increases the racial and cultural dissimilarities that throw into higher relief contrasts in political aims.



FIG. 144. Population densities in Poland. See Figures 142 and 155.

ECONOMIC RESOURCES

About 50 per cent of the total territory of Poland consists of arable land, 17 per cent meadow and pasture, 24 per cent forest. The proportion of arable land diminishes toward the east, increases toward the west. There is a similar decline of cultural level and population density from south to north. If agriculture were modernized and cultivation practices improved, there is no doubt that Poland could not only feed herself but also export agricultural products. Cereals, potatoes, and sugar beets enter largely into her agricultural economy.

[1] For the terms of a concordat between the Holy See and Poland, see *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 11 April 1925.

POLAND
1740
Scale 1:17 500 000
50 0 100 200 miles
K. OF NORWAY
SWEDEN
DENMARK
K. OF
SKAGERRAK
KATTEGAT
Stockholm
GULF OF
FINLAND
Lake Ladoga
St. Petersburg
Volga River
RUSSIA
Moscow
Oka R.
COURLAND
POLISH LIVONIA
Dvina River
Lovat R.
Volga R.
Königsberg
K. of PRUSSIA
Danzig
POMERELIA
Vilna
LITHUANIA
Dnieper R.
Desna R.
Don R.
EMPIRE
Elbe River
Berlin
Oder River
MAZOVIA
Warsaw
Vistula River
POLAND
THE EMPIRE
Bug R.
Pripet R.
Kiev
Cracow
Vistula River
Dniester River
Donetz R.
Danube River
Vienna River
KINGDOM OF HUNGARY
Prut R.
Sereth R.
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
SEA OF AZOV
BLACK SEA


PARTITIONS
OF POLAND
To Russia
To Prussia
To Austria
1772
1793
1795
Scale 1:17 500 000
50 0 100 200 miles
Stockholm
St. Petersburg
Lake Ladoga
Volga River
Moscow
Oka R.
Dvina River
Lovat R.
Königsberg
Danzig
Vilna
Pripet R.
Dnieper R.
Desna R.
Don R.
Berlin
Elbe River
Oder River
Warsaw
Vistula River
Bug R.
Cracow
Kiev
Dniester River
Donetz R.
Prut R.
Sereth R.
SEA OF AZOV
BLACK SEA

Sixty-four per cent of the population is engaged in agriculture and forestry, 15 per cent in mining and industry, 9 per cent in trade and transport. Poland ranks fourth among European states in the production of hard coal, first in zinc ore. She produces enough petroleum to supply all her needs and to export about half of the production. Her fuel resources, abundant labor supply, and situation near Russian markets have enabled her to build up large textile factories, which are supplied by raw cotton from the United States and elsewhere.

Her geographical position in the midst of a vast plain, without natural frontiers eastward towards Russia or westward towards Germany, is Poland's chief reason for maintaining a large army. Military expenditures absorb two thirds of the total revenue. As we shall show more fully in later pages, the uncertain relations of Germany and Russia to Poland have made it practically impossible to reduce the fear with which Poland regards these two powerful neighbors, separated from her by no natural barrier. Were the Polish people of one mind on public questions, their resistance to external danger would not be a constant preoccupation; but they were long divided among three powers, — Russia, Germany, and Austria, — and it has not been easy for the separated parts to become closely welded. In addition there are differences of opinion as to the social and political objects of the new state. Representatives to the national parliament are broken up into a large number of small groups that can scarcely be called parties, since they represent exclusively limited or provincial interests. A working majority is always difficult to obtain, and in these circumstances government becomes a matter of compromise, hesitation, and fear, little calculated to frame constructive policies or execute a national program of reconstruction on the one hand and maintain firm foreign relations on the other.

THE HISTORIC POLISH STATE

To understand the present relation of Poland to her neighbors one must recall something of the historic greatness of the country in past centuries. It is characteristic of the Polish people that in the face of oppression by Russians, Prussians, and Austrians, they never relinquished hope that they would be united one day under a government of their own. They had a past of which they could well be proud.

Fig. 145. Based on Shepherd, *Historical Atlas*, Pl. 130-131, and Droysen, *Allgemeiner Historischer Handatlas*, Pl. 44.

Fig. 146. Based on Putzger, *Historischer Schul-Atlas zur alten, mittleren und neuen Geschichte*, Pl. 25. Both figures are from the *Geographical Review*, 1917.

The Polish realm long included Lithuania, and at one time it extended from the Baltic almost to the Black Sea (Fig. 145). It nearly reached the Oder on the west; it passed the main stream of the Dnieper on the east. Warsaw was long one of the great capitals of Europe. The trade of the Ottoman Empire in part flowed northwestward, along the navigable streams, from the Black Sea and the Bosporus through Polish towns.

During the 12th and 13th centuries Poland was torn by civil war, owing to the quarrels of rival Polish princes. Military pressure by Mongols and Prussians further diverted the strength of the Polish government. By attaching Lithuania to itself in 1386, Poland had increased its territory so greatly that for several centuries thereafter it was one of the two or three largest nations of continental Europe. But its internal and external difficulties were at last to prove fatal. As Prussia advanced on the west, Poland sought to advance eastward. Poland seems to be unable successfully to absorb large Russian elements. It was itself an oppressor of large non-Polish elements. Within one hundred and twenty-four years of the time of its greatest expansion, Poland suffered the first of the divisions known in history as the three partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795).

The final partition of Poland left it paralyzed. National pride was humiliated. The robber states (Russia, Prussia, and Austria) set up new boundaries that completely disregarded the natural relations of the region. The social and economic life of the people was shaken to its foundation. Rivers that once pulsated with life became merely "dead border lines." Though revolutionary movements were started in 1830 and 1863, the latter being suppressed by outrageous cruelties, Polish nationality was hopelessly enchained until the close of the World War in 1918.

ORGANIZATION OF THE NEW REPUBLIC

When the defeat of Germany (1918) made possible the re-creation of the Polish state, account was taken first of the principle of viability; that is, the state must have the balance in economic resources, the size, and the access to markets that would enable it to avoid economic shipwreck. In the second place, there had been general agreement on the Wilson postulates that the new Polish state must (1) include territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, (2) be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and (3) be guaranteed political and economic independence and territorial integrity. As interpreted by Polish leaders, this meant a return to the boundaries of the 18th century.

FIG. 147. Ethnography of Poland and its border zones. Poland did not accept the eastern boundary as proposed by the Peace Conference of Paris but negotiated directly with Russia; and in 1920, following the unsuccessful Russian invasion of Poland, the treaty of Riga was signed, fixing the boundary far to the east of the so-called Paris line, as shown above. The Allenstein and Marienwerder plebiscites resulted in an almost unanimous vote for Germany. The division of Silesia (Fig. 150, page 414) was based on a plebiscite held on 20 March 1921. Teschen, Orava, and Spits (Spiš) were divided between Czechoslovakia and Poland by the Council of Ambassadors (Figure 151). Ethnography based on British General Staff ethnic map, 1:1,500,000, 1918. Key to numerals: 1, Poles; 2, Germans; 3, Czechos and Slovaks; 4, Magyars; 5, Rumanians; 6, Ruthenians (Ukrainians); 7, White Russians; 8, Lithuanians.

Many wished to see even East Prussia included. It was taken for granted that Danzig would become a Polish port. All of Eastern Galicia was assumed to be Polish territory, though inhabited chiefly by Ruthenians. All of Upper Silesia[1] was considered essential, in order that the vast coal resources of that region might be available for the rebuilding of Poland's industrial life. On the northeast was Lithuania,

[1] In contrast to Lower Silesia, a former Austrian province now a part of Czechoslovakia.



FIG. 148. Coal and iron deposits in Upper Silesia and Teschen. A plebiscite was held in Upper Silesia, 20 March 1921. As a result of the vote, and subsequent study of economic and geographic conditions, a boundary was established as shown above. See also Figures 149, 150. The figure 1 designates the part of Upper Silesia allotted to Czechoslovakia. Coal from various maps accompanying *Handbuch des oberschleisischen Industriebezirks*, XII, *Allgemeiner deutschen Bergmannstag, Festschrift, Band* II. Iron from F. Bamburg, *Schulkarte zur Kultur-Wirtschafts and Handels-Geographie von Deutschland*, 1 : 750,000, 1913.

and the Poles could not forget that it was once part of a Greater Poland with a long Baltic coastline. Like the other states of central Europe in post-war years of chaos and uncertainty in both domestic and foreign affairs, Poland feared her neighbors and felt that the more extensive her territory and the larger her population the greater would be her future security.

BOUNDARY SETTLEMENTS BY PLEBISCITE

No congress of European leaders striving to adjust rival claims could possibly grant such a program as that which Poland presented. It was believed that the transfer of Upper Silesia to Poland would so weaken industrial Germany that she would refuse to sign the peace treaty; even if she did sign it would be impossible for her then to fulfill the reparation clauses of the treaty; certainly an irredentist problem would be left to be settled by war at the first opportunity. To compose these difficulties plebiscites were provided for Upper Silesia in the southwest and at Marienwerder and Allenstein on the north. The two last-named voted overwhelmingly for union with Germany; the large Polish element is Protestant (Lutheran) and prefers to remain in a Protestant state.

Upper Silesia

In Upper Silesia more than 700,000 votes were cast for union with Germany, nearly 470,000 for Poland (1921). Taking account of the distribution of the votes, the Council of the League of Nations, to which the matter was referred, decided upon the boundary shown on the accompanying maps. It passes through a crowded industrial region where the population is rather evenly divided between Germans and Poles. To draw so irregular a line through a highly developed industrial country of mixed population is to invite endless trouble in the future. The allegiances of the two nationalities are very hard to determine, for they depend not alone upon race, language, and nationality, but also upon economic opportunity and cultural advantages, particularly schools, which are of higher quality under German administration. Trouble springs also from the uneconomic division of coal properties, industrial plants, cities, and the country populations naturally related to them.

FIG. 149. In spite of the preponderance of Polish inhabitants in the plebiscite area (enclosed by the heavy broken line), more than 700,000 votes were cast for union with Germany and only 470,000 for union with Poland. Many Poles voted for German ownership because they feared the economic effects of the division of so highly developed an economic unit. After Romer, *Travaux géographiques*, Vol. IV, 1919.

A special arrangement for subsequent joint government of the district helped to diminish some of these difficulties, but it could not dissipate them. In 1922 Poland and Germany signed an elaborate convention (more than 600 articles) for the regulation of German-Polish life in Silesia. Limited to 15 years' duration, it expires in



FIG. 150. The Polish-German boundary in Upper Silesia as drawn after the plebiscite of 1921. The focus of industrial development is the region between Beuthen, Gleiwitz, Katowice, and Krolewska Huta. Joint commission control was adopted to prevent disruption of this highly organized region. Based on *Flemmings Generalkarte*, No. 67, 1922.

1937. It is intended to give the industries of the region proper supplies of raw materials and manufactured products, permit the smooth working of the railways, provide water and electricity to consumers, guarantee freedom of movement across the irregular frontier, and insure the protection of minorities. There are elaborate provisions for the settlement of disputes, for the liquidation of German interests on the Polish side of the line, and for virtually free trade between Polish and German Upper Silesia. The railways are administered as a unit, so that there is freedom of transit for inhabitants on both sides.

By the partition of Upper Silesia, Poland received 53 of the 67 coal mines of the region, or 24,000,000 tons production out of 31,000,000. Poland's share of the zinc and lead mines gave her 70 per cent of the total output. She shared in almost equal degree in the blast furnaces and steel and rolling mills. As for population, 572,000 Poles remain on the German side, 350,000 Germans on the Polish side. A mixed commission administers the convention, and an arbitral tribunal exercises the functions of a court in relation to disputes arising under the treaty, with ultimate reference for certain cases to the Council of the League of Nations or the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Naturally, Germany is disappointed because she did not retain the whole of Upper Silesia; having it, she could more readily have met the extremely difficult economic conditions imposed by the necessities of reparation. Poland is also disappointed because she did not obtain the whole of her original claim. Each complains that minority populations upon the territory of the other are unfairly treated in the matter

of economic opportunity, in school privileges, and in other respects. Beginning in June 1925, a tariff war increased the bitterness between the two states. The German market for Polish coal and iron and manufactured goods was closed; the Polish market was likewise closed to Germany. Each country injured itself as much as it did the other. Chronic irritation of this sort has been added to other motives in keeping alive the question of revision of frontiers. Germany insists that the device of the Polish Corridor (Fig. 152) can only be temporary, because it is an artificial creation and detaches East Prussia from the main part of Germany. Poland, on the other hand, has a strong nationalist feeling and cannot be brought to see that a revision of boundaries is possible. France and Great Britain support the present treaty arrangements with respect to boundary lines, because a revision in one place would surely be followed by attempted revision elsewhere, not merely of boundaries but of reparations also. Only chaos would result from a general attempt to alter the present arrangements. Supporting France and Great Britain are the states of central Europe that have been created out of the territory of former Austria-Hungary or have benefited by allocations of territory therefrom — Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

Teschen, Orava, and Spiš

The former Duchy of Teschen (Fig. 151) long had an important part to play in Polish relations with Czechoslovakia. Here is the source of supply of coking coal for both Poland and Czechoslovakia. But Poland has large deposits of higher-grade bituminous coal, while Czechoslovakia has lower-grade bituminous coal and deposits of inferior brown lignite. In addition, the coal mines of Teschen lie in the western third of that district, just where the Czech population lives. The larger western part of Teschen was eventually assigned to Czechoslovakia, the rest to Poland; the Polish part includes the headwaters of the Vistula, where these take their rise in

FIG. 151. Division of disputed territory in the three districts of Teschen, Orava, and Spiš (Spits).

the Tatra, the lofty northern summits of the Carpathians. Czechoslovakia obtained the coal mines but agreed to deliver a part of the output to Poland. The central railway went to Czechoslovakia, while Poland secured the town of Teschen.

Associated with the Teschen settlement were the two districts of Orava and Spiš, which have small groups of Polish people that Poland wished to include. By a decision of the Council of Ambassadors [1] the territorial limits were drawn as shown in Figure 151. In Orava the new boundary is located southward of the main Carpathian divide; in Spiš it is located north of the divide.

DANZIG AND THE POLISH CORRIDOR

The device of a corridor to the sea was intended to promote favorable commercial contacts between Poland and the industrial and commercial centers of western Europe. It is too narrow to be defensible against Germany on both east and west, and the special arrangements at Danzig do not give the Poles that degree of liberty in the organization and management of the port that they deem necessary for the service of Polish overseas trade. It was the hope of Polish leaders that they would here obtain a broader stretch of territory than that occupied by "indisputably Polish population" (Fig. 152). Their hope was based upon the relation of the Polish state to the Vistula. Since the earliest times that stream has been associated with Polish nationality. From the Carpathians almost to the sea its banks have long been bordered by Polish populations. Moreover, Poland maintains that the ethnographic principle cannot be followed, because the Corridor was the scene of intensive penetration by German colonists aided by the Prussian government. The substantial preference which the German farmer enjoyed (in addition to large tracts purchased by the government for forest reserves) gradually forced out Polish settlers. Danzig at the end of the Corridor had its Polish population gradually reduced to but 10 per cent of a total of 170,000 (1914). Thus was fought out the latest of many struggles waged between German and Slav for territory which each considered vital to its security.

The Corridor itself at the time of its allocation (1919) was inhabited by an almost equal number of Germans and Poles — 418,000 of the former, 439,000 of the latter. The improved land was held chiefly by large German landowners, and the change of sovereignty affected

[1] The Council of Ambassadors, composed of Allied ambassadors, was organized after the Peace Conference of Paris early in 1920. Its chief function is to execute the treaties of peace.

FIG. 152. Ethnography in the Polish Corridor, focus of conflict between Poland and Germany. The shaded areas represent German-speaking majorities; the blank areas, Polish majorities. Solid heavy lines, represent boundaries; dotted line, plebiscite boundary; dot-and-dash line, Russo-German boundary of 1914. The Marienwerder and Allenstein plebiscite areas voted for union with Germany (1920).

them most seriously. As a class they have a large part to play in the government of Prussia and are as critical of the Polonizing process in the present as the Poles were critical of the Germanizing process in the past.

It was to be expected that Poland would make the most of the territory bordering the Baltic at the end of the Corridor that was possessed in full sovereignty. Prevented from possessing Danzig, she has turned to Gdynia, where, at great cost, a naval base is under construc-



FIG. 153. Railways in the Polish Corridor, suggesting the difficulties involved in depriving Poland of a maritime outlet by way of the Vistula.

tion, the work to be completed by 1930. This is a matter of concern to Danzig, for the development of a Polish port near by will inevitably cause a diminution of trade through Danzig; and this loss, together with the loss of German trade that has already taken place, will still further disturb the commercial life of the city.

The present working arrangement between Poland and the Free City of Danzig was determined by treaty between the two in 1920 and by supplementary agreement in 1921. These conventions make Poland

responsible for the conduct of the foreign relations of Danzig. Poland was authorized to establish at Danzig a postal, telegraph, and telephone service communicating directly with Poland and between Poland and foreign countries. To Danzig was granted the right to use all postal, telegraphic, and telephonic means of communication within the territory of the Free City and to enjoy the use of all similar facilities between the Free City and foreign countries.



FIG. 154. By the treaty of Versailles most of the country about Danzig that was inhabited by Germans was united with Danzig to form a Free City. The inset shows details of the port and suburbs of Danzig.

As between the Free City of Danzig and Poland, the former has undertaken to provide racial, religious, and linguistic minorities with privileges similar to the minority rights enjoyed in Poland under the Polish minorities treaty. The Free City of Danzig is included within the Polish customs frontier and is under the control of the Polish central customs administration, receiving therefrom a certain fixed percentage of the net receipts. A Harbor Board, composed of five Poles and five Danzig commissioners under the presidency of a Swiss citizen, operates the port of the Free City in order to guarantee the citizens of Danzig the rights reserved for them, at the same time that Poland is assured the free use of railway, telegraphic, and other transport facilities. The city may not be used as a military base, nor may it be fortified or made the seat of manufacture of munitions or other war material without the previous consent of the League of Nations. Polish war vessels may anchor in Danzig harbor and the Polish government may come to the defense of Danzig by land if circumstances require it and the local police are insufficient.

The German population of Danzig believes that it should work for a still greater measure of freedom or for union with Germany and condemns the acts of the Poles at every turn. It is asserted that there has been a steady attempt to Polonize the city. The new economic relations intensify the political and racial differences. Danzig cannot

maintain its former trade relations with Germany, and the former trade connections between the Polish hinterland and Danzig are unprofitable to Danzigers because when shippers transmit goods through the port the merchants of the port do not participate in the work of transport and its profits. Finally, there is the difficulty of communication across the Corridor. This is now regulated in a most detailed manner, but the actual working conditions make both travel and transport between the Corridor and German territory on either side extremely inconvenient and costly. While goods in transit between East Prussia and the rest of Germany are exempt from all customs duties, they can be carried only under conditions of "privileged transit"; that is, on sealed trains reserved for this purpose and exempt from passport and customs formalities. All other traffic is subjected to the most wearisome and annoying regulations that keep both Germans and Poles in a state of bitterness already fateful as a result of the territorial settlement.

POLAND AND RUSSIA

The course of Russian-Polish relations since the World War enables us to see how uncertain even now is Poland's eastern boundary. Early in 1920 the Soviet government had defeated Denikin, the Cossack leader who organized the anti-Bolshevist forces of southern Russia and the Kuban. Anticipating a Soviet attack following Denikin's defeat, the Poles pressed forward rapidly for more than three hundred miles, took Kiev in May 1920, and held the northwestern part of the Ukraine.

It appeared that Poland might realize her aspiration to settle her troublesome eastern frontier question in her own way. The eastern frontiers of Poland are difficult to define because there are no sharp lines, whether of race, religion, or national consciousness. The historic boundary of 1772 is out of the question; it would include more non-Polish than Polish populations. The best strategic boundary is a line drawn through the Pripet marshes, in the headwater area of the Pripet River, but this also is far east of the limits of strictly Polish speech. If every nation struggles uncompromisingly for the best strategic frontier, there can never be peace; for no sooner is one stragetic advantage gained than another farther on is desired to protect the first. Nor could Poland forget those glorious pages of her history that recounted the heroic deeds of her leaders in eastern fields of war and commerce. Polish military power and intellectual force had made themselves felt from Vilna to Kiev. Polish colonies and many of the large estates of a Polish aristocracy are scattered throughout this broad region.

The eastern boundary of Poland as recommended by the Peace Conference at Paris is shown in Figure 147, and it was planned to leave to negotiation between the governments of Russia and of Poland the settlement of the precise boundary between these two countries. It was not thought wise to go further until the Russian people had a chance to reorganize their political affairs and express their views as to the position of the Polish frontier. Fearing that the Polish invasion would be followed by wide territorial claims, the Russian Soviet government concentrated troops on the west and swept the Polish army back to the gates of Warsaw (August 1920). With its armies in a favorable position it was the turn of the Soviet government to make extreme demands upon the Poles. The acceptance of these demands would have made Poland a vassal of Russia and guaranteed the extension of Bolshevism into western Europe. Russia was to have a large army on Poland's frontier, and Poland was to have scarcely any army at all. Radical groups in Poland were to have government sanction, and there were to be no restrictions upon the spread of Soviet propaganda. Only in the matter of eastern territorial limits was there an apparent liberality; but the other terms made this concession of no consequence. Faced by these conditions, Poland had no choice but to fight.

Under French leadership, with munitions from the Allies and fresh recruits from all ranks of Polish society, the Polish army now took the offensive. In a few weeks it had reached a line corresponding roughly to the line of German occupation in 1918 and the treaty of Brest Litovsk. Here it remained while a treaty on new lines was framed by Russian and Polish representatives at Riga (October 1920). An indemnity was to be paid by Russia. The boundary between Poland and Russia was fixed to the east of the line recommended by the Peace Conference of Paris. In 1924 the Soviet government, upon receiving formal recognition by Poland, reaffirmed the eastern boundary of Poland as defined in the treaty of Riga.

The hatred of the Pole for the Russian is based on differences of culture and mode of thought, on marked differences of religion, and on the terrible persecutions of the past hundred and fifty years. Poland is a nation of western ideas; Russia is almost oriental by contrast. The strength of the hostility is suggested in the romantic poetry of Poland, which is full of anti-Russian allusions.

EASTERN GALICIA

In the former Austrian province of Galicia, Poland has one of her major problems, as a consequence of ethnic division between Polish

population on the west and Ruthenian in the east. To differences of race are added differences of religion: the Poles are Roman Catholic; the Ruthenians, Greek Orthodox Uniate. But the culture of Eastern Galicia is Polish, and Poles form the chief population of the towns; no other section of the Polish people is more ardently Polish in nationality. It is the seat of a large university (Lemberg). Hardly any other part of Polish territory has published so high a percentage of Polish books and newspapers.

The Ruthenians, who form the majority (59 per cent) of the population of Eastern Galicia, are closely allied to the Ukrainians or Russians rather than to the Poles. Lemberg and other similar districts are Polish islands set in a Ruthenian sea. The Ukrainians and Russians wish to unite with them all people classed as Ruthenian: the Poles insisted on having recognized their predominant culture and former ownership, and especially their claim to have Polish territory extended southward to join Rumania (Fig. 147, page 411). The territorial junction with Rumania gives these two countries better defense against a Bolshevist penetration of central Europe; it provides what is called a military "barrage," or "sanitary cordon," all the way from the Baltic to the Black Sea, for a time a principal item in the Polish and even the Allied program; it gives Poland control over the headwaters of the Dniester and permits the shipment of oil and other goods to ports on the Black Sea.

The problem of Eastern Galicia was further complicated by the historical division that existed between Eastern and Western Galicia as early as the 10th and 11th centuries. The matter entered its modern phase in 1848, when a Ukrainian movement began in Austria that had for its object the creation of the eastern part of Galicia as a separate province. For several years there was much controversy with the Poles over the question; but in 1867 Austria made the whole of Galicia a single province with a common assembly, or Diet.

Since that time the Poles, partly as a result of better education, have become dominant in Galician affairs. They have controlled administration, courts, and education, and have obtained much of the land. Their methods have not always been above reproach. The struggle was one of those minor contests of nationality that were overshadowed in the past by the common antagonism of all subject races to the central government of Austria-Hungary. A definitive settlement of the question was made in 1920, by the treaty of Riga between Poland and Russia (Fig. 147).

THE VILNA DISPUTE

One of the most difficult of the boundary questions between Poland and her neighbors is the Vilna dispute. Here a broad belt of territory extends northeastward from central Poland across the hinterland of Lithuania and includes Vilna as a principal city. By treaty with Russia in 1920, Poland agreed to a boundary between herself and Russia that ran along Lithuania's eastern frontier. The population includes a large number of ethnic elements whose racial and nationalist affiliations it is difficult or impossible to determine — a mixture of White Russians, Lithuanians, Poles, Jews, and Germans. The line between Lithuania and Poland shown in Figure 157, page 433, was a demarcation line administered by Allied officers and designed to put an end to immediate hostilities during the period of the Peace Conference. Both sides violated the agreement and at length irregular Polish forces under General Zeligowski occupied Vilna and the disputed district.

A plebiscite held in January 1922 was followed in February by a declaration on the part of the members of the Vilna Diet for incorporation in the Polish Republic, and thereupon the Polish Parliament voted the union of Vilna with Poland and seated the twenty Vilna delegates. A year later the Council of Ambassadors took up all questions regarding Poland's eastern frontiers and, in a resolution respecting them, recognized in effect the Russo-Polish boundary of the treaty of Riga, the Polish-Lithuanian frontier, and Poland's possession of Eastern Galicia and of Vilna. Naturally, Lithuania refuses to accept the decision of the League, but as the weaker state it is not in a position to enforce its claims. The dramatic agreement upon peace in 1927 between Pilsudski and Waldemaras at the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations has not altered in the least the actual situation. It was an agreement "in principle" only, and the troublesome "details" of a situation have a way of asserting their greater importance. These details are fully described on page 432.

THE LAND QUESTION

Like their neighbors, the Poles have a land question of serious aspect. Among large landholders, 18,000 own 40 per cent of the total area of Poland and leave much of their holdings uncultivated, with resultant overcrowding of adjacent agricultural communities. To better the conditions of life, the Polish Diet in July 1920 voted drastic land partition laws. But even this action will not give everybody a piece of land, nor will it necessarily increase production. The new law permits the Polish General Land Office to take the lands of the

former Prussian Colonization Commission and other government owned land, as well as large privately held estates, and sell them to actual farmers, with preference to soldiers wounded in the war. Depending upon location, the maximum size of farms may not exceed 150, 450, and 600 acres.

THE JEWISH POPULATION

The most serious racial problem in Poland concerns the Jew. He is more numerous there than in any other country in the world except Russia. During the 14th and 15th centuries the Jews came to Poland in great numbers, partly because of expulsion from many other European countries, partly to escape almost universal persecution elsewhere. In the 18th century many came from Austria and West Prussia. Poland was one of the few countries that never expelled the Jew.

Then the Jews became so numerous and powerful that they secured a general assembly in 1600 to apportion taxes among Jewish citizens and protect the rights of the race, and this continued until 1764. Jews competed with Christians in commerce and in the crafts with such success that eventually they were restricted by law. For example: in Galicia they were forbidden to be grain dealers; they could not export salt or deal in alcohol; their artisans could not be employed by Christians. By 1895, while only 14 per cent of the total population of Russian Poland were Jewish, 84 per cent of the merchants were Jews, 20 per cent of the literary men, 51 per cent of the educators, and 24 per cent of the physicians. Only 2 per cent of the farmers, factory workers, and miners were Jews.

The main difficulty of the problem springs from the lack of national feeling among Jews. Throughout Poland's history they have worked rather for racial rights than for national revolutionary aims. In 1907 they opposed the Polish national parties and contributed to a Socialist victory.

In 1919 the problem entered a new phase with the disorders at Vilna and elsewhere. The Polish Jew had not thrown himself wholeheartedly into the development of the new state. It was natural that the patriotic Pole should view his new-found freedom with ardent feeling and should have little toleration for any race that resisted the strong tides of nationalism. Better relations have now been established, and there need be no further political importance in the Jewish problem if religious liberty is guaranteed and the Jew attempts to seek no special political rights.

In common with the states of Rumania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Czecho-

slovakia, Austria, and Hungary, Poland signed a minorities treaty with the Allied and Associated Powers.[1] The matter is especially important for Poland in relation to the Jews. Article 10 provides that educational committees shall be appointed locally by the Jewish communities of Poland and shall be subject to the general control of the state; it provides for the distribution of the proportional share of the public funds allotted to Jewish schools, and for the organization and management of these schools. Article 11 requires that Jews shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their Sabbath, the only exceptions being in case of military service or the preservation of public order. Poland will refrain from holding elections, either general or local, on Saturday.

The pact to end Semitism made in 1925 is of more importance than the general treaty privileges of minorities. The Polish government agreed:

(1) To widen the sphere of activity and functions of the legalized Jewish communal organizations in the towns and cities.

(2) To create a department of Jewish affairs in the Ministry of Education.

(3) To withdraw special restrictions upon Jews in army, banking, and legal circles.

(4) To grant public rights to Jewish private schools and to the use of Yiddish as the language of discussion in the councils of Jewish communities.

POLAND'S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN

France has taken a keener interest in the new Poland than has any other nation. The French wish Poland to be both free and strong, and thus constitute a powerful ally in case of future trouble with Germany, one favorably placed to strike with France on either side. This explains the encouragement given in France (1916–1919) to the organization and equipment of the Polish Legion, the use of French instructors in Haller's army, which was trained in France and entered Poland in 1919, and French diplomatic aid to Poland. It will explain much in the international arrangements of Europe in the future. Trade agreements with Poland will reflect French interest, for French goods have not been sold widely in the former Russian Empire. Moreover, there is a historic cultural basis for the friendship of the

[1] In common with the other states that signed the minorities treaties, Poland must give equality of trade conditions to the Allied and Associated Powers, and, in addition, she agrees to the application to the Vistula, the Bug, and the Narew rivers of the international waterways régime as set forth in the treaty of Versailles.

two peoples. French and Polish artists and men of letters have long had a marked community of sentiment and interest. Henry of Valois, invited to become King of Poland, reigned at Cracow for a few months before he became Henry III of France. Napoleon revived Polish nationality for a brief period (Duchy of Warsaw, 1807–1815). One of the four best collections of Polish books outside Poland is in Paris, established by the poet Mickiewicz. (The three others are at Leningrad, at Rapperswil in Switzerland, and in the British Museum.)

British economic interest in Poland is expressed in three ways:

(1) Desire to have a British High Commissioner at Danzig.

(2) Heavy British investments at Danzig and for a time in the Galician oil fields.

(3) British-held stock in the factories and mills of Lodz and in the coal and oil companies of the south and southwest.

FIG. 155. There is a close correspondence between the seats of industry and the foci of population as shown in Figure 144. Based on E. Romer, Industrial Map, *Wall Atlas of Poland*, 1926. The areas of the largest circles are proportional to the number of workmen employed.

With Danzig an active commercial center and eventually a large city, and with British naval strength capable of controlling the city's government in time of war, Great Britain may be said to have won a commercial victory by securing a free-city régime for Danzig. She followed steadfastly the policy of not allowing it to return to Germany, nor would she consent to Polish sovereignty.

The French and British policies, opposed as they are with reference to all things Polish, were thrown into sharper contrast when, beginning in March 1921, the disorders of Upper Silesia became a matter of international concern because of their relation to the reparation payments. The German government sought to delay beyond May 1921 an agreement on reparations required by the treaty of Versailles, saying that the fate of the mineral wealth of Upper Silesia was related to the amount of the payments Germany could make. An ultimatum from the Allies for a time brought Germany to terms and the Upper Silesian matter had an independent settlement. But the problems of both Upper Silesia and Danzig cannot always be settled by fiat. In the years ahead French and British policies may be expected to clash again and again in these key situations, and full advantage will doubtless be taken by Germany of the political possibilities of impending disagreements.

POST-WAR DIFFICULTIES

As a consequence of wide devastation during the World War, the invasion of the Bolshevist army in 1920, and the difficulties of economic recovery, industries and trade in Poland fell into a bad way, and by 1924 the country was in a state of rapid economic decline similar to that which so many of the other countries of Europe had suffered. Taxes were difficult to collect; the government met its obligations by printing great quantities of paper money whose value fell to lower and lower levels; there were no constructive schemes for the reorganization of economic life. As in all such cases, unemployment grew; the textile and metal industries ran on part time. A bad crop year in 1924 increased the difficulty, for it compelled Poland to import both cereals and flour. A study of the situation by an economic mission led to a program of reform similar in scope and character to those carried through in Austria and Hungary. The currency was stabilized, expenditures more firmly controlled, loans made in foreign markets under adequate guarantees, and taxes raised to a level that permitted the government more nearly to meet its expenses out of current revenues.

These are the temporary aspects of Poland's present situation. There are permanent features of far greater consequence. The chief perils to independence and peace are three hostile neighbors — Germany, Russia, and Lithuania; division of counsel in the national government; the tendency of the large landowners of eastern Poland to support the exercise of dictatorial power by powerful leaders or through the restoration of a monarchical form of government. Pilsudski's coup of 1925 illustrates the extraordinarily divided and timid character of the national parliament, the power of the army in controlling or threatening to control civil life, the explosive temperament of Polish leaders, the danger of a foreign war provoked as an expedient to gain political ends.

These qualities of temperament and domestic politics would be of sufficient peril without the external dangers arising from Danzig, the Corridor and its division of German territory, the Vilna dispute, and the state of war in which Lithuania persists as a consequence of Zeligowski's coup of 1921. Russia professes acceptance of the present territorial status, while at the same time she encourages Lithuania to believe that she supports the recovery of Vilna. Most unfortunate are such relations with Russia when Rumania, sole ally of Poland in resistance to a Russian advance, is on equally bad terms with Russia over Bessarabia (pages 372–373). The "sanitary cordon" is itself in need of sanitation. Though precise lines are now laid down as boundaries on the political map and the preambles of treaties express amiable intentions, these things are far removed from the real purposes of the signatory powers.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

LITHUANIAN DEVELOPMENT AND RELATIONS

The Lithuanians are a weak people politically, though numbering more than 2,000,000 and including up to 4,000,000 of population in their territorial claims. Historically they have had close relations with Poland; yet they are now opposed to the Poles. Ethnically they grade into Russians in a broad transition belt on the east; yet they desire nothing else so little as a return to Russian domination. Commercially they are disorganized, undeveloped, dependent; yet they wish to have political independence and a hold upon that part of the trade of Russia that under settled conditions might flow through the port of Memel. A brief review of their historical struggle and their geographical environment is needed to understand their present anomalous political situation.

EXPANSION OF LITHUANIA AND UNION WITH POLAND

For centuries the settlements of the Lithuanian pagan tribes extended inland only to Kovno on the Niemen (Fig. 156). They were shut off from other Baltic folk by heavy forests and innumerable lakes and marshes. After the forests had been partly cleared away and commerce developed, strong covetous neighbors invaded the land, for Lithuania is a plains country throughout. There are no mountain barriers, and the coast is easily accessible by sea. In the 13th century came the first invaders, the Teutonic Knights (page 438). Hard pressed by the newcomers, the Lithuanians withdrew from the coast and rapidly extended their eastern limits.

The power of the nation seemed to grow almost in proportion to its difficulties. From a small state of 30,000 square miles in 1263, it became a large nation of 250,000 square miles in 1385. In little more than a hundred years, Lithuania pushed its southern frontier to the Black Sea. It controlled the entire Dnieper and the Niemen, which together form parts of a great historical highway across Europe. This brought it to the Polish frontiers. Eventually it became a part of the Polish state.

The union of Lithuania and Poland in 1386 was a personal union through the king, who was as much the king of Lithuania as of Poland. This lasted until 1569, when there was effected a closer union through a common Diet, with Lithuania still keeping a separate army and treasury and having its own administration. In 1791 the former

FIG. 156. Based on Droysen, *Allgemeiner Historischer Handatlas*, Pl. 37. From the *Geographical Review*, Vol. 4, 1917.

distinction between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish state was abolished. Thereafter the two states agreed to have a common administration, one army, and one treasury.

Thus Lithuania was assured the support of Poland, at first against the Teutonic Knights and later against the growing Muscovite power, and was able to preserve its western civilization, however near it was to oriental influence. Had Poland remained independent, the fusion of Polish and Lithuanian peoples would probably have been uninterrupted and the present antagonism between them would not exist.

Nationalism has been carried so far that most groups, however small, now seek a separate existence. To a large degree this is a distinctive product of the 18th and 19th centuries; it resulted in part from the wide dispersion of cultural concepts and republican ideas through the printing press, and the opportunity for self-training that this put into the hands of natural leaders. In the 18th century a strong educational movement resulted in the printing of grammars, dictionaries, poems, and stories, in the Lithuanian tongue. In the

19th century came a further revival of national sentiment, and the publication of newspapers, folklore, ballads, and fables. All of these publications were greatly stimulated by the religious spirit of the times.

FATE OF LITHUANIA IN THE PARTITIONS OF POLAND

At the time of the partitions of Poland (1772–1795), the greater part of Lithuania came into the hands of Russia and was organized as a province with a governor in charge. The land-owning nobles were left in local control. When the Lithuanian and Polish higher classes revolted (1830 and 1863), the Russian government confiscated many of the large estates of the nobles and divided the land among the peasants, exiling the revolutionists. After 1864 the printing of Lithuanian books in Latin script was prohibited. The Russian language was made obligatory in the schools and in official reports and documents. The government seized Lithuanian books printed in Germany or Austria and imported into Lithuania. A Lithuanian congress meeting at Vilna in 1905 protested against the acts of the Russian government and demanded Lithuanian autonomy and the use of the Lithuanian language.

In that portion of Lithuanian territory which lies north of the Niemen and which was included in East Prussia, the Germans carried on a Germanizing process (Frederick William I, in the 18th century, sent several thousand colonists into the country), but the region remained strongly Lithuanian despite these efforts. In 1844 the Lithuanian language was forbidden, though it was later permitted in the schools for instruction. German was decreed the official language in 1896.

THE ECONOMIC BASIS

Lithuania is without mineral deposits of commercial importance and must depend primarily upon its forests and crops for means of livelihood and commerce. Agriculture is of a primitive type, with cereals, flax, and potatoes the principal products. Not more than half the tillable land was formerly owned by the peasants. More than 80 per cent of the population is employed on the land, the holdings being of the small type. As a whole the nation is composed of peasant folk. Since the organization of the provisional government of Lithuania, most of the landed estates have been seized and divided among the peasants, and on the whole the latter are rather well off. Coincident with this division was the assignment of small lots of land to the town populations of the artisan class.

One of the great difficulties of a state of this character is to develop products which industrial nations want and which create a trade balance, for this makes possible the purchase of foreign wares like machinery, shoes, cloth, and a supplementary supply of food. The only way in which Lithuania can obtain such a trade balance is to sell its raw products, of which the most important in value are flax, rye, and flaxseed, in the order named. To be profitable this requires intelligent and cheap production, good transportation facilities, and a market demand. To assist the farmer the government is striving to organize agriculture, encourage dairying, and improve the character of its exports. Transportation conditions are still poor. The part nearest East Prussia has almost no good roads, though its soil is more fertile than that of any other part of the country. The commercial organizations are almost wholly in the hands of foreigners, Jews especially, and Germans. Lithuania was a part of the former Jewish Pale (Fig. 166, page 470), and the towns are more Jewish than those of Poland. Vilna is often called the Jerusalem of Lithuania.

PRESENT TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS

The Niemen is to the Lithuanians what the Danube is to the Rumanians and the Rhine to the French.

> The Niemen separates the Lithuanians from their foes: . . .
> On this side throngs of Lithuanian youths, . . .
> On the other, in helmet and armor,
> The Germans on horseback stand immovable.
>
> ADAM MICKIEWICZ, *Konrad Wallenrod*

While a number of Lithuanians live south of the Niemen (or Memel), they form a large majority north of that river at the tip of East Prussia, and it was this section, with an area of 945 square miles and a population of 150,000, including the port of Memel, that, by the treaty of Versailles, Germany ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers. Presumably the region was to be turned over to Lithuania.

The territorial problems of Lithuania have so far proved insoluble, partly on account of the special status of the Memel district, partly because of the continuous dispute with Poland over the territory of Vilna and the boundary in the Suwalki region (Fig. 157). Here Lithuanians and White Russians merge into each other without strong ethnic distinctions. The German and Russian armies being withdrawn, a first step (1919) was the establishment by the Allied powers of a demarcation line, so as to prevent fighting between Poles and Lithuanians. For

FIG. 157. The boundary between Lithuania and Poland is still unsettled. In the Suwalki district there was for several years a neutral zone extending six kilometers on either side of the indicated line. Elsewhere there has been no agreement respecting a final line, the whole zone being neutral for a time but without control or government by either state.

more than three years following there was a constant succession of border incidents, despite the presence of Allied officers. Lithuanian feeling has been embittered by the treaty between Poland and Soviet Russia signed at Riga in 1920, which transferred a part of the Lithuanian hinterland to Poland, thus giving Poland a strategic position with respect to Russian Baltic trade. It is true that Lithuania and Russia have signed a non-aggression pact and Russia has expressed sympathy for Lithuania in view of Polish violation of Lithuanian rights; but this does not give back Vilna.

The steady territorial and strategic encirclement by Poland has

long filled Lithuanian leaders with apprehension. Their fears do not stop here. The original Polish claims at the Peace Conference of Paris (1919) envisaged a "Greater Poland" to include the territory that was once under Polish sway when Lithuania and Poland were united (page 408). Lithuania believed that Poland was determined not merely to encircle but eventually to absorb her. France being Poland's strongest ally, French influence was equally feared, especially because a French High Commissioner governed at Memel in the period following 1918.

There was so much dissatisfaction with the attitude of the League of Nations in taking no positive action regarding unauthorized Polish military occupation of the Vilna region in 1922, that an insurrection broke out in 1923 directed against the Allies prominent in the League, and a provisional Lithuanian government was installed. A local Diet or Legislative Assembly at Memel thereupon voted for the union of Memelland, that is, the city and its surrounding district, with Lithuania. When the Council of Ambassadors offered to transfer the Memel territory to Lithuania with guarantees for the autonomy of the district and for the use of the Niemen River and the port of Memel by Poland, Lithuania objected to the exercise of any special privileges by Poles at the port of Memel, fearing absorption by the stronger state and indignant over broken Polish pledges. When the Council of Ambassadors declined to hand Memel to Lithuania unconditionally, on the ground that both the treaty of Versailles and the Barcelona Convention (page 23) committed it to the plan of obtaining for Memel a special status as a port of international concern, the matter was referred to the League of Nations. A special committee was appointed forthwith to study the question. It recommended the cession of the territory to Lithuania with guarantees for a reasonable measure of autonomy and for freedom of transit trade so that non-Lithuanian elements of the population would be provided with easy access to the Baltic. Meanwhile, Lithuania prevents the use of the Niemen by the Poles, refuses to allow postal or telegraphic communication with Poland, excludes Polish citizens by refusing them passports, and insists that a state of war exists between the two countries.[1]

While Poland insists that Lithuania must not be given a privileged position in Memel lest Polish interests come to harm, she also makes every pretension of non-aggression and peace. Her position is fundamentally weakened by her unlawful acts in seizing Vilna. It is strengthened by the fact that large Polish territories find their natural outlet at Memel. Poland has no ports of her own, and she has

[1] See page 423 for a reference to the Polish gesture of 1927 with respect to Vilna.

therefore to seek by every means in her power for port privileges, not only here but at Danzig. Until the Germans built a short railway line north of Memel during the World War, rail connections between Memel and the hinterland were south to Tilsit and so into East Prussia and northeastern Poland. The safeguarding of international interests at Memel and on the Niemen are important for Germany and Russia also, as was clearly recognized in the framing of the treaty of Versailles, the river being declared to be one of international concern. Lithuania attracts little sympathy from Latvia, because the port of Libau profits by the dispute over Memel. Germany, regretting the loss of a city so recently hers, can look without distraction upon a quarrel on the part of others over its control. French sympathies are Polish always, for the French want a strong Poland as a barrier between Germany and Russia. England alone of the nations of western and central Europe sympathizes with Lithuania. These confused conditions mean that Memel is in a state of complete stagnation. Polish timber cannot make its way down the Niemen, and timber export has declined as a result of restrictions upon owners, agents, and raftsmen. The national government of Lithuania at Kovno is in constant dispute with the city of Memel over the financial contribution which Lithuania is obliged to make to the territory of Memel, according to the Memel Convention of 1924.[1]

[1] By the terms of the Convention of 1924, which settled the status of Memel Territory, the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan have provided for the autonomy of the territory so as to preserve "the traditional rights and culture of its inhabitants." While sovereignty over the territory is Lithuanian, as shown, for example, by the fact that the President of Lithuania appoints the Governor of Memel Territory, at the same time ample provisions are made for the full competence of the local authorities in legislative, judicial, administrative, and financial matters. The Governor is assisted by a Directory of five members who act as a sort of cabinet, but the Directory is responsible to the Chamber of Representatives and its five members may not hold office after the confidence of the Chamber has been withheld. Full provision is made for equality of rights of citizenship as between inhabitants of Memel Territory and Lithuania, who may pass from one to the other. To provide revenues for Memel Territory, agreements are made between Lithuania and the Territory which determine what percentage of revenues shall be assigned to the latter from monopolies, customs duties, excise duties, and commodity taxes. The Port of Memel is declared a port of international concern and, with modifications, Barcelona Convention recommendations are applied (pages 23, 24). The expenses for the maintenance and development of the Port of Memel and the public waterways are provided by the Lithuanian government, with contributions from Memel Territory. A Harbor Board now administers the Port of Memel. It consists of three persons — one Lithuanian appointee, one representative from Memel Territory, one member named by the League of Nations. It is the business of the board to maintain the existing free zone. The Lithuanian government has undertaken to establish in the Port of Memel under the direction of the Harbor Board a free zone suitable for the storage, handling, and working up of timber of non-Lithuanian origin, provided that duties on the import and export of timber are not abolished.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

LAND AND TRADE IN ESTONIA AND LATVIA

For centuries the eastern Baltic coast has been the scene of racial and political conflict. Ivan III of Russia made its possession a leading political object late in the 15th century, fighting both Germans and Poles; and his successor, Peter the Great, consolidated these gains and established St. Petersburg (now Leningrad). Baltic outlets were vital to the development of northwestern Russia. They were essential to the maintenance of tolerable trade relations with the much more advanced countries of western Europe. To Russians these seemed quite proper objects, but the inhabitants of the coastal belt are not Russian folk. They are Lithuanians and Letts, an allied Indo-European stock (Fig. 1, page 6), and Esths and Finns of Finno-Ugrian origin. German traders have long been a small but powerful element in the towns and Germans own a disproportionate part of the land. Russians form but a minor part of the population of the coastal belt.

In the opening stages of the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Baltic populations of non-Russian stock saw their opportunity to escape from the political oppression of Russia, sharply manifested after 1905 (page 454), as well as their economic bondage to the German element in the south and the Swedish element in the north. The four chief groups — Finns, Lithuanians, Letts, and Esths — set up independent governments, and it is with two of these that we are here concerned. What were known as the Baltic Provinces — Estonia, Livonia, and Courland — were organized into two states:

(1) Estonia, which is composed of the old province of Estonia and more than half of Livonia.

(2) Latvia, formed out of the rest of Livonia and the whole of Courland.

The Estonian National Council was provisionally recognized by Great Britain in May 1918, and the Letts were similarly recognized in November, a Lettish National Council having been formed at Riga and a provisional government organized late in 1917. Both states were fully recognized by western powers in 1921.

DOMINATION BY OTHER PEOPLES

These two new states did not base their claim to independence upon historical precedents, for ever since tribal days they have been under the control of others — Germans, Swedes, or Russians. They desired freedom from economic exploitation by minority elements that had strong governments behind them and a wall-like racial and cultural

solidarity. The exploitation of the peasants, who form the bulk of the population, had been carried on through a system of land tenure that had its roots in the events of the 12th century, when German traders first visited the region to exchange wares with the natives. With the traders came missionaries, and finally crusaders. Thus in 1200 came Bishop Albert, with twenty-three shiploads of knights, organized into an order called "Brothers of the Sword," or Livonian Knights. They



FIG. 158. Ethnography and boundaries in Lithuania and the former Baltic Provinces of Russia. The former boundaries of the provinces are shown by a line of light dashes. (Dorpat is now Tartu.)

converted the heathen natives and subdued the land by force, making a place for German colonists, whose settlements have remained distinct to this day. The Livonian Knights, defeated in 1236, united with the Teutonic Knights, an order likewise devoted to forcible Christianization. The struggle with the natives of the Baltic Provinces was then renewed. During the 14th century, and again in the 16th century, there was a series of wars whereby the religious orders were weakened, and their territory was overrun by Poles and Swedes. After 1561, Poland held all of Livonia, and Courland became a Polish duchy. Amid all these and later changes the Prussian landlords kept their political hold upon the country, and with it their control of the land and the means of commerce.

In 1629 Sweden, under Gustavus Adolphus, got control of Lettland, to give way in turn to Russia in 1721, in the time of Peter the Great. During nearly a century of Swedish rule represented by this interval, many of the German landlords had to give up their estates and the people were permitted to maintain schools. Under the Russian rule that followed, all the privileges of government were regained by the German lords, who made the fullest use of their opportunity. Churches, schools, and police laws came under their control; the peasants were made serfs, practically slaves. They could be sold or given away; the lords had the power of life and death over them. Not until 1804 could the peasants own property or land, and even then such ownership accomplished little, for the landlords obtained still more land until, by 1850, they owned 60 per cent of the whole. Between 1845 and 1863 laws were promulgated by the Russian government which limited the rights of the landlords and gave the peasants a better hold upon the soil.

In 1884 the government of the Czar began a Russianizing policy which continued until the revolution of 1905. The Russian language was prescribed in the schools, in the University of Dorpat, and in the whole civil administration. Instead of encouraging the German element as theretofore, the Russian government now sought to de-Germanize the provinces. Socialism spread rapidly in the general effort to overthrow the existing government, and many of the estates of the German landlords were seized in the revolt of 1905. The Russian government put down the revolution with great vigor and brutality. From that time until the formation of republican governments in 1917–1918, the Germans on the one hand and the Russians on the other were equally hated by Esths and Letts.

It was the presence of the German barons in the Baltic Provinces that led Germany to hope for the conquest of this country early in

1918, when the German army completed its eastward advance and established itself on a line which it held down to the end of the World War. By the treaty of Brest Litovsk (Germany and Russia, 1918), the country west of a line running from Dvinsk to Brest Litovsk was to be made into states whose government and economic control were to be in the hands of German princes. The German government also organized a great colonization scheme, advertising large estates that were made vacant by the flight of Lettish peasants. It was called the Hindenburg Colonization Plan.

GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO RETAIN CONTROL

For more than a year after the close of the World War, the fate of the region was in the balance. As one of the conditions of the Armistice of 11 November 1918, Germany denounced the treaty of Brest Litovsk, though by an unfortunate article of the agreement she was required to remove her troops from the Baltic Provinces only when ordered by the Allies to do so. A long delay ensued. This gave the army leaders and the powerful German land-owning barons, or "Balts," who had controlled the country for centuries, an opportunity to interfere with the newly formed and weak governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Von der Goltz, the German army commander, supported by soldiers of fortune from Germany and the local German nobility, tried to bring the whole Baltic region under German control, intending thus to hold the western outlets of a vast hinterland and provide a base for German economic and political penetration of Russia. Several times, as a result of Allied pressure, the German armies withdrew over limited areas and permitted the Bolshevists to work their will on the defenseless inhabitants. By this action, there was created a still wider gulf between the native peasantry and the German landowners; instead of increasing German influence, they put an end to it. Under the supervision of an Interallied military mission, the evacuation of the German armies was completed late in 1919, but the mission to be effective had to be supported for several months by a strong Allied blockade of the Baltic coast of Germany.

AGREEMENT WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA

Having obtained recognition from the Allies, it was important for Estonia to arrange peace with Soviet Russia, so that industries could be revived, order maintained, and an eastern administrative boundary established.

As a result of a conference at Dorpat an armistice was concluded

on 3 January 1920, whereby the Esths obtained practically the whole of the territory they claimed on ethnic grounds. The principal articles follow:

(1) The Russian government recognized the right of a nationality within the former Russian Empire to separate from Russia and to enjoy absolute independence, basing this action on the principal of self-determination; it renounced voluntarily and forever all sovereign rights over Estonian people and territory. The frontiers were defined as in Figure 158.

(2) It was provided that no armed vessels should be kept on Lakes Peipus and Pskov.

(3) Of particular interest is the section of the treaty dealing with economic relations, providing for the equality of trade in commercial, industrial, and financial enterprises, ships and cargoes, farms and industries, agricultural products and exported goods. "No customs duties or tariffs shall be levied on goods transported across the territory of the other signatory of this treaty." Freight rates are to be no higher in one country than in the other country. Estonia is to provide Russia with whatever port space is needed for commercial purposes, with a free port in Revel (Tallinn), or wherever a free port may be established.

(4) Special agreements must be made between Estonia and Russia with respect to fishing on Lakes Peipus and Pskov, the operation of commercial vessels, and the diversion of water.

(5) Russia is to have the right to obtain electric power from the waterfalls of the Narova River (which runs from Lake Peipus into the gulf of Finland), and Estonia is to have the right to construct and exploit a direct single- or double-track railway connection from Moscow to some point on the Estonian frontier.

(6) Finally, Russia grants to Estonia rights over 2,700,000 acres of forest land in the governments of Petrograd, Pskov, Tver, Novgorod, Olonetz, Vologda, and Archangel.

These provisions are, on the whole, surprisingly liberal. They are, however, not a mark of Soviet benevolence, being clearly intended to pave the way for closer relations on the part of Russia with a state so critically related to Baltic trade outlets.

AGRICULTURE AND TRADE RELATIONS

Both Estonia and Latvia are in the class of small agricultural states, with populations of 1,115,000 and 1,844,800 respectively. Less than a quarter of the population is supported by industry, transportation,

and commerce. Of the population of Estonia 24 per cent lives in towns; of Latvia, 22 per cent. In countries with a better balanced economy these figures are 40, 50, or 60 per cent. In order to start its national life each state was obliged to borrow money, the United States and Great Britain being the largest creditors. Because they are small and inexperienced countries, financial assistance is hard to get and the administration of such tiny states, including the upkeep of military forces, makes a heavy demand upon the national budget. Obviously the burden of government would be diminished by a political union. The reasons why this has not been effected are outlined on page 443.

Since agriculture is the principal basis of life, the division of the large landed estates has been a matter of interest to the new peasant citizens from the first. It has been said that 90 per cent of every nationality in Europe is more interested in social than national problems, in the question of food and wages rather than culture and independence. This expresses itself most clearly in the universal desire on the part of the masses to acquire land for individual use. Under the old Russian system about twelve hundred Baltic nobles held nearly 60 per cent of the total land area of the Baltic Provinces. They long treated the peasants as chattels without rights in land. The new governments almost immediately promised land reforms. Practically all of the large estates were divided into small parcels of about 30 acres each, peasant committees distributing the land and the government denying compensation to the owners. The forests were nationalized. By 1925 the minorities were protected by constitutional provisions which gave Balts, Russians, and Swedes cultural institutions and cultural self-government through local councils that look after education and religious matters, largely control cultural activities, and are measurably free from interference by government.

While the holding of the land in large estates enabled the former German landowners to exploit the peasants, it is also true that the large landowners formed the most intelligent part of the population. They were responsible for the introduction of modern agricultural machinery and the practice of diversified farming. While the peasants have won freedom from the Balts, they have lost an important part of the brains of the country. The town laborers who turned to agriculture discovered that land without work is not wealth; and they have appealed to the government to give them agricultural education and financial assistance. Under Russian sovereignty, Estonia and Latvia enjoyed some advantages which they have now lost. The textile, shipbuilding, leather, paper, and other industries had operated under the protection

of a high tariff, whereas separation meant the loss of their former markets, including protection and working capital. The exports of Estonia and Latvia must now compete on an international basis in world markets. Under these handicaps the government, while continuing to encourage industry, has turned its chief attention to agricultural progress, to the improvement of cattle breeding, dairy farming, and the like. In a similar way improvements are sought in the production of flax, which accounts for about a quarter of the exports in both countries, and the development of the timber and paper industries. Strange as it may seem, foodstuffs constitute the most important items of import as well as of export, because of the lack of balanced production. Wood and wood manufactures come next in the list of exports, then textiles and fabrics, and paper and paper goods. Metals, machinery, coal, oil, and fertilizers are the leading imports. Industrial Germany and England are the nearest and the cheapest sources of supply for such a list of imports, the best markets for exports.

Estonia and Latvia are of interest to Russia because their ports — Riga, Libau, Windau, Port Baltic, and Revel (Tallinn) — are the rail outlets upon the Baltic of the western provinces of Russia. Because Russia itself is still largely in a state of primary production and has similar products and needs, its trade with Estonia and Latvia is only about half that of Germany and England. The Baltic Sea is a British trading realm of acute interest ever since the World War, because of the need of the industrial cities of England for the raw materials of the Baltic and its hinterland and because the uncertainty of political relations between Great Britain and Soviet Russia has kept direct trade between them in a precarious position. It will be recalled that it was a British navy that blockaded the coasts of Germany in the World War and later closed the ports of Bolshevist Russia, that a British High Commissioner sits at Danzig, and that in times of disorder British naval units have repeatedly patrolled the coast of the Baltic. All this is in line with the traditional British policy of concentrating political or military effort upon commercial ports that serve as outlets for interior populations.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF BALTIC CONFEDERATION

When the small states of Estonia and Latvia came into being in 1918, and Lithuania with a population of two millions likewise declared its independence, a Baltic confederation or at least an entente was considered desirable. As early as August 1920 there was held at Riga a conference of five Baltic states — Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lith-

uania, and Poland. It was then sought to lay the foundation for a political and economic understanding respecting mutual interests in the Baltic. It was believed that a currency system might be framed that would be favorable to all and increase the power of each, because the currencies of small countries have difficulty in winning recognition in the international money markets and in foreign trade transactions. It was believed that a system of exchange of commodities might be worked out and that relations with Russia and with each other might be put on a more secure basis. But the several states have different languages and no close historical or political associations, in spite of the similarity of their social and political problems in the past. It was also believed that in such a scheme the German element of the population might regain political control, being more experienced in commercial and political affairs. A more practical basis of difference between the states is the fact that Lithuania is chiefly agricultural, more than 80 per cent of its population being employed upon the land. Its only large industry is the production of timber and lumber for export, while Latvia enjoys the commercial advantages of a critical position between Russia on the one hand and western markets on the other and has remained free from political difficulties such as impede the internal organization of Lithuania. Though still predominantly agricultural, both Latvia and Estonia[1] have definitely begun to encourage the processes of industrialization. This means a competitive attitude and the discouragement of union between Latvia and Estonia, while Lithuania is fearful of the competition of her two economically more advanced neighbors. Since the Vilna dispute (page 432), Lithuania has refused to send delegates to any conference which Polish representatives attend. She has therefore not been represented at the several Baltic conferences held since 1920. A Baltic "Locarno" has been the subject of discussion since 1925 when (with Lithuania absent) Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland signed a general arbitration convention.

[1] A draft agreement for a customs union between Estonia and Latvia was signed in January 1927.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

FINNISH PROBLEMS IN THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING

Of all of the new nations of Europe, Finland is farthest north. No other civilized people confronts more unusual problems of position and natural environment. The social, ethnic, and political conditions are still in process of rapid evolution, in common with those of its neighbors on the eastern Baltic, recently a part of the former Russian Empire.

Finland's first determination, after the proclamation of the republic in December 1917, was to secure a foothold, at least, on the Arctic coast. Only Russia on the White Sea and along the Murman and west Siberian coasts, and Canada at Hudson Strait, have comparable interest in a northerly exit on sub-arctic routes.

GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS

What are the resources of Finland? What is the physical basis of its strength?

As outlined in Figure 160, Finland is twice the size of New England. While the extreme north grades into Arctic tundra, the country as a whole resembles the Lake Superior region in topography and climate. The surface is generally rocky and lake-dotted, with an irregular drainage, a thin soil, and an extensive forest cover. In the milder south, where there is a deeper soil, there are farms producing hardy grains like rye, barley, and oats. Barley is grown up to latitude 68° north and rye to 64°, or to 67° in favorable years.

The population of Finland is 3,500,000. Helsingfors, the capital, has 200,000. The towns are small, and include only 15 per cent of the population (in the United States more than half of the population is urban). In the colder and remoter north the density of population is less than 1 to the square mile; in the warmer and more fertile south, on the edge of the Gulf of Finland, it reaches 93 to the square mile.

Agriculture and cattle raising engage the interest of about half the population, though only 8.5 per cent of the land is cultivated or in pasture. Nearly a third of the land surface is covered with peat marsh and bog, and nearly three fourths of the total area is forested.

"The Finns have been bred in the school of adversity." As a whole the country is poor and famines are not rare. In 1867 and 1869 there was general want, owing respectively to the poor crop of rye (the principal food) and a partial failure of the potato crop. The Finns have

emigrated in large numbers, chiefly to North America, for Finland cannot support its people on its own produce. A third of the imports are foodstuffs, and agricultural production is not keeping pace with the increasing population.

The chief wealth of Finland is in its forests and water power. Of the 2,500,000 horse power available, only 300,000 are now in use. Wood and wood products account for 75 to 85 per cent of the exports of the country. More than half of the forested area is covered with pine. Mineral resources are almost unknown. The total mileage of railways is 3000, which, in relation to the number of people, is a high figure and compares favorably with that of industrial countries like France and Belgium. The long and indented seacoast, with innumerable havens and extensive fishing grounds, has naturally bred sailors. Before the World War, Finnish ships plied between Stockholm, Antwerp, London, Havre, and Bordeaux. A regular line of steamers to South America was started in 1926.



Fig. 159. Water resources of Finland, a glaciated rocky country like Quebec. The Saima canal system, mentioned in the text, is shown just above Kotka on the Gulf of Finland. From *Atlas de Finlande*, 2d ed., 1911, Pl. 14.

For the most part settlements in Finland follow the watercourses. Certain canals date from the Middle Ages. The Saima Canal (constructed in 1856) connects lakes having an area of 2600 square miles, the largest group of lakes in Europe, of which more than 2000 square miles are in Finland (Fig. 159). This system connects directly with



FIG. 160. Population densities in Finland. Note the coastal position of the highest density grades and compare with Figure 161, showing the field of Swedish colonization. The heavy line encloses the principal body of Finns. Based on *Petermanns Mitteilungen*, 1913, I, Pl. 2, and Debes, *Handatlas*, 1913, Pl. 12 *c*.

the Gulf of Finland and is an outlet of incalculable benefit to the country.

THE PEOPLE OF FINLAND

The Finns are closely allied to their nearest Baltic neighbor, the Esths, but not to the Letts, who are related to Lithuanian folk; that is, they belong to the Finno-Ugrian stock, which is quite distinct from the Slavic stock of eastern Europe and from the Teutonic (Nordic) stock of Scandinavia and Germany. Finnish is the language of 88 per cent of the population; more than 11 per cent speak Swedish. Though small numerically, the Swedish element is very important, because it controls a large part of the wealth of the country and is active politically out of proportion to its numbers. The small remainder of the people comprises about 1300 Lapps in the north and about 2000 Germans and 6000 Russians in the southern portions.

Education in Finland is on a remarkably high level. Practically every Finlander can read. The discovery by Elias Lönnrot of the great epic of the Finns, the Kalevala, first published in 1835, gave a great impulse to the study of the Finnish language and culture. More than 300,000 legends, sagas, and proverbs have been collected.

All this intellectual activity, but especially the publication of the Kalevala, had a strongly stimulating effect on the nationalist movement. Though Russia conquered the territory of Finland, she could not conquer Finnish customs and culture. Despite the difficulties of her geographical environment and of ever-threatening trouble from the east, Finland has risen to the rank of a nation of great promise for the future — an outpost of western civilization.

RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING STATES

Finland's present problems in the field of political geography follow for the most part from the country's position between more powerful peoples of different race and speech — the Swedes on the west and the Russians on the east. In the 12th and 13th centuries the Swedes, after repeated crusades against the country, conquered it; and they kept it until 1809 — more than six hundred years. During this time the history of Sweden is the history of Finland. The whole country was impregnated with Swedish culture. Then came Russia, to stay until 1917, when the Czar was deposed and a Soviet government set up.

The Åland Islands

In the alternate ownership of Finland by Sweden and Russia, the Åland Islands have been a matter of dispute. They lie only seventy-five miles from Stockholm and twenty miles from the Swedish coast, and if fortified by a neighboring power would be a grave menace to Finland. Their strategic value grows out of their good harbors as well as their geographical position. They were ceded by Sweden to Russia in 1809, but their population of 19,000 is almost exclusively Swedish. In 1922 they were assigned to Finland in accordance with the recommendations of the commission of the League of Nations appointed to study the question, and Sweden has acknowledged the transfer.

A condition of Finnish ownership is the neutralization and non-fortification of the islands. Finland may not use them as a base for military operations. In case of a war affecting the Baltic Sea, however, Finland may assure respect for the neutrality of the island zone by laying mines and taking other measures, but must notify the League of Nations of its action in that



Fig. 161. Swedish colonists, former Swedish ownership of Finland, and the wide distribution of Swedish culture have combined to make the Swedes a powerful political group in Finland. From *Atlas de Finlande*, 2d ed., 1911, Vol. II, p. 20, text to map 46.

event. The same conditions apply if an attack is made against the Finnish mainland by an aggressor. The governments signing the convention that ended the Åland Islands dispute are (besides Finland), Germany, Sweden, Great Britain, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Denmark, all of them states with special Baltic interests.

Eastern Karelia

On two other borders of Finland, territorial problems arose that were solved by agreement with Russia. East of Finland is the province of Eastern Karelia, occupied by a people racially allied to the Finns. There are also cultural relations of sentimental interest. Here originated the runes that constitute the basis of the Finnish classic, the Kalevala. By the terms of an agreement ratified in 1920, Russia guarantees autonomy to Eastern Karelia and to the Karelian population of Archangel and Olonetz (northeast of Lake Ladoga), which is Greek Orthodox in religion and Russian in civilization but without marked political preferences. The Soviet government tardily granted the autonomy thus provided. Other articles deal with freedom of transportation and the rafting of timber on waters across the boundary line between Finland and Eastern Karelia. Commercial freedom of wide scope is provided by articles on the use of ports, railways, telegraph lines, freight and customs rates, fishing rights, harbor fees, and the like.

The Pechenga Region

On the Arctic coast Finland sought an extension of her territory to include a strip of shore in the Pechenga region. The significance of the claim is due to the fact that the ice-free waters of the North Atlantic Drift here flow along the shore zone and cause the ports of Pechenga and Alexandrovsk, 250 miles north of the Arctic Circle, to remain open through the winter months, when all the ports of the eastern Baltic and the White Sea are closed by ice. Archangel, for example, is icebound for nine months each year. The Baltic ports of Finland, particularly Åbo and Hangö, are kept open by icebreakers. It was to secure an open port that Russia built the Murman Railway (Fig. 160) and Catherine Harbor (Alexandrovsk). The northern ports would be of far less importance if it were not that Russia has already lost all of her Baltic ports except Leningrad. In making the treaty with Finland, Russia insisted that Russian citizens should be guaranteed free right of transit through the Pechenga region to Norway and back without inspection or charges.

THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION

The internal political problems of Finland depend in part upon the division of the population between Finns and Swedes; in part also upon a difference of opinion among sections of the population as to the political objectives at which a republican government should aim. At the beginning of Finland's national history, following the Russian Revolution, there were several brief internal struggles between Whites and Reds that ended in qualified victory for the Whites. The communist agitation continued for some time, proximity to Russia increasing the difficulty, and there was lingering bitterness as a result of the civil war.

Additional burdens were laid upon the new state through the fact that there was a demand for land reform on a scale that implied both social and economic revolution. Since the country is chiefly agricultural, it was natural that an Agrarian Party should be organized. It supports the coöperative movement and favors the rural population. This party won the elections in 1925, its candidate becoming President, a result achieved by combinations with other parties, particularly the National Progressive Party, which is interested chiefly in internal developments. The Swedish People's Party is interested primarily in maintaining the rights of the Swedes, seeing that the Finns openly oppose the Swedes as a class. While the Swedes received certain stipulated language rights under the constitutional guarantees for minorities, and while both the Swedish and the Finnish languages are official in legal proceedings, the Swedes assert that educational facilities for Swedish students are steadily declining. At the same time the nationalist parties hold that minority rights are an infringement of sovereignty. It is too early to forecast the outcome of the chauvinistic and anti-Swedish attitude of the Finnish bourgeoisie, who accept the Swedes as an economic group but oppose them as a cultural group.

Land reform became an immediate object of the new government of Finland in 1917 and 1918. By the end of 1922, more than 50,000 small holdings had been made independent freehold properties. A colonization law was put into effect in 1922 with compulsory purchase of landed estates authorized only as a last resort, in contrast to the course pursued in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other states of central Europe.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF RUSSIA

THE CULTURAL SETTING

From the standpoint of internal organization Russia has always been a weak country — weak in political structure, backward in social development, ill-equipped with economic machinery. Its great size is impressive. It is a land of continental proportions — almost as large as North America, one sixth the land surface of the globe. Because its autocratic government, under successive Czars, controlled a trained army and navy, it could muster in time of war a formidable military establishment and for a while strike heavy blows. This helped to conceal grave internal weaknesses. Russia's vast and fertile plains and huge peasant population, its large exports of foodstuffs and raw materials, its possibilities of production — all of these implied strength from the standpoint of western civilization. But in reality they were only as potent as the political, social, and economic organizations behind them. Mere area does not make an empire — it may be in fact an element of weakness. Resources are not wealth until their development is attacked by an effective economic organization, and their value is always enhanced by a favorable geographical environment.

No doubt the geographical environment in Russia supplied elements of strength ; but it had also certain dominating weaknesses. Over more than eight and a half millions of square miles is spread an open network of railways only 45,000 miles long. The rivers, lakes, and canals of European Russia add 20,000 miles of waterway navigable for steamers ; Asiatic Russia, another 20,000 miles. The United States with three millions of square miles has 260,000 miles of railway. A railway map shows that three fourths of the area of Russia is more than twenty-five miles from a railroad. Little use to have the greatest forests in the world (Fig. 171), if there are no railroads to convey forest products and if the streams are open but three months of the year and flow northward to an ice-choked sea. Little real value in possessing farther Siberia, if it is so remote as to be within the commercial orbit not of Europe but of Japan and the United States. Half of Russia's great population is low-grade stock, alien to Russian life and speech. Many of its folk are desert nomads, fishermen, hunters, and the like. Literacy even among the Russian stock is the lowest in Europe. High economic organization and high standards of living imply education and initiative and above all machinery, so that one man's work will satisfy more than one man's need.

FIG. 162. Generalized ethnographic map of Russia in relation to the boundaries of the larger natural regions. Ethnography after Debes and natural regions after map by Hanelik in Rudnyckyj, *Der Östliche Kriegesschauplatz*, 1915. For population density and explanation of cities see Figure 163. Smaller ethnographic elements, like the Lapps in the north and the Kirghiz about the eastern and northern Caspian, are not shown. "Caucasian" refers to locality, not race. Note the close approach of the bends of the Volga and Don near Tsaritsin. The Cossacks of the Don, the partly nomadic Kirghiz east of them, and the Tatars of Azerbaijan about Baku constitute a broad belt of non-Russian population with separatist tendencies, encircling the Caspian. Boundaries as in 1914. For present boundaries see Figure 168, page 474.

"Natural resources" is a time-honored phrase to which we too often defer without thinking. In reality such resources are inert and cartographic merely, until they are put into active relation to consuming centers. Russia has never been self-sufficient: she has had no

economic organization that could get efficiently from without what she could not produce within. Better internal transport could largely equalize the food supply, but it could not create the wares of city-made industries. For heavy industries big cities are needed. Russia has an infinity of villages, but their contribution to industry is only in lighter wares. The United States has 68 cities with a population of 100,000 or more; Russia, with 20 per cent more people, has only 20 such cities. Geographical diversity is a good thing provided the diversified forests, soils, fisheries, and minerals are not too widely separated from each other and from commercial lanes and markets. Finally, man himself in all his diversity is a geographical factor, interactive with the earth.

The vast plains of Russia are not a complete geographical environment. How to get the butter of pastoral Siberia and the dried fruits of Turkestan to western Europe was a problem in transport with which Russians were struggling even before the World War. Cotton culture in the irrigated lands of Transcaspia could stand the transport costs, and its acreage was increasing rapidly. As far back as the discovery of America, Russian leaders were seeking a northern route to Europe by way of the White Sea. Likewise the Baltic was an object of approach for centuries. The great plain of Russia, low, unaccented, boundless, was not enough for the Russian people. The several regions were all too much alike in stage of development, in the production of raw materials, and in need for manufactured goods, to live in a world of their own. They needed exchange if living conditions were to be improved. The Russians pushed toward southerly waters in farthest Siberia and on the Black Sea coast, and developed outlets along the Baltic, and even at the edge of the Arctic; and all this not just recently, but over a period of four hundred years. A need may be called real that is the object of so prolonged and determined a search.

Great historical issues are associated with the plain of European Russia. Here was dissolved the invading army of Napoleon. The nomad has ranged over it: for more than two centuries the Mongols were masters of it. Its earlier peoples in great migratory waves moved westward, occupying parts of central Europe. Finns, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Serbians, Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles of today are descendants of early stocks associated with the Russian plain. The government of Russia was long the most autocratic on earth. Its present rulers offer the extremes of communism. To some the Russia of today appears to be an experiment in liberty; to others a darker menace than the Black Death. Nansen describes it as "a world still unborn."

FIG. 163. The distribution of population densities in European Russia in 1910 according to *Petermanns Mitteilungen*, 1913, I, Pl. 2, and Romer, *Atlas géographique et statistique de la Pologne*, 1916. The creation of the line of new states on the western margin in 1917–1918 resulted in the loss to Russia of a population of more than 30,000,000 (1918). It also deprived her of a part of the Baltic coast which she had held for centuries as one of her few outlets to salt water.

Many, like him, have caught the "echoes of melancholy from the limitless steppes, from the unknown depths of an alien existence." If the measures in force today are extreme, we have to recall that this is the nature of revolutions: the present rulers of Russia, like the autocrats who preceded them, are as desperate men struggling in a flood.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1917

The word "Soviet" now stands for authority in Russia where formerly the word "Czar" was the symbol of power. In a few months in 1917 a long established system of government was swept away. The crisis developed suddenly: the causes had been operating for a long time. A few years of experiment with the Duma, or legislative assembly, established in 1905, and with the power of strikes on a huge scale, had torn away the veil of mystery that had long hung over government. "Politics became an everyday matter." It was discovered that the ruling caste was fighting its own people as well as foreign enemies. It terrorized and suppressed both the coöperative associations and the local committees that struggled patriotically with the problems of food distribution and hospital work in support of the World War.

The revolution did not have to fight to win its first use of power. The old régime collapsed of itself because its weak leaders were dealing with a war and with social changes beyond their powers of organization. In Leningrad (then Petrograd) the soldiers dropped all discipline, street crowds looted, prisons were opened, the Duma formed a new government committee. One government succeeded another rapidly as events drifted farther and farther toward the extremists of the Left. In September 1917 Russia had been proclaimed a republic. By November a second Congress of Soviets met and declared the temporary revolutionary government of Kerensky overthrown. A Council of People's Commissars was elected with Lenin as its President. The following February (1918) the Ukraine was in the hands of the Soviets. A discouraged army, questioning the purpose of the World War and its own cruel sacrifices, became completely demoralized. Its soldiers surrendered by hundreds of thousands or turned back home to sow revolt and banditry in all the centers of its peasant origin.

Back to Russia on the wings of revolution had come the exiled theorists who had long taught revolt, among them Lenin, Trotsky, and Zinoviev, leaders of the extremists. Out of the wreckage about them they constructed entirely new social, political, and economic systems which with missionary zeal they sought to impress upon their own people, untrained as these were in spontaneous political action and the use of the suffrage. Indeed, the active members of the new government believed that the masses had no political wisdom and that an oligarchy of leaders rather than democratic slogans would bring salvation. With equal zeal the leaders turned their attention to peoples outside Russia, attacking the social systems of industrial countries and seeking

to overthrow existing "capitalist" governments. No less than a world program of communism was the ambitious object of the new leaders of a people itself but newly freed from bondage. Thus Bolshevism became and has remained an acute international question, not merely a domestic issue.

It was the unexpected force of these revolutionary ideas suddenly let loose upon the world that most terrified western leaders. For ideas are not excluded by tariffs or killed by treaties. Nowadays they circulate everywhere. The world had to take account of communism as a fact of Russian life. Hardly less significant than the new communistic program was the sudden organization of the "Red" army to support it. Again and again that army struck with startling power. It overran the Transcaucasus and absorbed three young republics there; and it penetrated Poland on a wide front, almost reaching the gates of Warsaw. Earlier still (1919–1920) the recreated army overwhelmed the anti-Bolshevik, or "White," armies of Wrangel in the Crimea, Kolchak in Siberia, Yudenitch in Estonia, and Petlura in Eastern Galicia. It held its own against the Allied armies in the Archangel region and in eastern Siberia. It threw back an invading Polish army. It brought to a standstill on the Dniester the military operations of the Rumanians. The intervention of foreign powers in a domestic question had strengthened the position of the extremists. Thus the Russian civil war was changed into a new foreign war. The Soviet leaders believed in counter-attack by promoting a Red Terror at home (as in the French Revolution) and by kindling revolt among the industrial workers of Russia's former allies. They spoke of "freeing" Europe.

The Soviet experiment stands out as one of the most striking events in the history of modern Europe. Two politically unlike worlds meet on Russia's western frontier, and because of the clash of their ideals, their spirit, and their social concepts, the widest accommodation is required on both sides to restore working political and economic arrangements. The Russian leaders of the old régime had individually absorbed western culture; but the thought of the Russian people did not extend beyond the frontier. An infiltration of culture into Russia from the west had indeed taken place, but its effects were confined to a handful. The Russian intellectual of the 19th century has been described as a man having "his body in the backward East, his mind in the progressive West." It did not change the peasant's plow or his hut or increase his meager acres that his leaders dreamed of the westernization of Russia, of railroad building and industrial development.

We are prepared to understand the acceptance by an eastern people of our western ideas as if that were a rational recognition of our superior culture. It is not easy to understand the Russian case, because down to the time of the Russian revolution there had been no equivalent infiltration of Russian ideas among western peoples. We looked upon the Russian people as politically inert or receptive merely, for the risings of 1905, which first revealed the intensity of the fires of revolution, were regarded as the work of local and extreme groups. We did not realize that Russians in large numbers had a political philosophy of their own upon which they might some day take an aggressive stand. We thought that western capital and industry would transform the city life of Russia and that however much of barbaric or oriental color might be left, the main features of that life would tend to become western in character. It never occurred to us that such unsophisticated people would concern themselves intensely with the social effects of modern industry rather than accept with little or no question its undoubted material rewards.

The Soviet government of Russia has had the temerity in a modern industrial world to test theories of government in the face of war and starvation. It maintains communistic principles of state ownership of land and industry, houses and forests, and natural resources of every kind. In addition it makes special use for political purposes of the industrial workers of the towns, because they live in compact masses and are capable of quick and effective organization and indoctrination. In fact, it was the town workers that proved to be the Nemesis of the old order. Far and away the most important of the original body of communist principles was that of the state ownership of land, for it related itself at once in a most strategic manner not only to centuries of land hunger but also to the very life of the communistic principles themselves.

LAND HUNGER

For generations most of the land of Russia had been held in large estates; down to one hundred years ago nine tenths of it was in the hands of the few. These estates were tilled by the serfs that made up the bulk of the population. So far as the serfs themselves owned land, the plots were small in extent and had only the most primitive equipment. The life of the mass of the people was extremely wretched. For a long time they were slaves in effect if not in name, and the greatness and power of the empire meant nothing to them.

In a series of edicts dating from 1859 to 1866, Alexander II abolished serfdom. At the same time he divided the land into two parts: one



FIG. 164. The cereal supply of Eastern Russia for a normal five year period preceding the World War, A belt having neither marked excess nor deficiency trends northeastward from northern Rumania to the Urals and separates a huge northwestern cereal-deficient tract dependent upon the southern Ukraine, the Don region, and the Taurida northwest of the Caucasus. The figures give the average annual per capita production for each government. The average annual consumption of the four grains mapped is about 800 pounds a person. The boundaries of the governments of pre-war Russia are shown by fine dotted lines; the capitals are given without parentheses if the population exceeds 100,000, with parentheses if under 100,000.

part was left to the landlords; the other was given to the former serfs, with provisions for payment to the landlords. But relief was short-lived on account of the rapid increase of population during the next fifty years. It resulted that the need for land became even greater,

and the Russian peasant was on the verge of starvation practically all the time. In 1891–1892 thousands died of starvation. When the war with Japan (1904–1905) turned out badly, disturbance became general. The peasants burned the houses of many of the landowners; there were mutinies in the army and the navy; the country was in a state of semi-anarchy. The harshest suppression failed to bring political stability, and the Czar at last issued a manifesto in 1905 promising a representative assembly, or Duma, whose original powers he later gradually diminished so that by 1914 it no longer represented the people at all. The land question had grown still more acute. The peasants suffered from heavy taxes, lack of cheap transportation, and a medieval state of agricultural practice. Neither emigration from Russia nor assisted colonization in Siberia provided a sufficient outlet for Russia's increasing millions. Many of the emigrants to Siberia returned. The natural increase of population kept adding millions to the total, and the size of the farms was so small that the successive distributions of land by the government were not sufficient to cure the evil. Despite the transfer to the peasants of more than 20,000,000 acres of land between 1905 and 1914, despite a decrease in the number and size of the private estates, the peasant's universal cry was still "more land."

For one thing, the agricultural problem had never been carefully studied; no thoroughgoing schemes of agricultural reform had been worked out. For another, sections of the agricultural population lived upon land beyond the border of the zone of dependable rains. In the dry region of the lower Volga the winters are more severe than in the grain-growing Ukraine, and droughts are more common. Here is a border zone where the rainfall is so irregular and deficient that the farmer must make intelligent and substantial modifications of customary farming practice in order to succeed. His problem is similar to that of the farmer in the semi-arid western parts of Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, where by "dry farming," with its special methods of tillage to promote water conservation in the soil, the disadvantages of repeated drought are partly offset.

The revolution of 1917 swept away a long-established type of land tenure and drove the landowners, bourgeoisie and aristocracy alike, not only from their estates but also from Russia. The peasants wanted the land, no matter who owned it, and the estates were divided up. The peasants quickly discovered that their seizure of the land did not bring prosperity. Two thirds of them had no draft animals. To add to the confusion, city populations to the number of millions poured into the country in order to escape starvation. They came demand-



FIG. 165. Wheat and rye, cultivated and arable lands of European Russia. Compare with Figure 164. Poland, Finland, the Caucasus region, and western Siberia are omitted. From maps in *La Russie à la fin du 19e siècle*, Paris, 1900.

ing land, and after the redistribution the original peasant farmers had little to show for their effort. Even the organized city groups planted upon the expropriated estates, as well as collective farming schemes, came to nothing. It was designed by the Soviet leaders to put the country and the city into ideal economic relationship on the basis of the exchange of products and to have the large estates managed by Soviet groups from the cities who would form nuclei of affiliation with the more powerful centers of political organization in the larger cities.

We have sketched the course of the land question from the period of serfdom in the latter part of the 19th century down to the great revolution of 1917 in the midst of the World War. To understand later phases of the problem it is necessary to return to the question of general political and economic organization in the Soviet régime. During the past decade the Russian leaders have learned to make concessions in principle as well as in form, and these have grown out of the rigid tests that the peasantry have applied to communistic theories regarding the ownership of land and the control of agricultural products.

ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The present Constitution of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was formally adopted on 6 July 1923. It opens with a vigorous attack upon capitalism and the alleged harm that it has done the world, and boldly advocates (1) consolidation of Soviet power on an international basis, and (2) "class" struggle as a means of uniting the working masses in a socialist family. It then refers to the "will of the peoples of the Soviet Republics," points out the security that will flow from a "voluntary association of peoples enjoying equal rights," and declares each republic in the union to have "the free right to withdraw from the federal state." But an examination of the constitution, paragraph by paragraph, shows that these are mere words and that no such right of free withdrawal or of the free exercise of popular opinion in fact exists. One would be entirely misled to suppose that the name "republic" or the declarations of liberty contained in the constitution have the faintest resemblance to similar ideas in their actual functioning in western civilization. One has only to remember the meager transportation facilities, the low stage of culture among Russian peoples as a whole, the appalling illiteracy of the peasants, to realize that popular opinion would be a very difficult thing to crystallize; and if such a thing existed or were brought into being, the machinery of Soviet control would effectually prevent its expression, as we shall now explain.

The supreme executive authority is declared to be the Soviet Congress and, during the intervals between sessions of the Congress, the Central Executive Committee. But there are two modifying conditions. The first is that the Soviet Congress is to be made up of representatives of the city soviets and soviets of the city colonists, in the proportion of one delegate to every 25,000 inhabitants, while the provincial districts have one delegate to every 125,000 inhabitants. In the second place, the supreme executive authority of the Soviet Con-

gress is most of the time actually in the hands not of the Central Executive Committee (386 members), but of a small sub-committee called the "Presidium." During the intervals of the sessions of the two bodies (Congress and Central Executive Committee) from which theoretically it derives its power, the Presidium is "the highest legislative, administrative, and enacting organ of the Union." As such it "attends to the execution of the constitution" and of all ordinances of the Congress and of the Central Executive Committee. It may abrogate the ordinances of the separate People's Commissariats (12 members) and those of the Central Executive Committees of the various republics. It may even abrogate the ordinances of the Soviet Congresses in the various republics, being obliged only to submit such action for examination and confirmation to the Central Executive Committee. Under these conditions its responsibility to bodies over whose elements it exercises control is the merest shadow. We see this most clearly expressed in Article 9, where the effort of the republics against political and economic counter-revolution and banditry is consolidated in a "United Governmental Political Administration," which *directs the activities* of the political departments of the governments of the federated republics. By these and other means supervision over the authorities of a given republic is so close that there is no freedom at all, except such as the separate republics may wish to exercise with respect to purely local affairs in which the central authority has no political interest. The right of withdrawal of a state from the confederation has no basis whatever in fact. A single illustration is the status of the Transcaucasian republics, especially Georgia and Armenia; after military conquest they were organized as separate republics with as little to say concerning their right of withdrawal as if they were still under the autocratic rule of the Czar.

In a country most of whose 135,000,000 inhabitants are peasants, there could be no such thing as popular or public opinion. Moreover, there is no opposition party. The Communist party, which numbers about 700,000, is the only potential source of government, and, as we have seen, the real source is in a small group within the Presidium. A political structure of this sort cannot be altered save by the exercise of power within the innermost circles of the Communist party itself. This means in turn that it comes down to a question of individual or personal power. With the death of Lenin (1924) the expected struggle within the inner group took place, a struggle between those like Zinoviev, who stand for proletarian world revolution, and those like Stalin, who believe that a policy of propaganda for revolution does harm to

Russia and is in fact hopeless. The very agency which the government organized to maintain itself during the period of earliest insecurity, namely, the "State Political Department," is admirably suited to the exercise of power by a single man among those nine selected men who constitute the heart of the Central Committee, namely, the Politburo. This department is active in expelling the former upper and middle classes and thus suppressing counter-revolution. It has its own military forces composed of specially disciplined young communists, and by an active system of espionage it exercises the will, dictatorial and otherwise, of the man or men in control of the Politburo.

ECONOMIC REVOLUTION

As soon as the Bolshevist leaders had gained control of the administrative machinery of Russia, they put into force the communist ideas that they had developed over a period of years. The land was nationalized, the proletariat of the cities was organized, city proletarian groups were established upon the large estates, and a new economic régime was to come into being by the general exchange of the products of the land for the manufactures of the town. Private trading was abolished, and no such thing as capitalism was to be tolerated. In the "holy war for bread" in the early days of the revolution the proletariat tried to collect wheat from the peasants with machine guns. The peasant was the slave of the government and the requisitions of grain and cattle led to uprisings which were only quelled by the Red Army and by a change of economic policy. While famine may weaken the Soviet government, good crops do not materially strengthen it. In the struggle of the past few years between the peasants and the government, the government has been defeated. The peasant wishes to accumulate his wealth within his own economy. To employ force on a large scale would be to break the morale of the Red Army, because with the return to compulsory military service it has now become a peasant army.

It was Lenin himself who first clearly saw and announced the breakdown of the communist economic system through the inherent qualities of human nature itself. The desire for private property and the failure of the peasants to make inspired sacrifice for an abstraction — the communist idea — led him to announce the New Economic Policy, or NEP, which he named "state capitalism." By the development of this idea in succeeding years the peasant, who is still without title to his land (regarded as a national or state asset and as such not to be bought or sold), is yet permitted to sell his surplus instead of being

required to exchange it under Soviet control. He may also employ labor the year round. The NEP contemplates an extension of the scheme of concessions for the development of mineral and forest resources and the like, thus attracting capital to industry without directly violating one of the main tenets of communist faith.

These partial measures have attracted no important amount of capital either from the peasants or from abroad. Economic initiative is still stifled; the output of coal is about half the pre-war standard; the export trade is chiefly in flax and hemp, furs, and timber. Even the capital required for the movement of these simple exports is found with the greatest difficulty. The demands of labor are constantly rising, both for higher wages and for the privileges or supplementary services which they enjoy. A million of unemployed or partially employed (1926) constitute a grave city problem, and only the introduction of foreign capital will raise production to the level of Russian need.

The effect of the New Economic Policy upon agriculture is shown by the increase in the area of the land in grain. During 1923–1926 this increase exceeded 25 per cent, whereas under the earlier period of communist control of surplus the area decreased by 35 per cent. Moreover, every peasant farmer wants his own holding of land and he is quite fanatical about it. His seizure of the large estates was not for the purpose of helping out Soviet theory or the city populations. The peasant and his leaders were miles apart on the land question. The peasant wanted to satisfy his age-old hunger for land upon which to make a living. To the Soviet doctrinaires the seizure of the landed estates was a general attack upon the bourgeois element. They regarded any system as economically weak that permitted such a class to develop. The peasant had no theories of this sort to trouble him. He looked straight through to the fact that by the communist system he was a source of city support, and that by the control of the city proletariat the Soviet system exists. This system is too tenuous and remote to catch or sustain his loyalty. He understands only that his farm products are sold for a price less than he once received, whereas the factory products are from 200 to 300 per cent higher. The result is that the present system seems to have little more success than the earlier one for the collective exchange of commodities; and students of the problem expect that the final result will be a still more marked economic swing of Soviet leaders toward the Right. This would most likely take the form of increased concessions to industry and to foreign capital and a nearer approach to the ordinary methods of buying and selling in capitalist countries.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Russian foreign policy is in general limited by a number of quite definite elements or points of view of which the following are the chief:

(1) It desires not to recognize the debts of the former Czarist régime but to make new agreements in modification of the terms of those debts and to tie up the question of debts with the question of the recognition of the Soviet government and the development of trade relations. It is opposed to what it calls "the unrestricted and unilateral recognition of the debts."

(2) The Soviet government aggressively and persistently, but with repeated denial of its own acts, attempts to disseminate its political views among the peoples of what it calls "capitalistic" countries, in order to undermine foreign social and political systems and set up Soviet governments in their place. It has been active in China (1926–1927), it made large contributions to the miners' fund during the coal strike in England (1926), and it has violated its non-interference agreements with Great Britain, France, and Italy.

(3) While denouncing the capitalistic system, the Soviet government has invited capital to come in upon a concession basis, using its own money and its own labor, not those of Russia. In other words, the government seeks to attract foreign capital but only tolerates it for the sake of mutual economic benefits. It believes that the Russian economic interests are sufficiently important in the present state of industry to enable it to force foreign capital to accept Soviet terms.

(4) It has concerned itself with territorial and economic problems over a wide range of country: with the Chinese outer dependencies (Mongolia and Manchuria), it has made special agreements opening up the way to further advances at propitious intervals; in the Baltic states it has pursued a policy of concluding agreements of non-aggression and neutrality, at the same time strengthening economic relations by commercial treaties that bind the economic development of these states more closely to Russia, if possible; it has furthered a policy of neutrality in the Near East and stronger commercial relations between Russia on the one hand and Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan on the other; and it has developed better commercial relations with Japan.

(5) The Soviet Union claims a steady improvement in its economic and cultural relations with Germany, "more than with any other country." The German government in 1927 guaranteed special credits for Russian industrial orders in Germany, credits used exclusively for the purchase of machinery required for the expansion of industry in Russia.

While these are the declared objectives of Russian foreign policy, it should be remembered in reading all official statements upon these points that the whole policy is dominated by the desire of Russia to overthrow the present "capitalistic" régimes and establish a Soviet system of government. This has made it impossible for foreign countries to conclude agreements with Russia, since there is a purpose in each treaty that is not expressed in the text, a purpose subversive of the very government that is asked to sign. Such an attitude toward both negotiation and agreement is foreign to western understanding, which sees in Soviet methods only duplicity and bad faith.

At the beginning of the Soviet régime it was supposed by foreign observers generally that communistic principles would naturally drive out of the minds of the new leaders any thought of territorial expansion. The proletariat of the towns had always maintained that foreign wars were the product of capitalistic and imperialistic enterprises on the part of autocratic rulers or an aristocratic ruling class. It is with no little astonishment that the world now realizes that the purpose of the Russian government is unchanged with respect to the expansion of frontiers. This is easily justified by the Soviet leaders on the ground that the supposed benefits of their system of government are so great, or will ultimately become so great, that the manner in which border peoples are absorbed is of no immediate consequence. Russian resumption of pressure upon China for the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the enforced treaties with both Manchuria and Mongolia by which Russia recognizes an "independence" on the part of those outer provinces that is desired by Russia only because it provides her a foothold for further aggression, the absorption of the Transcaucasian "republics" — these are all parts of a well-laid design on the part of the Soviet leaders to extend the practise of Bolshevism among peoples within their range of power.

On its western border Russia finds a chain of new or enlarged countries extending from the Arctic to the Black Sea that have gained or kept their independence largely because they are supported by France and Great Britain. Both Poland and Rumania, the largest of the group, are protégés of France. The Baltic countries are of special concern to Great Britain not only because of their own production and export of raw materials such as timber, flax, cereals, and the like, but also because it is through them that Great Britain may expect a share of the raw material exported from Russia itself. These countries and their commercial ports offer English merchants the opportunity of getting Russian products without dealing directly with the Russians

themselves. It is true that Russia has made treaties of peace with her western neighbors and that she has solemnly pledged herself to respect the new boundaries; but this is a matter of expediency only. From the nature of her diplomatic relations thus far we can but conclude that, given a favorable opportunity, she would not hesitate to denounce the treaties and reëstablish the boundary lines in accordance with her own desire to regain possession of her former outlets on the Baltic.

The most acute single question on Russia's western frontier is that of Bessarabia. The opposing banks of the Dniester are patrolled by Rumanian and Russian troops. It is only a question of time when, with other distractions out of the way and her economic power increased to the point where she can support major military operations, Russia will demand the return of the province or attempt to take it by force. Rumania cannot expect to have the full support of the western powers should she come to blows with Russia over the question of sovereignty in Bessarabia. She has received, through the Bessarabian treaty of 28 October 1920, recognition by the Allies of her sovereignty there, and it is stipulated that that sovereignty shall not be called into question. On the other hand, the contracting parties reserve the right to submit to the arbitration of the Council of the League of Nations all questions that may be raised by Russia concerning the details of the treaty. (For a further discussion of the question the reader is referred to page 373.)

In accord with its own original rules of international behavior, the Soviet government has maintained that it is not bound by convention or law with respect to territorial waters and that it may extend the limits of such waters in conformity with its own ideas of right. In exercising jurisdiction beyond the three-mile limit on the Murman coast, Russia became involved in difficulties with Great Britain, and while the two governments have been able to come to an agreement, it is not at all certain that the terms of the agreement can be maintained. Similar problems are bound to arise on the Black Sea coast and on the Pacific coast of Siberia, where fishing rights and privileges are likewise related to the question of territorial waters.

In Central Asia the relation of Russia to her neighbors and to the question of territorial expansion takes on a somewhat different form and Soviet acts are based upon wholly different motives. To understand them it is desirable to turn to the ethnic composition of Russia; and in that connection to see how the government of Moscow secures the adherence of peoples so unlike the Russians in social and economic organization.

ETHNIC AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Of the many ethnic groups comprised in the table on page 468, the ten that are starred represent peoples that were the chief cause of border insecurity in the Russian Empire. While political self-consciousness and power of organization were low among Lithuanians, Letts, Esths, and Transcaspian peoples, they were strongly felt on grounds of history and tradition by the Poles. The Finns, ethnically different from the Russians, had struggled for a larger measure of autonomy, and they lost no time in taking affairs into their own hands when the Russian Revolution provided opportunity. The Ukraine was the seat of a separate movement for withdrawal from the Russian Empire. It is the richest and the most densely populated part and is the region best served by railroads. In contrast to the policy pursued by Russia with respect to the Baltic states, there was a determined effort to keep the Ukraine attached to Moscow; for to permit it to form an independent government would be to make the rest of European Russia economically dependent upon the Ukraine. The interior would be shut off even more completely than ever from the sea, whereas access to the sea and particularly to warm water has been one of the historical aims of Russia. The Ukraine was overrun by the Red Army and its regional government ousted in 1919.

Most of the territory now detached from Russia on the west is occupied by people who live in a relatively high state of culture as compared with Russia, though on a relatively low level of culture as compared with central and western Europe. In central Asia and eastern Siberia, Russia had to deal with ethnic groups of a totally different order of importance. The more primitive Siberian tribes wholly lacked political self-consciousness, and their geographical position and environment had imposed a low standard of life. Their commercial activity is feeble, and they play no vital part in the political life of Russia. Some of the ethnic groups in Turkestan, as well as on the shores of the Black Sea and in the region east of the Volga, are Moslems whose religious attachments are with the Moslem world and whose political self-consciousness has been raised to the rank of a political force by the progress of the short-lived but energetic Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanian movements. Armenia and Georgia, finding it difficult to associate themselves with a radical government north of the Caucasus, each sought national independence. Today, as republics in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, they represent merely Soviet conquest by force of arms (1921). A Black Sea federation, to be composed of the

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE ACCORDING TO THE CENSUS OF 1897, AND WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF 1914

(Figures represent thousands. Names of loosely attached border peoples are starred.)

	RUSSIA IN EUROPE	POLAND	CAUCASIA	SIBERIA	CENTRAL ASIA	FINLAND	TOTALS
ARYANS							
SLAVS							
Great Russians	48,559	267	1,830	4,424	588	6	55,674
Little Russians *	20,415	335	1,305	223	102		22,380
White Russians	5,823	29	20	12	1		5,885
Poles *	1,110	6,756	25	29	12		7,932
Other Slavs	213	7	4				224
LITHUANIANS *	1,345	305	5	2	1		1,658
LETTS *	1,422	5	2	7	1		1,437
IRANIANS	2		418		364		784
ARMENIANS *	77		1,096		5		1,178
RUMANIANS *	1,122	5	7				1,134
GERMANS	1,312	407	57	5	9	2	1,792
SWEDES	14					350	364
OTHER ARYANS	132	1	105	6	1		245
SEMITES	3,715	1,267	40	33	8		5,063
URALO-ALTAIANS							
FINNO-UGRIANS							
Finns *	143					2,353	2,496
Karelians	208						208
Lapps	2					1	3
Mordvinians	990			21	13		1,024
Other Finno-Ugrians	1,090			32			1,122
Esths *	990	4	4	4			1,002
TURKO-TATARS *							
Kirghiz	264			33	3,989		4,286
Tatars	1,953	4	1,510	210	60		3,737
Bashkirs	1,488		1	1	3		1,493
Sarts					968		968
Chuvashes	838	1		4			843
Uzbegs					726		726
Turkomans	8		25		249		282
Osmanli Turks	69		139				208
Other Turko-Tatars			205	227	623		1,055
MONGOLS	171		14	289			474
OTHER URALO-ALTAIANS	4			82			86
GEORGIANS*			1,352				1,352
OTHER CAUCASIANS			1,092				1,092
HYPERBOREANS				39			39
CHINESE, JAPANESE				86			86
TOTALS	93,479	9,393	9,256	5,769	7,723	2,712	128,332

Cossacks in the Don country and the Kuban united with the Ukraine, was at one time a possibility, because of the common interest of these three regions in free trade among themselves and access to outer world commerce through Black Sea ports and the Dardanelles. A Siberian and a Turkestan confederation were other regional possibilities. A

Far Eastern Republic came into existence in eastern Siberia, and here ensued a prolonged struggle between Whites and Reds that for a time threatened loss of territory to Russia, especially when, following the World War, Japan occupied the country as far west as Lake Baikal and seemed about to hold the territory by force. By giving up territory on the west the Russian leaders were able to concentrate the forces at their command with such success as to overwhelm the Whites under Petlura, Kolchak, and others, and keep the most important parts of the former empire together. As soon as military control was assured, a reorganization of government took place along the lines of the system sketched on pages 460 to 462. By combining firm central control with a distinct measure of local autonomy, the divergent parts have since been held together.

The task of uniting the fragments of former Russia, all given a centripetal tendency by general unrest and revolution, was made still more difficult by the nature of the land itself. The Ukraine, for example, is traversed by the Dniester River, one of the oldest trade routes of Europe. Thus it has drawn cultural elements since early times from Oriental, Greek, Gothic, Byzantine, and North Germanic contacts. Upon its banks many historical battles were fought for the control of the river by Russians, Poles, Hungarians, Moldavians, and Turks. When we consider that trade has been historically the most important instrument in the spread of culture, we may understand that the ethnographic differences between Ukrainians and northern Slavs were thrown into greater contrast by their cultural dissimilarities. In Siberia, on the other hand, it was not cultural differences so much as an unfavorable geographical environment that increased the dangers of disruption. Broad mountains and plateaus cross Siberia in the neighborhood of Lake Irkutsk and separate the lower Amur provinces from western Siberia. The Trans-Siberian Railway cuts across them; but one railway is too slender a thread to unite governments and illiterate peoples so widely different in spirit and in contact with the outside world. The chief rivers of Siberia flow northward to an ice-choked sea accessible only from the west. Real union has been further impeded by the desire of each section to profit by the special resources in its possession. Eastern Siberia has much more natural trade affiliations with Japan and with the United States than with European Russia. The Republic of Georgia in the Transcaucasus country has some of the most important manganese deposits in the world and would like to win special profit through their exploitation. A similar motive animates the Azerbaijan Tatars of the Baku oil region.



FIG. 166. The Pale of Settlement, former European Russia, according to the *Jewish Encyclopædia* (article on Russia). In none of the Russian governments without shading on the map do the Jews form as much as 1 per cent of the total population, except in the Baltic region, where percentages of Jews are given in figures (1, 2, 7).

Two elements within Russia itself deserve special mention — the Jews and the Germans. Within the Jewish Pale of Czarist Russia (Fig. 166) were more than five million Jews. The wealthiest and best educated were scattered through the country, but in general Jews were prohibited from living in Great Russia. Poland now has the largest number of Jews formerly within the Pale of Settlement. They constitute 14 per cent of the total population in the territory formerly known as Russian Poland. There are large numbers of Jews in Galicia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, and Bessarabia. It is characteristic of the Jews that they have a community life distinct from that of the people about them. In Russia they had grown so numerous as to become an

object of persecution. They are an element of weakness rather than of strength in the development of a unified Russian state, the more so as they were obliged in the earlier régime to dwell largely in the cities. Recognizing this fact, the Soviet government has encouraged their settlement on the land, particularly in the Crimea. Whereas there were about 50,000 Jews engaged in agriculture in 1914 in Russia, this number had grown to 130,000 in 1925.

Of greater political importance are the Germans who for centuries formed a Teutonic outpost in the Baltic Provinces, and who in the 18th and 19th centuries became the dominant element in the landlord, tradesman, and artisan classes. In 1762 numbers of them were invited to settle permanently in southern Russia in separate agricultural colonies, and they now occupy important geographical positions, especially in the Don region and the northern Caucasus. They have increased the economic value of the regions in which they dwell, profiting by the allotment of rich land originally granted to them, exemption from military service, and the advantages of local self-government. In the Ukraine they exercised a strong political influence during the Ukrainian separatist movement (beginning in 1918). Wherever located they have been a firm basis of German economic and political penetration; for despite complete severance of ties with the mother country, they maintained their speech, religion, traditions, and social system uncontaminated by the Slavic peoples around them. With the rise of the nationalist movement in Russia a "Russianization" process was introduced among them by government, and extensive migration of Germans followed, chiefly to America. Their treatment as foreigners during the World War still further weakened them through property losses.

THE RAILWAY SYSTEM

There is little doubt that Russia would have fallen back into the divided condition in which it lived during the medieval period if it had not been for the railway system inherited from the previous régime. Railways and telegraphs enabled the central government at Moscow to maintain communications and move troops with enough speed to exercise the power necessary to keep Russia coherent. A railway system had come into being much later in Russia than in other countries. Count Witte, a great statesman who became minister of communications in 1892, doubled the annual increase of railway mileage. Before his time there was but the skeleton of a national railway system. The mileage was limited to six principal lines serving the largest towns,



Fig. 167. The principal railway lines of Eurasia and the field of former British, Russian, and German conflict in western Asia, particularly Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan.

with a combined length of 18,000 miles — about that of the United States a generation earlier. Witte's objects, however, were not those of conquest. Because the country was chiefly agricultural, it would be at the mercy of the big industrial nations of western Europe, in Witte's view, if it could not use its own raw materials and labor to create manufactured wares upon its own territory. As a result of his policy there was a rapid growth in industrial cities. In the sixteen years following 1897, Odessa, Kiev, and Kherson, the three chief centers of iron and steel manufacture, increased their population 55, 150, and 40 per cent respectively. The ores of the Caucasus, the oil of Baku, and the forests of the north were all developed rapidly.

It was this railway system, these industrial cities, that the Soviet leaders came, in a sense, to inherit. They found themselves provided with an instrument of power which they used to the fullest extent, despite their isolation from the rest of the world and the continued deterioration of rails and rolling stock. But in uniting the different ethnic elements and in making use of the railroads to consolidate their power, the Russian leaders found themselves confronted with an economic situation that has been a persistent challenge to their ability to govern. Russia has always been in a low state of industrial and agricultural development, despite the advances made since Count Witte's time. More than two thirds of the peasants in the central

agricultural provinces have no draft animals. The level of agricultural efficiency is extremely low. In response to the inferior economic status of the country, enforced by long winters and cheap basic raw materials such as leather, wool, and wood, household industries are still maintained on a large scale. Trade by barter has greater scope than in any other civilized country in the world. The village and city fair is still a medium of great commercial importance, more than sixteen thousand such fairs being held in Russia, 85 per cent of them in European Russia. Here goods are exchanged or sold as in similar fairs in Latin America. More than one hundred thousand visitors have attended the Nijni Novgorod Fair in a single year.

Having much food to distribute and coarse, bulky products, such as hay and lumber, to transport, Russia needs to develop her railways and canals as well as her ordinary roads. A normal deficiency of food occurs over three quarters of European Russia and must be made good by imports from southern Russia or from outside countries (Fig. 164). The rate of transportation by rail has hitherto been high. The industrial centers are far from the sea. Capital and the higher grades of skilled labor have had to come from abroad. The tendency of the Russian industrial worker to return to the land for the harvest season has still further increased the cost of production by leaving industrial plants idle or understaffed for a part of each year. Transportation by canal is seasonal; for there is so great a change in rainfall from summer to winter as to render the streams unnavigable for a part of the year, and all of them are frozen during the winter months, the average number of days running from 100 on the Don to 150 on the Volga.

Finally, there is the attitude of the Soviet leaders themselves toward the levelling processes set in train by the adoption of communistic principles. Many of the most intelligent people, including teachers, doctors, and lawyers, have been killed. Thousands have fled to France, Great Britain, and the United States. Bolshevism has meant a step backward in the intellectual life of Russia. Equally serious has been the effect of communism upon the former Russian coöperative societies. These were remarkably well organized, considering the generally backward state of Russian society and political organization in the Czarist régime. They were all the more important because they represented a spontaneous movement on the part of the Russian peasants to organize for economic benefit. At the beginning of Soviet rule the coöperative societies were looked upon with suspicion because they represented the independent organizing instinct of the Russian people. By 1921 the economic machinery of the country was in such



FIG. 168. Political map of European Russia, showing principal administrative divisions according to official sources.

a bad way that limited trading privileges were given them. By 1927, the agricultural coöperative unions were said to represent 6,500,000 farms and the consumers' unions, chiefly urban, to have 11,000,000 shareholders. Allowance must be made for duplication of membership in the various commodity societies; also, the restrictions on imports and on private trading force both buyer and seller to rely upon the coöperatives.

The political consequences of certain extreme climatic conditions have been thrown into high relief by the inefficiency of the Soviet government. Because they are among the contributing conditions of Russian life, they will be outlined here. Upon Figure 169 are shown the several rainfall belts in a critical area east of the Volga. The better favored lands of European Russia lie north of Samara and west of the Urals and a light rainfall marks the country around the head of the Caspian Sea. Here is a region that periodically suffers from drought, as in 1924, and especially in 1921 and 1922, when, after several dry years, crop failures became common, and hundreds of thousands of persons starved to death or emigrated, thus increasing the number of unemployed in the towns. The American Relief Administration during 1921–1922 fed nearly eleven million children and adults in the famine regions of the Volga, Urals, and the Ukraine. Twelve thousand medical institutions were assisted and more than seven million persons were vaccinated against diseases that had reached epidemic stages. The situation was beyond the power of the Soviet authorities because the railroads had fallen into a state of disrepair, and there was a greatly diminished flow of imports and exports and a steady decline of organized industry. Only the occurrence of famine was needed to show how weak was that economic organization and how incapable was Russia of coping with its own problems.



FIG. 169. The shaded area represents the famine belt. In general, it corresponds to the region having a mean annual rainfall of 10 to 20 inches. Crop failures follow a succession of unusually dry years.

As one goes from west to east in the Russian republics the climate becomes constantly more continental in type, the aridity more extreme, the cold of winter and the heat of summer more intense. But just as in central North America, on the plains of the Middle West and the Northwest, the greater part of the rainfall of the interior of Russia — that is, western Siberia — falls in the summer or growing months, thus making an extension of agriculture possible far beyond the limits of the 16-inch rainfall line. Fortunately, too, the black-earth belt (*chernozem*) shown in Figure 170, that forms the well-known basis of Russia's richest agricultural district, extends eastward with modifications far

beyond the Urals, with outposts as far east as the Trans-Baikal country. As fast as railways have been extended into the drier portions of western Siberia and eastern Russia, wheat growing has followed as well as the production of other cereals. But it requires a strong economic organization to offset the effect of a succession of bad years such as periodically recur here as in all semi-arid regions. A close railway network is the first essential, an adequate equipment of rolling-stock is a second, and finally, there must be flexibility throughout the whole economic organization in order that the state itself may step in during an emergency and use the surplus of favored regions to meet the deficit of those stricken by drought.

THE EASTWARD MARCH OF EMPIRE

It is impossible to understand Russia if we think only in conventional terms of its historical relation to western Europe and the Atlantic. For while the maritime nations of the rising west were engaged in exploring the coasts of eastern North America and establishing colonies in the New World, Russia was broken up into independent principalities and suffering from the civil wars of rival factions. It had not yet collected itself after more than two centuries of Mongol or Tatar domination, a period in its history which ended in 1462 with the consolidation of the tsardom of Muscovy. During the long period of the rule of the nomads there was almost complete preoccupation with eastern peoples. Only as late as 1492 did any considerable part of Russia have a ruler sufficiently strong to attempt a "western policy." In that year Ivan III interfered actively in Lithuanian affairs, and his successor took a still stronger position in attempting to secure a footing on the Baltic coast and to establish relations with western European powers. Barring his way were Lithuanians and Poles, Teutons and Swedes, who already at that time looked upon Russia's westward movement as a sinister threat of barbarism against civilization. Under Peter the Great (1672–1725) Russia first reached imperial stature. In his long and vigorous reign he won not only Karelia on the north but also Livonia, Estonia, and part of Finland, and established himself firmly upon the Baltic coast.

Yet Peter's most conspicuous territorial gains were not in the west but in the east. In 1725 he dispatched Bering upon the first of two famous voyages of exploration in the North Pacific, and it was only after 1742, and following Bering's second expedition, that the cartographers knew even the general outlines of the farther Siberian and Alaskan coasts. In the century before, Russian trappers, traders, and



FIG. 170. Note the relation of the Trans-Siberian Railway to the fertile black-earth belt. Only three of the five main soil groups are represented. North of the black-earth soils are the coniferous forests of Siberia; southward is the region of grasslands and diminishing rainfall. The gray-earth zone is largely desert. Based on *Atlas of Asiatic Russia*, 1914.

missionaries had wandered over the length and breadth of Siberia. They navigated the Ob, Yenisei, and Lena, and learned that these northward flowing streams emptied into an icy sea. Russian fur traders first reached the Pacific shores in 1639. The period from 1600 to 1800 may be looked upon as Russia's heroic age of discovery and settlement in distant Siberia. The long and hazardous journeys through the wilderness and, among others, Bering's great exploit, are comparable to the earliest English, French, and Spanish voyages to America. When western peoples were carrying the exotic products of the New World eastward across the Atlantic, successive land caravans in Asia were traversing seven thousand miles of plain and mountain, desert and grassland, to bring the silks and teas and spices of Cathay to the trade marts of Russia tributary to the Black Sea. Here were the roots of that association with the East that has continued into our own time. Russia's eastern orientation is not a mere figure of speech but a historical fact. Her present relations with China are not the work of Bolshevist leaders merely; relations of one kind or another have persisted since Chinese wares first made their appearance in the tents of the Cossacks. Originally an Asiatic power in Europe, Russia is now a European power in Asia.



FIG. 171. The field of settlement of Russian colonists in Siberia according to the *Atlas of Asiatic Russia*, 1914. Note the scattered settlements in dry Turkestan and the continuity of settlements in the belt of heavier rainfall on the margin of forest and grassland farther north. Consult the map of soil belts, Figure 170. For Lenin Land read Northern Land (formerly Nicholas II Land).

THE SIBERIAN REALM

The eastward extension of Russian power was not accomplished through exploration and discovery merely but by conquest and, in later periods, by colonization. Up to the 16th century Siberia was not safe for the settler or the traveler. Trade across it was from point to point through tribal territory. Only in the late 16th century did Yermak, a Russian Cossack explorer, open the door to the Orient. By 1630 the Russians claimed to be masters of the Yenisei. In 1638 tea was first imported from China. The Cossacks reached Lake Baikal by 1643 and the Bering Sea by 1656. Fierce contests with the Chinese for the possession of the Amur country ended when the Chinese drove out the Russian colonists and established territorial limits to Russian advance which were to be maintained to the middle of the 19th century. Only as late as 1858 was Russia able to seize the Amur and make it the boundary between the Russian and Chinese empires.

By her penetration of Siberia, the establishment of a chain of military posts, the wide organization of trade on the part of both trappers and merchants, Russia became firmly planted in the heart of Asia and the power of the Mongol Tatar hordes was broken forever. If western civilization held back the Slavic hordes, it is equally true that the latter in their turn defended Europe from further Mongol invasion.

An important feature of the character of the Russian people is their ready adaptation to new conditions. The Russian has always been able to become farmer, tradesman, hunter, fisherman, or cattle breeder without losing the community organization that more than any other thing characterizes his life. This makes him a successful explorer and colonist and a powerful agent of empire. In modern times it has given stability to the Russian colonizing movement in Siberia. Along the black-earth belt a White Russian population has been developed that now extends across Siberia for four thousand miles from Omsk to Vladivostok (Fig. 171); and in the six-year period 1907 to 1912 from a quarter to three quarters of a million of colonists annually went to Siberia, chiefly along this rich belt of soil. Following the World War the flow began again; but it almost ceased after 1920 when the breaking up of the estates of European Russia offered the peasant a chance to own land under more favorable conditions than he had enjoyed theretofore. Now again the stream of colonization has begun, encouraged by a central colonization bureau at Moscow, by the technical studies of soil and climate that have given the new colonist the benefit of the science of soils, by increased railroad building now in progress,

FIG. 172. Political divisions of Russian Central Asia. The Kazak Republic includes the Kirghiz country (Fig. 195, page 549).

and finally by a treaty between Russia and the Kirghiz tribes which has fixed limits to the grazing lands that the nomadic Kirghiz may occupy.

At the present time it is not the six-thousand-mile Trans-Siberian Railway that is of chief importance in the occupation of western Siberia but the branch lines that reach out to north and south and that now serve a broad belt of occupied country extending from the edge of the coniferous forest on the north, southward to and even beyond the 10-inch rainfall line on the northern edge of the Kirghiz steppes. Farther east settlements are gathered about the railway, though the conditions of transportation are still exceedingly difficult, freight rates too high, the markets of the Far East and of Europe too distant, to furnish an adequate outlet for the grain and dairy products of the region. Mere distance is here a great handicap which neither the railroad toward the west and the east nor river steamboats plying between western Siberia and the Arctic coast (principally on the Ob River) can overcome. The result is an attempt to make a commercial liaison with the Transcaspian country and Russian Turkestan. Between the irrigated lands along the southern border of the empire and marked by the cities of Samarkand, Merv, and others, there has been a marked

development of irrigation and the growth of cotton as the chief commercial crop. If there could be established, through better rail connections, complementary trade relations with the cereal-growing belt on the north and the cotton-growing belt on the south, a more nearly self-contained economy could be established measurably independent of that outer world whose markets are economically almost inaccessible. Until this is done western Siberia will still be an outlying colony of Europe. It has no direct outlet to the world-encircling and commercially life-giving sea. A constant prepossession of the colonists has been a shorter and cheaper route to markets and one more independent than the Ob River-Kara Sea route, open for but two months of the year at the most.

Unlike European Russia, Siberia had no land tenure system to reform. The Soviet government was able to organize local autonomous groups sympathetic toward it and enjoying some degree of local self-government. Of independence and union on the part of the Siberian people as a whole there could be no thought, for there is no unity among the different groups, no conviction as to the form that local self-government should take, no adequate leadership; and above all, there are the deterrents of poor communications, an illiterate people, and a large lawless element. Of the total population of 13,000,000, about 9,000,000 are Russians. The ultimate power of this vast realm may be appreciated from the fact that its territory covers more than 4,800,000 square miles, if we exclude Transcaspia, Turkestan, and the steppe provinces; or more than 6,250,000 square miles if we include these provinces. It is true that the value of the territory is lessened by its remoteness, by the desert and mountain character of a great deal of it, by the dense coniferous forests that impede settlement. But in the past twenty-five years the population has doubled, and with the increase of railways and the European demand for cereals it cannot fail to go on increasing and to become, in time, a major political unit. It is even now the third largest population group in the continent of Asia, China and India being respectively first and second.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

ANATOLIA: LAST REMNANT OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE

Few realize how far into Europe the Turk once penetrated and how dangerously near he came to overwhelming western civilization. For more than two hundred years he was the aggressor against European peoples, chiefly Germans and Magyars, who bore the brunt of his repeated assaults; but in 1683, at the second siege of Vienna, he was decisively defeated by forces under the Polish leader Sobieski, and since then the field of his power has progressively diminished. As late as 1908 the Sultan of Turkey was the nominal ruler of the Adriatic provinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina, although the special position of Austria-Hungary made her emperor the actual ruler. The Mohammedans of Bosnia (chiefly Serbs) number 30 per cent of the total population of the province; and it is almost as far from Bosnia to Constantinople as from Bosnia to Paris.

Before the Balkan wars the Turkish Empire was as large as Russia in Europe; its population was nearly as large as that of France. One of the difficulties of the Turkish rulers during the centuries that their empire endured arose from the high degree of complexity in the ethnography of Turkey's subject peoples — higher than that exhibited by any other empire in the world except Russia, with her vast extent, and Great Britain, with colonies in every part of the world. To the ethnic differences among her peoples were added equally important differences of religion and character, differences not mitigated by the leveling processes of general education and free commercial intercourse. Lying at the meeting place of three continents, Turkey has drawn widely upon racial, linguistic, and religious stocks whose dissimilarities have not been offset by superficial similarities imposed by conquest or the pastoral-nomadic life.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL ENVIRONMENT

The task of governing Turkey was complicated by the nature of the country. Locally there are rich tracts, as on the valley slopes and floors of the Smyrna region and about Adana (Cilicia); but, as shown in Figure 179 (page 495), a mountainous relief prevails over a large part of the border of the Anatolian plateau, and the arable tracts have a patchy peripheral distribution without a network of railways to permit profitable commercial exchanges to be made. Extensive parts of the central region are semi-arid and some parts are desertic. The western

FIG. 173. Only a European foothold remains to Turkey in Europe, in unrestricted sovereignty, the régime of the Straits imposing limits to sovereignty over the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. For details see Figures 181 and 182, and 184, page 516.

part of the plateau (Phrygia) has good pastures and arable valleys; the Pontic winds bring rain to a zone of settlements along the northern border of the dry central region (Galatia and Cappadocia), where Turkoman and Kurdish nomads find temporary pasturage following the spring rains; the core of the plateau (Lycaonia) has less than 8 inches of rain. In connection with the Baghdad railway line, German engineers before the World War had reclaimed 100,000 acres of land by irrigation in the plain of Konia, utilizing the water of the Isaurian lakes in the Taurus Mountains. The natural vegetation is grass on the plateau and a scrubby growth of trees on the higher slopes. Forests are limited mostly to the seaward borders of the plateau behind the agricultural tracts or are interspersed with them where there is a heavier rainfall or rougher land.

The interior of Arabia is typically desert country with a light and uncertain rainfall and a very limited extent of locally irrigable soil. The population is dominantly and in places exclusively nomadic, with the lightest of political affiliations. The former Turkish possessions in western Arabia — Hejaz, Asir, and Yemen — were so remote and little known that Turkish sovereignty there was but a shadow. We

commonly fail to appreciate their distance from the center of Turkish authority. Arabia is about half as large as that part of the United States west of the Mississippi (Fig. 36, page 141). It is as far from Constantinople to Mocha in southwestern Arabia as it is from New York to San Francisco. Outside of the Balkans, Anatolia, the Syrian region, and the Hejaz, there were almost no railroads in the Turkish Empire, and there has always been a central administration whose bad effects could hardly have been offset in any circumstances.

The strong and varied relief of the natural regions of Turkey and the great differences of climate from place to place have had a marked effect upon the division and mode of life of the people.

(1) The Turks are largely confined to the mountain-rimmed and partly desert highlands of Anatolia.

(2) The Armenian race long occupied the high valley floors about Lake Van, spreading thence northward to the valleys of the Transcaucasus and southwestward to the Cicilian plains about the Gulf of Alexandretta.

(3) The Syrians hold a fertile strip of land along the Mediterranean, shut off by the mountains of Lebanon on the south and the Syrian desert on the east.

(4) The semi-nomadic Kurds keep largely to the mountain pastures at the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.

(5) The Arabs inhabit the oases of the vast interior desert of Arabia or live in locally fertile districts about the desert border including Syria and Palestine.

(6) Judea is a naturally well-protected plateau where the Hebrew race had its early development.

Each people has a distinctive historical homeland.

HISTORICAL RELATIONS AND POLICIES

The complexities of race in Anatolia have also in part grown out of a long and changeful history. Military expeditions of the past, no less than commercial life, passed and repassed the sites of modern peoples. Hittite and Syrian, Persian and Greek, Egyptian and Assyrian and Babylonian, Roman imperialist, European crusader, fanatical Moslem, raiding nomadic Arab, and parasitic Turk, sent their armies across this part and that to capture towns, take spoils, enslave peoples, or guard a highway of approach.

The great Eurasian trade and political movements have involved some part of the Turkish Empire — sometimes all of it — ever since its formation. Armenia was a meeting place of the inner trade routes; Syria was the maritime outlet of the hinterland trade; Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf region were a focus of eastern commerce. Important towns grew up at critical places: Haifa is an historic port where caravans gathered; Mosul, or "Central Gates," is near a high pass leading up to Armenia; Konia, once a center of Turkish power in the Seljuk Empire, was at a desert meeting place of north-south and east-west routes in Anatolia; Aleppo was a focus for traffic about the shores of the Gulf of Alexandretta. Smyrna was the richest prize of all, save only Constantinople, for it was the center of a spiritual and material culture as old as Attica. Trebizond was to the Greeks of the pre-Christian centuries what Hongkong is now to the British.

When the Turk captured Constantinople from the Byzantine rulers in 1453 and thus completed control of the gateways to Asia and the tributary trade, European traders earnestly sought a new route to India, for with increasing risks of trade over the old route went higher costs. Finally Dias discovered the southern end of Africa (1488), and soon after a new and all-water route to India which avoided the Turk was found by Da Gama (1498). The Suez Canal in our own time (completed in 1869) diverted trade still further from the old caravan routes across Asia Minor.

The historic weakness of the Turkish Empire was due primarily to four causes:

(1) The country's central situation at one of the greatest crossroads of the world and its bridge-like character between central Asia and southeastern Europe. This made of its territory a battlefield of rival powers and called for a weakening overextension of political effort.

(2) The inclusion of a large number of different and widely distributed peoples in a low stage of development, without the facilities for economic betterment, and turbulent to a costly degree.

(3) As a result of the two preceding conditions, continuous wasting of Turkish stock on foreign battlefields, not merely by war but by all the insanitary conditions that poor organization and primitive medical service imposed.

(4) A vicious and discriminatory tax system, which laid ruinous conditions upon struggling industry, went hand in hand with a total lack of constructive economic effort.

It will help us to understand the present problems of the Turkish people if we look for a moment at the rise and spread of Turkish power.

From central Asian nuclei there moved westward nomadic Turks, first the Seljuk Turks who in the 11th century conquered Anatolia from the Byzantines, and later the Ottoman Turks who largely absorbed the earlier conquerors, founding an empire in 1326 with a capital first at Brusa and later at Adrianople (1365). In the process of conquering or adding resident populations there was much mingling of blood, and with it an extension of Turkish speech and Mohammedan religion. In the eight years from 1512 to 1520, the Turks conquered Syria, Egypt, and the holy places of Mecca and Medina. By the latter action, Sultan Selim I of that time became the "Defender of the Moslem Faith," and made himself Caliph, or Head of the Church.

Selim's successor, Suleiman, pushed the Mohammedan conquests far into Europe, besieging Vienna in 1529, though without success. In 1565 Malta likewise was besieged. Thereafter there was a decline in Turkish power, especially after the defeat of the Turkish navy at Lepanto in 1571 and the second siege of Vienna, which ended disastrously for the Turks in 1683.

In the later years of the 17th century Hungary was lost to the Turks. Then followed the loss of the northern shore of the Black Sea. In the early part of the 19th century the Greeks and the Serbs successfully rose against the Turk, and from that time down to recent years the pressure of the Christian against the Turk has been almost unremitting. But for the antagonism between the Russian and British empires, the struggle might have ended long ago in the expulsion of the Turk from Europe.

Internal difficulties in the Turkish Empire, and even revolution against the Turkish authorities, continued until in 1876 a constitution and a parliament were introduced, not as an expression of liberal tendencies but as a blind to prevent foreign interference. Conflicting racial and religious interests were manifested as soon as the parliament set to work, and rendered it impotent. In the long period from 1876 to 1908 Sultan Abdul Hamid II held the reins of power exclusively in his own hands. He fought western liberal ideas in his court and in the country, and tried to make Pan-Islamism a political force. Through it he hoped to continue his leadership of the Moslem world and to exercise strong political influence among the Moslem populations of:

(1) Great Britain, in India, Egypt, eastern Africa, etc.

(2) France, in northern Africa.

(3) Russia, on the northern Black Sea coast, in Transcaucasia, and in Russian Turkestan.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1908 AND THE NATIONALIST POLICY OF THE YOUNG TURKS

Only a few years before the World War the autocratic policy of the Sultan was most unexpectedly interrupted, with profound effects upon the subsequent history of Turkey, and indeed of the world. In July 1908 the Young Turks came into power, overthrowing the ruling party and forcing the reactionary Sultan to restore the constitution of 1876. It was thought that the period of liberty and freedom had at last set in; there was the greatest excitement and rejoicing throughout Turkey. The Greeks of Smyrna, the Albanians of Europe, the Armenians, the Arabs, and even the Turks themselves believed that the day of deliverance had come. The racial and religious hatreds seemed to disappear overnight; and in their place came a spirit of good will. There was almost equal rejoicing abroad because of the new era, for it was recalled how badly governed Turkey had been, how many of her own citizens she had massacred, how rotten was her internal organization.

At first the troubles of the Young Turks were due to the efforts of the old régime to regain control. After a mutiny in the army at Constantinople had been put down, the Young Turk party made the Sultan a prisoner at Salonika and put his brother, Mohammed V, in his place. A nationalizing movement began, known as Pan-Islamism. The scattered units of the entire Mohammedan world were to become federated in a vast political system. The power of Islam was to be consolidated. Even Finland and Hungary were to be brought into the scheme. United Turkey was to form the center of the Islamic world, though permitting distant peoples, like the Arabs of Egypt, Morocco, and Tunis, and the people of Persia and Afghanistan, to enjoy local autonomy.

To further their objects and stimulate popular enthusiasm, the officials and teachers idealized such barbarian leaders as Attila and Genghis Khan and wrote in poetic style of the glories of these so-called heroic figures. Scholars and writers formed clubs, published books, and held celebrations to revive Turkish hero worship.

Another phase of the movement was attention to national economic problems. The leaders asserted that as long as trade and industries were in foreign hands the Turk was impotent. Greek and Armenian traders and shopkeepers were persecuted, boycotted, and expelled, and national banks were started, as at Aidin and Konia.

But the Young Turks failed from the very beginning. They began

to oppress the subject races; made no effort to punish the men who had carried out the terrible Adana massacres of 1909, in which more than 30,000 Christians were killed; tried to suppress the liberties of the Greek Orthodox Church; started a commercial boycott of the Greeks; and sought forcibly to colonize Macedonia by bringing in Mohammedans from other parts of Turkey. Instead of drawing together the diverse peoples of their empire, the Young Turks in the end only started into fiercer life the age-old racial and religious hatreds.

ZONES OF INFLUENCE OF THE GREAT POWERS

One of the most serious consequences of the lamentable events that occurred in Turkey at the end of the old and the beginning of the new régime was the renewed ambition of the great powers to gain larger spheres of influence in Turkey, so that if the empire vanished they should have richer spoils. The effort took concrete form in 1916, during the World War, when an agreement was made that Russia was to have the whole northern Armenian region (Fig. 174) as a sphere of commercial and political influence, which meant that if the Turkish Empire



FIG. 174. Adjacent to the principal ports are rectangles representing proportional value of trade — the open portion, imports; the shaded portion, exports. Statistics are for 1910–1911, that is, before the Balkan wars in which Turkey lost the majority of her European holdings, and when the trade of Turkish ports was in a normal condition. Zones of influence are drawn as laid down in the so-called secret treaties made during the World War. A, B, C are supplementary zones; D, E, F, G are special areas mentioned in the various agreements. Railways as in 1928. For the railway net of 1914 see Figure 175.



FIG. 175. Navigation and harbor rights and concessions in Turkey in 1914. Railways as in 1914; for the railway net of today see Figure 174. It is in the light of the facts shown in this and the preceding map (Fig. 174) that the terms of the discarded treaty of Sèvres (page 492) should be read.

disintegrated, Russia would hope to own this part of it. Italy was to have special rights in Adalia and Dodecanesia. France was given a similar position in the Adana region, Syria, and southern Armenia; while England was to have a sort of protectorate over Palestine and Mesopotamia.

With the complete collapse of orderly government in Russia in 1917, the Russian sphere faded from the map of Turkey and in its place there appeared three countries — Armenia, the Georgian Republic, and the country of the Azerbaijan Tatars (Fig. 188, page 527).

The Italian zone at Adalia represents an independent effort. When the Turkish Empire was in a state of disorder in 1911, Italy sought to increase her territorial holdings in Africa by acts of aggression in Libya (Tripoli). Austria-Hungary had seized the provinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulgaria had declared her independence of Turkey — why should not Italy have Libya? War with Turkey followed. It was a hard campaign, and before it was won Italy seized the group of islands known as the Dodecanese, from which she was to withdraw as soon as Turkish troops were withdrawn from Libya. Italy also obtained railway concessions in the Adalia region from the weak

Turkish government, and strengthened her hold upon the coal mines of Heraclea on the southern Black Sea coast east of Constantinople.

As the World War progressed, it became more and more important for the Allies to have the aid of Greece, on account of the progress of German operations in the Balkans and the possibility of a submarine campaign with the Greek coast as a base. Greek adherence to the Allied cause could be won only if the Greeks felt that there would be a chance, after the war, to unite the Greek populations of the Ægean. While there was no agreement to this effect, there was a tacit understanding. Now the islands known as the Dodecanese (page 402) are exclusively Greek in customs, language, and religion. Neither the Turks through centuries of rule, nor the Italians in a few years, could change the fundamental character of the people. To this day the sailors of Dodecanesia maintain the Hellenic traditions of the past. Moreover, the islands lie near that part of the mainland of Asia Minor that was predominantly Greek, and that supported Smyrna as a commercial center. But the Italian incubus could not be shaken off. Fourteen of the islands have been left definitively in Italian hands by the treaty of Lausanne (page 501). The rest of the Ægean islands are divided between Greece and Turkey (Fig. 139, page 398).

THE POLICY OF CAPITULATIONS

Whatever their location and character, the Turks have always been a poor people and the standard of education has been low. It is also noteworthy that the Turk has never shown business qualities. The Turkish peasant is a farmer, not a trader, and the Turkish leaders played the part of overlords, not that of creative business organizers. As a result, almost all the business of the country was traditionally in the hands of non-Turkish people — Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Italians, French, Germans, and English. Wherever mines had been developed, railroads or irrigation works constructed, foreign capital and foreign brains were chiefly responsible.

At first thought it might be supposed that foreign assistance would be nothing but a benefit to Turkey. And so it would, were it not that foreigners in Turkey were too often concessionaires who got control of valuable resources and lent money at usurious rates. In addition they occupied a privileged position in the country. In fact, citizens of Great Britain, Italy, France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary were in many respects in a separate class from Turkish citizens, whether Turks, Greeks, Armenians, or Jews, since they were practically exempt from the payment of income taxes and of certain other taxes to which the

Turk was subject. The foreigner was immune from search, could secure passports from his own consul, and could be tried in courts of his own nationality. All of these special privileges together constituted a body of privileges known as "capitulations." The capitulations date back for centuries and were the outgrowth of a conception of law unlike that prevailing in our day. In their earlier development they were extended to the weaker as well as the stronger Christian states and had no relation to foreign penetration. Their modern phase no doubt gave protection to foreigners in face of a rotten judiciary; but their extension emphasized Turkey's weakness, if it did not increase it. One entire region, the Lebanon, was placed in a privileged class and passed under foreign control in 1864. With the modern type of capitulations went increasing corruption. Officials sought bribes at every opportunity. The situation was parallel to that in China (page 587). Upon declaring war in 1914, Turkey abolished the capitulations; but the powers refused to recognize her action, until obliged to do so at the time that the treaty of Lausanne was negotiated (page 501).

THE OTTOMAN PUBLIC DEBT

The question of debt was politically important to Turkey even before the World War; for with debt control were related still larger schemes of political control, through which combinations of capital sought to gain advantages not to Turkey's interest. The total pre-war debt of Turkey originally amounted to $716,000,000. France, the chief creditor, had 60 per cent of the total, Germany came next with 20 per cent, and Great Britain followed with 15 per cent. The debt was administered by a Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, which consisted of one representative each for France, Great Britain, Holland, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Turkey, and one representative of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. The president of the Council was French or British in alternate years. If money was borrowed, it was the Council that administered the service of the loan. When interest or principal became due, the Council collected a certain amount of the ordinary revenues. The Council reached into almost every corner of Turkish financial affairs. Its control went so far as to affect even the tax on live stock in some districts. On the other hand, it introduced modern methods in a number of industries, and was the principal influence in establishing the silk industry. Its staff of trained employees totaled nearly nine thousand in 1912.

Students of Turkish problems long held that if Turkish affairs were to be improved, the exclusive privileges involved in the public debt and

in the concessions must be modified or abolished. They asserted further that it would be greatly to Turkey's interest if all the revenues of the state were controlled by a central treasury, instead of by many collecting and disbursing agencies, as in the past. So complicated were these financial affairs, so poor was Turkey after the World War (she had already lost one tenth of her revenue and one sixth of her population in the Balkan wars of 1912–1913), so great was the rivalry of the powers, that it was impossible to make Turkey pay a war indemnity such as had been pledged by the other defeated powers.

THE NEW NATIONALIST PARTY

With the collapse of Turkish military power in 1918, the occupation of Constantinople and adjacent waters by an Allied army and fleet, and the threat of dismemberment, Turkish sentiment for the integrity of the Turkish Empire crystallized in the form of a Nationalist party. Organized in October 1919, the new party soon carried Adrianople and Brusa. It had the whole interior of Anatolia in which to develop, for only the coastal regions were held by the Allies. The French were attacked and defeated at Marash late in February 1920; and their retreat was accompanied by a fresh massacre of Armenians in the Cilician region. The British were harassed on the borders of Kurdistan by tribesmen who were instigated by Turkish officials. The Greek forces that held the demarcation line at Smyrna were hard pressed. The Allied armies had largely disbanded, and the greater part of the world was stricken with disorganization and laden with debt.

Seeing these influences at work, and seeing also their own country disintegrating, the Turkish leaders revived the national sentiment and spurred their people to new efforts to defeat the scattered battalions of the Allies and regain the empire. That they were successful was owing chiefly to the heavy terms of the treaty of Sèvres, drawn up by the Allies and signed by the Turkish representatives but never ratified by the Parliament. By its terms the Ottoman Public Debt service was to continue upon that part apportioned to Turkey; all concessions granted prior to 1914 were to be conserved and confirmed; and control of import and export duties was conceded. "Free zones" were to be established in ports of alleged international interest: Constantinople, Haidar Pasha, Smyrna, Alexandretta, Haifa, Basra, Trebizond, and Batum. Non-Turkish territory was everywhere to be cut away: a new republic of Armenia was to take out a huge area on the east; Greece was to occupy the Smyrna region on the west. The Zone of the Straits was to be demilitarized and strict control over it maintained by an



FIG. 176. Percentage of Moslem population in Asiatic Turkey by sanjaks before the World War. The line of heavy dots represents approximately the northern and eastern boundary of the Arab lands.



FIG. 177. Density of population in Asiatic Turkey by sanjaks before the World War. In conjunction is shown the division of Turkey as proposed in the treaty of Sèvres (solid lines) and the Tripartite Agreement (broken lines): Zone of the Straits, Greek zone in the Smyrna district, Italian zone in southwestern Anatolia, French mandatory area in Syria and zone of influence in southeastern Anatolia, British mandatory area in Mesopotamia and Palestine. The dotted line represents President Wilson's boundary on the Turkish side for the proposed state of Armenia. For the details of the Wilson line see Figure 189, page 528.

Allied commission. Turkish vassalage, economic and military, was complete. From the Turkish standpoint nothing could be lost by renewed resistance, something might be gained (Figs. 174, 175).

In the past one hundred years the Turk has given ample proof that he well knows the principle that not only power but also the balance of power matters, whether in business or politics. The war debts of France, Italy, and Great Britain and the need for trade revival under exceptionally favorable circumstances increased the competition for Levantine trade and for economic privileges in the tributary lands. Given such a situation, the opportunity of the Turk, historically an exploiter himself long before the western powers learned the art, lay plain before him. When the terms of the treaty of Sèvres became generally known to the Turkish leaders, resistance to the Allies settled into a resolutely fixed principle. In spite of the general feeling in Christian countries that the end of Turkish control of Christian peoples was at hand, there was no corresponding resolution or means for conducting a crusade to effect such a result. By contrast the Turk felt that he was fighting for his life. The extent to which the Turkish Empire would have been reduced by the treaty of Sèvres, had the treaty been ratified and enforced, may be appreciated from the map shown in Figure 177.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE POST-WAR SITUATION

The disposition of the main bodies of population about the rim of the Anatolian peninsula, if examined in conjunction with the railroads and port statistics of Figure 174, shows still more clearly why Turkey felt that the treaty of Sèvres meant economic slavery and political extinction. The dry interior of the peninsula being ill served with railroads, it follows that sea communication between the different parts of Turkish territory (as cut down by the treaty of Sèvres) would have been vitally affected by the control of the Bosporus. Upon this historic strait focused the national life of Turkey. It is by ship and caravan that the bulk of Turkish goods is transported; railroad building has only begun. The representation of port statistics [1] shows graphically that the interest of Constantinople and the Anatolian peoples in the Ægean Sea is of the first order, a fact not to be overlooked when appraising the historic position or trade of the Greeks and their rival claims.

Smyrna was the chief exporting center and Constantinople led in imports — and precisely these were the ports that the Allies proposed to hold, the one through a Greek mandate, the other through the admin-

[1] The statistics for the seven ports are to be found on page 518.



FIG. 178. Distribution of rainfall in Anatolia. The approximate equivalent of 650 millimeters is 26 inches. From Ulrich Frey, "Das Hochland von Anatolien," *Mitteilungen der Geographische Gesellschaft in München*, 1925, Plate 7.

FIG. 179. Relief of Anatolia. Note the plateau character of the peninsula, its abrupt and indented border, and interior valleys and basins. Of special interest is a comparison of new boundaries and of population densities in Figures 173 and 177 with the coastal valley lowlands as represented here. Contours reduced from the sheets of the millionth map, British General Staff.



FIG. 180. Outline map to show (*a*) the "military zone" (stippled) in northern Syria according to the treaty of Sèvres; (*b*) the modification in favor of Turkey according to the Angora Agreement of 1921 (line of heavy dots).

istration of an Allied commission. The territorial losses of the Balkan wars deprived Turkey of Salonika and Dedeagatch, two of the seven ports of chief importance. The prospective loss of Smyrna to Greece, of Beirut to France, and of Trebizond to Armenia, together with the inclusion of Haidar-Pasha in the zone of the Straits and the special régime of Constantinople (with its tributary territory in Europe reduced to the needs of water and vegetable supplies), placed practically every outlet of Turkish trade in foreign hands (Fig. 174).

Were the interior of Turkey a closely organized agricultural unit, the loss of coastal outlets might have been less serious. On the contrary, the arable lands of the peninsula lie for the most part near the sea in patches and narrow belts or tongues of valley floor, or on the lower soil-covered hill slopes. Elsewhere, and notably in the steppe-like interior, the pastoral-nomadic type of life prevails. This life being on a more primitive level than that in Europe, it follows that the Turk could afford to waste his land and people without fearing for their future, if he could in the end recover the coastal outlets.

Still another geographical element affected the situation. The Turk had been fighting on his own distant ground, and the Allies would have to come to him; and that is costly. Here time told on the side of the Turk. It was, therefore, logical to conclude that the treaty of Sèvres and the supplementary Tripartite Agreement of even date (1920) between Great Britain, France, and Italy would have no validity unless the Turk agreed. The Allies could not force him to accept their terms.

TURKEY'S TERRITORIAL GAINS SINCE 1919

The Angora Agreement and Cilicia

The first step in Turkey's elimination or modification of the territorial provisions of the treaty of Sèvres was taken on the military line of northern Syria. Down from the northeast runs a string of valleys toward salt water at the Gulf of Alexandretta. By the treaty of Sèvres, France encircled that outlet, whence a considerable trade reaches the coast and where fertile lands already productive are susceptible of still greater development. It is not a principal Turkish outlet, but it is an important one. By the Angora Agreement (1921) Turkey recovered it up to the heavy line shown in Figure 177, though France still retains an economic priority in the vilayets of Adana, Diarbekr, Sivas, and Kharput — virtually the French zone of the secret treaties (page 488) and of the Tripartite Agreement. Of chief importance in the region is the Cilician plain. While the northern part is gravelly and dry and supports a population chiefly nomadic, the southern half has a fertile soil abundantly supplied with water available for irrigation. In the early years of the present century, Egyptians, Syrians, Bulgarians, and Circassians colonized it, notably displacing the old Turkish population.

Smyrna, Constantinople, and the Straits

As soon as the Angora Agreement had gained them the first of their essential outlets about the Gulf of Alexandretta, the Turks turned to Smyrna, which has long been the largest export center of the Turkish realm. Besides, it is the focus of one of the few really dense populations of Turkey. Nothing could be more certain from either the historical or the commercial standpoint than that it would become one of the chief objectives of Turkish military ambitions. The city was burned in the taking and its Greek population fled to Greece in one of the greatest folk movements in the world's history (page 401). The remnant was expelled or exchanged and the ethnic composition of the region completely altered. With Smyrna in his hands, Mustapha Kemal Pasha turned to Constantinople; and, though he had no fleet, it was obvious at the beginning that he would try to enlarge his European holdings as a basis of negotiation and compromise.

Second only to Constantinople as a symbol of power and prestige throughout the Mohammedan world is the Turkish hinterland in Europe — eastern Thrace with Adrianople. Before the Turk had reached the Golden Horn, Adrianople had been his European capital.

In 1913 Turkey had put forth her "historic rights" to the city and had recovered it by agreement with Bulgaria at the close of the Second Balkan War, thus modifying the Enos-Midia line upon which they had agreed at the close of the First Balkan War.

The Allies had been prepared to make concessions ever since the failure of the treaty of Sèvres first became apparent. In March 1922 the Allied ministers at Paris had already proposed substantial departures from the treaty of Sèvres in a note that was almost apologetic in tone. Two great objectives were, however, retained — protection of Christian minorities and freedom of the Straits. The latter is the crux of the entire situation, for it is primarily of international importance and concern. The Straits are one of the principal maritime passages of the world, and control of them is a great diplomatic and military advantage. Up to 1910 the movement of shipping through them surpassed that through Suez.

TURKISH CLAIMS IN THRACE

Before reviewing the final treaty of peace between Turkey and the powers it will suffice to mention two significant regional situations, in Thrace and in Mesopotamia, that entered critically into the treaty making. The debatable ground of Thrace has long been a political

Fig. 181. Political boundaries in Thrace. Boundaries established by the following treaties are shown: San Stefano, 1978; Berlin, 1878; London, 1913; Bucarest, 1913; Constantinople, 1913; Sofia, 1915; Neuilly, 1919; Sèvres, 1920. For the Lausanne line see Figure 182.

storm belt. Turk, Bulgar, and Greek meet there in an environment that offers something congenial to all three races. The present division of territory is only the last of a long series made to establish boundaries where no natural or ethnic divisions in truth can be found. Elsewhere in the disputed territory of the Balkan Peninsula two (or rarely three) powers have been involved, whereas in Thrace at least five groups of interests are in conflict. Greece has sought to encircle Constantinople and shut off Bulgaria from the Ægean as well as Turkey from Europe. Bulgaria has persistently sought a territorial and commercial outlet to the Ægean on the south. Turkey has resisted both Greece and Bulgaria, and in 1920 the powers put into force a special post-war régime for the Zone of the Straits that introduced a fourth group of interests. The trade of Russia gives her also a primary interest as a fifth power.

THE MESOPOTAMIAN BORDER

The question of Mosul and its oil fields is a substantial part of the Turkish settlement. The British mandatory area, as at first proposed, encircled the oil district, and this position was incorporated into the treaty of Sèvres only when France had relinquished an overlapping territorial claim in return for the privilege of securing one fourth of the oil produced in Mesopotamia. France also gave Great Britain the right to build oil pipe lines to the Mediterranean across the French mandatory area in Syria, in return for the privilege of buying one fourth of the oil that may be piped in this way from Persia. The problem was complicated by the fact that irrigation possibilities, oil reserves, and strategical considerations make Mesopotamia a highly desirable block of territory — to the British, with Egyptian and Indian empire interests on either hand and an oil-burning navy, no less than to the Turk trying to piece out his national domain and recover some part of his former strength. After prolonged and critical negotiations and the most patient effort on the part of the Council of the League of Nations, the difficulty was resolved and a line established north of Mosul (Fig. 32, page 188).

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN 1922–1923

After the Greek armies of occupation in the Smyrna region were routed in the summer of 1922 and the Greek inhabitants expelled, the Allies were prepared to concede Thrace as far west as the Maritsa River, including Adrianople. There was suggested a demilitarized zone on land and the freedom of the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara,



FIG. 182. Boundary of Turkey in Europe as determined by the treaty of Lausanne (1923).

and the Dardanelles, under the League of Nations, and the protection of religious and racial minorities. In the following month an armistice (Mudania) was signed, providing for Greek evacuation of Thrace, the occupation of the district by Allied contingents, and the establishment of neutral zones along the Straits to be governed by mixed commissions.

At the first Near-East Peace Conference, the Turks carried out their expressed determination to make the "Nationalist Pact" the foundation of their policy. This was a declaration drawn up by Mustapha Kemal Pasha and adopted by the Turkish Parliament at Constantinople, and later by the National Assembly at Angora (1920). It declared the right of the Arab portions of the former Turkish Empire to have an autonomous government, and the determination that Cilicia and Mosul should not be separated from Turkey. The ownership of the sanjaks of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, in the region of the Caucasus, and the status of western Thrace were to be determined by plebiscite. While the freedom of the Straits and the protection of minorities were viewed favorably, unalterable opposition to the traditional policy of the capitulations was declared, and upon this rock the conference broke.

No sooner is one diplomatic failure acknowledged than fresh effort must be made with a revised program and a new "formula," if peace is to be assured. A second peace conference [1] resulted in the treaty of Lausanne, of which the principal provisions are given below. Somewhat detailed attention is given the provisions because by them a new Turkish state came into being, with the widest consequences for European nations and for the Turkish people themselves.

PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE, 1923

The nations participating in the treaty of Lausanne are designated as follows, and no little significance attaches to the forms of designation:

(1) The British Empire, France, and Italy,
(2) in agreement with Japan, and,
(3) by invitation, Greece, Rumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and,
(4) also the United States of America, and,
(5) on the other hand, Turkey:
(6) Bulgaria and Russia as littoral powers of the Black Sea to participate in both negotiations and decisions because the Straits question should be especially examined; and
(7) Belgium and Portugal to take part in the discussion of the economic and financial articles on account of the questions which arose for these two powers from the state of war in the East.

The treaty of Lausanne was signed 24 July 1923, and has been ratified by the contracting powers. By the terms of the treaty of Sèvres, Turkey was all but eliminated from Europe, since she would have retained only the city of Constantinople and a small tract of land immediately adjacent thereto. The Lausanne terms restored to Turkey the Thracian boundary of 1914 in all but a few minor details. Figure 182 shows the Lausanne line in Thrace. The Maritsa now forms the boundary from a point near Adrianople southward to the Ægean. Opposite Adrianople is the important railway station of Karagach. It becomes Turkish and thus gives Turkey immediate access upon her own territory to a section of railway that connects this important city (and former Turkish capital) with the present railway line between

[1] The Lausanne Agreement between the Turks and the Greeks (May 1923), a condition precedent to the general peace agreement, ended the difficulty over the Smyrna occupation. By that agreement the Greeks acknowledged the damage they had done in Anatolia during four years of military occupation, and the Turks waived indemnity for the damage in consideration for a small territorial adjustment in Thrace, whereby the town and railway station of Karagach, across the river from Adrianople (Fig. 182), are ceded by the Greeks to the Turks.

Bulgaria and Constantinople. Greece is excluded from eastern Thrace and from the coast of the Sea of Marmara after three years' occupation. Bulgaria's southern boundary is left unmodified in eastern Thrace. It stands as defined in the treaty of Neuilly. An important feature of the Thracian boundary is the establishment on either side of it of a demilitarized zone in which all fortifications shall be destroyed and no new ones erected. A similar demilitarized zone is established on either side of the Bosporus, the Dardanelles, and certain islands (Fig. 182).

Certain islands of the Ægean, including the Dodecanese, were also definitely disposed of by the treaty of Lausanne. The earlier agreements of 1913 and 1914 assigning to Greece a group of islands — among them Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Nikaria — were confirmed, subject only to the exception of those islands given to Italy by Article 15 of the treaty itself. Italy obtained fourteen islands, all of the Dodecanese group or adjacent thereto. These include the important islands of Rhodes, Cos, Patmos, and Castellorizzo. Imbros and Tenedos were assigned to Turkey, with guarantees for the non-Moslem population. Those islands that lie within three miles of the Turkish coast remained Turkish unless otherwise allotted. On the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Nikaria, Greece is to establish no naval base and no fortifications, and her military contingents on these islands shall be limited to the normal number called up for military service on the spot.

Among the territorial provisions is one relating to a small area on the western side of the Gallipoli peninsula called the Anzac Area, granted in perpetuity to the British Empire, France, and Italy. Custodians appointed by these three powers will preserve the graves and cemeteries there; but Turkey controls access to the area, and it must not be built up or fortified in any way except as houses are constructed for the sole use of the custodians.

Turkey renounced all rights and titles over Egypt and the Sudan as of 5 November 1914, and also recognized the annexation of Cyprus as proclaimed by Great Britain on 5 November 1914. These provisions affect British title to the lands in question. The Italian title to Libya, gained as a result of the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912, is confirmed by an article which also abolishes even those rights and titles of Turkey in Libya which Turkey enjoyed under the treaty of 18 October 1912 (Lausanne), which closed that war. Turkey further recognized and accepted the "frontiers" (boundaries) of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and the Czechoslovak State, as laid down in the several treaties closing

the World War. On account of the layout of Turkish territory in Europe and the course of the railroads upon which several Balkan nations must depend for through railway communication, the freedom-of-transit clauses of earlier treaties between the Allied Powers and the Central Powers are adhered to by Turkey, and likewise the earlier arrangements preceding the World War as determined at Berne, and the conditions respecting international railways as laid down in the Conference of Barcelona of 20 April 1921.

All states that benefited by the Balkan wars through the distribution of territory or that derived benefits from the terms of the treaty of Lausanne are hereafter to participate in the annual charges for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt. The proportional principle of division or allotment in the case of both annuities and capital sum is adopted. A given country shall pay an amount determined by the ratio between the "average total revenue" of the territory in question and the total revenue of the Ottoman Empire in 1910–1911 and 1911–1912. Turkey thus assumes about 40 per cent of the debt.

The treaty clauses relating to the freedom of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosporus are particularly interesting. These waterways are declared free to transit and navigation by sea and air for every ship no matter what its flag or cargo, and there is to be no tax or charge except for services directly rendered. There are specific provisions for the use of these waterways in a "time of war, Turkey being neutral," a "time of war, Turkey being a belligerent," and so on. If Turkey is neutral in time of war, the conditions for the use of the Straits are the same as in peace. No power may send through the Straits a force greater than the most powerful fleet of any littoral power bordering on the Black Sea. If Turkey is a belligerent, she may prevent enemy vessels from using the Straits, but neutrals may pass.

There is to be full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race, or religion. Instruction in their own language is to be provided for non-Moslem nationals in Turkey in those districts in which they form a considerable portion of the total population. Turkey adheres in Article 99 of the treaty of Lausanne to twenty-two treaties, conventions, and arrangements dating from 1863 to 1920 and dealing with a variety of international subjects, such as submarine cables, postal arrangements, obscene publications, exemption of hospital ships from port charges, etc. The list is in addition to many other treaties and conventions mentioned more especially elsewhere in the text of the treaty.

A number of supplementary conventions and agreements between Turkey and the Allies were signed at the same time as the main treaty of peace. By their terms Turkey and the contracting powers renounce pecuniary claims as a result of the World War. An important agreement is that relating to judicial procedure in Turkish courts. It has grown out of the capitulations which reserved to the nationals of foreign powers certain privileges in the matter of trial for offenses or crimes committed in Turkish territory. Turkey now agrees to have investigation made as a basis of reform in her judicial procedure. Foreign legal counselors will be engaged for this purpose from a list prepared by the Permanent Court of International Justice of The Hague, and the list will be restricted to nationals of those countries that did not participate in the World War. Whatever the outcome of the advice received by Turkey in the matter, there is to be hereafter no foreign interference with Turkish courts. An agreement between Greece and Turkey, dated 30 January 1923, required the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, except the Greeks of Constantinople and the Turks of Western Thrace, an agreement that has since been carried out. In order to improve relations between Greece and Turkey there was provided (with moderate reservations as to residence) full and complete amnesty for crimes and offenses committed during the war by their respective nationals.

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

The rise of Turkey as a real power after defeat and threatened extinction was owing largely to the emergence of a strong personality, Mustapha Kemal Pasha. He is an astute man of action, wise in his knowledge of the human spirit. He seized the opportunity when Turkey lay in the dust to raise new issues, consolidate his power through the shadow of a National Assembly and the organization of a People's Party which he controls, and, after a series of brilliant military victories, bring about the convention of Mudania and finally the treaty of Lausanne. This task completed, he raised fresh issues and the latest, that of westernization, bids fair to occupy his administration and that of his successors for a long period of time. On 1 March 1924, in a famous speech before the National Assembly, Mustapha Kemal said that the Moslem religion must be freed from its rôle as a political instrument which it had been made to play for centuries. In a studied address he declared that the new régime "rejects in their entirety the old superannuated methods of government." On 3 March, the Assembly abolished the caliphate. After that came the suppression

of the religious schools and courts and the absorption by government of the property of the Mohammedan church.

A period of political destruction must needs be followed by a period of creation. So it was not long before the fresh troubles of the Turkish state called for the drastic reorganization of its internal life. It was nothing less than a new civilization that was being aimed at, and were the constitutional basis of a new western civilization to be worked out by the painful processes of experiment and adjustment over a long period of time, the power of the rulers might fail. In a startling address before the National Assembly in February 1926, Mahmoud Essad, Minister of Justice, arraigned the old order in Turkey in terms more severe than those that had ever been employed by a foreigner. He declared obsolete at least 1500 of the 1800 articles in the book of Turkish Law (Mejelleh). He described the judges as "functioning by deductions from a jumble of books on jurisprudence and also from the fundamentals of religion." Contrary judgments were rendered in similar cases, he declared. The necessity for the absolute separation of religion and state was emphasized. Believing Turkish national life to be out of harmony with the older body of laws and therefore a hampering influence, he urged the Assembly to go very much further and instead of adapting modern civilization to Turkish ways he insisted upon the astounding principle of adjusting Turkish ways to modern civilization as an indispensable precedent to its new career.

In consonance with the Minister's speech and the wish of the President, the National Assembly adopted three new codes of law — civil, criminal, and commercial. In the past the body of "sacred law" was based on the Koran as a primary source and also upon a series of sayings traditionally attributed to Mohammed, as well as on a system of law developed by lawyers and judges and only in part codified. This peculiar combination made it possible to have an antiquated legal system involving the use of two sets of courts as late as the end of the World War. These, together with the system of capitulations which still further complicated matters so far as the foreigner was related to Turkish life, were all swept away. In their place was put not some new outgrowth of Turkish life and experience but *a system borrowed from western civilization* in conformity with which the Turkish nation is asked to walk by its own rulers. The civil code was taken from Switzerland, the criminal code from Italy, and the commercial code from Germany. Of these the Swiss code, which is the basis of the new Turkish civil code, is the most important because it modernizes the greatly complicated and antiquated part of older Turkish law. The

Swiss Civil Code was itself adopted in Switzerland only after several years of discussion and alteration. Its adoption by Turkey means the end of polygamy and slavery, at least on paper. It means that a system of laws has gone into effect which is independent of religion. It aims through the separation of church and state to make one nation out of the Turkish people and the non-Turkish minorities, for its leaders conceive that the failure to create a unified Turkish state has been due in large part to the fact that religion has been the central principle of political life and control. In the place of such a scheme is substituted one of national patriotism, personal liberty regardless of religious affiliation, and uniformity in the enjoyment of ordinary civil rights.

The attempt is being made to reform and simplify the Turkish language. The Gregorian calendar is now the official measure of time, and the day is divided into twenty-four hours. Brusa is to be "the point of the first meridian" (this presumably means that time in Turkey is to be measured from the meridian of Brusa). The old Mohammedan calendar is to be retained for a while together with the new. Preparations are being made for the introduction of the metric system.

The new constitutional forms, the slogans of western democracy, the spectacular modernization of the status of women, the brilliant patriotic and military successes of Mustapha Kemal, are likely to mislead us if we attribute all these qualities to the Turkish people as a whole rather than to the members of the small ruling class who hold power in their hands today. The number of intelligent men is very small, and there is a population of fourteen millions to govern. A new nation cannot be made overnight. The law may be changed, but the realities of liberalism and democracy come only by painful experience. What the new forms and the new spirit will endure and achieve can only be determined when the competence of both leaders and people has been put to the test.

Certainly the new Turkey faces some first-class problems. Among her internal problems are two of special significance because they are by nature chronic and they cannot be resolved by a gesture or a happy thought. The first is the Kurdish question. Under the guise of religious conviction a Kurdish revolt was organized in 1925, and owing to the strong Moslem sentiment that exists throughout Turkey there was danger for a time that the opposition elements would rally about a new leader and sweep the republican régime away. With characteristic energy Mustapha Kemal placed twelve provinces under martial law, decreed a partial mobilization, and overcame the rebellious forces. But the cost was staggering: twelve million Turkish pounds.

The second problem relates to the conflict of interest between Constantinople and Angora. The commerce of Constantinople has declined and for this the new administration is blamed. The site of Constantinople is admirably suited to modern trade. It is connected by rail and shipping routes with diversified regions throughout the Near East. It was for many centuries a strategic and religious center as well. Angora, by contrast, is an isolated small town completely separated from the main avenues of commercial life. Constantinople finds the cause of her trouble in legislation at Angora rather than in post-war conditions that have affected a large part of the world. The transfer of the capital had a bad psychological effect upon trade. In Turkey, as elsewhere, money has depreciated, the cost of living has risen. The general taxes remain excessively heavy despite certain exemptions to industry and the revision of the tax scheme, for example, the produce tax. Foreign capital is not attracted, owing to the complicated history of past Turkish loans and the unsettled state of both Turkey and her neighbors. The government has had to compensate a large number of turban and fez manufacturers and traders who had been hard hit by the adoption of the new hat. It was obliged to construct railways, to subsidize and endow industries.

By a single stroke Turkey did herself immeasurable harm in the expulsion of the Greeks from the Smyrna region. As France expelled the Huguenots and Spain the Moors, so Turkey expelled the Greeks, and in all three cases it was the best artisans who were lost. Turkey at this stage can ill afford to part with the asset of an artisan class; but she felt called upon to choose between a method designed to achieve national solidarity and the risk of keeping unsympathetic and troublesome elements within her borders. She has to pay the price of her choice, and the price is heavy. Her choice has helped neither her inherent strength nor her credit. Dangerously weak is the condition of one-man rule.

The man power of Turkey has been depleted in numbers and strength by fifteen years of almost constant fighting in the Italo-Turkish war of 1911–1912, the first and second Balkan wars, the World War, the war with Greece for the possession of Smyrna, and the suppression of the Kurdish revolt. Demobilization released men who had no means of livelihood and became vagrant hillsmen, peasants, robbers. The Moslem refugees from Greece (page 401) to the number of 400,000 were transferred to Turkey under conditions of great hardship. They had few household goods; they were uprooted from their homeland; some of them did not even know the Turkish language. On the whole,

the task was well managed, but hardship on a large scale was inevitable. The corresponding transfer of Greeks wiped out the question of non-Turkish minorities save for the Moslem Kurds, a depleted Armenian group, and scattered remnants of Greeks. Turkey has become an essentially homogeneous state.

Because of the untapped water-power, fertile river valleys, undeveloped mineral and forest wealth, Turkey has substantial even if limited economic possibilities. It is a predominantly agricultural country, and though it cannot now sustain a large city population it has the resources upon which industry can be based. Its population numbers 43 to the square mile; the United States has less than 40, while Greece has 167, England 700. Farming conditions have changed but little in several thousand years of history. The ignorant, simple farmers are conservative, and the great historical changes in civilization have influenced them hardly at all. The method of cultivation is a crooked stick tipped with flint and drawn by water buffalo or oxen. Deep plowing is unknown. Modern machinery is a curiosity. Grain is still crushed between stones by hand.

The new government of the republic has endowed eight agricultural schools and the President has turned gentleman farmer. The tithe has been abolished. This was often the means of blackmail. Instead of a 12 per cent tax on the total produce there is a 10 per cent tax on the marketed crop only. In the last two or three years conditions have improved in western Anatolia, where new agricultural implements have been introduced and mills and factories built. In 1925 there were some six hundred Fordson tractors in Turkey and a hundred and fifty of other and larger makes. Figs, tobacco, cotton — these are among the principal exports that sustain Turkish international exchange. The strength of the peasant is undoubted, but a strong country cannot grow from agriculture alone. The new government has nationalized a number of industries on a monopoly basis. Salt and tobacco have been taken over in this way, and sugar promises to be. There is no taxation upon the material for the installation of factories. The greatest difficulty is lack of communications. An extension of railways and motor roads would help agriculture and also permit the government to keep military control over the country. Each agricultural region must be linked with the coast. Railway construction is therefore pursued in earnest by the Kemalist government.

It is to trade that Turkey must look for her chief sources of revenue, and she is so poor that her commerce will long be obliged to sustain a very heavy burden of taxation. Her exports for a good many years

to come must consist of special articles not produced in agricultural communities near by. Rumania and Russia can produce large quantities of grain much cheaper than Turkey, but Turkey is better suited for the production of dried fruits, tobacco, opium, and fine skins. Turkey's undeveloped wealth will gain in importance because of foreign need for new raw materials to feed the industries of the world. While half of Anatolia is desert, steppe, and mountain, there are locally fertile areas upon which silk, cotton, tobacco, fine wool, and subtropical fruits can be produced. Improved irrigation works will greatly increase the production and will make cotton growing possible even on the central plain of Konia, where now much of the land is desert for lack of a proper application of the available water supply.

THE TURKS AS MOSLEMS

Turkey has been traditionally the spearhead of Mohammedanism. She exemplified the militant spirit of that religion, and maintained for centuries the ground won from Christian Europe in the Balkans, as that other wing of the faith, the Moors in the Iberian peninsula, held their ground against Christian Spain. The Caliph, or head of the Moslem church, in Constantinople was the center of the Islamic cause in the world despite the fact that the authenticity of his claim to the title was disputed.[1] In contrast to the Arab groups, the Moslems of India and of Anatolia have generally supported the Turkish caliphate (page 137).

With the success of the Turkish nationalist movement came changes not only in government but in headdress, as noted above, and even in religion. Though "Islam" was declared the religion of the Turkish state, the privileges relating to it and the caliphate were abolished. No longer does there exist that powerful figure, the Sheikh-ul-Islam; in his place is a "director of cults and religions." As a first step the caliphate was made elective by the Grand National Assembly in 1922, following the abolition of the sultanate, but the sweep of reform was too strong to stop there and with the proclamation of a republic in 1923 and the abolition of the caliphate, the cycle of modernization was

[1] The Sultan of Morocco, the Mahdists of the Egyptian Sudan, the Senussi in the Libyan Desert, the Wahabis in central Arabia, have never made acknowledgment of the Turkish Caliph. Nor has such recognition been given by the Arabs of the Hejaz, Palestine, and Syria, which contain the holy places of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. Throughout the country from Mecca to Aleppo, the Sultan's name was for a time replaced in the Friday liturgy by that of Sherif Hussein, the hereditary guardian of the holy cities of the Hejaz, who was for a time referred to as "The Commander of the Faithful," though he himself did not assume the title of Caliph. His voluntary exile to Cyprus upon the appearance of Ibn Saud ended his power in both spiritual and temporal affairs.

complete. Religious courts were subordinated to the Ministry of Justice. Instead of the Sheriat, or Holy Law, were constitutional provisions for the regulation of conditions of worship and education.

In the primary schools of Turkey one hour of religious instruction a week is required; but in the higher schools this does not hold, and there is increasing attention to science. Sermons in the mosques may now be preached in Turkish, but prayers retain their original Arabic form. To be a Moslem in Turkey today it is necessary only to assert a belief in a single God and in Mohammed as his prophet. The four remaining cardinal doctrines — prayers, almsgiving, pilgrimage, and fasting during Ramazan — have become optional. The lower value of pilgrimage comes in part from the strained relations between Turkey and the Hejaz. It is extraordinary that these sweeping changes brought no general revolt among the Moslem peasantry. They did call for much debate throughout the Moslem world and, in the Moslem conferences that followed, the headship of the church was an object of special concern and rivalry, many claiming office. Time alone will tell whether Turkey gains or loses by her lessened religious attachment to the other countries of the Moslem world.

THE TRIBES OF KURDISTAN

The eastern part of Turkey consists of rugged mountain country inhabited by Kurdish tribes. In the whole of Asia Minor there are in all nearly three million Kurds, of whom half are now in Turkey. Since they occupy from a third to a quarter of Turkish territory and constitute the largest single element of Turkish population aside from the Turks themselves, their loyalty to the new Turkish régime is a matter of importance. They are a semi-nomadic people, migrating into the high valley pastures in summer to return in winter to the warmer valleys and lowlands. Their seasonal migrations bring them into conflict with the settled Armenians of the high valleys about Van, Mosul, Kirkuk, Bitlis, and Kharput, and with the Persians in the villages of Kermanshah, Isfahan, and Seistan. Their attitude toward the villages and settled lands is in some respects like that of the Afghans of northern India or of the nomadic Arabs to the oasis dwellers of Syria. In addition, the Kurds live in valleys which lie athwart both ancient and modern trade routes. They control the mountain passes, the eastern Anatolian gateways. The heavy tolls that they exact from passing caravans is one of their chief sources of revenue. The Kurds were known to Marco Polo and yet earlier travelers as "an evil generation whose delight it is to murder merchants."

The administration of Kurdistan is complicated by the Kurdish claim to rights in Christian villages, an old arrangement which allowed the nomadic tribes to winter in any Armenian village. Moreover, the fiercer spirit and wilder mode of life of the Kurds made them tools of the Turkish government, who settled them in many of the Armenian valleys in order to establish a Mohammedan majority there. Thus they could also assist the Turkish government in its occasional massacre of non-Moslem populations. For this service Kurds were let off with moderate taxes and with the furnishing of auxiliary troops in time of war. The old Turkish government attempted to split up the tribal organizations of the Kurds by securing the permanent settlement of formerly migratory tribes upon the land. It did this through fear that the Kurdish tribes might combine in large units to fight Turkish troops in guerilla warfare among mountain fastnesses.

Key to Figure 183.



Fig. 183. The home of the Kurds about the headwaters of the Tigris. Key to numbers: 1, Turkish-speaking peoples; 2, Armenians; 3, Chaldeans; 4, Assyrians (Nestorians); 5, Jacobites; 6, Persians; 7, Lurs; 8, Arabs. From British General Staff, *Map of Eastern Turkey in Asia*, etc., No. 2901, 1: 2,000,000, 1910. "Kurdistan" is a regional not a political designation. Boundaries as in 1928.

In the treaty of Sèvres (1920) between Turkey and the Allied and Associated Powers, a provision was made for an autonomous government east of the Euphrates and south of a proposed republic of Armenia (page 528). The southern limit of the new Kurdistan was to be the Syria-Mesopotamia boundary and the Kurds of the district or vilayet of Mosul were to be permitted to join the new Kurdish state. Safeguards were provided for the security of non-Kurdish populations. The plan appeared to be in the way of realization after the Turkish armistice of 1918, because British troops occupied Mesopotamia beyond Mosul, where they had pacified the country and employed both Kurds and Arabs in the administration. The treaty of Sèvres came to naught, however, through the resistance of Kemal and his followers, and Turkish authority was reasserted over Kurdistan and Turkish claims upon Mosul were vigorously pressed (page 118).

The Kurds of northern Kurdistan were willing to side with Turkey so long as there was danger of an independent Armenia. Those on the south were inclined to set up local provisional governments and to make agreements with the British. As for an autonomous state, the Kurds have no racial or national organization, no good means of communication, no common military organization either to create or to support such a government. People are grouped about rival chieftains, and they take a purely local view either of internal organization or of relations with non-Kurdish states upon their borders. Being fanatical and reactionary Moslems, they naturally resisted the progressive ideas of Kemal, so vigorously enforced among the Turkish populations of Anatolia. This primary difference between Kurds and Turks was enhanced by local political conflicts between Turkish and Kurdish nationalities during the years that immediately followed the rejection of the treaty of Sèvres. In February 1925 the Kurdish tribes engaged in a general revolt against Turkish authority, and for two months large Turkish armies were required to confine the disturbance. Despite the winter season, the principal armed bands were encircled, and the revolt ended with the capture and execution of the leaders. Instead of beginning a policy of reasonable pacification, the Turkish authorities sought to complete the Turkification of these unruly tribesmen.

Doubtless the final effect of the Turkish conquest of Kurdistan will be beneficial to both Persia and Iraq, owing to the fact that the Kurds spread or migrate into these adjacent countries. They were in revolt against the Persians for several years following the World War, and their migratory and raiding habits and fanatical spirit tend to bring them into repeated conflict with their masters.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

CONSTANTINOPLE AND ITS THOROUGHFARE

THERE are four cities, it is said, that belong to all men rather than to the people of one nation — Rome, Athens, Jerusalem, and Constantinople. All four are closely related to Mediterranean history. The capture of each one of them at one time or another has been a turning point in human affairs. Their temples have seen the growth of powerful religious influences. Their streets have echoed more than once to the tramp of armies bent on conquest far beyond "the rim of the known world."

Constantinople is one of the most beautiful cities in the world and has a history full of color and tragedy and romantic adventure. Jason sailed past the site of it in his search for the Golden Fleece. From the days of Xerxes and of Alexander the Great down to its capture in 1453 by the Turks, it was a point of great military interest. For nearly a thousand years it was one of the chief centers of culture and the capital of the Byzantine, or Eastern, Empire. Its natural defenses are exceptionally strong. Napoleon believed that its possession was worth half an empire. The Anzac area (Fig. 182, page 500) is a permanent memorial to the deeds of valor performed by the Gallipoli expeditionary army in 1915–1916 in a fruitless attempt to take the western defenses of Constantinople.

Even in the period of decadence in the late Byzantine Empire, Constantinople remained a great port. The Turks long encouraged the settlement of foreign colonies in various quarters to restore its trade and make it an international port. Its position at the crossroads of Europe and Asia enabled it, down to recent times, to profit enormously from the trade of southern Russia, the Transcaucasus, Persia, and Mesopotamia, and also, in earlier years, from the overland trade of Inner Asia, India, and the Far East. Into its marts flowed goods from every part of the world "from China to Caledonia and from Scythia to the Sahara." Because Constantinople was the greatest of mediæval marts and its power dominated the ports of the Near East, the early Turkish sultans could style themselves "Lords of the Upper and Lower Seas." One sultan at least threatened to invade Germany and even France: "to our forefathers Constantinople was a word of terror." Through it in our own time ran a part of the Berlin-Baghdad railway line, by which Germany expected to control the Near East and the road to India.

THE MODERN PORT

As a commercial thoroughfare for eastern products, the Constantinople region now has but a limited value. A large part of the commerce of the Straits — that is, both the Dardanelles and the Bosporus (Fig. 184) — passes the city but does not enter it. The caravan of earlier days came through its gates; the modern steamer sails by. While its historical position as a focus of sea and land roads is still maintained, the development of ocean commerce in modern times and the possibilities, supplied by the Suez Canal (opened in 1869), of an all-sea road from Persia and India to western Europe, have greatly diminished its importance as an entrepôt. It has profited little from the rapid development of Black Sea lands during the past hundred and fifty years. Southwestern Russia, in that period, was transformed from a pastoral to an agricultural realm, rich in cereals. Cities grew marvelously; industries sprang up; oil and manganese were exported in large quantities. From 70 to 90 per cent of the total exports of these products went by way of the Straits.

But in just the proportion that these lands became economically strong, Constantinople — the gateway of southern Russia — gained in political and military importance. For centuries it was one of the settled aims of Russian rulers to gain possession of the city; and religious motives were added to commercial reasons: Constantinople was the city from which the influences of the Greek Orthodox Church spread throughout Russia.

The pressure of the Russians was first exerted against the Greeks (for example, in the 10th century), and by Catherine the Great against the Turks. In 1878 Russian soldiers were almost within sight of the minarets of Constantinople. In 1914 it was promised to Russia by the Allies. Excepting Odessa and remote Batum, it is the only "warm" port and one of the three "open" ports that Russia could expect to have. The others are Vladivostok in eastern Siberia (Fig. 171, page 478) and Alexandrovsk on the Murman coast (Fig. 162, page 451).

CONSTANTINOPLE'S PLACE IN THE PAN-GERMAN SCHEME

It was during the period of rapid growth of Black Sea commerce from 1880 to 1914 that there was developed in Germany a policy which went under the name of Pan-Germanism and which was fostered by the military party and the Hohenzollerns. It sought to achieve many imperial objects, among which was the control of the rich lands of the Near East as a source of raw material for the growing industrial needs of



FIG. 184. Turkey in Europe and the present boundary in relation to the projected Zone of the Straits (treaty of Sèvres) and the present actual zone (treaty of Lausanne). For the boundary of the Smyrna region in relation to the Zone of the Straits see Figure 177, page 493. From maps accompanying the text of the treaty of Lausanne (British Treaty Series No. 16, 1923), and other sources.

Germany. In 1898 the German Emperor visited Damascus, Jerusalem, and Constantinople, making his visit the occasion for the furthering of Pan-German aims. From that time until the opening of the war in 1914, Germany pressed the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railway as part of a general scheme for reaching into subtropical lands and controlling a larger share of the world's raw materials. She aimed to build the Baghdad railway to the head of the Persian Gulf, whence she could divert the commerce of India and the Far East. The Baghdad railway and its branches were the means by which she sought the copper of the Taurus Mountains in southwestern Armenia, and the tobacco, fruits, cotton, and wool of Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in return for manufactured articles from German mills.

German enterprise was highly successful, and German imports into the Turkish Empire rose from 6 per cent in 1887 to 21 per cent in 1910; those of Austria from 13 per cent to 21 per cent. During the

same time the imports of English goods fell from 60 per cent to 35 per cent, and of French goods from 18 per cent to 11 per cent of the total. German business men from 1908 to 1911 obtained very important concessions for the port of Alexandretta and for the building of a line from Baghdad to Basra, in territory of great strategic importance to India and the Far East and in relation to the politics and commerce of the Mohammedan world (Plate I, opposite page 146). In 1913 General Liman von Sanders headed a German military mission at Constantinople which thereafter practically controlled the Ottoman army.

The latest struggle for Constantinople began early in the World War. It led to the disastrous Gallipoli expedition of the Allies against the Turks in 1915–1916; and after the defeat of this expedition and the entry of Bulgaria into the war, direct railway connection was established from Berlin to Constantinople, thence across Anatolia and via the tunnel through the Taurus Mountains to the head of the Gulf of Alexandretta, and again through the tunnel that pierces the Amanus range to Aleppo and eastward to Nisibin. Germany did not relinquish her hold of the Baghdad line until the end of the war. She furnished supplies and ammunition for the Turkish armies operating in Palestine, which armies the Allied forces (chiefly British) could dislodge only by building another line from El Kantara in Egypt northeastward through the Sinai desert to Gaza, and thence to a connection with Jerusalem.

ELEMENTS AFFECTING THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONSTANTINOPLE QUESTION

It was natural that the people of the other three world-cities, mentioned on page 513, should be greatly concerned in the fate of Constantinople. Italy has at least a sentimental attachment for Rumania, and she can reach that country directly only by passing Constantinople. Of more practical interest to Italy in developing her merchant marine is access to all Black Sea ports and their commercially tributary regions. The Jews of Palestine, and likewise the Syrians and Armenians, farther north, watched with intense interest the fate of Constantinople in the World War; the capture of the city by the Allies, it was believed, would free all the oppressed peoples of the Turkish Empire.

Greece has long hoped to restore to the protection of the homeland those Greeks who live on the southern shore of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. She could never relinquish the thought that her thousand years' possession of Constantinople gave her the

strongest historical claim. Greeks form the largest element in the Christian population of the city. The city was long the stronghold of the Greek Church, and even under Turkish rule the Greek Patriarch was a notable and privileged figure. The war of Greek Independence (1821–1829) had for one of its objects the re-creation of a Byzantine Empire, including Constantinople. But the Greeks are not experienced governors of alien people. To be sure, in the early colonial period Greece had settlements from one end of the Mediterranean to the other; and like most other peoples the Greeks wish to see their ancient glories restored. Of course that cannot be done without ignoring the ancient glories of other states whose claims overlap those of the Greeks.

In modern times we have thought of Constantinople as a Turkish city. The Mediterranean and its eastern approaches in the region of Constantinople have been called the moat between Christianity and Islam. It was a moat that had been crossed only at Constantinople and Gibraltar (Plate I, opposite page 146). But, as we have seen, Constantinople was the capital of the Eastern Christian Church for more than a thousand years, before the Turk came. Moreover, there is no absolutely vital connection between the Mohammedan religion and Constantinople. Mecca has always been the religious capital of Mohammedan peoples. To be sure, the Sultan declared himself to be the supreme head of the Mohammedan church, but this assertion was not agreed to by all the Mohammedans themselves. In actual practice the Sultan delegated his religious power to the Sheikh-ul-Islam, and every Moslem law was supposed to be confirmed by him; but the Arab chiefs of Mecca, Medina, Yemen, and Asir never acknowledged his rule.

It was jealousy among the great powers that kept the Turk so long in Constantinople. The city is a rich prize to hold or control. In 1910–1911 it had nearly a third of the total import trade of the Turkish Empire, and from the military standpoint it is the key city of the Near East.

COMMERCE OF THE PRINCIPAL PORTS OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE (1910–1911)

	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	
Constantinople	31.48%	9.00%	
Smyrna	10.87	20.60	
Salonika	10.64	5.04	
Beirut	9.98	4.66	
Haidar Pasha			Total of 5.94%
Trebizond	2.24	1.28	
Dedeagatch	1.65	1.82	
Total value of exports in 1910–1911			$80,000,000
Total value of imports in 1910–1911			150,000,000

The table on page 517 shows the trade of Smyrna, Trebizond, and Constantinople in normal pre-war years; it shows also the overpowering strength of British shipping in that trade. It indicates how strong was the hold of the British upon the coastal regions and towns in areas of commercial and strategic importance in the Near East and explains why she is eager to restore her power there.

The primacy of British shipping in the Mediterranean region before the World War is shown by the following figures for the Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf.

	Tons		Tons
British	14,000,000	Italian	4,000,000
Austro-Hungarian	6,500,000	French	4,000,000
Russian	5,500,000	German	2,750,000
Turkish	5,000,000	Greek	2,250,000

Dutch, Belgian, and Rumanian, less than 1,000,000 tons each

For Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, Greek, and Italian shipping, the total was about 1,000,000 tons each for Constantinople, with British shipping at 6,500,000 tons. Today the tonnage of British shipping at Constantinople is 2,500,000; Italian, 2,464,000; Greek, 2,123,000; French, 825,000; all others, 2,000,000.

No power wanted to see another in possession of the strategic gateway of the Bosporus. This jealousy is in large part the basis of the present settlement. In many respects the policies of France and Great Britain are directly opposed to each other here, as well as elsewhere in the Near East. For example, the British long favored the policy of letting the Greeks have Smyrna, because it would have put not only the Smyrna region but its Turkish hinterland under the influence of the British fleet and British commercial interests. On the other hand, the French preferred Turkish control. French policy favored a French sphere of influence in southern Russia (Ukraine), Rumania, Greece, and Turkey, based on Constantinople. Rather than see French influence extended, the British prefer to let the Turks remain in Constantinople. If the French thought that putting the Turk out of Constantinople would bring the British into control of the region, they would prefer to have him stay.

PRESENT STATUS OF CONSTANTINOPLE

When the long-awaited moment came to rid Europe of the Turk, the rival commercial interests of France and Great Britain delayed the settlement until nationalist sentiment in Turkey had crystallized. Thereafter another war was the price that they would have to pay for

Constantinople. The treaty of Sèvres was hard in many respects, but it left to Turkey at least a shadow of sovereignty over a patch of European soil. There were to be no fortifications about the city or in the Zone of the Straits, and an Interallied commission was to control the navigation of the zone. Greece was given Thrace and a generous territorial adjustment about Smyrna. When the Greeks were driven out of Smyrna in 1922 and the victorious Turkish army approached the Straits from the Asiatic side, the Allies hastily revised their claims and approached the final settlement with increased deference toward the Turk. There was signed supplementary to the treaty of Lausanne (page 501) the Straits Convention, which establishes the status of Constantinople for an indefinite period.

The Straits Convention provides complete freedom of navigation through the Straits in time of peace for either merchant ships or ships of war, save that the maximum force which any one power may send through the Straits into the Black Sea may not exceed that of the most powerful fleet of the littoral powers of the Black Sea at the time of passage, three 10,000-ton ships being permitted as a minimum. In time of war, Turkey being neutral, the waters of the Straits must be free to belligerent powers, and the air likewise. If Turkey is at war, neutrals shall have the right of free passage, Turkey reserving the right of freedom of search.

The demilitarized zones shown in Figure 184 are established so as to provide further guarantees for the provisions of passage that are of international concern. This, together with a Thracian Convention providing for a demilitarized zone between Greece and Turkey and between Bulgaria and Turkey along their European frontier, substantially lessens the possibility of war as a result of frontier "incidents." The two conventions, however, do not prevent recruiting in the demilitarized zone or the transfer of military personnel for training outside the zone. In the Zone of the Straits, Turkey reserves the right to transport her armed forces through the demilitarized zones and islands and their territorial waters and to observe from the air the surface and bottom of the sea. Since this privilege is necessarily joined with that of alighting on land or sea and of maintaining land communications, demilitarization in effect means only that the Straits will not have heavy permanent fortifications.

Both freedom of passage and guarantees of "the security of the demilitarized zones" are underwritten by France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, who will meet acts of war or the threat of war "by all the means that the Council of the League of Nations may decide." To

secure these arrangements and administer them there is created a "Straits Commission," an international body composed of representatives of the signatory powers. If independent Black Sea powers sign the convention, they too may have representatives on the commission and thus join in the administration of the Straits.

With at least a mild international régime established, Constantinople might be supposed to regain at once its old commercial importance. Truth to tell it is in a state of serious decline. An impoverished army of Russian and Turkish refugees have crowded into it; the capital has been removed to Angora; the tributary territory in Europe has been cut down to a tract but 8800 square miles in extent; Russian trade is still demoralized; the large Greek population has been reduced (to 18 per cent); the city no longer attracts in equal degree those tributary streams of Asiatic commerce upon which it so largely depended. The Turks of 1453, after capturing the city, forcibly settled Greeks from Thrace and Trebizond in the Phanar, or Greek quarter, realizing their value in trade and industry. The Venetian and Genoese merchants were encouraged by the grant of special privileges, prototypes of the "capitulations" of our day. Thus the earlier Turk with an eye to business. Today, the Turkish leaders are rampant nationalists. Excepting only at Constantinople, the Greek element has been driven out of Turkey and the cities, all too few, suffer thereby, for they are the product not of agriculture but of commercial life and the Greeks are among the principal traders of the Near East.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

THE TRANSCAUCASIAN PEOPLES

Transcaucasia is one of three narrow connections between East and West. The Suez Canal forms a second; the Bosporus and Dardanelles sever Europe and Asia at the third. It is a fair inference that much history is made or is in the way of making wherever an isthmus connects two great populated land masses or a strait connects two great seas whose shores are peopled by settled folk and traders. Such is the Transcaucasian land bridge, broadly divided into three parts: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan (Fig. 186). It has been an historical battleground of rival interests. In its later phases, the struggle for possession has been between Russia and Turkey, modified by the desire of the three new republics to stand alone.

THE NEW GOVERNMENTS AND THE GREATER POWERS

Shortly after the Russian Revolution of March 1917, an autonomous government was organized in Transcaucasia. It took the form of a federal republic, the members of which — Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, or the country of the Tatars — were governed by separate national councils. But the Federal Republic of Transcaucasia failed to harmonize the discordant aims of its three constituent members; nor could it offer effective resistance to Turkish aggression in the spring of 1918. The Mohammedan Tatars could not be counted on to oppose the Turks and thus assist the Armenians; the Georgians were chiefly interested in their own national security, and at one time looked to Germany as a protector; the Armenians would not join their two neighbors, because elements among them favored an understanding with Soviet Russia. The religious differences between the three chief groups accentuate the racial differences. As might have been expected, the federal arrangement was discarded and Transcaucasia as a political organization fell apart, to be replaced by three republics.

The former Turkish provinces of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum (Fig. 185), which had been seized by Russia in 1878, were renounced by the Soviet government under the Brest Litovsk treaty of 3 March 1918 and occupied by Turkey. There followed under Turkish auspices a plebiscite which resulted in a forced decision in favor of annexation by Turkey. Turkey acquired an additional strip of territory in Transcaucasia by the separate treaties which she concluded with the three Transcaucasian republics in May 1918. The extent of this second

FIG. 185. Successive advances of Russia in Transcaucasia.

annexation was not precisely defined, and its validity disappeared with the collapse of Turkish power in October 1918.

In January 1919, France and Great Britain appear to have agreed to divide southern Russia between them as spheres of influence. France was to have the western Ukraine, and Britain was to have the whole Caucasus and Kuban region. At the same time that the British occupied Transcaucasia, a French expedition was sent to Odessa to supervise Ukrainian affairs and direct military operations against the Bolshevists. But the expedition was withdrawn after the refusal of the Ukrainians to yield to the demands of the French leaders for complete military, economic, and political control. The failure of the French at Odessa dangerously weakened the British in Transcaucasia and ultimately led to a change of policy. The withdrawal of the British forces was owing in small part to the charge made against Great Britain that she was seeking to gain control over additional territory rich in oil, and in larger part to the expense of maintaining, in so remote a region, costly military forces and works without the support of another power.

For a time it appeared probable that Italy would succeed Great Britain in the military occupation of the region, since a certain amount of Italian capital is invested there, especially near Batum. Moreover, Italy theretofore had not been assigned any important rôle in maintaining order in the disturbed sections of the Near East. The coal mines of Heraclea on the southern shore of the Black Sea, east of Constantinople, were of special concern to Italy (a coal-importing country poor in fuel) and their control was later sought in the treaty of Sèvres. But the plan for Italian participation came to nothing, and after the British withdrawal (1919) almost no military men were left in the region. The Kurds and Tatars then took possession of part of the Turkish border region in the belief that the Armenians, in whose interest chiefly the occupation had been established, had been deserted by the Allies.

RACIAL DIFFERENCES AND THEIR POLITICAL RESULTS

Transcaucasia has remnants of almost all the races which for ages past have crossed and recrossed its frontiers or sought refuge within its bounds. Five main groups are divided into forty-odd subdivisions, of which from twenty to twenty-five are indigenous. In starting their national life after the World War, the three Transcaucasian states were confronted by extremely difficult boundary questions, because no one race inhabits a given region exclusively, intermingling having resulted in patchy ethnic distributions throughout a wide zone. This is especially the case on the eastern frontier of Russian Armenia, where Armenians and Tatars are hopelessly mixed. To draw boundaries in such a region between peoples weak and inexperienced at best was almost a task of despair. In the Turkish treaty of 1921 it was provided that Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were mutually to agree upon their frontiers. All of them were to have special privileges at the international port of Batum, which is the focus of commercial life at the eastern end of the Black Sea.

FIG. 186. From map by W. E. D. Allen in the *Geographical Journal*, May 1927.



FIG. 187. Note the small extent of smooth land in Georgia and Armenia and the isolated character of the Armenian basins. The boundaries between rough and smooth lands are generalized from various relief maps. The outlines of the snowfields along the crest of the Caucasus Mountains follow Stieler's *Hand-Atlas*, 1916.

RIVALRIES OF THE POWERS

Transcaucasia is peculiarly adapted by position and by internal differences of race and religion for international intrigue, unless held in control by a stronger power. It has been argued that though each Transcaucasian group should be kept distinct, the whole region might be placed under the League of Nations or a single mandatory power because of the geographical position of the country at one of the cross-roads of Eurasia. It was thought that if placed under separate mandatories, the three constituent peoples might intrigue against each other and quarrel endlessly over boundaries, customs, the migrations of nomadic villagers, water rights, irrigation privileges, mines, and all the other conditions and resources whose development is necessary if the lot of the people is to be bettered and orderly governments are to be maintained.

The problem has been solved by Russia, not by western Europe or the League of Nations. To save two such valuable assets as the oil of

Baku and the manganese of Georgia, the Soviet government at Moscow threw the Red army into the region, and with this effective "diplomatic" weapon was able shortly to add a group of Transcaucasian "republics" to the Soviet Union and conclude with Turkey the treaty of Kars, 13 October 1921. By its terms a definitive treaty between Turkey and Russia fixes their boundary as shown in Figure 186. Though Turkey is shut off from Batum, it is to have the use of the port, a provision of little present consequence in the absence of railway communication, though the privilege is potentially of great value. Turkey gains territory lost partly in 1855, partly in 1878, thus confirming in substance the Russian losses sustained by the treaty of Brest Litovsk (1918). The Transcaucasian territory in Russian hands has been divided among a group of governments euphemistically called a federated republic. This federation deals with Turkey and Persia and the constituent members deal directly with each other, but all under the guiding hands of the agents of Moscow.

Turkey was induced to sign the treaty of Kars only by the incorporation of certain special clauses not mentioned above:

(1) The population of Batum and of the region immediately adjacent is constituted the Republic of Ajaria and is given "administrative autonomy" and the right to develop its own culture, its own religion, and its own agrarian régime.

(2) The region of Nakhichevan constitutes an autonomous territory under the protection of Azerbaijan (Fig. 186).

(3) A conference of Black Sea states is to elaborate an international statute to assure freedom of Black Sea ports and of the Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles).

(4) The rural population along the frontier may pass freely from one side to the other with their flocks and pasture them in the customary places.

What measure of freedom from Soviet control, if any, Transcaucasian peoples may win, depends not alone upon their domestic evolution under the ægis of Russia; it depends also upon the expatriated groups of Georgians and Armenians. They have organized a union of interests to inform the powers of political and diplomatic happenings and to await a favorable time for action. Their case might be hopeless but for the fact that Russia's foreign policy, founded in socialistic and economic doctrines unacceptable to the rest of the world, has made so little progress. On all frontiers are unsettled questions that contain the germs of war. It is hard to believe that this position can be long

maintained. The day may come when even liberal concessions may not keep within the Soviet circle peripheral regions like Transcaucasia, Eastern Siberia, and Turkestan.

SPECIAL FEATURES OF GEORGIA

Georgia declared itself an independent republic in 1918. Government was at first by an elected national council, or assembly, with a responsible ministry. The new state at first accepted German protection, and Germany sent troops to Tiflis and probably restrained the Turks from occupying Georgia. By the Russo-German treaty of 27 August 1918 (supplementary to the treaty of Brest Litovsk), Russia acquiesced in Germany's right to recognize the independence of Georgia. In 1920 Georgia concluded a treaty with Soviet Russia in which the independence of Georgia was recognized within the following territory: the provinces of Tiflis, Kutais, and Batum, the districts of Zakataly and Sukhum, and a part of the Black Sea government. But the military conditions imposed gave the Bolshevists practical control of the republic. The next step was a revolt of Georgian nationalists, followed by military invasion and the complete absorption of the country by Soviet power.

The Georgian Republic is well located as a thoroughfare for the trade that flows westward from territory east of the Caspian Sea and from Persia, whence a railway runs north across Armenia to join the Georgian system. It has both oil fields and copper deposits. It has also the greatest manganese deposits in the world, which were the source of 28 per cent of the world's supply in 1925. It has fertile valley lands and an excellent climate for cereals and subtropical products, like tobacco, cotton, dried fruits, raw silk, etc. The borders of the Armenian highland on the south and the snow-capped Caucasus on the north form barriers that will be excellent natural frontiers, should the time come when independence is a reality, not a shadow.

ARMENIAN ASPIRATIONS

The Armenian nation once had an independent existence but lost this position when the Turk extended his rule over Asia Minor in the 13th and 14th centuries. Thereafter the Armenians were persistently persecuted even down to our own times. For example, in 1894–1895 the Moslem Turks attacked the Christian Armenians and put to death from 100,000 to 200,000 of them. These atrocities were repeated in 1909, in the Adana region especially.

FIG. 188. The extent of Armenia's claims in 1919 is shown by the heavy broken lines that include the Mediterranean coast from Adalia eastward. The shaded area designated "Armenia" consists of the four vilayets of Article 89 of the treaty of Sèvres. Georgia and Azerbaijan had but a short-lived existence as independent republics. See also Figure 189.

Taking advantage of the World War, the Turks "deported" thousands of Armenians and Syrians, young and old; that is, the "exiles" were driven into the wilder parts of the mountains and the Syrian Desert and left to die. To mention only a directly calculable result, more than 800,000 Armenians were assassinated, burned alive, or starved by the Turks between 1914 and 1918. The Christian nations of the West, therefore, sought not only to end the rule of the Turk in Europe (except for nominal sovereignty over a mere patch of land northwest of Constantinople), but also to free his subject peoples at Smyrna and in Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and the Armenian districts bordering Russia — thus the short-lived aspirations of the treaty of Sèvres.

Americans have long had great interest in the missionary schools and colleges, the hospitals, and the social development of Turkey. The group of six American educational institutions in the Near East include the American University at Beirut in Syria, Robert College and the Woman's College at Constantinople, the International College at Smyrna, the Sofia (Bulgaria) American Schools, and Athens College in Greece. Partly because of these interests, the European powers were unanimous in desiring the United States to undertake the mandate for Armenia, a task that lies far outside the scope of political possibilities.

The massacres, historical and recent, have left but a fraction of the Armenian race, which is in a minority in the principal administrative districts of Turkey. There could not be established a large new Armenia without putting into it populations of different race and speech, more numerous than the Armenians themselves.

The Armenians could not police or develop the whole region that some of their leaders claim. At least, they could not have done so after the World War except with the aid of large loans from the Allies and the support of Allied officials and troops. Such a plan would have encouraged other minorities to seek Allied aid in holding territory for the maintenance of which they have neither the moral nor the financial strength, a proceeding that would create nations of artificial character without real stability.



FIG. 189. Ethnography and boundaries in the Armenian country of eastern Turkey, 1914–1920. Between the ethnic elements noted, Turks have interpenetrated, especially in a belt from Kharput to Erivan. The Armenians of Turkey were almost exterminated during and after the World War. N designates Nakhichevan, a small autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic.

The independence of Armenia was proclaimed early in 1918 at Erzerum, almost in the center of the high plateau of Armenia. The claims of the new republic are shown on Figure 189, but within these boundaries only a small part of the people are Armenian; the rest are principally Kurds, Turks, and Syrians. With these facts in mind, the leaders of the Allied powers, by the treaty of Sèvres, whose terms they sought to impose on Turkey, freed four vilayets — Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, and Trebizond (Fig. 189) — with an area of 75,000 square miles, 50 per cent more than that of the state of New York. The Armenian population had been so much reduced that probably only 300,000 at the most lived in these four districts. Turkey, Armenia, and the Allied powers were mutually to agree to leave the exact location of the Armenian-Turkish frontier on the south and southwest to the recommendation of President Wilson. While this decision would have cut off Armenia from access to the sea at the Gulf of Alexandretta, an outlet was provided at Trebizond. In addition, Armenia was to have an outlet at

Batum, where a free international port with outlet facilities was to be created with equality of use for all Transcaucasian peoples. The absorption of Armenia within the Soviet Union ends for the present the dream of an independent Armenian republic under the protection of western Europe. Its present boundaries are shown in Figure 186.

Armenia is an agricultural country with a small urban population. The principal towns are Kars and Erivan. On the uplands are extensive alpine meadows, but no forests. A few rich irrigated valleys, a type of which is Aras, export fruit and wine. Erivan produces cotton and in 1925 opened a new cotton factory; Karabagh exports raw silk. Accepting their status as a part of the Soviet system, the Armenian people have set to work to develop their resources. Irrigation canals have been opened and new projects studied, roads repaired, electrification begun, and a reforestation program initiated.

AZERBAIJAN — A TATAR BOLSHEVIST REPUBLIC

The Azerbaijan Tatars are of totally different race and speech from either Armenians or Georgians. Part of them live just across the frontier of Persia. Those in Russia number about 3,000,000.

The Tatars of Transcaucasia, after establishing the Azerbaijan Tatar Republic, with a national assembly and council of ministers, altered the form of the government, which is now that of Bolshevist Russia. Sympathetic relations are maintained between it and the Azerbaijanese of Persia as well as the people of Daghestan on the north. As Moslems they have also a bond of union with the Turks (page 487). Baku, with its valuable oil wells, fell under Bolshevist control at first; but subsequently a more moderate government, friendly to the Allies, seized power, and a British expeditionary force occupied the city late in 1918. When the British force was withdrawn, the city was occupied by the Turko-Tatars and annexed to the Azerbaijan Tatar Republic.

In May and June 1920, Bolshevist forces invaded Azerbaijan, captured the British war vessels at Enzeli on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea, and invaded Persian territory. This campaign was carried out in spite of a prior agreement with Persia to abrogate the understandings of the Czar's government respecting concessions and a sphere of influence in Persia. Embarrassed in the west by Polish resistance and on the south by Ukrainian forces under Wrangel and others, the Bolshevist leaders curtailed their Transcaucasian program and withdrew from Persia only to advance again in 1921, when there was no immediate danger on the west, and absorb the entire region.

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

PALESTINE AND TRANSJORDAN

(A) Palestine: A Zionist State

Though Palestine is the birthplace of both the Hebraic and the Christian religions, the followers of neither faith predominate there today. Of Christian sects there are many, the members belonging for the most part to religious orders that are associated with the holy places. The population is composed chiefly of Moslem Arabs, with much smaller numbers of Druses, Jews, and Turks. Before the World War Jews formed barely an eighth of the total population.

A ZIONIST STATE

The widespread interest in the creation of a new Jewish state in Palestine springs from the fact that such a state forms a homeland for Jews. Some of the Jewish leaders had visions of a Palestine in which Jews would become the majority race; but the more immediate program was to set up a state from which action could be launched looking toward the amelioration of the condition of Jews in central and eastern Europe. It was not at all intended to start a great migration of persecuted Jews toward Palestine, for the country could not contain them. The form of political control was the most serious immediate problem. To turn over the government of the new state to either the Jews or the Arabs would have meant discord from the start. The population had had no experience in government, and it would certainly have carried into its first political contests a fanatical religious feeling that would have meant disaster if outside supervision had been withheld.

In view of these possibilities there appeared to be but one course to take: to make a strong western power the mandatory. In the treaty of Sèvres (1920) it was provided that Palestine should be administered by a mandatory, and that this mandatory should carry out the terms of the British declaration of 2 November 1917, which guaranteed the establishment of a Jewish national home. At the same time it was specified that the rights of non-Jews were not to be prejudiced. By the treaty of Lausanne (1923), which displaced the treaty of Sèvres, Turkey left to "the parties concerned" all rights and titles respecting territories outside the boundaries of Turkey (Fig. 173), thus confirming the positions of France in Syria and Great Britain in Palestine as mandatory powers.

It was logical to select Great Britain as the mandatory of Palestine, because of (1) her interest in the security of the Suez Canal near by and in the orderly behavior of the Arab tribes that adjoin Palestine on the

east and south, and (2) her long experience in controlling unruly peoples of diverse race, speech, and religious faith. The announced policy of the first British High Commissioner was to guarantee equality of treatment of the population elements, and to provide a national home for Jews, allowing them to return to Palestine only as the development of that country should permit the normal absorption of immigrants by rising industries and reclaimed agricultural lands.

Jewish colonies began to be established in Palestine as early as the 16th century, but the principal colonizing efforts were made during the past fifty or sixty years, stimulated by sentiment and by pogroms and other persecutions in Russia. Just prior to 1900 the Zionist movement got under way. At first confined to central and eastern Europe, it was later supported by Jews throughout the world. Colonization was its practical aspect. By 1914 there were in Palestine 46 agricultural colonies, of which 20 were in Judea, 7 in Samaria, 16 in Galilee, and 3 east of the Jordan. They varied in population from 20 to more than 3000. The total number of colonists was about 12,000. The area of land they cultivated was about 2 per cent of the whole of Palestine, or possibly 10 per cent of its cultivated area. Most of the colonies were agricultural.

Since the setting up of the British mandatory government the Jewish population of Palestine has nearly doubled, Jews now forming a larger proportion of the population than in any other country in the world. A record year was 1925, when 33,800 entered, 31,650 of them to remain. Poland has sent the largest number, in fact more than half, the percentages for Russia and Rumania being next. To provide homes for so large a number of newcomers was a social problem of the first order. Relief measures in the form of highway and drainage work have had to be undertaken to provide for the unemployed, and strong efforts are being made by local agricultural schools and by the American Mission (appointed in 1927) to survey the agricultural possibilities and make the settlements self-supporting. The total number of Jewish agricultural settlements is now more than 120, of which 41 are under the direct control of the Zionist Organization and wholly or partly financed by the Palestine Foundation Fund. But the population of the agricultural settlements continues small, the total for Palestine at present not exceeding 32,000, including dependents. The tendency of the Jews to congregate in cities explains in part the abnormally small number that have settled upon the land. A further reason is the great activity in the building trades to provide new homes for incoming Jews; but this is a temporary, not a permanent condition. The World Zionist Organiza-



FIG. 190. The Jewish colonies in Palestine, from maps of the Keren-Hayesod and the Keren-Kayemeth. Scale of map 1 : 1,150,000.

tion has still its greatest difficulties ahead. It must assume responsibility for a great variety of studies, since it is recognized as the official Jewish Agency for Palestine under Article 4 of the Palestine Mandate. In addition to practical work in agriculture there have been carried through important measures for public health and education. The Hebrew University, founded at Jerusalem in 1925, has developed rapidly, as well as institutes for medical research. A technical institute is maintained at Haifa. The Jewish population in Palestine expresses itself through an elected Jewish National Assembly that appoints a Jewish National Council. Zionism still has a major political problem to solve. Those who wish the land to become a national home are determined to make the Jewish people trustees of Palestinian soil. The extremists are aggressive in pushing the Arab aside and in making nationalism, not religion, the dominant motive of Jewish life. The Arabs complain that such an arrangement with respect to Jewish settlements constitutes a government within a government and that the Jews, though a minority, enjoy special privileges and control legislation. The moderates see Palestine only as a laboratory experiment or as a base of influence in dealing with the major problems of Jewish life in Europe.

RELATION OF PALESTINE TO THE WORLD

The decision which has placed Palestine under British control is but one step in a long historical sequence. Foreign influences have always surrounded and permeated Palestine. The seacoasts of Syria have called forth from the vast interior of Asia caravan and army. Up and down the Mediterranean coast, Turk and Egyptian have passed again and again. Doubtless the land would have had no political individuality whatever, had it not been for the plateau of Judea, a region from 2500 to 3000 feet above the sea, to one side of and above the main historical currents of western Asiatic life. When the Israelites sought to hold the lower flat land, like the Negeb at the southern end of the plateau of Judea, they were driven out. The armies of conquest kept to the roads in the fertile coastal plains. The Jew looked out, westward from his plateau, across a rich coastal plain held by unfriendly people whom he has never been able to conquer, except here and there for short periods. It was Samaria, in northern Palestine, that most strongly felt the pressure of outside influence. Here the trade routes ran just south of the Sea of Galilee to the Plain of Esdraelon and the port of Haifa. Thus they avoided the mountains of Lebanon on the north and the rocky plateau of Judea on the south.

Palestine is a tiny country. Set down in the United States, it

would cover about the same area as Vermont, and it has more than twice as many people: about 730,000 Arabs and related folk, about 158,000 Jews. It has been called "the least of all lands." Yet so mighty a force has emanated from it — the Christian religion — that its spiritual influence has penetrated every part of the globe. The inspiration of the great Crusades of the Middle Ages was the freeing of its holy places, then held by the Moslem Turk. It has long been a place of pilgrimage for the devout. No other land in the world so well illustrates the political force and historical importance of religious ideas.

THE PECULIAR POSITION OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE

All told, there are about 13,000,000 Jews in the world, of whom 4,000,000 live in Russia, about 2,000,000 in Poland, and about 1,000,000 in the territory of former Hungary. There are also large Jewish colonies in Constantinople, Salonika, Barcelona, and London, as well as in the larger German cities. New York has the largest Jewish population of all cities in the world (1,750,000). Added to the world's Jewish population are ethnic elements from many other lands besides Palestine.

Wherever he has gone, the Jew has formed a race apart. This is due to his religion as well as to his social customs and his personal character, and also to the attitude toward him of the peoples among whom he has lived. He has been terribly persecuted in Russia, where repeated pogroms have had the aspect of wholesale massacres. The old Jewish Pale of Settlement in Russia (Fig. 166), east of which Jews could not settle, was designed to segregate the Jews. The Russian policy resulted in a large concentration of Jews in western Russia, particularly in Poland; and it led also to heavy emigration to America. The American Jews are chiefly from Russia and Poland; very few are from Palestine. In Europe the Jew is found in every great trading center. In many cities either the local law or the instinct of the Jew has led him to congregate in a certain section, known as the Jewish Quarter, or Ghetto. Normally the Jew has been somewhat aloof from the political and social life of the country in which he has lived.

It is a striking fact that in his own country the Jew was historically not a trader. The Jews of Palestine were a secluded people, devoted to agriculture, who emigrated to distant countries because their own country was small and poor and because of hardships under Roman rule during the first few centuries of the Christian era. Thus the race has undergone a complete transformation, for the Jew outside of Palestine is preëminently a trader.

POSSIBILITIES OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

The heart of Palestine is the plateau of Judea, flanked on either side by lowland. On the west is the fertile, well-watered coastal plain, a hundred miles long and about fifteen wide. The eastern margin is abrupt — a very steep scarp that leads down to the Ghor, the flat-bottomed depression in which are the Jordan and the Dead Sea, the latter more than 1200 feet below sea level. This scarp is the Wilderness of Judea, a rocky belt of land with steep valleys — a barren, waterless country, the home of the wandering Bedouin. Eastward, beyond the Ghor, is the Syrian Desert, broken in three places by tracts of higher and better watered country.

The plateau of Judea ordinarily has enough rainfall for a limited agriculture, though there are occasional droughts that turn the grain fields yellow before their time. Only the center of the plateau has natural agricultural land; here are also the principal towns — Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron; and here the land is densely populated, though the total population is not large (Fig. 48). East of the plateau the aspect changes gradually. The margin of the plateau is grassy, but farther east is a parched land. In years of extreme drought nomadic and marauding Arabs raid and plunder the settled communities of the sown land. The Negeb south of the Judean plateau is also a desert land, uninhabited except for a few small permanent villages supported by wells.

The coastal region of Palestine has a rainfall of more than 30 inches a year and is rich in verdure, except during the dry summer months. The whole region has been smitten by drought again and again, throughout its history, as in the terrible years of 1869 and 1870. The great caravan routes of the region run along it. Here also are the populous cities and the ports. Four thousand years ago, in the days of Babylonia and Assyria, and again in the time of the Romans, the region was "thronged with caravans."

Palestine is capable of great agricultural development, a matter of extreme interest in the life of a new state that has practically no mineral deposits.[1] Climate and soil are so varied from place to place in short distances that many plants have become adapted to a wide range of temperature and rainfall. The olive grows on land from 850 feet below sea level in the hot Jordan valley to 2500 feet above sea level in upper Galilee. The fig is grown abundantly in upper Galilee, where

[1] Mention may be made here of the potash which it is proposed to extract from the waters of the Dead Sea by natural evaporation.

the population is dense and labor cheap; but export is on a small scale, owing to the lack of shipping facilities. Barley is a standard crop, even in some localities having but 10 to 12 inches of rain. Water poverty is the great stumbling block to agricultural development. The most practical plan of alleviation is to turn into the valley lands of northern Palestine a portion of the waters of the Litani River and of its tributaries. The necessity of securing additional water for irrigation in northern Palestine stimulated the Zionists to claim a northern boundary which should include most of the Litani watershed. While this claim was not allowed, assurance was given by treaty that the Litani water would be carefully used in Syria with the object of increasing the supply available in northern Palestine (Fig. 33). In the final boundary agreement (ratified in 1923), between France and Great Britain, provision was made for the preëxisting water rights of Syrians and for the equitable use by both Syria and Palestine of fishing and navigation rights on Lake Hule and Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee) and on the connecting stretch of the River Jordan (Fig. 190).

(B) The Transjordan Country

By reference to Figure 49 it will be noted that a line of heights runs along the eastern border of the Jordan Valley-Dead Sea trench. On the west the country falls steeply to a deep depression. On the east it falls off more gradually toward the upland plains of the Syrian Desert. It is hemmed in by desert country on all sides, a geographically isolated land: the Hauran on the north, then Gilead of Biblical account, and on the south Moab, an outpost of agricultural land at the border of the Syrian Desert. Eastward the land is barren, but the rolling country on the west has rich pastures and wheat and barley lands with numerous permanent though small Arab villages. The total population is about 200,000, all Moslem Arabs except for about 25,000 colonists.

Transjordan came into existence as a separate political unit in 1921 with Abdullah of the Hejaz as Amir, supported by an annual grant from Great Britain. But the country was shortly to be separated from Palestine and have independent relations under the British. These became official in 1923 when Abdullah was given a recognized status on condition that he should conduct a democratic government and accept the assistance of British officers. Later it was arranged that the British representatives should be appointed by the Palestine government, which government is responsible for the financial and political control of Transjordan. The annual grant from Palestine to Transjordan is made in return for the collection of customs duties on

goods of foreign origin reëxported to Transjordan. A similar refunding arrangement is made on the part of the Syrian government on articles of foreign origin reëxported to Transjordan.

As soon as the new government of Transjordan came into existence, it was faced with the difficulty of establishing relations with the raiding tribes from the desert that recognize no boundary. From a state of disorganization directly following the World War, Arab power rose to such a level under the leadership of Ibn Saud, ruler of the Nejd, that his representatives were able greatly to diminish British claims for an advanced frontier on the east and south as a means of protecting the eastern gateways of Palestine. On the other hand, to protect the Transjordan from tribal raids inspired by Ibn Saud and other Bedouin leaders, Great Britain annexed the Red Sea port of Aqaba which formerly belonged to the Hejaz, and maintained its position there, though Ibn Saud has so far withheld recognition of British claims at this point. Relations with Ibn Saud are further complicated by the rivalry between him and the British for the possession of the Hejaz railway. Syrian nationalists have found in the Transjordan country a welcome as embarrassing to the British as to the French in Syria.

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

THE PERSIAN OUTLOOK

The civilizations of the "transit" lands of the Near East are not without cultural import today, and modern economic development bids fair to restore western association on a scale and with an intimacy never before known. Persia, as an eastern outpost, has always been of interest to the western world. In the middle of the 6th century B.C., Cyrus created a powerful empire stretching from the Ægean to the Oxus and the Indus. After the brilliant recrudescence under the Sassanian kings (3d to 7th centuries A.D.), Persia shared the common fate of the transit lands, Arab conquest being followed by Turkish and Mongol invasions. The Iranian oases lie open to the steppes and deserts of central Asia. As Omar Khayyam depicted the sophisticated civilization of the oasis, so the great epic poet Firdusi immortalized the struggle between the sedentary Iranian population and the nomad Turanians and Tatars. The situation has not lost its significance today. Persia remains a transit land on the road to the east, open on the north to the power that controls the steppe.

The western and southwestern gateways of Persia have also played an important historical rôle not only in the extension of the Persian Empire (Fig. 191), but also in the invasion of Persia by armies in the past and by capitalists and industrialists in the modern period. A broad belt of oil-producing territory, mainly in the west and southwest (Fig. 194, page 545), has brought an industrial revolution to Persia that now largely overshadows the long dominant influences that emanated from the north.

LAND AND PEOPLE

Persia is one fifth as large as the United States. Its territory is about as extensive and twice as populous as that portion of the American West between the Rockies and the Pacific, south of Idaho and Oregon. Most of Persia consists of a plateau surrounded by mountain ranges highest on the north and west. The altitude of this tableland is 3000 feet in the region of Teheran and Meshed, 4000 feet toward the northwestern corner about Tabriz, and 5000 feet in the western districts about Isfahan. A great depression on the east has a drier climate and contains salt deserts toward which run the rivers of the plateau. The Karun River on the southwest is the only navigable stream. For 108 miles of its length it has a minimum depth of four

FIG. 191. Persia's present boundaries are shown by a heavy line. Additional territory which was part of the Persian Empire at the time of its greatest extent (500 B.C.) is shown by stippling. After Shepherd, *Atlas of Ancient History*, 1913, Pl. 8.

feet. Along the Caspian Sea and the shores of the Persian Gulf the country is lower, the Caspian coast having a high rainfall, the Persian Gulf coast being dry. On the tableland as a whole the rainfall averages about 5 inches.

As may be seen by reference to Figure 192, there is increasing density of population toward the northwest in response not only to the increasing rainfall of the Caspian littoral but also to the more dependable water supply of the mountain zone. The distribution of the tilled land is everywhere in response to available water. Dry farming and irrigation, chiefly the latter, are required to mature the staple grains, wheat and barley, which are the basis of Persian agriculture. Cotton is also grown in sufficient quantities to form an important part of the export trade as well as to support home weaving industries. Among the other important products of Persia, such as tobacco, silk, tea, flax, sugar, and opium, the last named is most generally cultivated and constitutes from 20 to 25 per cent of the export trade.

As a whole, the arable lands of Persia are underdeveloped, owing to the lack of railroads chiefly, to the absence of comprehensive irrigation works, and to an unequal and corrupt tax system under which the country has struggled for centuries. Only a beginning has been made in the improvement of agricultural and horticultural methods and in the study of the best means by which both agriculture and industry may be encouraged.

FIG. 192. Persia is made up in part of almost uninhabited desert (southeast) and in part of densely inhabited irrigated valley lands (northwest). In modern times it has not been able to develop its own resources, lacking capital and initiative. Modified from Philips, *Comparative Wall Map of Asia*, 1 : 12,000,000, 1912.

These are matters of international concern because Persia can become or remain orderly, fulfill its treaty obligations, and cease to be a field of rivalry between more powerful neighbors only when its internal administration is conducted on an honest basis. And internal administration can be conducted neither efficiently nor honestly unless there is first of all a proper system of communication between the communities that compose the Persian state, widely scattered over a difficult terrain. The present government is therefore not content to permit the commerce of the country to be carried by caravan, as most of it is carried today, but is improving the principal highways, introducing automobile trucks and horse-drawn wagons, and extending the railways.

In Figure 193 it is seen how inadequate are the railways now available in Persia. There is a line 80 miles long from Tabriz to Julfa at the border of Azerbaijan, with a branch line 30 miles long to Lake Urmia. In the northwestern corner of the country is another short railroad line now in bad condition. A 30-mile extension of the Indian railway system crosses the international boundary between Persia and Baluchistan and ends at Duzdab. The revenues of the sugar and tea monopolies have recently been assigned by law to railroad construction and will eventually make it possible to produce and market agricultural products on a larger scale.

Fig. 193. Railways of Persia, now limited to short lines near the boundary.

The extension of the railway system will have the effect of uniting populations now distributed in widely scattered irrigated spots, each part tending to live to itself and lacking the sense of national cohesion. To govern so large and varied a country under primitive conditions of travel, away from roads and railways, with great distances between the centers of authority in the chief towns, would be a task of the first magnitude for a strong central government. Such a government Persia had not had for many years until its present ruler gained the throne in 1925. Powerful religious and political elements have preferred graft and disorder, public officials have been notoriously corrupt, and a system of farmed-out revenues made taxation and robbery synonymous in the eyes of the peasants.

In addition, there is the division of the population itself into hostile groups. In the west are the provinces of Azerbaijan, Kermanshah, and Khuzistan (Arabistan), with a population of Kurds, Armenians, and Arabs, rebellious in temper, remote from authority, living in broken country difficult to conquer or to police. In the northeastern part of Persia the people are Turkish in origin and speech; for example,

Turkomans from Russian Turkestan. Along the shores of the Persian Gulf there are Arab and negroid elements. These ethnic variations are due to Tatar, Arab, and Turkish conquests, which were carried out repeatedly between the 10th and 18th centuries. Only in the central and eastern parts of Persia, between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf and eastward to the Afghan frontier, does there survive a considerable block of population of rather pure Persian type, who still speak the Persian language. In all the population numbers about 10,000,000.

ECONOMIC BONDAGE

It has been said that the history of Persia has largely been the defense of its eastern provinces from nomadic hordes threatening to overwhelm the cultivators. But in the modern period this danger has been of less consequence to Persia than (1) the industrial invasion in the oil country on her southwestern border and (2) the bondage to Russia, from which it has been hard for Persia to escape because of her geographical position in Asia and her remoteness from important markets. Three quarters of the exportable production has no other market than Russia, owing to the high cost of transport if an alternative route be taken. Fish from the Caspian, timber from the northwestern forests, cotton from Meshed and Tabriz, wool, carpets, silk, dried fruits — all these have to pay a prodigious toll for transportation and must compete in Russian markets with nearer sources of supply. This has made it hard for Persia to negotiate with Russia either about fishing rights in the Caspian or with respect to customs tariffs; for Russia might at any time, as she did in 1926, put an embargo on Persian exports and thus lay a paralyzing hand upon Persian agricultural life. Persian relations with Moscow are still in bad state, though a high-sounding treaty was signed in 1921 and a pact of guarantee and neutrality in 1927.

The Russian hold in Persia goes back three centuries to the time (1618) when Russian merchants first got the right to trade in Persia. The first commercial treaty between the two countries was signed in 1717. In 1735 Russian merchant ships were given the right to navigate along the Persian shore on the Caspian and to visit Persian ports, and Russian merchants might build warehouses on Persian territory. The treaty of Gulistan, 1813, for the first time gave Russian men-of-war the exclusive right to navigate the Caspian Sea "as before, no other power to have a military flag on that sea." The northwestern boundaries of Persia and the basis of all Russo-Persian commercial, territorial, and military relations for 93 years were laid down by the

treaty of Turkmanchai, 1829, following the war of 1827–1828. By special act supplementary to this treaty extra-territorial rights are recognized for Russian subjects in Persia.

With the exception of oil, Persian products will not stand the cost of transport by way of the Persian Gulf, and even when so exported they reach the Mediterranean only to compete with cheaper produce of the same kind from India and Egypt. Only between the lowlands of Iraq and the highlands of Persia is there a natural complementary relation, owing to the different dates at which fruits and cereals are grown in the two communities. But even this commerce is declining, because Persia discourages the transit trade to Baghdad on both religious and political grounds, forbids pilgrimages to the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf in Iraq, and even refuses to recognize Iraq as a sovereign state.

A FIELD OF FOREIGN RIVALRY

In addition to her internal difficulties, Persia has had to face the growing interference of three European powers, especially in the past twenty-five years. Russia and England long tried to push their control of Persian affairs to the greatest lengths. Just before the World War and also during the early stages of it, Germany was courting the Persians, hoping to have their aid when German and Turkish armies should march through Persia to begin their conquest of India.

Railways have been one of the items in Russian and British rivalry. Russia long wished to secure a trans-Caucasus line to the head of the Persian Gulf (Fig. 167), where it was possible to create a warm-water outlet. Great Britain has been quite as eager to complete a railway to India across southern Persia and Baluchistan. In addition to this, British statesmen have always kept a watchful eye on incursions into the Near Eastern realm whereby Britain's road to India might be threatened by foreign powers.

The chief differences between Russia and England were temporarily composed in 1907 by an agreement which gave Russia a large sphere of influence extending from Afghanistan to Kurdistan and including the capital, Teheran. The British sphere included southern Persia on the borders of Baluchistan. The British thus got control of the Persian Gulf outlet. Their navy may easily prevent the landing or the embarkation of an enemy expeditionary force at the head of the gulf. It was intended to leave central Persia either independent or neutral ground; but it was inevitable that Russian and British

interests should extend their authority until they controlled the whole country.

The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 came to an end with the opening of the Russian Revolution. Thereafter British influence counted heavily, as shown in the Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919 through which Great Britain was to have an enlarged measure of military and political control. The British government was to supply expert advisers at Persia's expense, military officers and equipment, railroads and other means of trade, and make a loan to be guaranteed by customs and other revenues.

Like the preceding agreement, the Anglo-Persian understanding of 1919 was short-lived. For a new leader appeared in Persia who was destined to change the whole course of political and economic life in that country. This was Reza Khan, leader of a Cossack force in northern Persia who had risen from the ranks and who, like Kemal in Turkey, was determined to end the special interests of western powers and to assert his country's independence. In February 1921 he marched his Cossack force to Teheran, had himself appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Persian Army and Minister of War, and when, in 1923, the Shah of Persia found it expedient to leave for Europe, the authority of Reza Khan was complete. While he was reasonably sympathetic toward western ideas, neither he nor his religious advisers were willing to go so far as Kemal had gone in Turkey with reference to the adoption of new modes of dress and new religious regulations. A short-lived movement for a republic was vigorously discouraged. In 1924 and in 1925 the Persian Constituent Assembly by an almost unanimous vote conferred the crown upon Reza Khan and provided for succession in his line. (The dynastic name of the new ruler is Reza Shah Pahlevi.)

The first act of the new sovereign was to rid himself of British and Swedish colleagues, to reorganize the Persian Army, and to assure its loyalty and effectiveness by making ample provision for its maintenance and pay. With this new military instrument he suppressed revolts on the distant borders of his realm, in the mountainous country on the west, along the shores of the Caspian, and in the far northeast where Persian territory runs with that of Russia. Finally he was able to put down a rising of the Lurs in the mountainous borderland of western Persia and of Arab tribesmen under Sheik Khazal on the southwestern plains in the field of operations of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Unruly tribesmen were disarmed, some of the leaders executed, and the whole country pacified.

FIG. 194. Former Russian and British spheres of interest in Persia. While these have now disappeared, they illustrate a striking phase of Persian dependence, still as great as ever, upon Russia and Great Britain. The black dots represent the principal known occurrences of petroleum. Based on data in Redwood, *A Treatise on Petroleum*, Vol. I, 1913; Schweer, *Die türkischpersischen Erdölvorkommen*, 1919; Morgan, *Mission Scientifique en Persie*, 1895; Stahl, *Handbuch der regionalem Geologie*, 1907; *Geographische Zeitschrift*, Vol. XXI, 1915, pp. 483–499; *Geographical Journal*, Vol. IX, 1897, pp. 528–532; Stieler's *Hand-Atlas*; and other sources.

While these events were taking place the finances of Persia were being reorganized through the work of an American, Dr. Millspaugh, appointed Administrator General of Finances. The internal revenue system was reformed, the customs tariff placed upon a new basis, and taxes gathered in a systematic manner. These excellent results were the consequence of the approval by the National Assembly in 1922 of control *of the entire financial administration* by the Administrator General. The budget of the government was made by him, and no financial obligation could be created and no payment made

without his written approval. Similar powers were transferred to him with respect to the granting of commercial or industrial concessions and to the decisions of the government on any financial question. Thus too it was sought to avoid the corruption of earlier times, to put public moneys to public use, and to strengthen agriculture as the basis of Persian life. Only thus could foreign loans be secured for the extension of railways and the building of much needed irrigation works. All this was fundamental to that change of agriculture required under the new international agreements for the control of opium production (page 608). Persia has been able to agree to such reduction only as agriculture may accommodate itself to the gradual transfer from the growth of the poppy to cereals, cotton, dried fruits, and the like. Unfortunately it appears that corruption and inefficiency are ineradicable evils. The hand of the Administrator General seemed too heavy. Difficulties with the national legislature ended in his resignation, though the government continues to advance its railway program. It is proposed to construct 800 miles of line to connect the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea via Teheran.

Great Britain and Russia will continue to watch the Persian political field with the closest care, for both have large economic interests at stake and both have large Mohammedan populations on or near the Persian border that are naturally interested in the fate of one of the strongholds of conservative Mohammedan faith. In addition, Britain has naturally pursued the policy of securing as great a share as possible of the world's oil supply, owing to the increasing dependence of her commercial fleet upon oil as fuel and because oil is also in growing demand in the British Navy. Commerce being the life-blood of the British nation, neither her merchants nor her government can watch unconcerned the growth of great oil companies that control the world's output. Moreover, oil from the Persian fields will enable the Indian government to substitute oil for coal on its western railways.

Aside from agriculture, oil is the chief undeveloped asset of Persia. It is produced at present in a belt of country about 200 miles northeast of the Persian Gulf, whence it flows through a 10-inch pipeline to Abadan on the Shatt al Arab, the common outlet of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers at the head of the Persian Gulf. Great Britain's position has been long established about the borders of the Persian Gulf, and when oil development began, she concerned herself at once with future control. Five years after the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was formed (1909), the British government itself purchased over £2,000,000 out of £5,000,000 of capital stock. By 1925 its holdings

had risen to over £5,000,000 out of £19,450,000 total and the territory included in its present concessions is no less than a half million square miles in extent. This means special British interest in the extension of the oil field northwest through Iraq. Possible production here no doubt encourages the British government to burden itself with the mandate for that country. Whatever rivalries and dangers afflicted Persia as a consequence of this situation, they have now been largely offset through the actions of the Persians themselves, through the vigorous leadership of the new Shah, and through the economic policies inaugurated by the financial adviser.

CHAPTER THIRTY

INNER ASIA: THE UNSETTLED LAND OF THE NOMAD

In the vast interior of Asia are small groups of peoples of importance to the whole circle of countries round about them. Thus Tibet, long nominally a province of China, has recently become independent (under British protection); Russian penetration of Inner and Outer Mongolia has involved China in constant difficulties; at intervals Afghanistan has threatened the peace of India and, more recently, of Persia; Turkestan has a variety of unstable Mohammedan peoples.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL ENVIRONMENT

Inner Asia is in general a land of interior drainage, with mountain streams descending to the desert borders, where at greater or less distances from the base of the mountains they are lost in salt lakes or desert sands. Most of the land is wholly uncultivable because of the aridity of the climate or the roughness of the topography. Part of it is composed of sand and gravel desert, part is covered with heavy incrustations of salt, part consists of high, cold mountain country, and part of rich valley floors capable of irrigation.

The sand and gravel deserts have very little vegetation, and are covered in places with shifting sand dunes called *barkhans*, as for example in the desert of Takla-Makan (in Eastern Turkestan). The sand deserts with the accompanying salt deposits and brackish lakes occupy portions of the central desert floors. The border of each basin is composed of gravelly waste deposited in a broad belt at the foot of the mountains, and supports a thin vegetation useful to the nomads in their wanderings from summer pastures in the mountains to winter pastures on the borders of the oases. Large tracts of Inner Asia, especially Mongolia and the northern part of Russian Turkestan, are covered with loam formed upon heavy deposits of wind-blown loess. Upon the loamy soil, grass grows rather abundantly during the rainy season of spring and supplies pasture to the tent-dwelling nomads that inhabit the region.

While each desert basin has its tracts of arable soil and corresponding groups of population, as in Eastern Turkestan, the whole of Inner Asia may be described as having its chief salt and sand districts in a broad belt extending from the Caspian Sea eastward through Eastern Turkestan, Tibet, and western Mongolia, and principally from the Aral Sea to Lop Nor (Fig. 195).

FIG. 195. Relief of Inner Asia. The cross-lined areas represent rough land, the unshaded areas smooth land, as generalized from the best atlases and other sources. The solid black areas represent snowfields whose outlines are reduced from the topographic sheets of the *India and Adjacent Countries Series*, 1 : 1000,000, 1913–1916.

It is north of this sandy belt that the grassy steppes occur in an equally broad zone extending from the Volga near Samara, eastward past the northern end of the Caspian, all the way across Siberia to the Pacific. North of the steppe country is a vast belt of forest (called *taiga*), which extends across Siberia from the Urals to the Pacific (Fig. 171).

The movements of the nomadic people are controlled by the belted arrangement of the vegetation and the differences in climate from place to place. Just as there is a movement from mountain to basin floor in each separate basin with the approach of winter, so there is a general movement of the nomads from the grassy belt of southern Siberia southward to warmer winter pastures on the borders of the desert. The wanderings of the people are on a large scale and in response to geographic conditions that are here seen to be a more powerful and intimate influence than in almost any other primitive society of the Old World.

In the earliest times, when civilization first arose and the cultivation of cereals began (possibly 10,000 B.C.), the inhabitants of Inner Asia

were fixed upon the land as agricultural peoples, or as hunters who had their homes in the oases. It may be presumed that later the hunters, growing in numbers, turned shepherds as animals were domesticated, and extended their wanderings farther and farther afield in search of fresh pastures for their increasing herds. There was thus produced a tendency toward a division of the population, so that throughout the historical period the Iranian (that is, Persian) population of western central Asia and the Persian plateau remained settled in towns and tilled fields, while the Mongol stock of the region toward the east took to nomadism to a steadily increasing degree.

The nomad is used to long journeys on swift and strong horses accustomed to desert climate and forage; and as his tribal organization developed he was capable of ranging widely to raid settled lands, escaping without punishment. Here we have the basis of the success of the Mongol conquerors, who found ready-made an instrument of empire superior to any that could be opposed against them. Even today the wanderings of the nomads carry them over a great reach of country. Some of the Kirghiz in the eastern part of Russian Turkestan winter in the region of the Aral Sea and drive their flocks to summer pastures in the steppes of Omsk, eight hundred miles or more away to the north.

THE WESTERN STEPPES OF THE KIRGHIZ REALM

The northern portion of the steppe region of western Siberia is marked by fertile black soil; the middle portion has a poorer brown soil; and the southern portion is desert or semi-arid (Fig. 170). From time immemorial this has been the grazing ground of nomadic tent-dwelling peoples, the Kirghiz, wild and unruly horsemen of the steppe, whose main sources of wealth are horses, sheep, cattle, goats, and camels. The total population of the region is more than 5,000,000, of which only about 10 per cent is urban. (Note the region marked "Kirghiz Steppe," in Figure 196.)

The first active settlement of this great steppe region was in the early 18th century, when Cossack posts were established. There followed a slow infiltration of Russian settlers, — peasants, voluntary religious exiles, and additional Cossacks. Colonization and immigration on a large scale began in 1894 with the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway in western Siberia (Fig. 171). The manufacture of butter has become a great industry with the new colonists, and, like agriculture (wheat, rye, oats, millet), would have developed much further if it were not for a wholly inadequate transportation system and a generally primitive organization of commercial facilities. Trade is carried on by



FIG. 196. To bring out the grazing lands more strongly the map has been constructed in a somewhat unconventional way, the intermediate grade of rainfall being represented by the white, or unshaded, part of the map. Some of the land having over twelve inches of rainfall is grazing country, and some even of the driest territory has populous towns where irrigation is practiced, for example, Khiva. Based on *Atlas of Asiatic Russia*, 1914 (in Russian); *Atlas climatologique de l'empire de Russie*, 1900; and Bartholomew, *Atlas of Meteorology*, 1899.

fairs chiefly, of which every town of consequence has one each year. There is still a considerable caravan trade.

Politically, the region is important because of the displacement of the Kirghiz by the Russian colonists, who have penetrated in the north chiefly since the middle of the 19th century, because here they find a rich soil and greater accessibility to the railroad. Thus the native nomads have been pushed farther south into the brown soil belt and the more arid steppe region, where life has become harder. The process is not halted by even the 10-inch rainfall limit, since the rain falls chiefly in the growing season and even 8 inches permits the crop to mature. A treaty between the Russian government and the Kirghiz leaders has now fixed a limit beyond which Russian colonist farmers may not go in their southward advance into Kirghiz country. The Kirghiz were unwilling to become sedentary under Russian pressure. The habit of roving is in their blood. "He feels it to be the greatest misfortune and humiliation when he must take to the plough, somewhere by a water course on the edge of the desert; and so long as the loss of all his herds has not hopelessly crushed him, he does not resign himself to that



FIG. 197. Land classification map of Russian Turkestan. After *Atlas of Asiatic Russia*, 1914 (in Russian).

terrible fate which Mahomet has proscribed with the words: 'Wherever this implement has penetrated, it has always brought with it servitude and shame.'"

The population is wholly Mohammedan, of Turkish-Mongol blood, and of Turkish speech. There has been a growing feeling of unity, in contrast to the Kirghiz of Russian Turkestan, that came from the spread of Pan-Islamic ideas and the Pan-Turanian movement, the latter intended to organize politically the widely scattered peoples of Turanian stock. Since the beginning of the Soviet régime, practice in local self-government has been confined to the Russian element under the guise of federation, the so-called autonomous Kirghiz republics. The object of the Soviet leaders is to make of government a means of affiliation with Moscow and a factor in the extension of Soviet power in Inner Asia.

RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA

It was in 1734 that Russia received the surrender of all the Kirghiz hordes; but it was not until the military successes of General Peroffsky in 1848 had been achieved that the Kirghiz ceased to be an obstacle to Russian advance toward the east, particularly in Russian Turkestan. Then followed the fall of the khanates of Turkestan. By 1865 Tashkent had been captured; by 1868 Samarkand. In 1873 Khiva and the Amu Daria district were taken; in 1875 Ferghana, Kokand, and Bukhara fell into Russian hands. There were still the Turkoman

FIG. 198. Ethnography of Russian Turkestan. From *Atlas of Asiatic Russia*, 1914 (in Russian). The capital letters on the map are the initial letters of the leading cities (Fig. 172).

robbers and slave dealers to reckon with, and after repeated efforts these were definitely conquered in 1884, when Russia stood at the Persian and Afghan frontiers, and the whole Turkestan region was rounded out.

The territory of Russian Turkestan is an extension southward of the steppe region of the Kirghiz, and it also includes a desert tract 1200 miles from east to west which extends southward to the foot of the mountains that fringe the northern border of the great plateau of Iran. The desert section is marked by irrigated bands of country along the northward flowing streams and by towns of both historic and recent importance — Merv, Khiva, Samarkand, etc. — connected with the Caspian at Krasnovodsk by the Transcaspian railway (Fig. 171). The region is hemmed in on the south and east by the mountains of central Asia, broken in two places by the Zungarian "gates" (Fig. 195), through which have passed the ravaging hordes of Turks and Mongols that streamed into western Asia and eastern Europe.

Russian Central Asia[1] (that is, Russian Turkestan and the Kirghiz country) is a great lobe of the Russian Empire thrust southward into Inner Asia, and it has brought Russia a large crop of political troubles. The frontier of a great empire does not remain fixed for long; it is

[1] The collective or regional name is employed here because of the uncertain status of the new administrative units arranged on an ethnological basis, such as Turkmenia, Uzbekstan, Tajikstan, and many others (Fig. 172). The Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara have been absorbed by the Soviet government.

nearly always advancing. Each fresh advance tempts the empire-builders to go a step farther, to protect land and peoples already gained. As a result, Russia has pressed against China in Eastern Turkestan, has troubled and has been troubled by the British in Afghanistan and Persia, and has encroached on Turkey along the frontiers of Transcaucasia.

The entire Turkestan region (Russian, or Western, Turkestan; and also Eastern, or Chinese, Turkestan) is peopled in the main by folk of Turko-Mongol origin — Kirghiz, Uzbeg, Sart, Turkoman, etc. The Kirghiz are represented everywhere, forming in some places as high as 80 per cent of the whole. Their attachment to other Moslems and to the Koran is relatively feeble and the Turkish effort failed, during the World War, to stir up a feeling of racial solidarity as part of a great Pan-Turanian scheme. The Uzbegs of Russian Turkestan, numbering about 2,000,000, were formerly nomadic but are now almost entirely settled on farms. They are of Mongol origin chiefly and nearly all are Mohammedans. On the south, whoever controls the cities will control the mountain peoples, who trade with the cities.

The people of Turkestan might become independent if they were not so diverse in racial character and had not the strong antipathy toward governmental control that is characteristic of the nomad. The Russian economic stamp was impressed upon the region before the World War and is the result of encouraged colonization still in the feeble frontier stage. The lower-class Russians of the towns form the real government, though Russians as a class represent but 5 per cent of the total population of Turkestan. From the standpoint of outside relations the great increase in cotton and fruit cultivation is notable. It has changed the economics of the region from a provincial to an international status, despite the remote situation and the severe handicap of Bolshevist disorganization.

EASTERN, OR CHINESE, TURKESTAN (SINKIANG)

Chinese Turkestan extends 1200 miles east and west, 600 miles north and south. It is an uneven, mountain-bordered plain opening on the east toward Mongolia (Fig. 195). The higher parts of the province are snow-covered (above 15,000 feet), the lower are desert. Midway between is a belt of rough canyoned country, also virtually uninhabitable. The people live chiefly in two belts of grassy vegetation — the one on the mountain meadows just under the snowfields, the other on the edge of the basin plain where the soil is locally well supplied with water from the mountain streams. The chief river is the Tarim. Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan on the west are the only

cities of importance. The oasis life of the people of Eastern Turkestan is easy and isolated, and it is in the oases that the population (Turki) chiefly live. Only 10 per cent are nomadic shepherds (Kirghiz), and there is a small group of fisher-folk (Lopliks) who live in the lakes and reed swamps of Lop Nor. Nearly all are Mohammedans.

This remote province of China has been the seat of important historic movements of population. Whether because of a periodic change of climate or because of the nomadic habit of life and the constant shifting of population which this entails, the people of Eastern Turkestan were pressed westward; some of them even moved across Afghanistan and then into India as part of the Indo-Scythian invasion (in the 2d and 1st centuries B.C.).

For almost twenty centuries, down to our own time, the control of the region shifted from Chinese to Turk, to Mongol, and back to Chinese. By the end of the 1st century A.D., the Chinese had practically withdrawn behind their Great Wall. Turkish control then came in, and lasted for more than five hundred years. Turk and Tibetan and Chinese struggled for ownership of these remote oasis peoples for more than half a millenium, until Genghiz Khan conquered the land in the 13th century; more than a century later came the conquest by another great Mongol leader, Tamerlane. During the 15th and 16th centuries there was a long period of civil war which ended in 1758 with the re-conquest of the whole region by the Chinese. Civil war began again, with the repeated invasion of the whole region by large Chinese armies. Only for brief intervals was the province independent. In 1862 a Mohammedan rebellion broke out in China, and taking advantage of it, this remote province massacred thousands of Chinese and ended Chinese rule until 1876, when the whole region once more — and finally — fell into Chinese hands.

In thus driving a wedge into central Asia and colonizing a far distant province, the Chinese were responding partly to motives of empire-building and trade; for across the region ran the great caravan route to western Asia. They were also in fear of the people who lived just beyond the Great Wall; it was in this debatable ground that from the earliest times there had been fierce and continual struggles between the civilized and sedentary population of China and the nomadic barbarian hordes of Inner Asia.

In the later development of her government in Eastern Turkestan in the past few decades, China has treated the region as a colony on the same footing with the eighteen provinces of China proper. Most of her difficulties hitherto have come from the disturbed state of the

Kokand region, east of Tashkent. Intrigues hatched in Kokand among a fanatical population constantly troubled the people of China on the western borders of Eastern Turkestan. To placate the Khan of Kokand, China formerly paid a yearly subsidy of about $15,000. These troubles ended with the absorption of Kokand by Russia in 1876, and though there has been danger of Russian absorption of Kashgar since that time, there has been nominal peace for nearly fifty years.

In spite of Mongol influences, the people of Eastern Turkestan show little kinship to the Mongols. Instead they are more closely related to the Iranian stock. Hence the anomaly of the weak Chinese holding a remote people of different culture and speech. A strong local government could not be formed, because the oases are widely scattered and are separated by difficult desert or mountain country. The towns and oases are from a hundred to two hundred miles apart. A population only a little more than 1,000,000 in number is strung out over a belt of country 2000 miles long. Naturally it has been the prey of every invader.

The largest trade is with Russian Turkestan, and there is some trade with India also, in spite of the hazards and difficulties of the long mountain roads and the cold high passes. Transport is by cart and caravan, the latter chiefly. Cotton, hemp, and tobacco are grown, besides grains and vegetables. Silk and cotton are among the chief exports and are produced in the warm oases at the lower elevations, but the list is headed by felts and rugs, products of the numerous flocks and herds of the pastures on the desert and mountain border.

The Republic of Turkestan in Russian Turkestan was proclaimed early in 1918, but the proclamation had little effect in Eastern Turkestan. The Moslem Turks sought control of Eastern Turkestan as part of their Turanian realm. However, the people take life so easily that they will never do much to help the Mohammedan or the Turkish cause. They will long remain as clay in the hands of the potter. Russia's interest in Eastern Turkestan has always been keen, since the rich western part of the province, which has all the large cities, lies near her frontier. Through trade and political agents, she has long sought control as part of her process of penetrating India on the one hand and the northern Chinese trade realm on the other. The region is of interest to China chiefly as a thoroughfare for trans-Asiatic commerce. If China fails to form a stable government, she may find this province allying itself with the western Asiatic forces to which it is more closely related by ties of blood, language, and religion.

THE MONGOLIAN REALM

From the earliest times, the wild and nomadic Mongols raided the adjacent fertile Chinese provinces. Their military and political power was consolidated in the 12th century, with the establishment of control over closely related tribes. Under Genghiz Khan, in the early years of the 13th century, a well-drilled army was organized which penetrated the Great Wall and again and again ravaged and plundered the Chinese provinces. When Genghiz Khan turned his attention westward, he conquered most of Inner Asia, captured Tabriz and Tiflis, and with his Mongol armies swept westward as far as the site of Odessa. Farther north, Moscow was captured, then Nijni Novgorod; Poland was ravaged as far as the Vistula, Hungary invaded, Budapest taken. Down to 1914 prayers were still said in some of the churches of Galicia for deliverance from the Mongols.

No subsequent leader equalled the exploits of Genghiz Khan, and after periods of revival under Kublai Khan (late 13th century) and Tamerlane (14th century), the Mongol empire fell apart. The fragments are now divided among China, Russia, and Great Britain. The Mongols have fallen behind in the science of war. Their weapons were once the best in the world, their people had great endurance, and the nomadic life admirably suited them for wide conquests in the grasslands of eastern Europe and western and central Asia. Their arms are now obsolete, though if trained the Mongols might become once more an important military factor.

China has been compared to a sea into which all waters flowing become salted. Thus she has absorbed into her population or modified by her culture one after the other of the dynasties of barbarian origin that sprang from the region of Mongolia north and west of the Great Wall.

Mongolia, as shown in Figure 209, is the largest region under Chinese sovereignty outside of the eighteen provinces of China. It has nearly half the extent of the United States. It contains the great Gobi Desert, with an area of nearly a half-million square miles, extending 1000 miles from east to west and from 450 to 600 miles from north to south. It has no permanent through-flowing streams, and is a region of great contrasts of temperature between summer and winter.

The Gobi Desert is not everywhere a sandy waste. In the eastern part between Kweihwacheng, Kalgan, and Urga the surface is flat or rolling and the ground is covered with thick, short grass that supplies excellent pasture. Though the region is capable of rapid and high

development, there has been no marked advance in Chinese commerce for fifty years.

The Mongolian realm is divided into Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia (Fig. 195). Inner Mongolia is populated by two classes, the nomadic and the agricultural. In former times the Mongols invaded China, as noted above; but in later years Mohammedan Chinese have penetrated the region of the Mongols, where they become not only agricultural but pastoral people as well, and this with great success. Their penetration has been unusually active during the past fifty years, in which time the edge of cultivation has moved forward fifty miles in the region northwest of Kalgan.

Since freight is often from twenty to forty times more expensive by land than by water, the cost of cart and caravan transportation across the vast plains of Mongolia is readily appreciated. We may also judge thereby the benefits which the buildings of railways would bring to the widely scattered towns that form the chief centers of trade. Owing to the poverty of the land, the population numbers only 2,000,000. The limited resources, the scattered and thin pastures, and the traditions of the people make nomadism the rule. Large numbers of Chinese cart and pack animals come from Mongolia. It is estimated that in normal times 100,000 camels have been used for the transport of tea from Kalgan in northern China to Siberia, and that the caravan trade employs 1,200,000 camels and 300,000 oxcarts.

Mongolia is crossed by historic roads, important in both former and present commerce. Among the most important is the one to Eastern Turkestan, the great Inner Asian trade route, the main communication between east and west. It has a total length from Peking to Kashgar of 3500 miles and for hundreds of miles winds through depopulated and untilled country. It crosses mountain passes 10,000 feet high. Here and there are well-watered oases with an abundance of vegetation, and with prosperous but sleepy towns.

While the old caravan trade of China dates back beyond the Christian era, the rich trade with China which Russia enjoyed is not more than two hundred years old. In 1689 a treaty was signed between China and Russia, granting to a limited number of Russian merchants the privilege of trading with China. Almost at once there was a lively traffic between the two countries. Silk and tea were carried across the Mongolian deserts and the Siberian steppes and mountains into European Russia. A small Russian settlement sprang up at Peking.

For a time there was an interruption of this trade, owing to political differences between the two countries, which grew out of the asylum

that was given in Siberia to a large band of Mongol robbers; but in 1725 a new agreement was reached in the treaty of Kaykhta. By the terms of the treaty the frontier cities of Kyakhta in Siberia and Maimachen just across the line in Mongolia became the gateway to Chinese trade. Warehouses and caravansaries were built, and a great trade once more developed. All Russians had the right to trade with China. Cloth and hardware were brought from Russia and were exchanged for the silks, porcelains, tobacco, cotton, and tea of China. This trade continued until the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway, whereupon the camel commerce of the overland road rapidly declined.

As one of the outer dependencies of China, Mongolia, like Tibet, has had a checkered career. Repeatedly it has been courted by Russia and repelled and then attracted by China. But rarely has it had either the vision or the means to become independent, so scattered and primitive is its scant population. The later stages of its history are recounted in some detail in the chapter on The Far East (page 602).

THE UNRULY STATE OF AFGHANISTAN

In its later aspects Mohammedanism presents one of its most acute problems on the northwestern border of India, where, tucked away in the heart of Asia, is Afghanistan, a small country of unruly Mohammedans. Though weak, it has hitherto stood between the two slowly growing empires of the British on the south and the Russians on the north, and it has fought them both. Afghanistan has been called "the land of rocks and stones and sanguinary feuds." Before the Afghan lies the region of northern India, which he has long coveted. He has frequently gone down and raided the plains and border valleys. He says in substance: "God in His goodness has placed these people near by to be our lawful prey, that we may go down and reap their harvests when our own crops fail."

The Afghan wars of 1839 and 1842 were followed by better relations between England and Afghanistan, which culminated in the treaty of Peshawar in 1855. But even after this there was only a limited admission of British officers. Afghanistan adhered strictly to a policy of isolation. The British policy became one of inactivity, or at the most of petty meddling in the affairs of Afghanistan, until Russian successes in Turkestan (1875) forced England to frame a new policy in which Afghanistan was regarded not merely as a frontier to India but as a possible avenue of Russian advance. The British had either to control Afghanistan or to endure the Afghan raids of the warlike and independent tribes bordering the Punjab.

The question of the independence of disorderly peoples deserves a moment's consideration, for to a marked degree it affects international policy in critical places. For example, in 1862 France got by treaty the right to support the independence of the Sultan of Maskat. This has enabled unscrupulous merchants to raise the French flag on Arab and Indian sailing vessels, and thus to get guns and ammunition into Afghanistan, by way of Jibuti (in French Somaliland) to Maskat and thence to the coast of Persian Baluchistan, thereby furnishing the means of raising those perpetual border revolts against British rule that may some day lead to a Mohammedan rebellion in India. In the past English merchants have carried arms to Morocco for the Moors to use against the French and Spanish, and to Madagascar for the use of the Hovas against the French. Some of the small turbulent states would probably have been taken over long ago by the great powers if it were not that the powers are jealous of each other and hitherto have expected to profit by disorder. A great deal of the turbulence is caused by merchants of these same big powers, who find their trade in arms profitable in spite of all the risks of capture and confiscation.

The Afghans are orthodox Sunni Moslems, rigid followers of old ecclesiastical laws and traditions. Add to this the fact that they are both fanatical in religion and ignorant of the extent of foreign power and the limitations of their own country and worth, and it is clear that they can be restrained only by a strong hand. It is a priest-ridden country, even the monarch being defied by the priests, who not only act as arbiters in tribal disputes but incite their people to hostility against "infidels." Without their support no government can stand. Civilization beats in vain upon the doors of the country whose chief defense is inaccessibility. The installation of a wireless station at Kabul, the construction of a telegraph line to connect with the Indian system, the improvement of roads about the capital, the introduction of motor cars, telephones, and schools — these are some of the modern elements commonly cited to indicate progress in civilization. Their effect upon Afghan's ten millions of people is about as great as that of a top hat presented to the chief of a tribe of Brazilian Indians.

In the epoch of treaty making that opened in 1919 paper agreements were made in profusion, and the epidemic reached even remote Afghanistan, called in the treaty with Turkey (1921) "the great state of Afghanistan." These two states recognized "the awakening of the Eastern World" and their emancipation. They specifically recognized the independence of Khiva and Bokhara, over which neither has any influence, promised mutual aid in case of aggression by a third power,



FIG. 199. Outline map showing in detail the proposed connections between the Russian and the Indian railway systems through Afghanistan.

and provided for Turkish assistance in Afghanistan in the matter of agricultural improvement and military training. With Persia, Afghanistan signed a treaty (also in 1921) of arbitration and of mutual aid in time of war. In Moslem quarters this is accepted as another sign of solidarity among Near-Eastern peoples; but its value, if any, can be but temporary and sentimental among populations feebly related by ties of business and living in widely dispersed communities.

So long as Russia and Great Britain maintained their pressure upon Afghanistan that country could only make a choice between the powers, favoring the one that seemed to be the stronger. At the close of the World War, when Turkish pressure was withdrawn, a change of rulers took place, and very soon thereafter an attack was delivered upon

British India on the pretext that it was fighting for independence and freedom from the condition to which Afghanistan had long been subject. British Indian troops took the field, concentrating to the number of 340,000 men in critical points along a front of a thousand miles.[1] So successful were the operations that within a month the Amir sued for an armistice.

In the subsequent treaty of peace signed August 1919, the privilege of importing arms through India to Afghanistan was temporarily suspended and the annual subsidies to the Amir's predecessor which had been allowed to accumulate were confiscated and no subsidy is now granted to the head of the state. Arrangements were also made to demarcate a portion of the line where the Afghan aggression took place, the boundary to follow a line laid down by the British Commission. A supplementary treaty (1921) provided for the shipment of arms and munitions under proper guarantees and for the mutual free exchange of goods without the payment of customs duties. It recognized the full sovereignty of Afghanistan and set up equality of relationship in all essential respects save that of British restrictions upon Russian special privileges. The new treaty arrangement has importance to India beyond its relations to Afghanistan; for war on the Afghan side always meant disorder among the fanatical Mohammedan tribesmen in India — unsubdued mountain people such as the Wazirs and Mahsuds, easily tempted to hostility through the influence of their religious leaders.

THE TIBETAN HIGHLAND

The area of Tibet is less than 800,000 square miles, or about three times that of the state of Texas. It is a land of exceedingly lofty mountains and high desert tablelands and valleys. Some parts of the region were not known until recently, one great section, including a mountain range theretofore unknown, having been explored by Sven Hedin as late as 1906–1908. Until recent years only Chinese representatives were permitted to enter Lhasa, the capital of the country.

In all there are about 4,000,000 Tibetans, living in semi-independent tribes, each with its religious leader, called a Lama. The chief religious ruler and absolute secular monarch, called the Dalai Lama, has hitherto lived at Lhasa in the royal monastery.

In recent years British interests in Tibet have become more impor-

[1] It is of interest to note that the effect of the short and successful campaign was heightened by the use of airplanes which bombed critical places in Afghanistan and appeared over the capital, Kabul. This new instrument of warfare illustrates its usefulness in this instance in a brilliant manner, since in earlier times the difficult terrain had limited military operations to the border and even there they were conducted under extreme difficulties.



FIG. 200. Tibet, with its lines of communication through India and China.

tant because of the British government's desire to protect its northern Indian frontier, to establish trade relations between the people of India and Tibet, and to gain access to southern China by way of the more populous eastern and southeastern sections of Tibet. The Tibetans have always opposed political and commercial penetration on the part of Great Britain and China. Though agreeing in 1893 to the establishment of a trade market at Yatung, situated in Tibet just outside the Sikkim frontier in northern India, the Tibetan government later authorized the building of a wall across the connecting road.

Fearing that the continued hostility of the Tibetans was inspired by Russia, Great Britain sent a military expedition into Tibet in 1903–1904, under command of General Macdonald and Colonel Younghusband. The latter entered Lhasa on 7 August 1904. The Dalai Lama fled, but a treaty was signed with Tibetan representatives which opened three places in Tibet to Indian trade: Yatung, Gyangtse, and Gartok. Trade was to be free. This proposal China agreed to, Tibet then being nominally under her control, and in 1906 she promised not to let any other power interfere in the affairs of Tibet. Great Britain promised not to annex Tibet or interfere with her administration, and in 1907 confirmed this position by the Anglo-Russian treaty.

When the Dalai Lama fled from Tibet in 1904, he first took refuge in Mongolia. From there he went to Peking, where he was told by the

Chinese government that his land was really Chinese territory and that he must subject himself to the Chinese authorities. He was given an annual pension and sent back to Lhasa in 1909. Disorders occurring in Tibet at the time, the Chinese government sent a column of soldiers to Lhasa and the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1910.

Then came the Chinese revolution in 1911 and the establishment of the Chinese Republic. In 1912, Mongolia and Tibet were declared to be integral parts of China. These activities of the Chinese government called for a protest from the British government, because of the fact that England had independent treaty relations with Tibet in which she did not recognize Chinese sovereignty. China stopped the advances of her troops and disclaimed any intention of making Tibet a Chinese province. In 1913 the Dalai Lama declared the independence of Tibet and Chinese officials withdrew, since which time China has exercised no authority in the country. Delegates from England, China, and Tibet met at Simla in the same year to arrange Tibetan affairs, but the Chinese government would not subsequently accept the agreement that was made. By the terms of the agreement Tibetan territory (Fig. 200) was divided into two parts:

(1) Outer Tibet (the part nearer India) was to be a separate province with an autonomous government only nominally under Chinese suzerainty.

(2) Inner Tibet (the part nearer China) was to be under a measure of control by China.

In addition there were provisions for a fresh trade treaty between India and Outer Tibet. In 1919 a second effort was made to bring the three parties to the Simla negotiation into agreement, but it failed because of the decline of authority at Peking and the general political disintegration of China in civil war.

It would increase political stability in the region if the frontiers of Tibet were definitely established as soon as possible, with the assistance and agreement of the local native governors. Neither those in the direction of China nor those that separate Outer from Inner Tibet have been fixed. As matters now stand, Outer Tibet has become practically an independent state under the guarantee of Great Britain and to that degree a dependency. In 1922 a direct telegraphic connection between Lhasa and India was effected as a result of the work of a British mission (Bell) that secured Tibetan agreement to the principle of British assistance in the development of the country.

CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE

THE FAR EAST

In reaching for the commerce of the Far East, European powers found themselves confronted by two established nations, China and Japan, whom they could not reduce to the status of dependencies. Japan from the first maintained her sovereignty intact and step by step advanced to a place among the great powers; China, far stronger and richer potentially, but actually weak and now disorderly as to internal government, has been able neither to protect foreigners residing in China nor to ward off the repeated encroachments of the European powers.

In the islands of the Pacific, on the contrary, there was little difficulty in achieving complete ownership, for the primitive inhabitants were easily subdued or won over by the Europeans. Objects of rivalry at first for their raw materials, many of the islands came to be considered important for their strategic value also. They were regarded as an approach to the mainland of Asia, and their possession was thought to be essential to the control of the trade of eastern Asia. Thus, through trade, Europe was brought across the Pacific and Indian oceans to the doors of the Far East. Relations were at first sporadic, as at Macao, near Hongkong (Portuguese), Deshima, at Nagasaki (Dutch), and Formosa (Spanish and Dutch for short periods). Later they were persistent and even aggressive, as when the English got Hongkong (1842) and the French by successive steps (1863, 1864, 1867, 1884, 1896) established themselves in Indo-China (Fig. 210). Each acquisition furnished local subtropical products and a market for European goods, and became also a base for trade conquests farther afield.

THE CONTROL OF RAW MATERIALS IN THE FAR EAST

When it is realized how large a part tropical and subtropical products play in modern industrial and commercial life, it seems natural that it should be the policy of Great Britain, the largest trading empire in the world, to get as great a share as possible of the raw materials and trade resources of the Far East, and she has pursued this policy with marked singleness of purpose ever since she acquired the Suez Canal. Through her control of the free ports of Hongkong and Singapore and the commercial organizations based upon them, she has made London one of the chief world markets for rubber, tea, spices, jute, gums, and hides. With her huge war debt, trade control and develop-



FIG. 201. The position and relations of Singapore, Great Britain's principal naval station in the Far East (page 44).

ment are matters of vital importance. She has the banking and other business facilities as well as the accumulated commercial experience to increase production in new lands.[1] In Japan's foreign policy, also, the trade motive has in recent years become a more active factor, especially in relation to eastern Asia. These two powers, as well as France, seek constantly to improve their financial and ocean transportation facilities in the Far East.

In the past the United States has bought the products of the Far East chiefly through Great Britain, Japan, and Germany. Her annual purchases of Oriental products just before the World War exceeded $200,000,000, and her exports were more than $100,000,000. The largest single source of American trade in the Orient is Japan (a total of nearly $650,000,000 in 1926). The Straits Settlements come next, Singapore being a great port for the raw materials of the East Indian

[1] The strength of these assets has been demonstrated since the time when this paragraph was written (1920) for the first edition of *The New World*, by the marked increase of British holdings of foreign securities. The liquidation of such holdings during the World War has now been offset by purchases of new issues until the total stands at twenty billions, as in 1914. By comparison the foreign holdings credited to the United States now amount to thirteen billions.

region — tin, hides, spices, rice, fish, tungsten, and rubber. Great Britain and Japan have maintained their trade advantages in the Far East because they have their own ports there. Americans have only one great commercial base, Manila, and that is not a free port. It now has large modern piers and extensive warehouses, and were it to become a free port, it would have a great influence in developing the wealth of the Far East and the Philippines. In the past twenty years American trade with the Philippines has risen rapidly and now amounts to more than $180,000,000 yearly.

RACIAL FACTORS

In the Far East and the Pacific the world's racial problems reach their present climax of intensity. Here the white race comes into political and commercial contact with the yellow race, a part of which — the Japanese — is striving to win assent to the principle of race equality. The differences between the two races in mode of life and ideals, and even in religion, are very great, and there is no tendency among them toward intermarriage. In Canada, Australia, and the United States there are special laws restricting or prohibiting the immigration of Chinese and Japanese. The immigration question has become especially acute in British Columbia (page 70) and California, where the Japanese birth rate is rather high and where the Japanese problem has had a serious outcome, owing to the rapid growth of bitter feeling among the labor unions, the unorganized laboring men, and some of the landowners.

Latin America, with large fertile territories either thinly inhabited or peopled by Indian or half-breed stock, is a field of possibly great overseas settlement by yellow labor. Every step in the process is of acute interest to Canada and the United States. When laborers on the coffee estates of Brazil became scarce during the World War, there was increased Japanese immigration, encouraged by subsidies from Japan and the welcome of the Brazilian government. There are now 50,000 Japanese in Brazil, most of them in São Paulo, many of them owning coffee plantations. A number of colonies of Japanese rice farmers live on the lowlands of coastal Brazil. There is a colony of Japanese in Lower California, Mexico. Peru has about 11,000 Japanese inhabitants.

In Europe, where comparatively crowded lands do not tempt immigration from the Far East, the problem of the yellow race scarcely exists. Differences between systems of agriculture play a part in such population movements: the plantation system of the tropics is better adapted to employ untrained hand labor. Distance is no negligible

factor: a Japanese workman in a European beet field would have to expend the savings of years in transportation. The harsh climate of northern Europe, as contrasted with the relatively milder climate of central and southern Japan, where there is the densest population and the greatest need of emigration, also has a deterrent effect. The tendency of the Japanese is to move into the warmer lands, like California, Hawaii, and the Philippines.[1] This tendency causes some of the people of Australia to be apprehensive that large numbers of Japanese may settle in the East Indies and Polynesia and become their unwelcome neighbors (Fig. 215 and related text, page 617). It is argued that the Japanese multiply so rapidly and live so cheaply that they drive out the white workman wherever they compete with him on equal terms.

At the Peace Conference of Paris in 1919, the Japanese plenipotentiaries long insisted that restrictions of immigration based on race should be finally removed the world over, but to this proposition the other powers would not assent.

The next phase of the question of racial equality was marked by a vigorous protest by Japan against the passage of the United States immigration law of 1924, whereby migrants of yellow stock are excluded if coming from a specified Asiatic Zone that includes the region shown in Figure 249, page 783. The protest was made on the principle of self respect, a principle to which nations must subscribe, according to the Japanese view, if international intercourse is to be amicable in a civilized world. So long as no question of national susceptibility is involved Japan claims no right to send laborers in unrestricted numbers to the United States, nor does it question the sovereign right of the United States or any other country to regulate immigration into its own territories. It is the declared purpose of the Japanese government not to send its nationals to countries where they are not wanted. Above all, Japanese pride was touched by the rude disregard which the immigration law implies for the honorable maintenance by Japan of the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908. This was an understanding between the United States

[1] While the mean January temperature in Kyoto is almost identical with that of Paris, the July temperature is about eleven degrees higher. In London, the mean winter temperature is practically identical with Hiroshima and Osaka: Aomori, at the northern end of Nippon, is colder than Berlin and nearly as cold as Warsaw, although hotter than either in summer. The January temperature averages 25° at Dalny, 16° at Newchang, and 8° at Mukden — fairly harsh. The consequence is seen in the fate of the Japanese colonization plans. It is the Chinese not the Japanese who are filling Manchuria, though Japan is in control of southern Manchuria and the Japanese quarter is a feature of each principal town, as at Mukden.



FIG. 202. Some of the economic elements in the political geography of the Far East.

and Japan reached after the violent agitation of 1906 in California over Japanese immigration. By its terms Japan undertook to adopt and enforce administrative measures which would check the emigration to the United States of Japanese laborers except certain special classes. Thus Japan voluntarily did what the law of 1911 in its original form sought to have her do and the law of 1924 compelled her to do. By the terms of the agreement the total number of Japanese admitted to and departed from the continental United States were 120,300 and 111,600 respectively, or an excess of admissions amounting to 8,681, an annual average of 578. In this number are included all classes of Japanese such as merchants, students,

tourists, government officials, and the like. So small a number can hardly be conceived to be a menace either to racial purity or to business. Nevertheless, extremists insisted upon a law of American origin, not administrative measures in Japan for that restriction which neither government questioned.

The exclusion law of 1924, as the immigration act of that year is called, was the last of a series of acts that stirred Japan. The first was the Supreme Court decision of 1922 declaring Japanese immigrants ineligible to American citizenship. The second was the Supreme Court decision of 1923 declaring the Anti-Alien Land Laws of the Pacific coast states constitutional, thus compelling thousands of Japanese residents on the Pacific coast to return to Japan or move to some other part of the United States. About 50,000 out of the 111,000 Japanese living in the United States were directly or indirectly affected by this decision.

(A) The Rise of Japan to the Rank of a World Power

When Japan was still a kind of hermit kingdom, both her foreign and her internal problems were simple. By centuries of experiment, life had become adjusted to resources and a balanced economic scheme had developed. Her people lived apart from the rest of the world, except for a moderate trade with China. For more than two centuries before Commodore Perry's visit to Japan, her sole point of contact with western nations was a single trading station on the island of Deshima opposite Nagasaki, where there was a limited commerce with the Dutch.

EMERGENCE OF JAPAN

It was in 1853 that the United States government sent Commodore Perry, with an American fleet, to demand Japanese protection for American sailors and property wrecked on the coast, and permission for American ships to use Japanese ports as a base for food supply or for trade. The Perry expedition forced Japan into the current of modern international life.[1]

Japan was profoundly shaken by the impact of western ideas. Her political and social institutions underwent what is probably the most

[1] Foreigners were at first welcomed in Japan as in 1542, but were expelled again in 1640. When Perry's expedition required Japan to open her doors, her ruling class decided to acquire some aspects of western culture in order not to be conquered by it. She has kept her civilization but added western means for waging war. She is now in the midst of the process of building up modern industries and overseas trade to feed her people while keeping them at home. On its present scale this is a modern means consciously employed to provide a substitute for emigration.

complete and radical change of its kind that has ever occurred in the world's history. The basis of Japanese social and military organization had been feudalism. Following the revolution of 1868 the system was abolished, and a national spirit developed that became a powerful instrument in empire-building. The first railroad was begun in 1870; today there are more than 10,000 miles of rail. In 1872, military service became universal and obligatory. A constitution was granted in 1889, and Parliament met for the first time in 1890.



FIG 203. The expansion of the Japanese Empire. After Karl Haushofer, *Grenzen in ihrer geographischen und politischen Bedeutung*, 1927.

It was just in the midst of this process of modernization that Japan consolidated her island possessions. In 1875 she got from Russia the Kuril Islands, thus rounding out her domain on the north. In exchange she relinquished a claim to the island of Sakhalin, the southern half of which was again recovered in 1905; the northern half was occupied for a time, but relinquished again in 1925 (page 574). In 1876 she took over permanently the Ryukyu Islands, which extend southward almost to Formosa and had paid tribute to Japan for centuries. In 1895 as a result of her war with China she won Formosa, the richest of her island prizes, with a population of 4,000,000. The World War enabled her to add the Marshall and Caroline Islands in the South Pacific (Fig. 213). Though these are unfortified, all peacetime conditions may be ended by a military crisis in time of war. Her island empire fringes the coast of Asia for 3000 miles and embraces an area of 261,000 square miles.

The merchants of Japan turned to overseas trade and her business men began to manufacture articles of commerce. At the present time the Japanese trader can be found everywhere through the East, from Sumatra and Singapore up through the Philippines and in all the open

ports of the coast of China. Japanese banks and warehouses sprang up in India during the World War (1914–1918), and Japanese merchants went in numbers into the Malay States, buying up rich concessions. In the same period Japan's commerce with Siam doubled, and her trade with the Dutch East Indies increased five-fold. In New Zealand the Japanese won over the former trade of Germany and temporarily took away much of British trade also. A fleet of Japanese steamers makes regular runs to Seattle and San Francisco, and another fleet plies between Japan and the west coast of South America. Japanese trade expansion on a huge scale in southern Asia, the Far East, and the Pacific, is one of the great economic consequences of the World War.

In addition to trade advantages, Japan gained territory. The German North Pacific Islands — the Marshalls and Carolines — became mandates of Japan. Confining her activities to the eastern theater of war where her commercial and territorial interests lay, Japan took but a minor part in the conflict. The war made little drain on the resources of Japan, while at the same time putting her in an excellent diplomatic position. In the meantime the world demand for shipping had given a great impetus to her shipbuilding and iron and steel industries and many lesser industries as well. The shipping tonnage increased from 2,000,000 in 1915 to 5,000,000 in 1927.

The principal territorial result of the World War in the Far East was the acquisition by Japan of Shantung and Kiaochow for an indefinite period. While Japan promised eventually to retire from the peninsula and not to make exclusive use of the port of Tsingtao, it was generally felt that Japan had come to stay. The famous Twenty-one Demands of May 1915 had not been forgotten. The militarist party was in power, and it had been but little affected by the lesson of Germany's defeat. There was also the general sense of humiliation in Japan in respect to past events when the great powers of western Europe gained privileges in the Far East which they denied to Japan. But the loss of Shantung aroused a feeling of national disaster among the Chinese; for 40,000,000 Chinese people became to all intents and purposes Japanese subjects. One of the richest provinces of China seemed to be lost, and one historically dear to the Chinese, who speak of it as "The Cradle of Chinese Civilization" and "The Holy Land of the Chinese People." The subsequent popular boycott against Japanese goods and a reduction in their use to 80 per cent helped to check the Japanese tide.

In conjunction with other events to be described on later pages of



FIG. 204. The field of Japanese influence in eastern Asia. Key to numbers: 1, southern China; 2, Shantung; 3, eastern Mongolia and southern Manchuria; 4, northern Sakhalin; 5, northern Manchuria. While these spheres were renounced at the Washington Conference (1921–1922), the Chinese civil war has delayed realization. In any event Japan still retains investments and special rights in every sphere and in Manchuria her privileged position has been actually confirmed by both China and the United States.

this chapter, Japan's ill success in Shantung helped to bring about a complete reversal of her Chinese policy in the Far East. By 1920 the militarist party had been able to throw Japanese troops not only into Shantung, Manchuria, and eastern Inner Mongolia, but over the northern part of the island of Sakhalin and in Siberia as far west as Lake Baikal. Yet by the close of 1921, Japan, to avoid political isolation, was drawn further and further towards the plans of her associates in the Washington Conference. Japanese troops were withdrawn from Shantung, and a declaration followed that Japan would not seek to establish an exclusive Japanese settlement in the former German leased territory of Kiaochow. Still later (February 1925) the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, in presenting to the Japanese Parliament the new treaty between Japan and Russia, announced a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China. Peaceful and friendly relations with China and the development of trade rather than political and military control were outstanding elements of the policy. She had by this time found that her people did not want to emigrate overseas to Manchuria and that her rising industries had in China a market that ought not to be disorganized by the pursuit of purely political or militaristic aims. It is easy to overemphasize Japan's withdrawal from Shantung. Japan still holds valuable leases there that are backed by Japanese money and through them Japanese merchants will go on developing their trade with China.

EXPANSION TOWARD THE MAINLAND OF ASIA

The rise of Japan to the rank of a world power was marked by two wars in which she won striking military victories: the war with China in 1894–1895 and the war with Russia in 1904–1905. But at the close of the first war Japan's military success was followed by diplomatic humiliation. She had driven the Chinese out of Korea, invaded Manchuria, and occupied the Liao-tung peninsula. China hurriedly agreed to make peace, and by the treaty of Shimonoseki, April 1895, she ceded Port Arthur (Fig. 204), the Liao-tung peninsula, Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands (west of Formosa) to Japan; she further agreed to pay a large indemnity and to recognize the complete independence of Korea.

It seemed that at last Japan stood firmly planted on the mainland with an outlet for her rapidly growing population. But Russia stepped in and combined with two other western nations — France and Germany — to compel the eastern nation to give up Port Arthur and the Liao-tung peninsula and withdraw from the mainland, on the ground

that, near Peking, Japan would be a menace to the peace of the Orient. All parties in Japan now began to look forward to the time when they could strike at Russia.



FIG. 205. The province of Shantung, home of 40,000,000 Chinese. Until 1914 Germany held the territory enclosed by the broken line about Kiaochow in lease from the Chinese government. Special rights in railways and mineral development are now held by Japan.

But the great powers were thinking much of themselves, their trade privileges and possible yellow hegemony, and very little of China, when they bade Japan leave the mainland of Asia. Their aggressiveness reached its climax in the closing years of the century. In 1897 Germany sent a fleet to China, ostensibly because two German missionaries had been murdered in the province of Shantung. China was compelled to give Germany a ninety-nine year lease of the fine harbor of Kiaochow and a surrounding area of more than 250 square miles, besides large commercial privileges in the province of Shantung, which has a population of nearly 40,000,000 Chinese (Fig. 205).

Russia also seized the opportunity of robbing a weakened China. It seemed clear that she intended ultimately to annex the whole of the great province of Manchuria. For the time being she took a twenty-five year lease of Port Arthur, from which she had driven Japan by diplomatic weapons in 1895. England obtained an enlarged area at Weihaiwei, compelled China to recognize British sovereignty over Sikkim in 1890, and extended her power to Kowloon, in 1898. China was forced to open a number of additional treaty ports and to permit foreign capitalists to build railroads and develop mines. France took Kwangchowan and a liberal sphere of influence like the others. Weak, pacifistic, rich, undeveloped, China appeared to be in the same class as Africa; the powers seemed to regard the country as so much booty to be divided among themselves.

Then in 1902, for the first time in history, Japan made a defensive alliance with a European power, Great Britain, on terms of virtual equality. This meant that in the impending war with Russia, who was constantly adding to her armed forces in Manchuria and about Port Arthur, Japan would have the help of Great Britain if any other power came to the help of Russia.

In February 1904 the Russo-Japanese War began, to last until September 1905. It was closed by the treaty of Portsmouth, named after Portsmouth, New Hampshire, where the peace delegates assembled on the invitation of President Roosevelt. Japan had gained wisdom as a result of her previous experience with the great powers, and pressed insistently for territorial advantages. Russia was made to recognize Japan's paramount interest in Korea, though that country was to be independent. Russia also transferred to Japan her rights at Port Arthur and in the Liao-tung peninsula, and evacuated southern Manchuria and the southern half of the island of Sakhalin. Japan was still further supported in her Asiatic policy by treaty with Great Britain in 1905. They agreed to assist each other against any other power or powers in maintaining their territorial rights in eastern Asia and India.

In July 1916 the Japanese and Russian governments signed a treaty by which Russia recognized Japan's special rights in most of China, while Japan recognized Russia's special interests in China's western territory, especially Mongolia and Turkestan. While this treaty is no longer in effect, it is important as marking a step in Japan's long and hard struggle to force recognition of her alleged special rights in China. By acts such as these Japan was to outdo the western powers in the penetration of China and the winning of special privileges.

Up to the time that Japan entered the Chinese field, other nations had won special privileges there without arousing acute anxiety in the United States. But so comprehensive were the claims of the Japanese, so aggressive their methods, so favorable their geographical relations, and so marked their racial advantages, that the full import of a foreign penetration of China was quickly realized in America. China being weak and her officials corrupt, she could always be made to grant concessions, even though these interfered with her domestic life or threatened her territorial integrity. From this time forward, the United States indirectly played the rôle of the champion of China. The Japanese question thereafter was not solely a matter of restricting Japanese immigration, but also a matter of ending the period of unfair commercial rivalry in China so that territorial rivalry and war might not inevitably follow. Equality of commercial opportunity was called the principle of the "Open Door" (page 596).

While the United States has pressed for the recognition of the principle of the Open Door in China it claims, under the Monroe Doctrine, a privileged position in the Caribbean. The critic is apt to say that the fair play which the Open Door policy implies is advocated really to supply a chance for American capital and industry — a matter of

first importance if we look at the favorable geographical position and the vast financial and industrial power of the United States. Roosevelt in 1910 recognised Japan's vital interest in Manchuria and Korea just as the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1914 recognized Japan's *special interest in China's future.* For neither could find an alternative that would avoid the stultification of American policies in the Caribbean. When the American government pressed for the evacuation of Shantung in 1919 and for the limitation of Japanese control in Manchuria, it was easy for Japanese jingoes to interpret the American policy as a deliberate attempt to dam up a natural stream of overseas emigration and to discourage Japanese industries and trade outside the archipelago.

THE END OF KOREAN INDEPENDENCE

The position of Korea (Chosen) deserves special consideration, for it occupies a key position in the Japanese territorial and strategic scheme. Though virtually independent during the greater part of its history, it has had frequently to recognize Chinese and occasionally Japanese suzerainty. In times of subjection it paid tribute and acknowledged its subordinate position by treaty. The war between Japan and China in 1894 was the direct result of competition between these two powers for the control of Korea. The Japanese victory was followed by the proclamation of Korean independence in January 1895.

Meanwhile Russia was advancing into northern China. Korea borders Manchuria for five hundred miles, and it lies between two naval bases — Vladivostok and Port Arthur — which Russia then owned. Agreements with Japan were made by Korea in 1896 and 1898, ostensibly to give equal opportunities; but by taking advantage of internal political dissensions, the Russians obtained a powerful hold over the reigning king, who from 1896 to 1900 gave them valuable concessions in timber, fisheries, and ports and let them construct military roads. The result was war between Japan and Russia, and Korea became a Japanese prize of war. Promised autonomy in 1905 by treaty between Japan and Russia, Korea was annexed outright in 1910. Promised a civil administration in 1919, it is still under the control of the military authorities. One oppressive measure has followed another. Domination by an alien government has bred resentment, then violence. Japan's every act of sternness has been met by renewed hostility on the part of the Koreans. Patriotic societies have been formed, vast public protests arranged. Assassination of Japanese soldiers and officials has led to wholesale retaliatory violence by the

Japanese military forces. The material improvement of the country — afforestation of bare hillsides, the buildings of railways, the improvement of agricultural methods — does not offset the sense of humiliation that arises from the daily interference of Japanese officials in the life of the Korean people.

Corruption and weakness are the historic traits of the Koreans. They have never been able to stand alone. The price of their weakness is foreign domination, never a welcome thing, and here especially distasteful because of militaristic methods of control that have followed outright annexation of Korea by Japan.

THE PRESSURE OF POPULATION

Before we trace the latest steps in the modern expansion of Japan's power we shall do well to see the compelling forces that spring from her domestic situation. One of the oldest and most powerful of the basic causes of war is an unequal birth rate on opposite sides of a boundary line. From the great migrations of history down to the recent World War, men have always looked across their international line-fences and envied the wealth or feared the strength of their neighbors. Germany, for instance, had more than 65,000,000 people and France had less than 40,000,000 in 1914, and their areas were but little different.

Japan must overflow her boundaries, if not by people then by exports. The average size of a farm is two and a half acres. Her farmers must make an acre of land feed four persons. Already numbering over 60,000,000, the birthrate of 32 per thousand, minus losses, means an annual increase of 700,000.

Before Japan was opened to European trade her people had by long experience learned to be self-sustaining. They cultivated every available spot and lived frugally. With the growth of foreign trade the Japanese were able to export some of their products and import food, with an immediate improvement in standards of living. To extend these advantages they were required to increase their trade still more, and this invited both territorial expansion and the stimulation of industry. Disproportionate city growth was the logical consequence of increased industrialization.

Though the population of Japan has increased 12 per cent in the last decade, the land under cultivation has increased but 5 per cent, the rice production but 4 per cent. The effect is seen in an increasing stream of imported foodstuffs. In 1922 Japan imported $3,000,000 of Canadian wheat, in 1926 more than $16,000,000. Like the rest of the world,

Japan has been caught in a wave of rising prices, increased taxation, and other war effects familiar to western peoples. The World War enriched a small class. It pushed along the democratic movement at a rapid rate and the social structure has been strained by the new political and social ideas that industrialism brings in its train. A restless industrial class has naturally followed upon the flow of rural population to the cities. This restlessness has been paralleled in the country by rural discontent and by a lack of tenants for landed proprietors. More than 2,000,000 laborers are employed in Japanese factories, and while the government has opposed the organization of labor unions, at least a beginning has been made and has to be taken



FIG. 206. Sketch map of the population density of Japan and Korea, 1913. For an interpretation of the statistics of 1925 see the *Geographical Review*, Vol. 18, 1928, page 375.



FIG. 207. Climatic Zones of Japan. From E. M. Sanders, *Monthly Weather Review*, July 1920.

into account in framing national policies.

Only about one sixth of Japan's total area of 176,000 square miles (including Formosa, but not Korea) is under cultivation, because so much of it is too cold for typical Japanese agriculture — and a large part of the rest is mountainous. Her poets sing the praises of Fujiyama, but the mountain cannot grow rice.

What environmental bonds hold Japan to the use of so small a part of its island base? Figure 207 represents the zonal arrangement of the climatic conditions of Japan proper. It shows clearly how small is the territory so favored by climate that it will support a dense population. Though the four main islands of Japan (Fig. 206) have an area of only 137,000 square miles, or less than the equivalent of either Montana (146,000 square miles) or California (155,000 square miles), they are called upon to support a population half as large as that of the United States (that is, more than 60,000,000, not counting Korea's 19,000,000 or Formosa's 4,000,000).

The central and southern climatic zones of the Japanese islands are the seats of the densest populations and most of the largest cities. The southern part of the central zone is distinguished as a two-crop region, rice in summer and wheat in winter. The southern zone is semitropical, and three crops a year can be raised. In the northern zone, where colonization is most active, the climate is marked by extreme temperatures. The average winter temperature is below freezing. The summer temperatures range between 60° and 70° F. There is also a deficiency of rainfall; for the annual average is here less than 20 inches in contrast to a constantly increasing precipitation towards the south. The eastern side of the central zone is naturally

the best favored, with a rainy summer season and less cloudiness and fog than the western side of the main island. With these limitations of the natural environment, the Japanese people must create a new commercial and industrial environment at home or emigrate. They have chosen to do the former, though this means that their social and political organization will be subjected to new strains of increasing intensity.

Desiring to keep the population together under one flag, the leaders of Japan have sought to provide both land and business opportunities. To aid production and industry, Japan has created a Department of Agriculture and Commerce, which plans to assist manufacturers in the solution of problems of industry and export trade. The department is authorized to grant liberal subsidies. Japanese shipping subsidies are among the largest in the world. Great shipyards have been built recently. On raw materials imported into Japan there are rebates, and these enable the Japanese manufacturers to compete successfully with European countries and with America in many lines of trade in China. In some cases the government guarantees a certain percentage of profit on home manufactures.

It would be easy to suppose that these enlightened measures are the result of that western influence which is supposed to activate Japanese policy; but the truth is that Japanese leaders have been forced to study their economic situation more closely for pressing domestic reasons. During the two centuries before Japan was opened to western commerce the population had been markedly stationary. Since then it has grown with increase in the variety of foods imported, the rise of industries, and the growth of city populations. As the increasing population pressed upon food resources, Japanese emigration first made itself felt to a marked degree, though by comparison with the great streams of transatlantic migration the Japanese stream was but a tiny brook. Since the World War the rate of population increase has shown no abatement. For each of the years 1926 and 1927 it amounted to about a million persons. The feebleness of Japanese emigration as a source of relief for the mounting population is readily seen in the statistics for 1922, 1923, and 1924, which show a total Japanese emigration overseas of 8728, 6506, and 11,670, respectively. Fluctuations in the price of rice and the increasing cost of this staple food have occasionally resulted in riots, as in 1920. If the price of rice goes up the city populations are panicstricken; if it falls the farmers are in despair. Laws had to be designed to prohibit undue profiteering, revise the customs tariff, and stimulate imports; and the government had at last to

appoint a commission to investigate the problems of population and food supply in relation to the economy of the country as a whole.

MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA AS OUTLETS FOR JAPAN

Not by trade alone is empire to be extended. Westward across the Sea of Japan are fair lands thinly populated. Manchuria and Mongolia are empires in geographical extent, far larger than Japan, and in parts of them are fertile plains with a temperate zone climate — a land capable of supporting a dense population and as yet only in a pioneer stage of development. There are vast pastures for the production of meat and wool, two products that in the past fifteen years have become increasingly and alarmingly scarcer in the world. The soya bean production has been extended to more than 5,000,000 acres. There are oil and coal and iron, and her supply of these things Japan, with rapidly growing industries, desires to augment. To the surprise of the policy makers, Japanese colonists went into Manchuria in small numbers. The Japanese population is even now after twenty years of encouraged colonization only 65,000 out of a total of 20,000,000, and is limited mostly to town dwellers. Overcrowded Shantung has been the chief source of Chinese emigration to Manchuria. The Japanese farmer cannot compete with the Chinese settler, and his object is not to find a new home but to make money rapidly and return to his native land.

On the other hand Manchuria affords Japan a highly favorable strategic position on the continent. It enables her to secure preferential terms for her manufactured goods; and what is of greatest importance, it enables her to control agricultural and mineral resources capable of large exploitation. The coal mines are in Japanese hands. Not only is it a strategic and economic hinterland to Korea (now definitely annexed to Japan); it was here that Japan learned how important was the possession of Manchuria if the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway were not to invite armed hosts to the western shores of the Sea of Japan. China cannot control the region, though sovereignty nominally resides in the Chinese government today. If Japan were to withdraw, this great pioneer region of fertile plains, temperate zone products, rich mines and forests would come under Russian control. The exports to Japan would be in Russian hands, and Russian capital would guide development.

Here also we have the key to the Japanese policy with respect to the Chinese Eastern Railway. If Russia controls it, the terminus, Vladivostok, becomes the center of two converging lines, the Trans-Siberian

or Amur Railway and the Chinese Eastern. Railway building, as in all pioneer countries, is the key to development and exploitation. It is also of the first order of importance from a military point of view. It is therefore not surprising that Japan should have engaged upon a far reaching railway program in Manchuria to serve these purposes. The South Manchurian Railway has been in Japanese possession since 1905.

No amount of pressure on the part of European powers has enabled them to relax Japan's hold on Manchuria. Among the Twenty-one Demands, as originally presented to China in January 1915, the one relating to Manchuria has quite special significance. After the Russo-Japanese War the original lease to Southern Manchuria by Russia was transferred to Japan. The lease was made in 1898 for a period of twenty-five years with expiry in 1923. One of the demands provided for an extension of this lease for ninety-nine years. Since this was not a wholly new claim but one that continued a treaty right which Japan had enjoyed for eighteen years, it was diplomatically difficult if not impossible to defeat the claim at the Washington Conference. Moreover, at that conference the Japanese representatives finally yielded on the question of Chinese property that they had taken from Germany, and particularly on the question of Shantung. The result was that both the Chinese and the American delegates decided not to press for a change in the status of Japan in Manchuria.

JAPAN'S POSITION IN CHINA

Japan's interest in China became established largely through commercial activities in former spheres of influence. Outside of Manchuria, these spheres have become less definite upon the map as a result of the present disorder in China and the Washington Conference, except that investments already made — for example, in the iron works and textile mills — will ultimately give Japanese merchants substantial advantages. The contracting parties at the conference agreed to maintain the principle of equality of opportunity for commerce and industry throughout Chinese territory and to refrain from seeking discriminatory privileges, preferences, or spheres of influence. This, however, relates to future effort. It cannot change the fact that the western powers and Japan have already invested large sums of money in China in specific places. The British have invested about $750,000,000, the Americans about $70,000,000, and Japan nearly $310,000,000. Japan's investment is not merely in loans, shipping, and banking, but in mills set up in China in order that the owners may take advantage of

cheaper Chinese labor. Her most significant possession is the Han-Yeh-Ping Iron Works of the Yangtze valley, the greatest industrial enterprise in China.

Of all the trading nations with interests in China, Japan undoubtedly occupies the position of greatest advantage. This is especially true if we regard the future. She is so firmly placed on Chinese territory that Manchuria, from a commercial standpoint, may be considered to be Japanese territory. She is in a position most quickly to make use of Chinese labor in the industrialization of China or to supply the capital to make that labor effective for Japanese owners. Mere geographical proximity has advantages of a high order since, from a military standpoint, she is able in a crisis to exert her full strength in a very short time. Her investments and political and strategic interests are in the main on the seaboard or reached by railroads of constantly increasing mileage, as in Southern Manchuria. Thus through her naval arm her military strength may be made effective and in a sense superior to that of other powers. Finally, she is of the same race, and while that may not lessen the danger of conflict between her and China it does give her a chance to gain a better understanding of the fundamentals of Chinese life and political spirit. It by no means follows that her statesmen will be wise enough to take advantage of such knowledge. Not the least of her advantages is her excellent moral position in relation to the other powers, with whom she has worked on Far Eastern questions in a spirit of willingness and compromise that forms one of the most striking examples of adaptation in recent diplomatic history.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE TREATY OF 1925

For the present, Russian and Japanese relations are by no means in a settled state, despite the treaty of January 1925 whereby Japan recognized the Soviet government and resumed diplomatic relations. We have mentioned the steady pressure throughout Russian history for warm-water ports (page 452), and that struggle may be expected to continue in the Far East with an intensity that may be roughly measured by the populations that come into being and the resources that may be exploited in the hinterland of the Amur region. It will inevitably result that the interest of these populations, with Russia behind them, will demand increasing rights and privileges and a freer flow of commerce than may be obtained in the present situation of the Russian Far East vis à vis Japan. These things are in the nature of permanent forces. They take but little account of the expressed recognition by

Russia in the treaty of 1925 of Japan's need for access to natural resources in the Far East. Nevertheless Japan is temporarily in a favored position as regards concessions. Specifically the most important item of the treaty is the provision that Japanese firms may secure concessions in the northern, or Russian, part of the island of Sakhalin for half the oil fields and for agreed coal fields for 40 to 50 years, the Russian government to receive royalties of 5 to 15 per cent.

JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

Japan will still continue to be dependent upon the United States for a large part of her oil supply and upon the East Indies for the remainder, except as the Sakhalin oil fields, of uncertain production, may supply a part of her need. More than 40 per cent of the total exports of Japan is silk and 90 per cent of the silk export is to America. Equally dependent is Japan upon the United States and China for cotton, on Australia for wool, and on Malaysia for rubber and sugar. However aggressive Japanese merchants may be, there is nothing in trade expansion as such that need cause fear of war. War is brought about not by trade, but (in part) by the special privileges that trade may come to enjoy. With her dense population and low standard of living, Japan has found that she can manufacture much more cheaply many things which she had long imported, even though she must import both the raw materials and the fuel required to manufacture them. Despite her poverty of natural resources and her inability to lead an independent economic existence, Japan is steadily becoming industrialized. While this means an increase in potential military power, it is also true that that military power cannot be exercised on a large scale without wrecking the whole commercial structure that Japan has reared. Japan could only go to war with a minor power and with the moral approval of the great powers. She could not herself engage in war with a first-class power, and least of all with the United States, without closing her principal overseas source of supply of essential raw materials and wiping out her markets. The entire economic life of Japan would be disrupted, if not wrecked. Moreover, while the nation might have stood the strain of such extreme measures in times past, it can hardly do so now; for the new suffrage laws have increased the electors from 3 to 10 millions. Though its government may be centralized, it is highly efficient. As political power becomes distributed among the crowded millions of Japan whose welfare is increasingly dependent upon world commerce, the military influence in Japanese politics must inevitably decline in favor of the commercial.

(B) China's Immediate Problems

China confronts six major problems, any one of which would be of serious import even to a well-organized government:

(1) The Chinese people are in the midst of an internal political and military struggle, the end of which is still in doubt.

(2) Financial arrangements must be made with foreign capitalists that will enable the Chinese people to develop their resources in a manner favorable to Chinese interests and with a minimum of outside political control.

(3) China has not yet ceased to fear aggression by the western powers, who have taken treaty ports, concessions, and territory in the past. (For example, Great Britain was ceded the island of Hongkong in 1842 after the Opium War; Germany took Kiaochow in 1897; Russia took Port Arthur in 1898.) It is true that the Washington Conference promised respect for Chinese sovereignty; but the powers signatory to the treaties of 1922 also agreed among themselves to maintain the principle of equality in the development of Chinese industrial and commercial opportunities — that is, equality as among themselves. The agreement clearly implies that China cannot take care of herself.

(4) China has Japan as a neighbor on the mainland, a proximity dreaded since the war with Japan in 1894 because of the economic stranglehold which she fears that progressive and ambitious Japan may secure, in pursuance of her "mainland" policy in eastern Asia. The absorption of Korea by Japan in 1910 is naturally disquieting to China.

(5) Russia has invaded the territory of northern China and signed treaties with regional chiefs in Mongolia and Manchuria that are designed to cut away these outer dependencies, never closely attached to China proper. Russia has also a firm hold on the Chinese Eastern Railway, which lies in a field of active economic conflict and former military conflict between rival powers, Japan and Russia.

(6) China still has her opium problem. By the treaty that closed the Opium War with England (1842), the opium trade was restricted and later abolished; but the illicit introduction of opium and morphia continues, to the great harm of the people. By the Opium Convention of 1912 the powers were to put further and more stringent restrictions upon the opium trade. The Third International Opium Conference of 1914 sought means of putting the Convention in operation, but the war interrupted the conclusion of effective arrangements, though repeated attempts have sought to lay the foundations of ultimate agreement.

CHINA AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION

How came China to her present unfortunate pass? The Chinese were a highly civilized nation when the Europeans were still in the Bronze Age. With her external commerce dependent upon sailing vessels, cut off by lofty mountains and vast deserts from western civilization, China developed a culture much higher than that of surrounding countries. She was a civilized nation in contrast to the barbarians far beyond her frontiers. Japan borrowed much from her. But the Chinese were isolated and, following Confucius, their greatest philosopher, extremely pacifistic. Until quite recent times they have scorned soldiering. The Chinese despised the "foreign devils"; they desired to be left alone. All of this might be sound philosophy if the rest of the world would leave them alone in return.

When the impact of western civilization came, China was unprepared to meet it. In her own eyes her culture was superior to that of the alien. She had lived long in a state of complacency and self-sufficiency. It took her defeat in the Opium War (1839–1842) to bring her for the first time to a sense of the new realities, and she had no cultural or political resources to meet the danger. The governing class was recruited by competitive examinations from all grades of society, not, as in Japan, from an aristocracy. It was the distinguishing mark of the Japanese aristocracy that it kept its identity and solidarity however much it changed its cultural and technical equipment in the process of westernization. Holding fast to a Confucian heritage, China rejected western ideas, futilely sought to expel the foreigner in the Boxer rebellion of 1900, became always more deeply involved with the powers, and ended by rejecting her own rulers in the revolution of 1911. Only when it was quite too late did she attempt to throw off altogether and by violence the servitudes of years. In the same period she broke with her own past and with the powers and all that they implied.

Chinese officials are notoriously corrupt. And corruption is bound to be a dangerous quality in an unlettered democracy breaking with old traditions. Japan tried to take advantage of this weakness by pouring millions into the government of Peking to obtain concessions and special privileges, following the 1911 revolution. The Chinese leaders know each other perfectly well, and to know is to distrust when money is involved. Political disintegration was bound to follow; even under the monarchical régime there was no really effective concentration of government at Peking. Moreover, local not national patriotism is characteristic of the Chinese people, so far as they have

any patriotism at all. The ignorance of the mass of the people and the general lack of means of communication favor the separatist policies of local leaders in periods of general disorder. In the absence of a network of railways, wagon roads, and telegraph lines, there can be no development of that public spirit upon which national solidarity depends. In fact, there is little community spirit. The local patriot finds each man shut within his own house and unwilling to join any measures for village protection. The result is that organized banditry finds here a fresh field and an unresisting population. To add to the difficulties of life, public funds are employed for war. The dikes fall into disrepair and flood and famine ensue.

Before western civilization had affected China's autonomy, the country was in a self-sufficient state. Though 85 per cent of the Chinese are engaged in agriculture and though the artisan class is relatively small and scattered, the whole in normal times formed a balanced economic system that might be upset by a great catastrophe such as a flood, a drought, a plague of locusts, or a local civil war, but that did very well until foreign wares came into Chinese markets. Western traders made their first wide deployment through the sale of cotton and opium. Oil fuel is now equally widely distributed. Then the foreigner built railways and introduced steamers upon the navigable rivers. When cotton was introduced it altered the delicate balance between supply and demand in many Chinese centers. When the railway came, it displaced thousands of porters, just as the steamers took away the jobs of the trackers. The effect would have been much more widely felt and might have been disastrous had it not been for the small railroad mileage (less than 7000 miles now existing) and the isolation which primitive transportation imposed on distant provinces. These must still live as self-contained economic and industrial units. But the result of the disturbance is sufficient to cause the Chinese to reflect bitterly upon the changes that have taken place, to blame the foreigner for them, and to do everything in their power to eliminate him and curtail his activities. This is the situation as it presents itself today to the western powers, who insist upon keeping what they have gained in China, whereas China insists on the elimination of the foreigner without knowing or apparently caring at what terrible cost the modern installations of China would come to an end or pass into corrupt and inefficient hands. A merchant fleet and the facilities of commerce and trade cannot be created overnight. We have only to recognize the effect of such a check in the flow of goods to realize that new treaty arrangements and violent changes in the customs schedule are

matters not for China alone but for the powers with which her history, rightly or wrongly, has been so intimately connected for the past half century.

Seen from this point of view, the present situation in China takes on a deeper significance. The disorder is not one that can be left to the Chinese on the principle that they must maintain order in their own house. Nor can it be left to individual powers to deal with the Chinese as they see fit, since the merchants of all the powers are interested parties. Nor can the matter be left to China and the powers to work out as they will, because China is weak and the powers are strong. Of course, in the last analysis no one but China can make China respected. But an arrangement whereby international supervision is given the final settlement would be from every standpoint the most likely to lead to justice for the Chinese.



FIG. 208. The area of China compared with the United States. Note the length of the Great Wall. Note the key in the lower left-hand corner which locates a few American cities for comparison.

POTENTIAL WEALTH

It is the great wealth of China that attracts foreign countries to her. She is the world's largest producer of antimony, supplying 75 per cent of the total consumption. She has large tungsten and oil deposits. Her iron and coal deposits are among the largest in the world that have not yet been developed. The iron-ore reserves aggregate nearly a billion tons, or about one fifth the amount of iron-ore reserves of present commercial grade in the United States. While it is true that only a fraction of this total is of commercial grade and sufficiently near transportation lines to be made available, there is the possibility that additional deposits may be found. It is estimated that the coal reserves form nearly a quarter of the world's supply; but little of it is coking coal, and some of the largest reserves are in regions so remote that their development must wait upon the distant and uncertain future. Both iron and coal in a raw or natural state are bulky products and

they cannot be shipped indefinitely far. In fact, the whole modern tendency is to concentrate the great iron and steel works in a few regions, rather than scatter them about in conformity with the geographical distribution of the separate deposits. Japan imports Chinese coal and iron, but that is as far as China's two greatest industrial minerals may be sent. If Japan were well supplied with coal and iron, her nearness to the Chinese market and the low standard of living of her people would diminish the value of China's coal and iron deposits. But Japan herself has such small reserves of both coal and iron that her industrial development is greatly hampered and her future limited. To such an extent is this true that Japan is exploiting her iron reserves in Korea and is experimenting with the concentration of low-grade ores in Manchuria. She also controls about 90 per cent of the available reserves of iron ore in China, chiefly in the Yangtze River valley and in the region northwest of Peking.

The commercial value of the Chinese realm is not to be measured alone by the raw materials upon which modern industry is based, but upon China as a market. To say that her reserves of iron and coal are so small that she cannot compete with the industrialized west is to say little. China has the largest cheap labor supply in the world, and in proportion to her supply of important raw materials she has the smallest railway system. If her reserves of iron, coal, and other minerals are even moderately developed, the transformation will be brought about through railroad building. Just as soon as railroads have been spread over the provinces having the densest population (Fig. 209), exchange of goods will follow on an increased scale. It is not at all necessary for the Chinese people to become industrialized, in the sense in which the western nations use the term, to increase vastly their absorbing capacity for western goods; for this capacity is measured not alone by the coal and iron that is produced but by elevation of the standard of living. A fractional change in this respect among but a quarter of the Chinese people would produce an immense augmentation of commercial exchange. Should China become industrialized *even to a moderate degree*, her commercial power would be incalculable. Though her lands spread from the subtropic south to the temperate north, at least two thirds of her population of 400,000,000 live in a coastal belt a few hundred miles wide. They have only begun to spread into the pioneer lands of the north, and they have not yet in any modern sense made use either of fertile lands that may be developed or of great rivers valuable alike for irrigation and for commerce; nor have they commercial interchange upon a basis of equality with foreign merchants.

The Chinese need no war to enlarge their territory. They need to exploit their mineral resources and adopt western methods of tillage upon underdeveloped land. Not conquest abroad but coöperation at home is the great need. Of 700,000,000 acres of arable land that it is possible to occupy in China (outer dependencies included), only 180,000,000 acres are now cultivated. The limitation of hoe culture is especially significant — two or three acres at the most — whereas much of the undeveloped land is of a sort that requires modern machinery. With its use there might come as great an economic change in China as would be effected by the development of mineral deposits on a large scale.

OVERPOPULATION

The greatest handicap of Chinese life, blocking progress towards industrialism, bringing disaster in the form of famine, and helping to



Fig. 209. The density of population in China, by provinces. Note the position of Shantung and Korea and compare with Figure 204. Based on statistics in the *Statesman's Year-Book* and other sources.



FIG. 210. The immense concentration of population in the broad coastal belt of China, the very low railway mileage of the country, and the importance of river transportation, all furnish a background for an understanding of the significant hold which European nations have on Chinese trade as a result of their control of 2000 miles of Chinese coast.

make the Chinese people inert and easy to exploit, is the crowded condition of the population. A third of the land holdings are less than one acre in extent, and more than half are one and a half acres or less, although an acre of land is the minimum per person from the standpoint of food supply. It is estimated that more than 50 per cent of the eastern villages and 80 per cent of the northern villages have an income below the poverty line of $150 per year, this figure including crops and all other sources of income. The appalling density of population in both the rice and the wheat districts, the high birth rate, the lack of reserves of foodstuffs, the overflow of the rivers in destructive floods, especially the Yellow River, — these have all brought repeated famines in which millions have perished. Millions are perpetually in a state of semistarvation. The pioneer lands of the north have only a moderate drawing power. Many have migrated from Shantung as well as the western and northern provinces, but to the average Chinaman these distant lands have no attraction. When emigration is suggested, he replies, "Who will look after the graves of my ancestors?"

There is no other peasantry in the world that gives such an impression of absolute genuineness and of belonging so much to the soil. Here the whole of life and the whole of death takes place on the inherited ground. Man belongs to the soil, not the soil to man; it will never let its children go. However much they may increase in number, they remain upon it, wringing from Nature her scanty gifts by ever more assiduous labour. . . . The Chinese peasant, like the prehistoric Greek, believes in the life of what seems dead to us. The soil exhales the spirit of his ancestors; it is they who repay his labour and who punish him for his omissions. Thus, the inherited fields are at the same time his history, his memory, his reminiscences; he can deny it as little as he can deny himself; for he is only a part of it. KEYSERLING, *Travel Diary of a Philosopher.*

The economic advances of outside nations have penetrated the whole economic life of China. With strong navies and a determined policy, these nations have demanded and obtained "rights," concessions, exemptions, franchises, almost innumerable. They have established open ports (Fig. 210), supervised the use of borrowed money, sought administrative control of territory adjacent to the railways (over which they have practically sovereign control), secured exclusive exploitation privileges, exempted themselves from Chinese taxes on imported material, and even maintained separate post offices. Between 1894 and 1898 the struggle for concessions reached its climax, and each one of the big European powers got its sphere of influence in China.

We have described in detail the steps taken by Japan. British

FIG. 211. French Indo-China and French and British spheres of influence in Siam, a buffer state.

interests in China, maintained from the first, took on a political character in 1834 when the East India Company's monopoly of the Chinese trade was ended and direct supervision of the trade of China was assumed by the British government. From that date until the Opium War of 1840–1842 Great Britain was able to make her military power felt in China and to overcome the traditions of isolation and superiority that had been the basis of Peking's policy. The island of Hongkong was ceded to the British, and Canton and Shanghai were opened to foreign trade. There was also an agreement that a customs duty of 5 per cent on both imports and exports should be put into effect. With the treaty of Nanking which closed the Opium War the principle of extraterritoriality began its work in Chinese affairs, for provision was made that British nationals should be punished by British officials.

Like other European powers, Germany sought a share in the land and trade of China. Her control of the lost territory of Kiaochow became complete. A German postal service was established, and Germany pursued a policy similar to that which Russia followed in Manchuria and the French in Yunnan. France likewise obtained a privileged economic position by the treaties of 1885 and 1887. She acquired a sphere of influence in southern China and special tariff arrangements for goods passing between Tonking and the provinces of Yunnan and Kwangsi. The treaty of 1885 forced China to give up entirely her sovereignty over Annam in favor of France. By the convention of 1895 France also obtained special privileges for railways in southern Chinese territory, thus providing for railway penetration comparable in its objects to that of Russia and Japan in Manchuria, and closing the door to other European and to American trade.

By 1899 the invasion of Chinese rights had gone so far that it looked as if commercial advantage in weak and powerless China could be

gained only by holding spheres of influence and by forcing through special discriminatory treaties. The territorial and political integrity of China was believed to be at an end. The powers were all of one mind: they were out to take whatever they could get.

It was as if the Russians and the English had just seized rival reservations on Long Island and the Jersey coast, commanding New York City; as if the English had wrenched away Charleston; the Germans, Philadelphia; the French, New Orleans; and Cossacks were garrisoned in strategic points throughout New England. It was as if the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railway were manned and guarded by Slavs, the New York Central by Belgians, the Pennsylvania by Prussians; as if the Pittsburg mines were handed over *en bloc* to an English corporation, and the Russians had exclusive mining rights to the gold of Alaska's Yukon region. BATES

THE TREATY PORTS

At the beginning of the 19th century Canton was the only port open to European trade. By the treaty of Nanking, which closed the Opium War (1840–1842), the Chinese opened five treaty ports to European powers, Japan, and the United States, for foreign residence and trade, and ceded Hongkong to the British. Since then China has opened, or has been compelled to open, a large number of other ports. In Manchuria, since 1900, she has opened a number of treaty ports under pressure from Japan; since 1898 she has voluntarily opened a number of desirable ports, with a view to keeping them under Chinese control. Of this class (among others) is the town of Chinwangtao, the winter port of Tientsin. There are no foreign concessions in the voluntarily opened ports; in them the international settlement, or "trade quarter" where foreigners reside, is under Chinese administration. At present China has 56 regular treaty ports and 8 voluntarily opened ports, 25 ports of call, and 16 frontier caravan stations, or marts.

Among Great Britain's Chinese concessions are Amoy, Canton, Hankow, Tientsin, and Shanghai (Fig. 210). Japan has concessions at Amoy, Foochow, Hangchow, Hankow, Newchwang, and Tientsin. Russia had concessions at Hankow, Newchwang and Tientsin; France at Canton, Hankow, Shanghai, and Tientsin. Belgium and Italy have concessions at Tientsin; and Germany and Austria-Hungary also had concessions there which were surrendered by the terms of the treaties of Versailles (Germany) and St. Germain-en-Laye (Austria).

At each treaty port is a tract called a "concession," where foreigners reside and manage their own affairs. They levy taxes and special

charges, build churches, and own warehouses, paying a land tax to the government. Foreigners enjoy equal rights, no matter what nation operates a given treaty port. Foreigners can also be tried in courts of their own; that is, there is extraterritorial jurisdiction at the treaty ports. Cases between foreigners and Chinese are judged under the law of the defendant, who has freedom as to counsel and supervision. In Manchuria the foreigners live in so-called New Towns, built around the railway stations and subject to either Japanese or Russian administration. The ports of call differ from treaty ports in that foreigners cannot reside there or have business there, and all goods to and from ports of call must pass through a treaty port.

The seizure of ports by rival powers was accompanied by the acquisition of tributary spheres of influence which in practice became commercial zones parceled out among British, German, French, Belgian, and Japanese merchants. Not having free ports or a sphere of influence, the United States carried on its Chinese trade under great handicaps. This condition, coupled with the rivalries of the powers already established, was dangerous for all; but the vested interests had grown to be so large that for some years American insistence upon the Open Door policy had little effect.[1]

In view of the prolonged decline of government in China, it is not surprising that its judicial system became both antiquated and corrupt, two qualities which have marked Chinese administration for hundreds of years. To offset the disadvantages of corrupt practice, the powers with vested interests in China obtained extraterritorial jurisdiction which enabled them to try criminal charges against their own citizens in special courts of their own appointment. To restore China to full sovereignty requires the abolition of these rights; but the special courts can be dispensed with only if the Chinese codes of law and judicial procedure are revised and simplified and honest judges are appointed.

By the terms of a commercial treaty between the United States and China (1903), the United States undertook to assist China in the revision of the legal code and agreed to relinquish extraterritorial rights when satisfied that a real change for the better had been made. China thereupon began such revision in 1904. Cruel and unjust punishments were abolished in 1905. Trained judges were appointed.

[1] The Open Door policy, as originally framed by Secretary Hay in 1899, was an attempt to prevent discrimination against citizens of the United States in spheres of influence staked out by other powers. It became associated with the principle of the territorial integrity of China among the powers only when critical occasions led the United States to press it upon others. It became a binding agreement at the Washington Conference in 1922.

Similar improvements in the postal service, in commerce and agriculture, were halted by the increased intensity of revolutionary outbreaks following 1911, and a growing degree of impotence on the part of the central government.

From the first, China had in vogue a system of municipal tariff and other transit exactions which subjected trade, whether foreign or domestic, to great embarrassment. A revision of the complicated system came to be an imperative need. Some provinces allowed goods to enter duty free (Mongolia); some had local rebates (Manchuria). Each power pressed for special customs privileges, as in the tariff on overland trade between China on the one hand and Russia, Great Britain, France, and Japan on the other. In 1842 (treaty of Nanking) it was arranged that 5 per cent added to the regular tariff of the treaty port would exempt goods from all other dues, no matter to what place in China they were sent. Trade at non-treaty ports was subject to the old exactions. Many ports should be opened up if the mineral and soil resources are to be effectively developed.

Eventually it became the judgment of leading statesmen that there should be international coöperation with respect not only to customs but to the supervision of Chinese rights in general. There was no question but that the tariff should be revised and the regulation of it left in Chinese hands, with supervision for a time; but supervision should be by agreement among the powers, not a matter for one power alone. To that end there was held in 1918 at Shanghai an international conference which had for its object the standardizing of customs rates in order that a 5 per cent ad valorem duty might be charged, with the possibility of a higher rate to increase the national revenues. An arrangement had already been contemplated by the treaty of 1902 between China and Great Britain and by that of 1903 between China and Japan and the United States.

A step in breaking down the barriers of special privilege was the organization of the New Consortium in 1919. It was composed of a group of banks and bankers from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan, formed as an international partnership and at the request of their governments. Its object was to finance the development of transportation systems, highways, and other basic enterprises by loans to the Chinese government. By these means, it was hoped to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of China and diminish international commercial rivalries in the Far East. Future concessions by China and concessions already given, upon which substantial progress had not yet been made, were to be pooled with the

consortium so that the four banking groups already named might have an equal chance of participation. Japan sought to reserve parts of Manchuria and Mongolia from the scope of the consortium, but was finally induced to relinquish these demands except with respect to certain branch-line railway projects in southern Manchuria. The principle of the consortium, extended and reaffirmed by the Washington Conference, can only be made effective if and when a sound constitutional government is formed in China that can deal responsibly with respect to foreign capital.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

The United States has come into both conflict and coöperation with the European powers in China. She has been in conflict because she has maintained the principle of the Open Door in face of the policy of spheres of influence, special privileges, concessions, and the like, obtained from China by a few European powers as occasions of weakness offered. She has found herself coöperating with the European powers in protecting her nationals, as in the Boxer rebellion of 1900, and again in Shanghai and other treaty ports in 1926 and 1927 during the siege of that city in the progress of China's civil war. She has also coöperated with the powers in the matter of reducing the Chinese customs schedules and in the principle of the consortium mentioned above. By the Washington Conference the United States took the most important single step it has taken in the Far East since the announcement of the principle of the Open Door. At that conference Japan, Great Britain, France, and the United States definitely pledged themselves to work in harmony, foregoing individual aggression, special privileges, and spheres of influence, and substituting the principle of coöperation, to the end that there should eventually come about an independent and unified Chinese state. To so great a degree have the critics of the conference settled upon its naval features that the complete change in the status of the Chinese question has been largely overlooked. Though continued disorder in China makes the agreements of that conference with respect to China of little immediate consequence, the mere declaration of purposes and the announcement of principles make it hard for a given power to pursue an independent course of aggression in the future.

The conference is a point of departure. It is not so much what has been done as the selfish policies that have been definitely and publicly renounced that give significance to the Chinese results of the conference. Japan can afford to take a new view, because her treaty rights

in Manchuria have been recognized, and we cannot deny that she has there wide scope for further imperialistic advances. Great Britain on the other hand is content to hold what she has gained, and if peace is restored, her predominance in Chinese trade will give her great commercial advantages. France has important advantages in southern China, but she has only minor interests elsewhere. Germany is completely eliminated. So far as Japan is concerned, the danger of further aggression depends upon Russia's policy with respect to Manchuria and the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Here is a great colonizing region with a temperate zone climate, fast filling with Chinese labor. It produces cereals and the soya bean in such quantities as to be, wholly aside from its valuable minerals and forests, a valuable adjunct of empire. These resources and related privileges in Siberian and Manchurian ports and rivers, and not communistic activity in China, are the real points of conflict between Russia and Japan.

We have now reviewed the steps by which China came under foreign domination, the rivalries and special privileges of the powers that led to the insistence by the United States upon the policy of the Open Door, and the corrupt and unresponsive state of Chinese political life. If the coöperation of the powers had become necessary, it needed more than mere recognition of the fact to make them take the first step. The serious threat of war, implied by Japan's aggressive militaristic mainland policy, following the World War, proved an effective spur. The Washington Conference of 1921–1922 may have come too late to save present-day China, but at least it ended a period of real danger for the powers themselves and set up principles of conduct that cannot fail to guide later policies, whatever future China may have. Its most important results are summarized in the following paragraphs.

The Chinese Customs Tariff is the subject of a treaty signed by the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal. It was agreed:

(1) To standardize the customs duties.

(2) To make a further revision of the customs schedule of duties on imports into China, to take effect at the expiration of four years following the completion of the immediate revision provided for in the treaty.

(3) To have thereafter periodical revisions of the customs schedule every seven years.

(4) To recognize the principle of uniformity in the rates and customs duties levied on all the land frontiers as well as the maritime frontiers of China.

Supplementary to the treaties whose clauses have been briefly outlined there were passed a number of resolutions. We shall note only those that are of exceptional importance:

(1) To establish in China a Board of Reference to which may be referred for investigation and report any questions arising in connection with the execution of certain treaty articles designed to stabilize the conditions in the Far East and particularly in China itself.

(2) To assist China in its expressed desire to reform its judicial system, to the end that there may be relinquished the extraterritorial rights now existing and subversive of Chinese sovereignty.

(3) To recognize China's desire to abolish foreign postal agencies by abandoning existing special postal agencies, but only on condition that an efficient Chinese postal service is maintained.

(4) To withdraw armed forces now on duty in China in the service of the powers whenever China shall assure the protection of the lives and property of foreigners in China.

(5) To provide for the regulation of the construction and use of radio stations in the territory of China.

(6) To assist the Chinese government in unifying the railways of China and in placing them under Chinese control, with such assistance as may be necessary from foreign financial and technical advisers.

(7) To require Chinese performance of obligations toward foreign stockholders, bondholders, and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, should changes in the administration of the railway and in favor of China be brought about.

These aspirations are still ineffective because of internal disorder in China. They are only so many points of departure in the first negotiations that will give direction to Chinese policy when civil war abates.

CIVIL WAR IN CHINA

The successive steps by which China has come to its present state of partition are too complicated to present in detail. It is sufficient to point out the general situation out of which disorder sprang and the trend of events during the past fifteen years. In the first place the hold of the Peking government upon the outer provinces of China has always been weak (pages 602 to 604). For centuries the chief source of interest on the part of the central government has been revenue.

Anything that deflected the flow of revenue was an object of official concern. So long as the stream of revenue was continued the local affairs of a provincial government were left to a large degree undisturbed. The Chinese are interested primarily in their own shops and farms. Only in a limited sense is there village or community pride. This means that even regional or provincial patriotism is negligible and national patriotism exists in only a narrowly limited sense. When the disturbing events of 1911 occurred, at the fall of the Manchu dynasty, the local leaders were startled into a new frame of mind. Each sought first to control his own province; each wanted ultimately to rule China. Ambitious military leaders extended their power and instituted rival programs. China became an armed camp. The soldiers lived by plunder in part, in part by orderly requisitions paid in local coinage, but bearing heavily on the already oppressed Chinese peasant and upsetting the delicate balance of life. There was little attempt on the part of the local military leaders to improve the economic conditions, no attempt to improve the roads or, what is of more importance, to maintain the canals and river embankments. Flood and famine were a natural consequence. China has been unable to break out of this vicious circle. No leader has been able to conquer the whole of the country. There is no railway organization to transport men, food, and munitions. Lawlessness has become almost general. Bandits and soldiers have looted one province after another, the former being recruited from the latter as commanders are defeated and the soldiers find themselves turned back to civil life. Only locally has order been maintained, road building carried on, and education developed, as in Shansi, for example.

The Peking government, nominally recognized as the government of China, has virtually passed out of existence so far as national power is concerned. This means that foreign loans are impossible to get. In the meantime increasing numbers of foreign troops and ships of war are on China's rivers and in her ports to protect the foreigner, to keep open the channels of trade, to safeguard the property interests and investments of their nationals. What the end may be no one can forecast; either it lies in Chinese character or it will be settled by outsiders if the Chinese lack the requisite leadership. In the more distant future China will be what the powers decide it shall become. The crowding that has afflicted China and the lack of modern means of communication have left China a politically inert mass. It is a grave question whether there is sufficient strength of character in the Chinese leaders to enable China again to become a nation.

THE OUTER DEPENDENCIES [1]

Given general disorder, it was clear that the outer dependencies would be among the first to attempt a severance of relations with China. They have repeatedly tried to make treaties without consulting the Peking government. This policy made trouble in Mongolia even before the World War. Not only had there been a marked advance of agricultural population distasteful to the Mongols, but many of the mixed tribes had been dispossessed of their lands. It resulted that when the old dynasty fell and a republic was organized the people of free Mongolia (like Tibet) declared their independence of China.

Both Manchuria and Mongolia for a thousand years have been the scene of forward and backward movements of peoples along the line between the Great Wall and the Desert of Gobi. Here is a broad zone that forms a boundary between an agricultural civilization which the Chinese proudly call "The Middle Kingdom" and a pastoral, nomad civilization of a barbarian type held in contempt by the Chinese. It was a Manchu leader (of Manchuria) who in 1644 overthrew the Ming dynasty and established in Peking the Manchu power, which continued until the Revolution of 1911.

Manchuria, though in process of colonization for fifty years, is still in a pioneer state of development. It has excellent agricultural land not yet occupied or but thinly populated. It has important iron deposits, and its timber lands lying near the sea are an object of special interest to Japan. There are also the interests of its 20,000,000 inhabitants to take into account. China enters as a third party, first because the territory is hers in nominal sovereignty, second because it may serve as an outlet for her crowded populations. Her repeated efforts to safeguard her rights have been ineffectual. Finally, the region is strategically related to Inner Mongolia, where there exist possibilities of pioneer settlement extending as far southwestward as Shansi. The whole extent of this active frontier is hardly less than a thousand miles. The Chinese call Inner Mongolia "the country of long grass." Here pastoral Mongols form the indigenous population. The country lies outside the Great Wall and for that reason did not attract Chinese farmers in large numbers until about fifty years ago. During the interval the plowed land has been extended northwest at the rate of a mile a year and the scattered agricultural population has moved even faster (page 582).

[1] For the present status of Tibet see pages 562 to 564.

China cannot possess the land in a permanent way through the colonization of her own people without periodically facing Russia in making decisions regarding land and railways and concessions that lie close to her long frontier, the boundary with Russia forming the longest international boundary in the world. When we consider that this boundary lies far from the seat of both central governments and that the distant Chinese provinces are thinly populated but highly valuable both economically and strategically, we are not surprised that quick and sweeping changes should take place in the politico-geographical situation from year to year. To the effect of distance should be added that of terrain: a large part of the territory is wild mountain and desert country and the most valuable part is newly developed land, as in northern Manchuria and eastern Siberia. We have also to remember that the political systems were entirely changed on both sides of the boundary, Russia's in 1917–1918 and China's in 1911. Protracted internal revolution followed the ending of the Manchu dynasty as revolution in Russia followed the abdication of the Czar. Naturally there has been uncertainty upon the distant frontiers.

No matter how revolutionary are the changes of the moment, the evolution of a people always reflects the historic past. The power of the Manchu dynasty was exercised but feebly in the outer marches of the vast Chinese Empire, and the China of today exhibits the same weak hold upon its peripheral regions, which are preoccupied by local affairs and are not tied to the eastern seats of population by railroads, wagon roads, or even canals. The allegiance of Tibet was always doubtful and Chinese sovereignty has long been but a shadow there. The same may be said of Outer Mongolia, where Russia in 1911, at the outbreak of the Chinese revolution, began aggressive measures and then negotiations which ended (November 1913) in the recognition by China of the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, a recognition that was confirmed in the Tripartite Convention of Kyakhta (June 1915), signed by representatives of China, Russia, and Outer Mongolia. By the terms of these treaties and agreements Russia gained a privileged position in autonomous Mongolia. Chinese troops were not to be admitted there nor Chinese subjects allowed to colonize the land. Russia promised to *assist* Mongolia to maintain an autonomous régime. Russians were to be allowed to move about freely, conduct any business they chose, export and import without the payment of duties or local taxes, and enter into agreements with the Mongolian government for the working of mineral and timber lands, fisheries, and the like. There were also special rights of pasturage.

But the ties that have bound Outer Mongolia to China for over two hundred years could not be set aside so lightly and Chinese rather than Russian trade continued to flourish. The chaotic conditions in Russia following revolution, and the threat upon Mongolia's frontiers, as well as the disorder that had crept into Mongolia, led to an appeal from that province to the Chinese government to restore the old order, which request was granted in a presidential mandate in November 1919.

The internal reorganization of Russia and her difficulties with her European neighbors led to a wide restriction of ambitions and power in the East, with the consequence that the Mongolian agreements came to naught, though they were designed, as the texts clearly show, to turn Mongolia into a Russian province. Proceeding on a new principle and with greater caution, the Soviet government came to an agreement with China on 17 June 1924, in a treaty which recognized Outer Mongolia as an integral part of the Republic of China and respected Chinese sovereignty therein, the troops of Russia being subsequently withdrawn. There were mutual undertakings to demarcate the national boundaries, to use rivers and lakes on the frontier on a basis of equality and reciprocity, and to renounce special rights and privileges and all concessions acquired by the Czarist government in the past. Russia agreed to relinquish the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction.

CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

Perhaps the most important feature of the agreement of 1924 relates to the Chinese Eastern Railway; for here we have not only a modern instrument of colonization, penetration, and war; but linked up with it by rail and opposed to it in policy we find the South Manchurian Railway connecting directly with the port of Dairen and long recognized as a most important asset of Japan in the extension of her power, economic and political, in the rich territory of Manchuria. The Chinese Eastern Railway was a term originally applied to the whole railway system of Manchuria, built by the Russians in accordance with the terms of agreement between China and the Russo-Chinese Bank in 1896. It was designed to make a short cut from Manchuli near the Manchuria-Siberia border straight across to Vladivostok, avoiding the route around the Amur and the Ussuri rivers, which was several hundred miles longer. A branch at Harbin ran southwest to Mukden and continued thence to Dairen and Port Arthur at the end of the Liao-tung Peninsula. The corporation known as the Chinese Eastern Railway was a joint stock company with private funds, like the bank

that financed the building of it. The Chinese government was given certain special rights, was to receive annually a certain sum of money, and was after eighty years to obtain the railway free of cost. The Russian government was not to interfere in what was designed on the part of China to be a purely commercial enterprise. Thus Russia, taking advantage of the close of the war between Japan and China and the willingness of Germany and France to join with her in restricting Japanese ambitions in South Manchuria, was able to engineer, ostensibly in the form of a private enterprise, another imperialistic advance; for by the terms of the agreement the zone of the railway had extraterritorial privileges and Russia might have her own troops, police arrangements, and courts. In 1898 the original concession was extended to include a line from Harbin south to Port Arthur at the tip of the Liao-tung Peninsula, and both the peninsula and its ports were leased to Russia for twenty-five years. Following the Boxer troubles of 1900, Russia saw her opportunity to distribute troops throughout Manchuria and withdraw them, if indeed she would withdraw at all, only when China agreed to humiliating conditions. The consequence was the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905 and the elimination of Russia from South Manchuria. Thereafter South Manchuria was recognized by Russia as a Japanese sphere of influence and North Manchuria was recognized by Japan as a Russian sphere of influence, each having its own railway system, each waiting a favorable time in which to extend its territorial control.

When Russia became disorganized following the revolution of 1917–1918, Japan sent an army of more than 70,000 men into Siberia and overran Russian territory as far as Lake Baikal. She was prevented from seizing the Chinese Eastern Railway only by the organization of an Interallied railway board. After 1 November 1922 the Interallied board ceased to function, and the railway was operated under a board of directors with a Chinese president and a Russian general manager. Thus affairs stood until June 1924. Then a new treaty was signed between Russia and China which declared the Chinese Eastern Railway to be a commercial enterprise. It was further agreed that all the shares and bonds of the railway should be transferred to China; but these promising phrases are neutralized by the further stipulation that the rights of the two governments arising out of the original contract of 1896 for the construction of the railway should be maintained without prejudice to Chinese sovereignty. Seizing a time when China was at odds with the powers who enjoyed exceptional privileges upon her soil, Russian agents persuaded China

that Russian friendship was sincere and philanthropic, since the Chinese Eastern Railway was to come into the possession of China without compensation. Extraterritorial rights were given up and the Boxer indemnity payments were waived by Russia. Now the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919 had left Shantung in Japanese hands, and remembering all the servitudes that have been described on preceding pages, China listened to the voice of Russia and made the agreement of 1924, with the understanding that any future discussion concerning details should be between themselves to the exclusion of any third party or parties.

A subsequent treaty between the Soviet government and the Mukden government — that is, the government of General Chang Tso-ling, the Manchurian war lord — followed the lines of the treaty of June 1924 between Peking and Moscow. Describing his territory as "The Government of the Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China," Chang Tso-ling proceeded to deal with Russia on his own account. Again there was agreement to settle the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway without reference to third parties, China to have the right to redeem the railway at any time with Chinese capital at the end of sixty years, not eighty years as in earlier agreements. So much of the future of the whole affair was left to commissions and conferences that it is clear that the text of these treaties means very little and that the whole field is still open to political manœuvering. Russia still retains the general managership of the railway and listens only at convenient moments to the claims and demands of Chinese authority.

Thus General Chang was able to deal with Russia on his own account, since he found himself most advantageously placed from a political point of view between two powerful rivals, Japan and Russia, from which advantages of great importance could be alternately derived. The situation is especially important in gauging the true relations between Japan and Russia, for it is in Manchuria that their real interests clash. Only in general treaties do these two nations speak in engaging terms of their undying friendship. The real issues are never lost sight of by the leaders of either country. On the part of Japan is the desire to pursue a mainland policy which would put into her hands the resources of northern China under the most advantageous conditions and enable her to invest capital for the development of those resources. At the same time her railroads and ports prevent that emergence of Russia upon the shores of the Yellow Sea that brought such instant and emphatic protest in 1905. On the other hand is Russia, whose Far Eastern policy is concerned not merely with

a warm-water port, but also with the regaining of the commercial and strategic advantages she once enjoyed in northern China and which she has now all but lost.

THE OPIUM PROBLEM

The government of China has been fighting the use of opium for the past two hundred years, first in a half-hearted way and latterly by every available means, seeing that the traffic has reached such proportions that it threatens to undermine the whole character of the Chinese people. By 1917 the cultivation of the poppy had stopped. Ten years before, China had concluded an agreement with Great Britain providing for an annual reduction of 10 per cent in the exports of Indian opium to China, China's own production of opium to be steadily diminished.

In the later phases of the opium question China has become involved with the other powers in differences of opinion and of policy through a set of circumstances that we shall now examine, for they illustrate clearly the helpless position of China today and the difficulties that the powers have, especially Great Britain, in giving up profitable rights. So widespread had become the effects of the narcotic plague by the beginning of the present century and so clearly had medical science shown the effects of narcotics in undermining the mental, moral, and physical strength of a people, that the antinarcotic movement acquired a scope and strength equal to the antislavery movement in the 19th century. While the movement relates to a number of habit-forming drugs whose devastating effects are well known, it has been centered chiefly on opium. The largest producers are China, India, Turkey, and Persia.[1] The number of pounds of opium produced by these four countries in 1922 were 4,400,000, 1,955,000, 650,000, and 450,000, respectively. The remaining four opium-growing countries — Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkestan, and Afghanistan — produced only about 350,000 pounds among them. The drug is widely distributed throughout the Far East, but it is consumed on a large scale chiefly in China.

The first international step for the restriction of the traffic in narcotics was taken about 1906. On the invitation of the United States an International Opium Commission met at Shanghai in 1909.

[1] India, like China, has recognized the same evil effects of the use of opium. Both of the two great Indian leaders, Gandhi and Tagore, signed a petition to the Opium Conference at Geneva in 1924, urging action by that body; but resistance continues, again because of the rich revenue derived from opium by some of the princes of native states.

There were present the representatives of twelve other powers. An international conference on the subject of the control of opium production and trade met at The Hague in 1912, and a convention was adopted defining the type of dangerous drug to be controlled and undertaking to regulate exports and imports in those countries not yet ready for total suppression, and to prohibit import altogether in others, except for medical purposes. A third international conference met in the Netherlands, June 1914. Then came the World War, and it was only in November 1920 that the First Assembly of the League of Nations was able to establish an advisory committee on traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs. The result has been a convention which has 56 signatories; among those that have ratified, 46 are members of the League.

But there are outstanding difficulties in the administration of so comprehensive a scheme. It is clear in the first instance that a system of licensing and close administration in many unequally governed countries cannot be administered equally and that smuggling on remote and ill-guarded frontiers will be heavy. Restriction of production seems a more direct method of attack. Because this demands a self-denying attitude on the part of producing countries like China, Persia, Turkey, and Bolivia,[1] it is clear that only moderate effectiveness may be expected. Opposition to the plan has arisen on the part of opium growers. In China a special difficulty is the actual encouragement given to opium growing by some of the war lords, who find in it a large revenue. As an example of the difficulty of control may be cited the case of Persia. Since Persia has not ratified the 1912 convention nor adopted the import certificate system recommended by the League, the trade is uncontrolled by export licenses and is a menace of large proportions to the populations of the Far East. The Council of the League adopted recommendations calling upon governments whose ships engage in the trade of the Persian Gulf to adopt measures of control.

In the first Geneva Conference of 1922 it was maintained that the opium traffic in the Far East could hardly be stopped or smoking prohibited so long as there was illicit production of opium. China's representative replied that China was not the chief purveyor of illicit opium. In his view the principal difficulty was with nationals who enjoy extraterritorial privileges. He maintained further that the coöperation of the powers was necessary for the effective control of the use of narcotics, since it was through the nationals of these powers

[1] A principal producer of coca leaves, from which cocaine (and derivatives) is obtained.

that export, import, transshipment, and transport were controlled. He added that China in due time, and after her internal disorders had passed, would again enforce anti-opium legislation and bring it to a full stop. As a result of a second conference held in 1924 there was agreement among the powers to control the production, distribution, and export of raw opium and to limit the production of drugs to medical and scientific needs. They agreed further to control the international trade in drugs. Though China did not sign the convention, it is clearly probable that if the powers sincerely enforce the regulations upon which they have agreed China will again meet her obligations and suppress the production and control the trade of opium.

CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO

THE PACIFIC REALM, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND

The wealth of India, the Far East, and the East Indies was known to Europeans several centuries before the all-sea route thither had been pioneered by Vasco da Gama from the west and by Magellan from the east. But its control could not pass into European hands until a sea route had been discovered; for the land routes were too long and difficult from the physiographic standpoint and they were beset by incurable disorders. Illuminating in this respect is the early abandonment of the Red Sea route (followed by Covilham in 1487 on his way to India), though it involved the crossing of so small a strip of land as the Isthmus of Suez. The physical geography of Asia helped its native peoples to exclude the rest of the world until time had worked a mighty change and the European became indomitable upon the sea.

Once the key to Asiatic trade conquest had been discovered, western merchants were swift to extend their range of power. Covilham and Vasco da Gama were soon followed by other Portuguese explorers, who pushed eastward and northward as far as Japan (Pinto, 1543). The Dutch were close behind them. Spain, with the Philippines as her chief center of trade, maintained a galleon service between Manila and Acapulco in Mexico. Japan and China were closed empires. The focus of activity was southeastern Asia. Long after their discovery Australia and New Zealand were counted as of no value, and the mazes of islands and archipelagos of the vast outer Pacific were on the whole regarded as mere stations for supplying food and water to the mariner.

As in our day, the political geography of the Pacific has always been closely related to the general European conditions of diplomacy and war, and for our present purpose its successive stages need not be detailed here. The vast Portuguese possessions shrank to mere footholds, as at Macao in southern China, and at Goa and elsewhere in India. The Dutch, though ejected from South Africa, held a large part of the East Indies. Spain's sphere in the Pacific was static. Russia, as a result chiefly of Bering's expedition, broke over the northern edge of the Pacific and planted her flag in Alaska; but Siberia was too distant and extensive and Russian commercial organization too primitive to permit effective penetration of the field of eastern trade until the modern period of overland railway construction in northern China.

It was the English who won supremacy in naval power in the early colonial period and, with shrewd foresight, backed up their great chartered trading companies as pioneers of empire. India is Great Britain's chief prize, but the power of her merchants is felt in every port of the vast trade realm of the Far East and the Pacific. French interests declined after a favorable beginning and only fragments remained until the second half of the 19th century, when France seized Indo-China. Germany came later and got less, being restricted in the Pacific to relatively poor and widely spaced island possessions; and she had no hold at all in densely populated Malaysia. The United States, though winning rights in Samoa (Pagopago) as early as 1839, did not obtain tangible authority there until 1889. Hawaii in 1898 and the Philippines and Guam later in the same year were the succeeding steps in a belated advance.

Throughout the first half of the 19th century the large European nations, in the full tide of industrial organization, sought eagerly for overseas markets, in the Pacific and the Far East as elsewhere. It is significant that during this period neither the United States nor Japan, the two strongest powers bordering the Pacific, participated in the division of territory. The United States, so lately expanded westward, had cheap land and a multitude of domestic enterprises that absorbed her energies and capital. She sought extension of power on the sea only when foreign trade was needed to supplement domestic resources and to supply a wider market for the products of her expanding industrial organization. Japan, who kept her ports closed to European trade until 1854, pursued a strictly provincial policy with respect to additional territory. Her interest in the Pacific, once aroused, was long restricted to the consolidation of island holdings off the eastern Asiatic mainland, until the whole archipelago between Formosa and the Kuril Islands, with an extent of 3000 miles, was in her hands. Thereafter she looked toward the mainland and its readily exploitable people and wealth rather than toward the outer and poorer Pacific islands.

With the spread of Japanese settlers to the Philippines and Hawaii and the phenomenally rapid growth of her overseas commerce, particularly during the World War, Japan sought every possible territorial and strategic advantage. By agreement with Great Britain in 1916 she was to obtain all of Germany's islands north of the equator, while Great Britain was to have all of those south of the equator, in the event of Germany's defeat. This agreement, confirmed subsequently to the treaty of Versailles, places Japan in a new relation to the western powers.

FIG. 212. The political map of the Pacific in 1914.

EXTENSION OF JAPANESE POWER IN THE PACIFIC

Japan's position in the middle of the Pacific, where her capture of the Marshall and Caroline Islands (1914) placed her, is of great concern to the naval strategists of the United States. In earlier years the defense of American territory in the Pacific was related to the idea of the "American quadrilateral." As Figure 213 shows, this consists of four possessions, widely spaced: Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands, Alaska; Guam, 1520 miles east of the Philippines; Hawaii, 2100 miles southwest of San Francisco; and Samoa, 1600 miles northeast of New Zealand. American concern for the means of naval protection in the Pacific first manifested itself about fifty years ago, when part of Samoa became an American responsibility. There were

Fig. 213. The political map of the Pacific today. All of Germany's former possessions north of the equator were assigned to Japan as mandated territory; and those south of the equator were similarly assigned to Great Britain, to Australia, or to New Zealand. Note the distances along the sides of the "American quadrilateral."

added the Philippines and Guam in 1898, and the Panama Canal Zone in 1903. These possessions cannot be protected adequately save by holding forward bases in the Pacific. From San Juan, Porto Rico, to Manila, in the Philippines, is almost halfway around the world. To defend these widely separated areas requires a great fleet of warships, powerful squadrons of seaplanes, abundant coaling and cable facilities, and large and powerful radio stations at strategic points.

Into the midst of this area Japan has now thrust a long finger, and no sooner did she capture the Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas (Marianne) Islands and turn out the German authorities than she sought

to Japanize the local industries and increase the defensive strength of the strategic points. As the mandatory power under the League of Nations, Japan is now expected to observe certain conditions: (1) the islands are to remain unfortified; (2) their people are assured some measure of autonomy in government; (3) the commercial rights of other nationals are to be protected. The islands assigned to Japan have a total population of 57,000; their foreign trade amounts to $2,500,000 and consists chiefly of the export of copra and phosphates. Their strategical importance far outweighs their commercial value. Islands have gained in importance because of the use of airplanes and hydroplanes in modern warfare. Also, the innumerable islets and protected inland waterways that abound in the Pacific furnish ideal hiding places for submarines. The existing status of the Pacific islands is shown in Figure 213. As commercial assets, the islands outside of the East Indies and the Philippines have only moderate value.

Were the control of the Pacific a matter of strategy only, the Japanese intrusion might arouse little concern. But, unlike the European powers who hold their possessions for trade or native development of agriculture, the Japanese are themselves tropical colonizers. They form half the population of Hawaii and are spreading into the Philippines. Only the barrier of restrictive laws prevents them from figuring more largely in the population of northern Australia. Their ethnic penetration of the lands of other powers is slow and limited, but it is favored by their manner of living and the prime necessity of the white planter in the tropics of securing acclimated labor. Such penetration is watched sympathetically by the Japanese government and is made the basis for claims of equality of treatment; in case of successful war, territorial control might follow. This matters because Japan has a strong central government; Chinese or Indian penetration in the East Indies is of less political consequence because it has no military power behind it.

CONTROL OF THE PACIFIC

As coaling and cable stations, islands are important if placed near or on direct steamship routes. The United States, for example, is interested in its small scattered holdings as they assist communication between Hawaii and the Philippines. The Pacific cable of the Commercial Cable Company runs from Hawaii to a relay station at Midway, and to Yap in the Palau group. From Yap an American-British line extends northward to the Bonin Islands, where it connects with the Japanese line to Tokyo. There is also a connection at Yap with British

lines to the Chinese coast, and the American cable extending to Manila has connections with New Guinea and with Menado in the northern Celebes. Though Yap was assigned to Japan as a mandatory of the League of Nations, the interests of the United States were secured by special treaty with Japan. The United States thereby obtained free access to the island for cable laying or operation, freedom to use on terms of equality with Japanese all telegraphic and radio facilities, and equality of trading privileges.



FIG. 214. The heavy line encloses the area peopled by the yellow race in the tropics. It has settled exclusively in regions receiving over 50 inches of rain a year (shaded area). A similar climate prevails in the northern part of Australia.

It was the view of Theodore Roosevelt that the Atlantic era must soon "exhaust the resources at its command," and that the Pacific era is just at its dawn. This is far from meaning that an early decline of Atlantic power will take place even in an absolute sense. It means only that the Pacific realm is now at the beginning of a political and commercial development that is of the greatest import to humanity. This was first clearly seen in the difficulties between Japan and the United States immediately after the World War, with respect to Japanese military occupation of Eastern Siberia and persistent Japanese efforts at control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Relations became strained over the Japanese exclusion policy of the United States government (page 783), and both countries seemed in the way of increasing their naval strength on a scale justified only by the fear of conflict. So dark a threat at the end of a devastating European war quickened the consciences of leaders in every government. The result was the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 1921–1922, with the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, China, the Netherlands, and Portugal participating. It was agreed that the contracting powers should abandon their respective capital ship programs and that future building should be for replacement only. The three principal powers — the United States, Great Britain, and

Japan — adopted the 5–5–3 ratio, with France and Italy at 1.75. Subsequently the same ratios were maintained in prescribing the total tonnage for aircraft carriers. Capital ships were not to exceed 35,000 tons displacement and guns were not to exceed a caliber of 16 inches. In however unsatisfactory a state the conference may have left the question of submarines, and however little subsequent progress has been made in setting further limits to naval armament, the one great spiritual purpose of the conference was achieved. Rivals that had spoken frankly of the danger of war had taken definite measures to reduce the risks of outbreak. Of still greater significance is the fact that rivals put their signatures to a compact that cannot be broken without dishonor.

An equally significant result of the conference was the four-power treaty with reference to insular possessions and dominions of the contracting powers in the Pacific realm. The treaty provides for invitations to a conference in case a controversy should arise out of any Pacific question, and frank intercommunication is pledged that efficient measures may be taken jointly or separately to meet a dangerous situation. Though the treaty includes only four articles, it accomplishes its main purpose; that is, it publicly recognizes the possibility of war in the Pacific and establishes the principle of conference before warlike acts are performed. Agreements supplementary to the main treaties of the conference provided for the maintenance of the status quo, as between the United States, the British Empire, and Japan, with regard to fortifications and naval bases. There is to be no increase in naval facilities or coast defenses. The agreement affects their respective territories as follows:

(1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (*a*) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska, and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (*b*) the Hawaiian Islands.

(2) Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except (*a*) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (*b*) the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and (*c*) New Zealand.

(3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kuril Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Ryukyu (Liuchiu) Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.

FIG. 215. Population map of the world. Each dot represents 500,000 persons. In Australia the white man found a habitable and an almost empty continent. Distance is measured in time as well as in miles, and modern transportation has greatly shortened the time of ocean journeys. Once two months apart, Australia and India are now ten days apart, and the same is true of Australia and China or Japan. From Finch and Baker, *Atlas of American Agriculture*, 1917. See also Figure 245, page 734.

THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

If the foregoing considerations of race and power affect American opinion, how much more seriously will they be taken by the small nation of Australia with one twentieth the population! The Australian leaders have not always found British statesmen in sympathy with them, and they claim that breadth of view regarding the admission of aliens is possible only in proportion as one is geographically removed from the menace of colored immigration. We turn to those special aspects which the problem wears in the white man's lands of the southern Pacific.

There are two British possessions — Australia and the Union of South Africa — in which the political problems of the time depend not so much upon the physical setting of the race as upon public opinion with respect to the exclusion of other races. In South Africa, the problem is to keep the colored population within the broad coastal zone on the east, where the climatic conditions are more favorable to it than to the whites. The white man needs the highland country; the native can do without it. In Australia, the problem is to keep out the Malays, the natives of India, the Chinese, and the Japanese. In both cases there is a direct avowal on the part of the white settlers of European stock to possess the land as a heritage for their children.

The Australian position was frankly outlined in 1903 by the commonwealth Premier, W. M. Hughes:

"The White Australia policy covers much more than the preservation of our own people here. It means the multiplication of our own people so that we may defend our country and our policy. It means the maintenance of social conditions under which men and women can live decently. It means equal laws and opportunities for all . . . it means social justice and fair wages. The White Australia policy goes down to the roots of our national existence, the roots from which the British social system has sprung."

The danger of delay is recognized:

"Our choice lies between filling up our spaces with immigrants from Britain, and, if needs be, other countries, and having the matter taken out of our hands and being swamped by the rush of peoples from the overcrowded countries of the world."

Up to the present the people of Australia have consistently followed out their restrictive policy.[1] About 98 per cent of Australia is occupied by persons of British stock or their descendants born in the commonwealth. "White Australia" has been described as the commonwealth's only religion. There is no problem of dissident elements entrenched in the country, as in the French-Canadian district of Quebec and in the Boer colonies of South Africa. The number of full-blooded

[1] Admission of immigrants into Australia is governed by "The Immigration Act 1901–1925," so-called. This act is the immigration restriction act of 1901 as amended in the period 1905 to 1925, inclusive. Under its terms an immigrant is required to pass the dictation test; that is, he must write out fifty words in any prescribed language on dictation in the presence of an officer. Physical and mental fitness and the ability to make a living are essential. Anyone advocating the overthrow by force or violence of the established government of the commonwealth or of any state or of any other civilized country or of all forms of law or who advocates the abolition of organized government may be excluded or may be deported after entry.

While immigration is under the control of the commonwealth government exclusively, the status of the newcomer, if he is an Asiatic, may be affected by the regulations in force in a given state. The separate states have much larger rights as contrasted with the central government than is the case in the United States. For a long time before confederation in 1901 the separate colonies dealt unequally with immigration questions. Queensland wanted to import coolie labor in order to develop its plantations of sugar, rice, and coffee. New South Wales and South Australia wished to exclude native inhabitants of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific islands. The Conference of Premiers held at Sydney in 1896 drew the colonies together, and largely out of their desire to guard themselves against the dangers of Asiatic immigration a Commonwealth Union was at length effected. Thereafter the central government dealt with the immigration question; but the states (e.g., West Australia), despite the desire of Great Britain to abolish discriminatory legislation against any people, have insisted upon such legislation chiefly with respect to Chinese desiring to own factories or land. Queensland for a time excluded Asiatics from government advances for agricultural purposes and in 1913 forbade non-Europeans to engage in sugar growing. No doubt it is true that discriminatory regulations will diminish as the relative number of Asiatics diminishes under the present scheme of selective immigration. When danger no longer threatens, a more liberal view will be taken of the rights of colored inhabitants.

Asiatics is very small, probably not more than 35,000, with the Chinese (23,000) in the majority. Australian aboriginals number but 30,000.

That Japan should have come into possession of the naval station at Jaluit in the Marshall Islands has been a source of less anxiety to Australia and New Zealand than Japanese occupation of the much nearer station of Truk in the Carolines. By this step Japan has come 2000 miles nearer Australia. It is the fear of the Australians, whether or not the facts justify it, that the nearer approach, apart from its strategical import, may mean increasing Japanese colonization in the warmer lands of the Pacific and harmful effects upon competitive white labor. For this reason Australians view with apprehension the steady importation of Japanese labor by French nickel firms in New Caledonia, only 750 miles from the Australian coast.[1]

The driving force behind the policy of exclusion is not a group or a party, but the whole Australian people. The labor unions are an active element in furtherance of exclusion, for they wish to protect the living standards of the working man. And labor in Australia enjoys a remarkable status, since it has at times held power in all of the states except Victoria, and at other times has supplied a vigorous opposition. In general, labor is strongly protectionist in order to eliminate foreign competition in industry. Toward theories of state socialism, such as the nationalization of land, Australian labor is curiously unresponsive: its position is that there are but few essential objectives for labor to aim at, such as restrictive immigration and high tariffs, acceptable working hours, and the protection and enlargement of union rights. The chief problem of labor is to develop increased efficiency and a sense of responsibility equal to the opportunities created by political success. Labor governments have been unwilling to put down violence and suppress disorder in time of strikes, though these paralyzed the chief producers, the farmers. The report of the Administrator of Northern Territory in 1918, following a strike, complained that the tyrannical methods of the workers' union had in fact disorganized government.

[1] Two island groups that lie relatively close to her northeastern coast — the New Hebrides and New Caledonia — are of special interest to Australia. Following the Anglo-French convention of 1906, France and Great Britain exercise control of the New Hebrides through a condominium and a joint court. This procedure has not proved to be a success; it invites delay and does not give the native justice, though it has regulated the recruitment of the native population by labor contractors. Two thirds of the area of the New Hebrides, and the best islands, are in French possession.

Related to the problem of the New Hebrides is that of New Caledonia, which is an isolated possession of France, long used as a convict colony. Strategically it is important because it lies near Australia — in fact, too near for comfort. The commercial value of the group, which exports chrome, nickel, and cobalt, depends in less degree upon the immediate products than upon relation to the trade of Australia and the East Indies.

ASSISTED SETTLEMENT IN AUSTRALIA

It became plain to all parties in Australia, immediately after the advance of Japan in the Pacific was confirmed by treaty in 1919, that empty territory was a poor background for a discussion of racial questions or a policy of exclusion. It had long been still clearer that Australia suffers economically because its trade relations require that part of its goods be transported halfway around the earth. It is a commercially isolated continent, however many times the end of isolation be announced. To become more nearly self-sufficient requires a larger population, increased industrial plant, and the fullest possible development of coal and water-power and machine installations. To increase population of a desirable kind the commonwealth accepted British assistance in April 1925. The form of coöperation was worked out under an agreement putting into effect the Empire Settlement Act of 1922, whereby the British Secretary of State for the Colonies might coöperate with the government of any dominion in assisting desirable persons to settle overseas. Pursuant to this agreement, the commonwealth government has made arrangements with the state governments for suitable areas of land and increased opportunities for settlement. The division of the expenses is £130,000 to be paid by the British government for every £750,000 expended in Australia on agreed undertakings. For every sum of £75 issued to a state government under this agreement, one assisted migrant shall at some time in the ten-year period 1925–1935 sail direct from the United Kingdom and be received into the state concerned. For every principal sum of £1000 issued to a state government for the settlement of persons upon farms, the state government shall provide one new farm. Provision is made for equipping the new-migrants with stock, seed, fertilizer, fencing, and the like, for supervising the management and development of their farms so far as they have settled upon the land, and for equality of treatment as between Australians and new arrivals. The British government has limited itself to the sum of £7,083,000 in furtherance of the agreement.

It is clear from the foregoing outline of assisted settlement that the people of Australia pay for a White Australia policy. If white settlers of a desirable sort do not come in sufficient numbers, stimulated movements must be brought into being, and they are expensive. The question is, how far should subsidies go? When are they economically undesirable or morally and socially undesirable? How far should the people of better favored lands pay for the expenses of experiment on the

part of those modern pioneers who ask for security, whereas the earliest settlers accepted hardships? There is also the problem of how settlement shall be conducted, by what modified schemes of agricultural practice, in what areas. It is easy to become enthusiastic over the vast population that Australia may support, but as a matter of fact, her better favored lands have been occupied. The recovery of the ground water, dry farming, and mixed farming and grazing may greatly extend the border of settlement in selected places; but neither enthusiasm nor patriotism will increase the rainfall. Climate takes no account of votes. Huge sums of money will not work magic, for money cannot invoke clouds and rain. In Northern Australia there is the special problem of a hot climate and a deficient rainfall. So few are the people, so difficult the conditions of living, that government itself is extremely difficult to carry on. An annual deficit of a million dollars a year for a population of little more than three thousand would have but one answer if its fate were dependent upon corporate business control rather than government control. One group after another has studied the problem, but so far without success. The administrator of the Territory recently advised lighter taxes and freight rates, free land to farmers, credits for building materials, a guaranteed price for crops, improved stock routes and water supplies — but who is to pay for this catalogue of improvements? Clearly not the 3500 Australians in the Northern Territory. Yet for them the commonwealth must go on incurring expense. The advocates of a White Australia policy will not admit that the northern tropical strip cannot be exploited by whites alone.

The growth of population in Australia under a White Australia policy is shown by the statistics for 1921. In the forty years preceding that date the rate of increase of the population of Australia was 22 per 1000, or double that of Japan. Since 1921 the increase of population has been 70 per cent by birth and 30 per cent by immigration. While 50,000 persons migrated from the United Kingdom to Australia in the period before the World War, only half this number is now supplied, despite unemployment on a great scale in England and assisted emigration! The pioneering spirit appears to have undergone a change.

A review of the internal conditions of Australia seems essential to an understanding of the most important international problems now facing the commonwealth. First is the extraordinary physical setting of Australian life. The eastern side of the continent is marked by a relatively low mountain belt running in general from north to south. Mt. Kosciusko in New South Wales is the highest point on the conti-

FIG. 216. The probable and known artesian areas in Australia are shaded. The heavy solid lines represent grades of rainfall in inches. Where there is less than ten inches annually and no artesian water, grazing is limited and there are no towns, except where mines have been developed, as at Coolgardie and Kalgoorlie, 350 miles east of Perth. For names of cities, see Figure 217. From official Australian *Year-Book*.

nent, 7328 feet. On the whole, the mountain highland rises to 2000 feet, with a lowland on the west having an average height of perhaps 500 feet. The average elevation of the continent is about 1000 feet. Forty per cent of the territory is in the tropics, 60 per cent in the temperate region. Australia is thus dominated by two rainfall belts, the tropical and the westerly. These move north and south with the sun so that alternately the southern part of the continent has winter rain and summer dryness. Summer rains are increasingly important toward the north. Taken as a whole the continent is dry, and a part of the interior is desert. Only the eastern coastal belt and the southwestern section of the continent have a sufficiently uniform rainfall to permit of normal agriculture. Here too are the forest belts of Australia and the regions of mixed farming, though Queensland specializes in sugar, with banana growing and dairying playing their part in the general economy. The accompanying map (Fig. 216) shows the distribution of the belts of agricultural land, the best of it containing the closest settlements and the largest towns. Of the 70 largest cities of Australia, 56 are in the agricultural area.

The land of Australia would be far less valuable than it is if it were not for the existence of great artesian belts which permit the pasturage of stock far from perpetual streams. Dry farming has likewise carried the inner border of the productive belt far inland. But there is a limit to which settlement has been or can be pushed. Forty-two per cent of the continent is arid; of this about one fifth is useless for stock and another fifth is capable of limited grazing development. Taking the continent as a whole, about two fifths is good pastoral country and only one fifth is what may be called normal agricultural land, if we include rugged mountains as well as valleys and plains. About 3 per

cent of the total area may be used for tropical agriculture. It is estimated that 20,000,000 people engaged in agriculture and manufacturing can be settled upon the more favored fifth of Australia before crowding begins. It is this part of the continent that is most capable of development, and not the arid part. Half of Australia still contains less than 10,000 people and this half still has an almost insignificant percentage — 1.5 and 1.6 respectively — of the sheep and cattle of the commonwealth. By contrast, 80 per cent of the people live in a belt of country 100 miles wide along the eastern, southern, and southwestern coasts.



Fig. 217. Australia extends almost from 10° S. to 40° S. To develop the northern (hot) region a low-grade labor supply is needed. But the Australian people wish to keep the continent as an inheritance of the white race. Japanese, Indian, and Malay exclusion has brought into being grave international questions. The northern part is tropical, the southern temperate. All the foci of population are on the coast. From official Australian *Year-Book*.

In order to bring into closer association the wide territorial expanses of Australia, the government has pursued since the World War an active road-building policy and has also considerably extended postal, telegraphic, and telephone services. As in the Argentine, the development of Australian commercial possibilities is hampered by the fact that there are eight different gauges in 27,000 miles of railway. One of the most important needs of the commonwealth is the unification of this system and the coördination of railways, roads, ports, and aviation facilities. To better marketing conditions the government is extending a scheme of credits to farmers in times of drought. The long discussed north-south transcontinental railway line, as projected, is conceived as a bond of union between two sides of the continent and a stimulus to stock-raising in pastoral lanes along the line. But its construction rests on a political not an economic basis. South Australia contends that the Commonwealth government in taking over the Northern Territory pledged a direct route; Queensland would like a deviation in her favor; South Australia fears lest the eastern states

be favored; West Australia has its commonwealth link in an east-west transcontinental line of dubious economic worth, however valuable as a political expedient. It is in West Australia that the Empire Settlement Act has been most extensively applied, though with limited success. Here there has been a rapid development of light railways on lands suitable for wheat growing.

Mere empty space has at last forced a division of Northern Australia into two new states that take account of the geography. Northern Australia has always been a mere fringe with very limited and doubtful internal developments. By the terms of the North Australia Act of 1926 the territory is divided into two states, Northern Australia and Central Australia, with the 20th parallel as the dividing line in each state. Thus each has approximately a quarter of a million square miles. Alice Springs is now the capital of Central Australia. Central Australia has its affairs controlled by a "Government Resident" assisted by an advisory council consisting of two nominated and two elected members. Northern Australia likewise has a government resident and an advisory council, but its progress will be watched and promoted by the "North Australia Commission." In both cases the real government is in the hands of the Minister of Home and Territories at Canberra. Neither state is to have a parliament until further development of population and economic possibilities takes place.

The influence of wide separation of settlements and the great distances between the eastern and western parts of the country is shown in the difficulty that Australia has in securing proper representation in her national Parliament. The attractiveness of a public career has been described as varying with the inverse square of the distance at which it has to be carried on. To travel several days to the railroad and several additional days to the seat of government does not appear as an inducement to able men to serve in Parliament.

PACIFIC INTERESTS OF NEW ZEALAND

In 1923 the territorial jurisdiction of New Zealand was extended by the addition of the Ross Dependency, comprising the Ross and Victoria quadrants of the Antarctic continent (Fig. 218). This addition, together with the award of the mandate for Samoa, gives New Zealand control of territory that extends from the equator to the pole. The Ross Dependency is a distant Antarctic possession of limited though unknown value. The two principal centers of interest of New Zealand in the South Pacific are Western Samoa and Nauru.

In Western Samoa, which before the World War was a German possession, New Zealand has undertaken to prohibit the slave trade and forced labor, except as the latter is necessary for public works and services. No military or naval works are to be constructed, and traffic in arms and ammunition is controlled. The island of Nauru was claimed by New Zealand on the ground that its rich phosphate deposits were essential to her agriculture. The Australian government having also requested possession of the island, the matter was resolved by making the British government responsible for the mandate. By subsequent agreement the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand agreed upon an Australian Commissioner. They further agreed upon a division of the phosphate production from a field that is estimated to contain a reserve of 42,000,000 tons. The present arrangement for the exercise of the mandate is anomalous, since the administrator alone controls all branches of government, with only indirect responsibility to Great Britain, the official mandatory power. The complete control of phosphate output is also a subject of criticism by the Permanent Mandates Commission. New Zealand has created a department of external affairs to manage the Samoan mandate and other external questions, such as the administration of the Cook Islands and regulations as to immigration.

At present the immigration problem in New Zealand has two phases, the first relating to the exclusion of undesirables, especially Asiatics, while the



FIG. 218. New Zealand now has territorial interests or responsibilities that extend from the equator (Nauru) to the south pole (Ross Dependency). The frames are devices for locating the several groups of dependencies. From map opposite page 151, the *Dominions Office and Colonial Office List* for 1927.

second has to do with the encouragement of immigrants who would make desirable citizens. With an area of more than 100,000 square miles New Zealand has a population of only a little more than 1,000,000, or an average density of about 10 to the square mile. The encouragement of white immigration would therefore greatly increase the future wealth of the country.

The internal economy of New Zealand is primarily agricultural. The list of exports reflects this condition. In order of importance they are: wool, meat, butter, cheese, hides, and skins. Because of its isolated position in the Pacific, New Zealand must depend upon distant markets, chiefly British. Neither industry nor agriculture is in a settled state, the one because of over-capitalization and the other because a protectionist policy for industry bears heavily upon the farmer. Since export is the commercial life of New Zealand and new and more favorable markets for the agricultural surplus are constantly sought, the government is hard driven to make an adjustment between the interests of protected manufactures and uncertain markets for agricultural surplus. The farmer considers the country undermanned, the manufacturer wants cheap labor; yet unemployment periodically troubles even this outpost at the same time that assisted immigrants under the Empire Settlement Act are coming in (12,000 in 1925).

The World War aroused an interest in imperial affairs that is not likely to subside. Singapore is no longer an abstraction but a point of personal interest to New Zealanders, who are now willing to undertake a part of the cost of the new naval works. British policy is closely followed in its practical developments in China, Japan, and the Far East and the Pacific generally. To New Zealand, as to Australia, economic and racial questions are at last a matter of general concern.

CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE

AFRICAN COLONIES OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS

In Africa the colonial rivalries of European powers developed their most intense phases during the 19th century. Every statesman and economist sees in the wealth of labor supply that the continent affords and in its enormous and still rapidly expanding volume of raw materials — fibers, oils, hides, minerals, rubber — sources of industrial and political power of great importance to enterprising nations of the north temperate zone. Indeed, some students regard the struggle for raw materials as a basic cause of the World War, no less than the rivalries in the transit lands of the Balkans and Asia Minor, competitive armaments, and the struggle for markets.

Except in limited areas, particularly in South Africa and near the Mediterranean coast of North Africa, there has been no permanent colonization of the sort that marked white occupation of North and South America. In the whole of Africa the white population numbers but 4,000,000 out of a total population of 130,000,000. Africa as a whole therefore represents a field of white conquest rather than settlement and home building. Exotic products of a tropical nature were not the only incentive to conquest. Fearing that tariff rates or war might deprive them of some essential raw materials, in part supplied by Europe, the traders and industrialists of that continent tried to make their position more secure by increasing the supply of such materials from the distant and weakly organized territories of Asia, Africa, and South America.

ELEMENTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA

The development of exploitable resources in Africa depends upon a few elements — good transport, cheap labor, and a climate favorable either for white occupation or for the growth of a desired product. Where these occur in favorable conjunction we see Africa in process of development. Where any one of them is lacking, development has been retarded.

Improved transport facilities not only extend European industrial enterprises and markets; they raise native standards of living. This does not mean that a railroad is always economically possible in places where either the European industrialist on the one hand or native groups on the other desire it to be built. The building of a railroad can be justified on economic grounds only if there are resources and people capable of rapid organization into a trading system that can support

the new transport facilities. It is of great advantage to Africa — and African colonial powers — that it has in general a large and relatively cheap labor supply and the blacks, at least, are able to live in every climatic zone. This makes it possible to develop mineral deposits, forest products, and pastoral resources in large amounts at low cost. African resources have been exploited not through the spread of white settlement primarily, but through the employment of capital in specialized industries using the modern resources of transport and markets and the help of native labor.

During the coming decades the welfare of the native who supplies the labor, and the guarantee of his food supply as a primary object of white control, no less than the production of crops for export, will inevitably be forced upon white administrators. This means a much closer study of labor in relation to specialized products than has hitherto been made. It must mean especially the close study of those regions of Africa capable of settlement by white pioneers. Neither the dense tropical forest on the one hand nor the desert on the other will support large industries and permanent white settlements. These will be established in the intermediate zones where grassland and forest alternate, as on the southern border of the Congo basin and in the belt of grassland that intervenes between the forests of coastal West Africa and the dry Sahara. It is a combination of moderately high altitude and alternating belts of moister and drier climate that gives East Africa its variety of products, scope for white men's plantations, an accessible labor supply, and favorable soil and climate for specialized production. Science will disclose, on the basis of field studies, where white population may spread most favorably, not in the sense of displacing native population, but as outposts that supply the machinery of organization, production, markets, and the like. In the absence of iron and coal deposits of consequence (in contrast to Europe and America), Africa cannot expect to become industrialized. It must draw upon the temperate zones for its sources of manufactured goods and it must pay for them in raw materials and food. In this relation it is the European that has taken and will continue to take the leading part. He is the administrator, the organizer, and in his hands lies the political future of the native.

Down to 1914, no serious politico-geographical questions arose respecting Africa except between European nations, for Liberia and Ethiopia (Abyssinia) are the only independent divisions of African territory. But the World War has added a new aspect. Fearful of losing that civilization which it had taken centuries to create, each of



FIG. 219. The present distribution of territory in Africa. (See also Figure 20, page 83, and Figure 52, page 184.)

the western powers, in the stress of war, called to its aid every nation tributary to it, even though small and weak. To assure loyalty, the tributary peoples were given exceptional privileges, which they later desired to translate into more practical terms. The idea of "self-determination" spread everywhere. Nationalism was intensified; where it had not hitherto existed it was created. The effect in Africa was to call into question everywhere the right of the European to rule. Revolts occurred in Mozambique (Portuguese), in Libya (Italian), and in Egypt (British), and an already dangerous state of feeling against white domination was intensified among 5,000,000 South African

blacks, as well as among those Hindu groups that had settled in East South Africa.

Fortunately for the peace of the world, large portions of Africa remained loyal in spite of the desire of their peoples for a larger measure of independence. Algeria and Tunis were quiet during the World War at least. Morocco sent thousands of soldiers to help France. The 10,000,000 natives within the Belgian Congo were loyal to Belgium and native colonial troops took part in the conquest of German East Africa (now Tanganyika Territory). Uganda and British East Africa (now Kenya Colony), Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria contributed to the conquest of German East Africa, Togoland, and the Cameroons.

THE PROBLEMS OF RACE AND RELIGION

The relations of African peoples to Europeans are governed in large part by certain outstanding racial, social, and religious tendencies. Let us look for a moment at the ethnographic background of the problem. Africa was invaded from Asia, by way of Egypt and the Arabian coast, at a time when an indigenous African culture could scarcely be said to exist. Successive waves of population spread west and south into every part of the land many thousands of years before the last period of intense white exploration in the middle of the 19th century. Distinct racial, linguistic, and cultural traits were developed, in some respects adapted to the geographical environment, in other respects a reflection of earlier racial history. The low culture of the agricultural negro in the hot, moist, forested realm of the central part of the continent contrasted with the high civilization developed by the Nilotic peoples on the northeast. The Berber, and later the Arab, spread over the northern desert (Sahara) and had a type of life unlike that of either the forest negro or the Nile farmer. In part sedentary oasis dwellers, both Berber and Arab were also in part nomadic — men of desert trails, watering places, and temporary pastures, and given to a free life.

Under Mohammedan influence, the Arab, fiercely fanatical and seeking the conquest of Christian peoples, came into Egypt; thence he spread across northern Africa, and into the Sudan. This was in the 7th and 8th centuries and represents one of the most important migrations of history. It was followed by the energetic invasion of Spain and prolonged Moorish control, not completely ended until the fall of Granada in 1492. An earlier stream of Arab migration had flowed down the eastern coast of Africa, to Zanzibar and Mozambique.

With the rise of Mohammedanism these Arab outposts in eastern Africa accepted the new religion, but they never became fanatical, owing probably to their political independence and to the remote and isolated positions they held. Though conquered locally, the Arab has been at all times a restless and often a dangerous element.

The negroes form the most numerous race in Africa. They number (with the Bantus) about 120,000,000 persons, or four fifths of the total black population of the globe, the remaining 30,000,000 living for the most part in Australasia and in America. Though occupying in the main the least desirable parts of Africa, where insects, malaria, heavy forests, and a moist and hot tropical climate made white conquest long impossible (it is still extremely difficult, in spite of the cult of "Brightest Africa"), the negro has multiplied and has developed great resistance to endemic diseases and the effects of tropical sunlight. His tribal organization is in some places extremely primitive, in other places well systematized; but group development has been carried nowhere to the point where it broke through the barriers of geographical position and environment to make the black a conqueror. In fact, the pure-blooded negro never exercised any self-originating political influence over other races. His is a plastic and imitative temperament. As one writer has put it: he has never founded a stone city, or built a ship, or produced a literature, or suggested a creed.

The white and the brown peoples have long competed for political and religious control of the blacks of Africa. Arab penetration was centuries ahead of the white conquests that followed the Age of Discovery (15th and 16th centuries). Had that age been long delayed, the growth of Mohammedanism would have put the combined Arab and Turkish worlds in possession of a vast and exceedingly dangerous reservoir of man power. For "Islamism brought with it, almost without fail, political organization, a certain amount of civilization, commercial activity, and the establishment of slavery as an institution." The defeat of the Moor (Moslem Arab and Berber) in Spain in the 14th and 15th centuries and of the Turk in southwestern Europe in the 17th century, and thereafter the steady waning of the Turkish Empire, stopped the advance of Mohammedanism, which was succeeded in Africa during the 18th century by gradual possession, on the part of western nations, of strategic coastal localities. There followed in the 19th century trade development, the rapid increase of missionary activity, and the partition of Africa.

The growth of Islam is far more rapid than that of Christianity among the negroes. It would almost certainly bring the negro into

conflict with the white for possession of the continent, if it were not so attenuated in actual practice by its superstitious converts. It has spread chiefly among the blacks of the Sudan, where there is intimate contact with the desert centers of religious influence, particularly the fanatical Moslem sects like the Senussi (page 138). Islam is still virtually unknown among the natives south of the Zambezi. The white man there dreads its appearance, fearing its effect upon the entire social and political organization.

The contest in Africa between white-skinned Christian and brown Moslem populations reaches its most acute phases in the northern zone of the continent — the Sahara and, more important still, the northern coastal belt. The Moors that were expelled from Spain retired to Morocco, where they more firmly established the principle of Moslem opposition to Christian advance. Under the ardent teaching of Turkish agents from Constantinople and elsewhere, the Egyptian nationalist movement, which has strong religious aspects, combined with other forces to threaten disorder. The scattered oases of the Sahara are the homes of unruly people. Great Britain has had to send yearly military expeditions against some of the tribesmen of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. France is faced by local but nearly continuous disorder in Morocco and on the desert edge of French Equatorial Africa, though not as a result of native initiative but rather of steady advance into more distant territories. Only by means of costly military expeditions was it possible, a generation ago, to break up the Arab military organizations of the Belgian Congo and of the Lake Nyasa region.

The rivalries of unlike peoples and cultures (not religions) are equally acute and even more dangerous in South Africa, where the white man is greatly outnumbered. The blacks have given incessant trouble, which has been augmented in later years by the growing ambitions of the Indian population, first introduced to work on the eastern coastal plantations. But for the segregation of blacks largely on the eastern margin of South Africa and the fairly rapid spread of the whites to the mines and pastures of the interior plateaus and uplands, where a cooler climate prevails, South Africa would never have been won as a white man's country, or if won would have been quickly lost, so far as effective settlement is concerned.

One of the effects of the political occupation of Africa by European nations has been a more rapid increase of native population, already so large as to threaten white supremacy. It is asserted that the population of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan dropped from 8,000,000 to

FIG. 220. The shaded areas represent districts with an elevation above or near 5000 feet and with relatively cool climate. They are the "white man's lands" of central Africa. However, white settlement on the uplands will depend not only upon altitude but also upon accessibility to railroads and the sea, the nervous effects of living at abnormally high elevations, the amount and seasonal distribution of rainfall, and the quality and amount of native labor. From 3000 to 5000 feet elevation the country is still possible for whites for prolonged periods. Below 3000 feet white men cannot long retain normal vigor and are subject to serious tropical ailments. Toward the south increasing latitude makes the upland country of Rhodesia habitable for whites at lower elevations. Compiled from the British General Staff sheets, scale 1 : 2,000,000, 1919.

1,800,000 through massacre and famine during the period of disorder (1870–1896) immediately before British conquest and occupation. The creation of great irrigation works and of a famine relief service has greatly increased the population of India. The same effect of white control is witnessed in Jamaica and Barbados. The stopping of tribal wars has of course greatly diminished the death rate in both India and Africa. In some of the native reservations in South Africa tribes have increased as much as several hundred per cent in fifty or sixty years.

The effect of European penetration in Africa, no less than in other regions where primitive races have been brought under the control of the white man, is marked by an almost complete derangement of indigenous social and political structures. With their strongly developed tendency to introduce changes, with their incessant political activity and its rapid imposition of new forms of government and society on native races, the Europeans brought what amounted to a

revolution in the way of life of every people with whom they came into contact. Native society in many instances has disintegrated before the European advance, and the problem of local self-government is in many cases one of adapting native forms to modern conditions without destroying the native sense of organization and responsibility.

THE WHITE MAN'S LANDS IN TROPICAL AFRICA

Though white settlements are scattered about the margins of the continent and in strategic trade centers in the interior, they are at present grouped in an effective way in only two belts of limited extent — a northern and a southern. Along the sea border in Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, nearly 1,000,000 whites have settled; and there are 1,500,000 whites of Dutch and British blood in South Africa. These two extremities of the continent were long thought to be the only lands capable of white colonization.

What are the possibilities of white settlement elsewhere? The striking feature of the topography of central Africa is the extent of large uplands where the white man can live and work, as shown on Figure 220. These are now in process of being tied to the ocean by trade routes and railroads that penetrate from Egypt, from Tanganyika and Kenya Colony (former German East Africa), and from the Union of South Africa. Long removed from the political control of the whites, the interior highland mass now invites people of white blood not only through its climate but by its products and its nearness to the densely populated districts which produce valuable raw materials.

It should not be thought that the shaded portions of Figure 220 represent the limits of white occupation in the area within the scope of the map. Many lower tracts have nuclei of white settlement here and there. Some of the elevated tracts cannot be effectively occupied until bordering regions through which they are reached are supplied with roads and railways and cleared of tropical diseases. Not all uplands are free of malaria, and the effects of such climatic characteristics as the great diurnal and slight seasonal variations of temperature remain to be studied before white colonization can be said to be successful. Toward the south there is a progressively cooler climate. Not merely in the most elevated districts but over the whole upland is white occupation possible, as in Southern Rhodesia, with 24 per cent of its territory at an altitude above 4000 feet. The rapid growth of Salisbury, the center of an extensive grazing and mining region, reflects these conditions.

It is not, however, the regions of cooler climate but rather the tropical lowland portions of Africa that furnish the kinds of goods that



FIG. 221. The Uganda region of central Africa. Note the importance of a dense native population near a large lake and a belt of "white man's lands" still undeveloped. Based on Sir Harry Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, Vol. II, 1904, 2d ed.

the countries of the temperate zone most require for their industries, particularly the European countries that lie much farther north than the United States. It was in Africa that Germany wished to secure large areas suitable for the production of coffee, cotton, cacao, rubber, palm oil, cane sugar, bananas, tobacco, besides minerals of which she had little, such as petroleum, tin, gold, and copper. The United States grows cotton at home, and many other subtropical products she obtains close by — in the West Indies, Central America, and northern South America. European countries must get these materials from abroad, and of course they would prefer to get them from their own colonies, where they can make trade arrangements favorable to themselves. This explains why they were all eager to share in the partition of Africa. In spite of the fact that scarcely any

FIG. 222. Distribution of known sleeping sickness districts and localities in central Africa. Compare with map of belts of vegetation, Figure 227. After map from Sleeping Sickness Bureau, London, 1909. See bibliography for areas in which sleeping sickness has spread recently.

one of the tropical colonies has paid its own way, it was hoped that in time they would become profitable, and until then, at least they furnished commodities that were vital to many industries.

The most serious environmental problems of the future colonists of tropical Africa are the germ diseases and the insect pests. Figure 222 shows the areas affected by sleeping sickness, which is perhaps one of the greatest restrictions upon development. This disease, which is transmitted by the tsetse fly, has its worst aspects in jungle-covered areas about the borders of rivers, lakes, and swamps. Only better drainage and the clearing away of native bushy or jungle growth will enable the white man to live safely or to keep cattle. Rinderpest further limits the grazing industry. Cholera and the bubonic plague recur in the low, hot, dirty, and humid coast ports. Tropical Africa is rich, and it can be won by the white man; but it will be won only after a long struggle by white settlers in coöperation with physicians trained in tropical medicine, and by governments intelligent enough to help the pioneer.

THE PENETRATION OF AFRICA

In its modern aspects the problem of land division in Africa, and particularly in the cooler uplands, involves European nations in many complex questions that cannot be fully understood unless they are placed in their historical setting. The first period of European control of Africa was in the second half of the 15th century, when traders, chiefly Portuguese, sailed along the west coast. Before America was

discovered they had reached the southwestern extremity of the continent. Another Portuguese expedition at this time explored the Red Sea and reached India; in 1498 Vasco da Gama sailed up the east coast and also reached India; the Far East was next brought within the field of European trade, and a Portuguese settlement, still in existence, was founded at Macao, in China. The English and Dutch followed quickly. Africa itself was then of less commercial interest than the Orient. Algoa (to Goa) and Delagoa (from Goa) register this state of obsession with what lay beyond Africa. The rival nations were content with mere footholds that served as way stations for ship repair and revictualing. The British had St. Helena, and later a part of the Gold Coast; the Dutch, Table Bay (Cape Town); and the Portuguese, Zanzibar. In fact, down to the period of the exploring expeditions and missionary journeys of Livingstone (1840–1873), Africa had not been penetrated at all effectively, as the maps of sixty years ago clearly show; and as a colonizing field it was thought expensive, unhealthful, and of little value. In a general way the native brought his wares to the coast (e.g., Dar es Salaam, Sofala, Delagoa, Loanda) or to a few commercially strategic inland centers (e.g., Lake Ngami).

But when European industrialization had developed a need for raw materials that yearly grew more active, when vacant spaces in the Pacific, the Far East, and southern and western Asia had been allocated, with South America a politically closed world on account of the Monroe Doctrine, Africa was the only large free realm in which political power and colonial trade could yet be won together. France annexed Algeria between 1830 and 1847; the English occupied a few places at the southern end of the continent, from which they had crowded the Boers, who thereupon established their settlements inland beyond the Orange River; Morocco was independent; the Turkish Empire nominally extended along the whole northern coast, but effectively was limited to Egypt and Libya. For the rest only scattered settlements and trading posts on the coast had been established by the European nations, including Holland (until 1871), Spain, Denmark (until 1850), and Portugal — but not Germany; the beginning of German colonial policy was a thing of much later growth.

The memorable explorations of Stanley at last effectively awakened public interest in Africa. He crossed the continent from 1874 to 1878, explored the great Congo River system, and untangled some of the long-discussed complexities of the equatorial lakes. By 1880 the whole civilized world was interested in the exploration story of Africa.

The more enlightened nations of Europe were determined to stamp out slave trading, which was still carried on extensively in the interior, though the exportation of slaves from Africa had practically ceased by 1850.

No other continent had such large unappropriated spaces, so many unattached peoples. There followed a general European rush for territory desirable chiefly because of its commercial value rather than as a home for colonists. The period of exploration of the interior therefore became the period of partition and of appropriation by big trading companies and concessionaires. France assumed a protectorate over Tunis in 1881 and thereafter so vigorously sought colonial objectives as to get the largest share of African territory. England occupied Egypt in 1882. Portugal put forth claims to much of the Congo, as well as the hinterland of Mozambique, where English traders and missionaries had penetrated. Belgium called a conference of the powers in 1876 whose outcome was an International African Association, and in 1885 Leopold II, King of the Belgians, declared himself sovereign of the Congo Free State. In less than half a century the interior of Africa had been transformed from an unknown wilderness into a colonial frontier of Europe.

From that time to this, there has never been a moment when the colonial policies of the European nations have not been profoundly affected by the African situation. Germany was at first more interested in her African colonies than she was in her Pacific possessions or the Near East. Only as late as 1904 were the long-standing differences between France and Great Britain that had once threatened war (the Fashoda incident [1]) at last composed by a division of spheres of influence. In 1911 the Agadir crisis (page 189) almost precipitated war between Germany and France.

THE FORMER GERMAN COLONIES IN AFRICA

The chief effect of the World War upon the political geography of Africa was the transfer of the four German colonies of Togoland, the Cameroons, German Southwest Africa, and German East Africa to France, Great Britain, Belgium, and Portugal. By skillful diplo-

[1] With the intention of linking her possessions in east and west Africa across the territory of the Upper Nile, France penetrated to Fashoda, a fortress on the Upper Nile, in 1898, at just the time that Kitchener, after defeating the Dervishes at Omdurman, was proceeding up river to complete the conquest of the Sudan. Extreme diplomatic tension was created by the meeting of the rival military forces, and actual hostilities were averted only with great difficulty. The outcome was the withdrawal of the French and hence a British victory.

matic work at Berlin and by remarkable activity in the field, Germany had won these four territories in the face of active British, French, and Portuguese opposition, laid claim to a part of the Sudan bordering Lake Chad, elbowed France down to the Congo, pushed the northeastern corner of German Southwest Africa over to the Zambezi River (the Caprivi salient, Fig. 219), and as a result was in position to plan still broader African conquests. The addresses of her statesmen leave no room for doubt that had she won the World War a Central African realm under German control would have been created out of Portuguese and Belgian territory and German domination would have been assured in the African politics of the future.[1]

FIG. 223. Map of Tanganyika Territory, formerly German East Africa; at present administered by Great Britain as the mandatory of the League of Nations, except for the northwestern corner, assigned to Belgium, and the Kionga triangle, assigned to Portugal.

Before the World War Germany was losing annually nearly 250,000 of her population through emigration to foreign lands, and it was her hope that parts of the African colonies might provide homes for some of these emigrants. Her chief interest lay in the development of the plantation system and the use of native labor for the production of tropical raw materials, supplies of which she also hoped to command. Great Britain and America control 90 per cent of the world's cotton supply, and for about three fourths of her cotton Germany had to rely on the United States, for about one fourth on Egypt and India. Of special value to German industry was the production in her African possessions of oils, particularly palm oil. While production was not high, it was in the way of rapid development. Germany's increasing

[1] Belgium obtained the Ruanda-Urundi districts (Fig. 62, page 204); and Portugal was assigned the Kionga triangle at the mouth of the Ruvuma River (Fig. 61, page 203). The British gains at German expense are shown in Figure 20, page 83; the French in Figure 52, page 184.

importation of food had also turned her attention to the possibilities of food production in her African colonies.

The territories and resources that Germany lost and that France, Belgium, and Great Britain gained will be briefly described in the succeeding sections. They are here set apart as regions of special importance because their management is an international responsibility. An annual report is made of their administration and their affairs are closely watched by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. The mandatory powers will as naturally try to keep them as Germany will try to regain them (page 18).

Tanganyika Territory (former German East Africa)

More was heard about German East Africa, now Tanganyika Territory, than about any other German colony because it is relatively more thickly populated and was the most valuable of all Germany's African possessions. It has a total area of 365,000 square miles, or twice that of Germany itself. The native population numbers more than 4,000,000 and is composed of both pastoral and agricultural elements. In addition there are about 15,000 people of Indian and Arab origin, and a population of 2500 whites.

The least favorable portion of Tanganyika Territory is the coastal strip, from 10 to 30 miles wide in the north and broader in the south. This is a fever-infested region of heavy rainfall and poor drainage. Farther west is the interior tableland, marked at its eastern margin by broken country with steep streams. There is a well-marked dry season, and the natural vegetation of the interior is savanna, grass steppe, or scrub. Variation of relief gives opportunity for great variety in cultivated products. At present the most important plantation crops are sisal hemp and rubber (Ceará). There are considerable possibilities for coffee and cotton production and for cattle raising in districts free from tsetse fly. On the slopes of Kilimanjaro and the Usambara Highlands, products of more temperate latitudes can be grown. Though limited in area, these districts should be valuable as a "white man's country." Two railways now connect the upland with the coast, one south of Kilimanjaro Mountain, near the frontier of Kenya Colony (British East Africa), and another from the port of Dar es Salaam. Ruanda and Urundi together constitute the densely populated, northwestern part of German East Africa. They were detached from former German East Africa (which as Tanganyika Territory is under British mandate) and are administered as mandated territories by Belgium (Figs. 61, 62).

Southwest Africa (former German Southwest Africa)

Southwest Africa is important, not because of the number of inhabitants, but for its extent and its political relation to the Union of South Africa, with which it is continuous. It is a huge desert region with an area of 325,000 square miles and a native population (mainly pastoralists) of 250,000. The white population numbers 24,000. It has been turned over to the Union of South Africa for administration as a mandated territory. It now has good connections by rail and by sea with Cape Town.

The coastal desert is a long band from 15 to 85 miles wide. It is marked by great sand ridges piled up by the southwesterly winds to heights that in places reach several hundred feet. The rainfall is, in most places, less than one inch a year. Fogs are characteristic, owing to the cold longshore current from the south. There are guano deposits on the offshore islands. The whole region resembles the Atacama-Tarapacá desert coast of western South America. Farther inland the rainfall increases on account of higher elevation and better exposure to the winds, and here are grazing lands of value. Still farther east is the Desert of Kalahari, with an interior drainage ending in salt pans, and with belts of dunes and scattered vegetation. There will never be a large population — the aridity is too intense. The grass is scattered, and the amount of stock that can be supported is small. It is estimated that the whole of Southwest Africa cannot maintain more than five thousand farms. There are diamond washings of considerable value, and diamonds now head the short list of exports, other exports being ivory, copper, and pastoral products.

The Cameroons

In February 1916 the British government accepted the French proposal for the administrative division of the Cameroons by France and Great Britain. It was arranged also that in case the question of the cession of the region to a third power were raised, Great Britain should have the first refusal of the port of Duala. This was during the World War. But in the peace treaty with Germany it was arranged to have the former German colonies governed under the mandate system. France controls the whole of the Cameroons save the small portion west of the main mountain range but including Cameroon Mountain, now joined to British Nigeria (Fig. 224).

The products of the Cameroons are mahogany, rubber, palm oil, cacao, and small quantities of tobacco and cotton. There are valuable

FIG. 224. French Equatorial Africa now includes the whole of the large region called the Cameroons, except for a narrow strip on the northwest which has been added to British Nigeria. That part north and west of the heavy solid line is mandated territory; that part south and east of this line was ceded to France unconditionally according to Article 125 of the treaty of Versailles, thereby restoring the boundary of 1911, modified in Germany's favor at the time of the Agadir incident. Note the northern limit of the equatorial forest, which suggests the grazing lands that lie between the forest and the desert Sahara beyond Lake Chad. The *Geographical Review*, Vol. 5, 1918.

grasslands in the interior, though these are difficult of access. The rubber resources might have led to greater development of the region, had it not been for the competition of East India rubber, which began to be produced on a great scale in 1913, and which so reduced the price that the gathering of rubber from wild sources by primitive methods was no longer profitable.

The territory has an area of less than 200,000 square miles and a total population of more than 3,700,000, of which about 3,000,000 are in the portion now under British mandate. Besides unhealthfulness in the lowlands, the chief physical difficulty in its development is the large number of falls in the streams, a condition which makes transportation expensive. Commerce would be almost at a standstill were it not for two small railroads which have been extended inland beyond the belt of falls.

Togoland

By agreement made between France and Great Britain in 1919, the latter assumed the administration of the western strip of Togoland (Fig. 225), while the former took over the higher and cooler eastern districts. This is the smallest of Germany's former African colonies,

and the most densely inhabited, with at least 1,000,000 native population. The country is unhealthful near the coast, but the highlands are capable of great agricultural development (Fig. 227). This is one of the colonies from which Germany hoped to get an increasing quantity of cotton for her manufactures. There are also valuable cacao and tobacco plantations, but they are small in extent. As a source of palm oil the region, like the rest of West Africa, is of constantly increasing importance. The colony has no good port.

The most serious condition to be overcome is the spread of sleeping sickness by the tsetse fly, which infests the underbrush near the coast and along the rivers (Fig. 222).

The new arrangements of the Peace Conference of Paris regarding Africa grow out of old problems. The Allies have disciplined Germany, it is true; but they have also made rules for themselves. The purpose was not merely to take away from Germany some colonial possessions, but to provide against the evils that the European nations saw in each other's policies and plans.



FIG. 225. Old and new boundaries in Togoland, one of Germany's four African colonies before 1914. The western portion is now a British mandatory, the eastern a French mandatory.

TRADE POLICIES AND NATIVE CONTROL

In spite of eagerness for territory in Africa, none of the European powers was able to make its tropical colonies a commercial success, except Germany in Togoland and Great Britain in Nigeria. All had preferential trade agreements which favored their own commerce. The colonies were reserved for the benefit of the traders of the home country. This was the policy of the French, for instance, in northern Africa, in Senegal, French Guinea, and Madagascar. Trade advantages are secondary, however, to the question of relations with the natives, whose welfare must be the chief thought of the European powers if the risks of bitterness and racial war are to be reduced. In



FIG. 226. Political map of Africa in the last part of the 19th century. The black areas represent European possessions in 1884 before the Berlin Conference of that year. The upper half of the legend represents international regulations adopted at the Berlin Conference and the Brussels Conference of 1890. After Keltie, *The Partition of Africa*, 1895. There was added by the London Convention of 1900 a zone of protection of wild animals extending from the Zambezi and the northern limit of German Southwest Africa up to the twentieth parallel of north latitude.

the treatment of the African native every European power, and especially Portugal, had broken the rules of fair dealing. In 1904 Germany pushed her punishment of the Herero tribes of German Southwest Africa to the point where these people were reduced in number from 60,000 to 18,000. Millions of Moslem Berbers and Arabs in French North Africa dislike the French (because they are Christian, not because they are French) as much as the Moslem Egyptians dislike the English.

The peace treaties of 1919 provide relief for some of the causes of dissatisfaction on the part of the native, short of granting him political control. The European nations cannot leave large sections of the world's low-grade populations to their fate. Firmly as this principle has become embedded in foreign office policies and justifiable as it seems from the general point of view, it must not be forgotten that it is, except in a few instances, outside the thought of the people to whom it is applied. Some of them would indeed prefer anarchy to foreign rule. If France were to withdraw from northern Africa, it would be a disaster to civilization there as great as that which followed the fall of the Roman Empire, when the Roman settlements of the same land one by one were abandoned and fields long cultivated reverted to the desert. Equally dark would be the prospect if England withdrew unconditionally from Egypt. In like manner, had the United States left the Filipinos to themselves, their islands would soon have been in a state of anarchy and would thereafter have belonged probably to Japan.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RESPECTING LIQUOR TRAFFIC, SLAVE TRADE, AND PROTECTION OF WILD ANIMALS

After Stanley's return from the exploration of the Congo, the European rivalry for territorial gains in Africa became still more intense. This led to a number of international projects and agreements, to which at least brief reference must be made, since they affect the present policies of government. First to be considered is the Brussels Conference of 1876, called by the King of the Belgians while Stanley was yet in Africa. Its object was the opening up of the continent through an International African Association. At first international in character, the organization soon became almost purely Belgian, and by various steps, too detailed to record here, led to the acquisition of the Congo by King Leopold of Belgium. The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 established the Congo Free State, provided for traffic regulation of the Congo River, laid down a free-trade zone in central Africa, and fixed the conditions of ownership by rival European powers. A second Brussels Conference, in 1890, delimited a slave-trade zone and a zone in which trade in arms and spirituous liquors was to be regulated.

The slave trade is an old problem in African administration. Early in the 19th century slave trading was prohibited by the more enlightened European powers. Slavery itself had been abolished by nearly all the powers by about the middle of the 19th century. But slave

trading continued to be active in the interior of Africa. For years before the defeat of the Mahdist forces at Omdurman in 1898, slave-raiding Arabs under Mahdist control terrorized the natives of the Sudan. Even now slave trading has not been wholly discontinued. Until the Italian occupation of Tripoli in 1912 the Senussi (page 139) sent slaves through Benghazi and, with the help of the Turks, received arms and ammunitions. Today the traffic is under the ban of law, and international coöperation is chiefly responsible for its lessening practice.

The latest step in the elimination of the slave trade relates to Ethiopia. When that state was admitted to the League of Nations (1923), it gave formal adherence to the Convention of St. Germain (1919) amending the General Act of Berlin (1885) and the General Act and Declaration of Brussels (1890), by which freedom of trade and navigation and the suppression of the slave trade were sought to be effected. Since Ethiopia had been the only independent nation of Africa, and one in which the slave trade still flourished, this action completes the international undertakings for the suppression of the evil. While it will take time to make the convention binding, Ethiopia has at least sent the League of Nations a report on slavery.

The regulation of the liquor traffic was of peculiar importance to the development of the African native. It is bad morality as well as bad business to debauch the native. His temper is more ardent, his impulses less subject to control, than in the case of the white. Unless the civilized world is prepared to back up by force, if necessary, and especially by strict police regulation, the control of the sale of liquor to the natives of Africa, these might better be left to run their own affairs. The world was shocked by the extent and cruelty of the slave trade; in the 19th century it was one of the chief pretexts of the European colonizing nations that they were bent on controlling territory so as to control the slave trade; it gave a pious turn to their acts which peculiarly fitted the spirit of the age. But it were as well to continue the slave trade under purely native responsibility as to substitute for it the unlicensed use of liquor.

Between the heavy lines of Figure 226 there was defined by the Brussels Conference of 1890 a zone for the preservation of wild animals, and this was confirmed by the Convention of London, May 1900. It is a matter of very great importance to the continent of Africa, which has the largest and most varied assortment of big game animals in the world. On the grasslands bordering the central tropical forest area, on the south and east, there are still many zebras, gazelles, hippos, rhinos, and waterbuck. They now live for the most

part in localities where they do not interfere with present settlements and should be protected on huge reserves regulated by law. They have been exterminated in some places in order to prevent destruction of the crops of settlers; but the process of extermination serves no useful purpose elsewhere, especially when carried on by irresponsible hunters intent on making a record of killings.

BENEFITS OF COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT

We gain some idea of the possible benefits of colonial development by looking at what France has already accomplished in northern Africa. The farms that the Romans had made with such care the French found a desert, and they immediately set to work to reclaim them by making hundreds of artesian wells, by damming up the streams that had been allowed to waste their precious waters in the sand, by fighting occasional swarms of locusts. Lion, hyena, and leopard had ravaged the flocks and herds; the French set to work to exterminate them in the neighborhood of settlements. They built several thousands of miles of roads and constructed hundreds of miles of railways. The fine cedars of the Atlas Mountains were in the way of extinction, and the French forest service came just in time to save them. By many different means France has placed under cultivation at least 100,000 square miles of land (or about twice the area of Alabama) that was formerly desert waste.

In 1894 Timbuktu was captured and the indigenous population released from the tyranny of its Tuareg masters. Since then eastward penetration has progressed apace. Before and during the World War, Tilho explored a vast area northeast and east of Lake Chad, including the fastnesses of Tibesti. With small detachments, chiefly of native troops, he sought out and dispersed those tribesmen who, under Senussi influence (page 139), sought to consolidate Moslem power in one of the least accessible places in the French Sahara. The isolated territories on the southern edge of the Sahara thus brought under French influence are susceptible of economic development, provided they can be made more accessible. Plans for a trans-Saharan railroad to this end include a line across the Sahara, connecting the coast of Algiers with the Niger and Lake Chad, which may eventually connect with the British system that reaches north from Cape Town (Fig. 219). French colonial rule was also extended into Madagascar, where the Hovas, a tyrannical Malayo-Polynesian people who settled in the island in the 16th century, had long practiced slavery, thus depopulating large tracts in the south and southwest.

MINOR COLONIAL PROBLEMS AND TRADE INTERESTS IN AFRICA[1]

The possessions of the smaller powers in Africa are bound to give trouble in the future. The Portuguese, for example, have carried the policy of differential duties on colonial commerce to such an extreme as practically to shut out all trade except with Portugal. If they had money and men with which to develop their own country, matters might not be so bad. But Portugal itself is poor and feeble. Its colonial governors follow no fixed policy except one of weakness and immoral toleration of the sale of liquor to the native. The home government has been so unstable in recent years that it has completely demoralized colonial administration. In southern Angola there has been fairly rapid development, with the help of British capital and enterprise. Spanish Guinea belongs to the same class of feebly developed colonies; Spain has long ceased to be a capable colonizing nation.

Perhaps no other part of the British Empire seems to us so remote as Zanzibar, yet were any other power to try to get possession of it, a political storm would be raised in England. The Zanzibar Arabs have favored the British in trade and politics; British strategy in relation to India and South Africa requires possession of the region; cables have been laid to it. It is a British protectorate with Zanzibar Town as a free port. England's position there, long contested by Germany, was finally confirmed and strengthened by the Anglo-German treaty of 1890, when she ceded Heligoland to Germany in exchange for additional rights in Zanzibar and Pemba. The cession of Heligoland was felt at the time to be of doubtful advantage, and it became a matter of great regret to Great Britain in the World War, when that island became a base of operations for the German High Seas Fleet.

It was in 1890 also that, by the terms of an agreement with Germany, Great Britain assumed a protectorate over Uganda. Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Uganda, and British East Africa, thus connected, form a broad strip, of imperial extent, that looks out upon the Mediterranean at one end and upon the Indian Ocean at the other. It flanks the route to India. Possession of it put the Cape-to-Cairo railway project a step nearer realization.

Germany was well satisfied with these changes, because with them went substantial advantages for herself. Besides Heligoland she

[1] The major colonial interests of the great powers are described in the separate chapters on these powers; e.g., Egypt and South Africa, in Chapter Two, *Problems of Imperial Britain.*

obtained the Caprivi salient, a long arm of territory extending from German Southwest Africa eastward to the Zambezi (Fig. 219); she extended the northern boundary of the Cameroons to Lake Chad; she became established in the Victoria Nyanza region inland as far as the Belgian Congo (Fig. 94, page 284).

France was equally fortunate. By the Anglo-French agreement of 1890 the protectorate over Madagascar was recognized (it became a French colony in 1896), and France became the recognized power of the western Sahara. In 1904 she had her position in Morocco recognized



FIG. 227. West Africa, from the Congo to Senegal, has been the field of keenest commercial rivalry in respect of raw materials. Note the variety and concentration of vegetation belts there. A small white population controls the commercial system of a large native population in West Africa. The map is diagrammatic in part, as in the Nile valley and in the interior of the Sahara and of Arabia. After Sir Harry Johnston, the *Geographical Journal*, Vol. 45, 1915

by Great Britain. Recognition by Germany came only in 1911 after the Agadir incident, as explained previously (page 189). France then bought German recognition of her Moroccan position by ceding to Germany a large section of French Equatorial Africa (strip to the Congo, Figure 219).

There remained a dispute between France and Spain which explains the odd disposition of territory south of the Straits of Gibraltar. Naturally, Spain has always been interested in the African coast opposite her. In 1912 she confirmed France's special position in Morocco and herself obtained a narrow strip along the coast, now called the Spanish Zone, and in addition an enclave on the southwestern coast of Morocco at Ifni. Two hundred and fifty square miles at Tangier became an "international zone." (Figs. 54, 55.)

WEST AFRICA

West Africa includes a belt of territory nearly 3000 miles long, extending from Mauretania at the western end of the Sahara south and east as far as the Portuguese possessions in the Congo region (Fig. 71). It comprises a score of organized states belonging to Great Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal. Including the Belgian Congo (pages 202 to 205), the region has nearly a half-billion dollars' worth of trade, carried on at more than forty ports. Great Britain has the largest number of trade agencies and most of the trade; Germany ranked second before 1914. Great Britain owns the richest territory and her interests, to which we now turn, illustrate the value of West Africa in the commercial world.

Among Great Britain's possessions, British West Africa, next to India, is the most important from the standpoint of raw materials. It includes (without the recent British portions of the mandated areas of Togoland and Cameroons) Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and Gambia, and contains 23,000,000 native people in an area of 490,000 square miles. Ocean transportation being the cheapest there is in the world, and the distance from West Africa to the English Channel being but three thousand miles, the rich resources of the region became the object of strong commercial rivalry between Germany and Great Britain. As a result of the World War and the peace settlement, Germany is now out of this market; her agencies are gone, she has lost her former prestige among the natives.

West Africa is rich in cacao and palm oil particularly, although it has important tin, coal, and gold deposits, as well as an increasing production of timber, nuts, rubber, fiber, and cotton. Among these

the richest in immediate possibilities is palm oil. With the rapid development of machine industry, lubricating oil is in great demand; the world's consumption of soap is also steadily growing; substitutes for butter are now in favor. All these things and more the palm tree will supply. From the seed an oil is obtained that has the greatest variety of uses. From Nigeria alone, in 1917, there were $20,000,000 of palm oil exports, or almost one half the total in value. Southern Nigeria has a dense population of more than 100 to the square mile, and here there is the greatest degree of prosperity, owing to large quantities of raw material (which may be gathered or produced upon the hot and wet lowlands of the coast) and to geographical accessibility.

Before the World War Germany took most of the palm-nut exports, employing even the meal of the nut for cattle feed. This trade has now been diverted entirely to British firms, who are opening additional motor roads and railways in order to tap several thousand square miles of palm territory, native transportation methods being primitive. Hand in hand with such development goes the stimulation of other lines of production, ground-nuts, cotton, and cacao. In 1925 the cacao produced on the Gold Coast alone was valued at $40,000,000; it formed four fifths of the total exports and half of the world's production.

ADEN

In connection with the minor European colonies in the horn of Africa (Fig. 228), mention must be made of the adjacent Arabian territory pertaining to the port of Aden. Though the British territory at Aden has only 56,000 people, who live on very poor land totaling



Fig. 228. The Aden region and the Strait of Bab el Mandeb, a focal point of eastern trade with Europe. The British own Perim Island, between which and the French possession of Sheikh Said lies the principal ship channel. Each power is therefore anxious to get control of the other's position.

about 80 square miles, the British protectorate covers some 9000 square miles. The place is important because of its strategic value in the defense of India and the Suez Canal, and because it is the focus of the Red Sea trade as well as that of Abyssinia and all that eastern portion of Africa known as French, British, and Italian Somaliland. All told, the population of the region of which Aden is the commercial focus is more than 12,000,000, and the region includes 850,000 square miles of territory, in places capable of early development.

THE THREE SOMALILANDS AND ERITREA

British, French, and Italian Somaliland are alike in possessing an arid or semi-arid lowland that rises in the interior to hills and tablelands with a somewhat moister climate, particularly in British Somaliland. The people are everywhere nomadic, moving from one water hole to another with their flocks and herds according to the seasons. They are all Moslems, practically without education, and all are in a measure difficult to govern. Except for the seaports there are no towns and hardly any permanent villages.

AREA AND POPULATION OF SOMALILAND BY POLITICAL DIVISIONS

	AREA IN SQ. MI.	POPULATION	PRODUCTS EXPORTED
British Somaliland	68,000	350,000	Hides and skins, gum arabic, cattle, ghee butter
French Somaliland	8,000	65,000	Hides and skins, coffee, ivory, beeswax
Italian Somaliland[1]	190,000	900,000	Hides and skins, butter, durra (a kind of millet)

Through French Somaliland via the Franco-Ethiopian railway to the port of Jibuti and through British Somaliland via camel caravan routes to the port of Berbera (the capital) comes the principal part of the overland transit trade of Abyssinia. This fact and the grazing possibilities of the grasslands of the region explain the conflict of claims in the hinterland for the ill-defined eastern part of Abyssinia.

Besides Italian Somaliland and Libya, Italy holds also the small colony of Eritrea on the coast of the Red Sea. The coast belt is barren and sandy, but inland there is a fertile central plateau with a cool climate and a better water supply. There has been little development of the region up to the present time. Its 45,800 square miles are inhabited by 330,000 people, divided between settled villagers on the plateau and pastoral tribes in the lowlands. Life is so primitive that there is

[1] Including Trans-Juba, acquired from Great Britain in 1924.

very little commerce, and the colony has no real commercial importance at the present time, except as a transit land for Abyssinian trade and as a focus (at the port of Massawa) for a part of the Red Sea coast of Arabia.

THE INDEPENDENT STATES

Ethiopia (Abyssinia)

Ethiopia is one of two independent states in Africa. It is remarkable for the absence of an external debt (which it consistently avoids lest political encroachment follow), and for its Christian religion long maintained in the midst of heathen African peoples. It has an area estimated at 400,000 square miles (though its eastern frontier has never been accurately defined) and is largely isolated from surrounding lands by its mountainous character and the deep canyons that nick the outer borders of its plateaus. There is a limited amount of barren lowland, especially on the east and south, but the plateau and mountain sections have a cool and moist climate. The population numbers between 8,000,000 and 10,000,000. While the state of development of the Ethiopians is low and their standard of living simple, they are so numerous as to furnish the basis for a considerable trade. Ivory, beeswax, and gums have been the standard exports, and recently potash has been worked on a commercial scale. There are also undeveloped coal and oil resources.

Thanks chiefly to its interior position and its rough topography, Ethiopia has been able to maintain its independence though threatened by aggressive European powers. It is cut off from the outside world by deserts and arid plains on the north, east, and south, and by great swamps on the west. A favorable conjunction of climate, labor supply, and resources has tempted European advance, but it has also led to rivalry between Great Britain on the one hand and France and Italy on the other, Ethiopia watching the dissension closely. Only as late as 1906 did Great Britain, France, and Italy come to an agreement, however vague, respecting spheres of economic interest in Ethiopia. While the territorial integrity of the country was then agreed upon, there was also a mutual recognition of rival claims, and it is not clear whether Ethiopia had more to fear from the previous epoch of rivalry than from the later and present epoch of agreement among European powers respecting Ethiopian rights. Great Britain has from the first received recognition of her special interests in Egypt and the Nile basin and their Ethiopian connections. Italy has long sought to connect Eritrea and Italian Somaliland through western Ethiopia. France has sought to

base her claims upon the necessity for a wide hinterland to her Somali Protectorate and to assume rights connected with the operation of the railway from Jibuti to Addis Ababa.

The "rights" of the three interested states entered a new phase in 1919 when an understanding between Great Britain and Italy came into effect. The latter was to obtain British help in constructing a railroad connecting Italian possessions north and south across western Ethiopia, while Italy recognized Great Britain's predominant interest in the control of the waters of Lake Tsana, which feed the Blue Nile and are necessary to the further development of both Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Fearing that bondage would follow Italy's attempt to secure exclusive economic influence of western Ethiopia along the line of the projected railway, Ethiopia sought to expose the intrigues of her neighbors and has been able to hold them in abeyance since she obtained admission to the League of Nations in 1923. Ethiopia holds that Great Britain is sufficiently protected in the use of the waters of Lake Tsana by the treaty of 1902, which prohibited Ethiopia from starving or drowning Egypt. However, both Italy and Great Britain raise questions outside the scope of the water supply. The Italian railway is looked upon as wholly unnecessary, since both Eritrea and Italian Somaliland are of little economic importance and are unsuited to white colonization. In the view of leading Ethiopians, it is not the connection between these two colonies that matters to Italy but the commercial production of Ethiopia itself. The British official answer to charges of intrigue against Ethiopia is that Ethiopia has delayed unconscionably its formal replies in the course of necessary negotiations, and that in any event Great Britain associated itself with Italy only to avoid competition between the two principal interested powers. It is asserted that Ethiopia's right to reject foreign proposals is unimpaired.

Liberia, a Negro Republic

The negro republic of Liberia is situated on the west African coast between Sierra Leone (British) and the Ivory Coast (French). Its total area is about 40,000 square miles (a little less than that of Pennsylvania) and the population has been variously estimated, the figures ranging from 700,000 to about 2,000,000, of whom all but about 50,000 on the coast are quite uncivilized. Liberians of American origin number some 12,000.

The foundation of the republic was the result of efforts made by the American Colonization Society, founded in 1816 to settle free

American negroes on African soil. In 1820 actual settlement began, and in 1847 the colonists promulgated a declaration of independence and drew up a constitution. Even today the government does not effectively control the interior regions, and this has led to the progressive diminution of Liberia's territory by French and British encroachment. Should this or similar absorption by Europeans threaten Liberia with real danger of extinction, the United States would doubtless play a guardian's part.

The political influence of the United States has been carried directly into Africa by treaty with Liberia, so that the United States has now assumed obligations that cover a stretch of 15,000 miles, or three fifths of the circumference of the earth, from Liberia to the Philippines. The United States loaned Liberia $5,000,000 in 1918 for the construction of roads, etc., and has assumed the position of chief financial adviser to the republic, a position which was previously held by a joint commission of representatives of Great Britain, the United States, and Germany.

The development of the resources of the region is hindered somewhat by the constitutional provision that none but Liberian citizens may hold real estate, except for colonization, missionary, educational, or other benevolent purposes. The present head of the government of Liberia has broader views of the country's future than his predecessors held and is seeking to provide better commercial opportunities for whites, upon whom the economic progress of the country must depend. The largest industrial undertaking yet made is rubber production. An American company is developing large plantations and expects to use the cheap native labor supply. Nearness to the large rubber market of the United States — by comparison with the greater distance that separates the East Indian field from America — is a favorable factor.

CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR

LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AND BOUNDARY DISPUTES: RELATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES

The great problems of our time are not confined to European fields. They occur in almost every occupied part of the world from Spitsbergen to South Georgia. With the use of airplane and submarine for commercial and strategic purposes, even remote islets have a new importance. The natural pastures of the moss-covered tundras of Siberia, Lapland, and northern North America are now thinly inhabited and of low value, but they may some day be the scene of commercial rivalry as a source of meat supply. At some future time even the sea may be marked out politically in zones of economic development, if the food value of its hordes of now unused but useful marine organisms should ever be developed. The Amazon valley, hot, forested, unhealthful, and thinly inhabited, seems now of small importance; but it may yet be a source of incalculable energy when medical science conquers the tropical germ diseases and when the resources of the temperate zones are taxed to capacity by rapidly growing populations.

Therefore in a realm so vast as that stretching from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego, the home of 30,000,000 people of white blood, of nearly 25,000,000 Indians and Negroes, and of 45,000,000 more of mixed blood, it should not surprise us to find problems of practical interest to the whole world and of paramount interest to the United States.

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

To every thoughtful person in the United States, Latin American relations and problems appear the more important because of past diplomatic and commercial neglect. Though the people of the northern republic call their Latin neighbors "Americans," make much of the protective value of the Monroe Doctrine, and lay particular stress on the good effects of closer commercial ties, the United States must face the cold fact, whether agreeable or not, that satisfactory relations are not being established. The ties appear to be artificial. There is lacking the bond that is in general the strongest in the world — a common language. Then there are differences of race which are even more nearly fundamental. They manifest themselves in manners and dress, in literature and ethics, in sports, and in social and political ideals.

Finally, there is the instinctive and world-wide antagonism springing from the fear and dislike of the weak for the strong. In the case of Latin America this fear rests upon a foundation of fact as well as upon a measure of instinctive antagonism due to unlike race and lesser commercial and military power. The steady growth of the United States in territory and influence, mainly among former Latin American possessions, naturally arouses anxiety as to future advances. The following table reveals the surprising fact that the United States has extended its influence and control more rapidly since its annexation of Hawaii (not to mention the earlier acquisition of territory originally Latin American in the southwest) than any other great power, even imperialist Russia. In such an advance both the total result and the method are subjects of attack.

The United States has a democratic government, and it has in recent years disavowed imperialist designs and even protested against such designs on the part of European powers; yet the fact is that territorial expansion has marked American history from the beginnings of settlement in colonial days, through the period of the Louisiana Purchase and the annexation of Florida, during the period immediately before and after the Mexican War, down to the present. The protectorate over Haiti assumed in 1915, the treaty with Nicaragua in 1916, whereby the United States obtained for 99 years the right to construct a canal through Nicaraguan territory, and the purchase of the Virgin Islands in 1917, are merely the latest in a long series of advances. The situation is shown both in the table below and in the map of the Caribbean region on page 658 (Fig. 229).

Name	Date	Relationship	Area in Sq. Mi.	Population
Hawaii	1898	Annexed	6,450	250,000
Cuba	1898	Virtual protectorate	44,150	2,900,000
Porto Rico	1898	Annexed after war with Spain	3,600	1,250,000
Philippine Islands	1898	Annexed after war with Spain	115,025	8,500,000
Guam	1898	Annexed after war with Spain	210	14,500
Tutuila (Samoa)	1899	Annexed by treaty with Great Britain and Germany	77	7,250
Panama	1903	General supervision	32,400	450,000
Santo Domingo	1907	Supervision of finances	18,500	955,000
	1916	Military administration		
Haiti	1915	Supervision of finances	11,000	2,500,000
Nicaragua	1913	Virtual protectorate	49,500	716,000
	1916	Grant of canal rights and naval bases to United States		
Virgin Islands	1917	Ownership by purchase	132	26,000
		Totals	281,044	17,598,750

FIG. 229. American penetration in the Caribbean. Consult the table on page 657. Note the Panama inset in the upper right-hand corner. Several small islands of the Virgin group are in British possession (Fig. 19, page 79).

The events referred to above are facts that impress the Latin American countries more powerfully than expressions of good will and devotion to democratic ideals. In part the expansion of the United States is a manifestation of the almost universal land-hunger of the peoples of the world; in part it is an expression of that pioneering instinct which has ever driven the people of the United States beyond their territorial frontiers; in part it is a conviction of the superiority of American institutions over those they displace in some Latin American countries that are too weak and backward to manage themselves; and in part it is a recognition of the commercial advantages that are naturally associated with a higher degree of political control.

Whatever European nations might have preferred to do, they have in practice — at times under direct compulsion — recognized the Monroe Doctrine and left the United States free to pursue its southward advance; but such expansion has in recent years evoked a feeling of hostility among the Latin American states, a hostility based on the assumption that their economic and political liberties were at stake; and the United States is therefore confronted with direct and powerful political opposition for the first time since it embarked upon its policy of expansion overseas.

The willingness of the United States to coöperate with Latin American republics has shown itself in the organization of the Pan-American Union, in friendly interest in the once active Central American Court of Justice, and in acceptance of the offers of the A B C powers — Argentina, Brazil, and Chile — in the Mexican trouble of 1916; but it is not certain that coöperation is equally acceptable to the Latin Americans, who have a quite different character and a markedly different social order, and whose governments, though patterned after that of the United States, actually operate in a quite different way. Moreover, they cannot help seeing that the history of the period beginning in 1898 shows the United States as an expansionist power of rapidly growing strength, with a population that now numbers 120,000,000, or more than the population of the entire group of twenty Latin American nations. They realize that in any coöperative enterprise the United States would play the dominant part.

Then, too, there are marked differences of opinion between the people of the United States and those of Latin American countries as to the social and political problems of the day. To take a single instance, there are great differences with respect to colored populations. The tendency to intermarry with the native races is a marked characteristic of the Latin Americans. In Chile whole sections of the

former Indian population have become mixed with the whites, and though the Indian element is strongly marked, there is no longer any recognition of the existence of the Indian in those particular sections, the population calling itself Chilean. Similarly, a large mixed class exists in Peru and Bolivia, to cite two more illustrations out of many. In short, the barriers of race are far less marked in Latin America than in the United States.

There can be recognized in parts of Latin America a considerable decline in the quality of the population. Our common thought is that the world is improving; but as a matter of fact portions of it have lost ground. This is particularly true in Haiti and Santo Domingo, in parts of Central America, in Venezuela, and in Mexico. In actual practice democratic principles have been left far behind. There are a few countries in which military dictators are in actual control, instead of truly representative governments. Professing the same general political principles, the people of Latin America and those of the United States show the utmost divergence of political practice.

Should there be increasing weakness on the part of small and politically disintegrating states, the possibilities of encroachment by powers with imperialist designs would require consideration. It is feared by the neighbors of the United States that the impulse to dominate the Caribbean and the Pacific will grow stronger, and may lead eventually to sovereign control. One argument always stands ready for effective use: that only in growth can guarantees be found that colonies and naval stations of other powers will not be established near the shores of the United States to threaten its security as well as its peace. This consideration explains the purchase of the Danish West Indies during the World War, the protectorate over Haiti, the special arrangements with Cuba (the Platt Amendment), with Santo Domingo (a receivership amounting to a protectorate), with Panama (direct ownership of the Canal Zone and special treaty arrangements with the Republic of Panama), and with Nicaragua (the purchase of canal rights and the regulation of her financial affairs). If the United States allows financial operations to be carried on and obligations to be incurred in Latin America by its commercial rivals, the natural outcome will be protectorates and naval stations of its own; for these rivals look to the United States to guarantee the obligations of the weaker Latin American countries of the Caribbean that are most affected by practical applications of the Monroe Doctrine.

The United States is also impelled to expand commercially in the part of Latin America nearest to it by the necessities of modern

civilization, which require tropical products in increasing quantities. Were tropical America occupied by more progressive peoples than those which race, history, and climate have conspired to develop there, economic relations might be built upon a basis of ordinary exchange, as between France and America. Instead there is a population locally incapable of protecting itself or of managing its affairs, and in a few places in a state of political and economic decline. Only under the stimulus of necessity and through the influx of the agents and capital of temperate lands are the tropical products of weak countries made available. With the importation of aggressive men and capital into the tropics goes the importation first of economic and then of political systems.

The only serious fear connected with such an importation is that it may lead to the exploitation of unwilling peoples by unfair means. Political discontent and even war have sprung again and again from this imposition of ideas and power upon other peoples. Such imposition is not restricted to tropical America, but is world-wide; it is associated with the extraordinary expansion of the political and economic systems of the densely populated industrial nations of the north temperate zone into the tropical lands of America, Africa, and the East and West Indies.

COMPETITION FOR SOUTH AMERICAN TRADE

Though serious efforts have been made to turn the tide of Latin American students and travelers toward the United States, it must be said that it still flows far more strongly toward Europe, and particularly to France. For the Latin Americans find that the older cultures of Europe more nearly meet their taste in manners and accord better with their point of view, their philosophy, and their ideals. This congeniality of mind and the keener needs of the European merchants for raw materials (as compared with the United States) have conspired with the extensive type of South American production to put the commerce of Latin America very much into the hands of the commercial and financial interests of western Europe. To this end also has contributed powerfully the better shipping service to South America from England and France. Recent and rapid American gains in that commerce have intensified competition with European interests in South America. We now sell more to and purchase more from Latin America than the United Kingdom and Germany combined, and they are our chief competitors. Of the total Latin American exports in 1926, the United States took nearly 40 per cent.

American capitalists have very largely increased their railway holdings and will tend in the future to have a stronger hold upon land transport, which will greatly stimulate American industrial enterprises. Large American export houses have established themselves in the main coast ports. A chain of banking houses has been founded to offer banking facilities to the American merchant and investor. At Chuquicamata, in northern Chile, American interests have acquired the largest deposit of commercial copper known in South America. American firms own the rich copper and silver mines of Cerro de Pasco in Peru, and various copper mines in Chile, among them those of the Braden Copper Company near Rancagua, and those of the Chile Exploration Company, at Chuquicamata, in addition to the iron mines of the Bethlehem (Chile) Iron Mines Company at Tofo north of Coquimbo. During the World War many manufactured goods formerly obtained from Europe were imported from the United States, and some of that war-time trade the United States has held, owing to improved knowledge of the needs of South American people and their peculiar desires and to the better freight rates that the new cargo carriers in the South American trade were able to offer for a time.

A prominent Briton wrote in 1913 that one of the eleven main probable causes of future wars in which Great Britain might take part would be

". . . any attempt of the United States to exercise peculiar political or commercial privileges in South America, east of the Panama Canal Zone, and in general any attempt on the part of an outside power to interfere with the independence of the South American republics; or a disposition on the part of any South American state to confer peculiar privileges in commerce on the subjects of any foreign power to the detriment of the free-trade principle."

It is important to note that the writer does not include Central America and Mexico in his list, and it is equally important to note that he speaks as a representative of a free-trade nation. He has given us, therefore, both a broad political statement related to the independence of the South American states and a narrower statement relating to trade arrangements that shall give the British merchant the same chance as the American.

Great Britain is by far the largest investor in South American enterprises: her citizens own large concessions in the Mexican oil fields and in Colombia; her railway financiers built the Argentine railways; and for a time she was the largest owner among foreign nitrate companies in northern Chile. The Peruvian Corporation

(British), which has almost sovereign rights in Peru, temporarily holds the rich guano concessions of the Chinchas Islands and owns the Southern Railway, from Mollendo and Arequipa to Lake Titicaca and Cuzco.

The growth of Spanish interests in Latin America was very rapid from 1914 to 1919, partly for sentimental and political reasons and partly for business reasons, seeing that Spain, by engaging in trade as a neutral country during the war period, greatly increased her bank reserves. After the war she appointed a committee of engineers at Madrid to investigate the possibilities of commercial expansion with the Spanish-speaking republics of Latin America, with the object of promoting closer business and political relations. There is to be a permanent exhibit of Latin American products at Madrid.

Because of the Monroe Doctrine, European countries have looked to the government of the United States to maintain order and guarantee the security of their loans in Central American states, and this the United States cannot do unless it occupies a privileged position and holds the main strategic points. Since 1910 the United States has frequently landed marines and even maintained them in Honduras and Nicaragua, and has taken over indefinitely the functions of the defaulting government in Santo Domingo. In September 1915 an agreement with Haiti provided that the United States may take such steps as may be necessary to maintain an adequate government. The United States also undertook to supervise the financial and military affairs of Haiti. Pershing's military expedition into Mexico in 1916 was in line with the American custom of maintaining order, or at least taking the lead in quelling disorder, in the parts of Latin America that lie near by.

Opposed to this supervisory policy of the United States are large and influential sections of South America, and these sections have followed their big neighbor's behavior with the closest attention. Chile has been watchful and suspicious, because the United States befriended her rival, Peru, in the bitter war of 1879–1883. The manner in which the Panama Canal Zone was acquired offended Colombia deeply, and it will be long before that country is in truth the friend of the United States. Though belated, American action in recognizing the neglect of Colombia's interests in 1903 by the agreement of 1921 to pay her $25,000,000 and grant special transportation privileges in the Canal Zone is at least a necessary first step in the direction of better relations. The United States and Colombia are naturally closely allied through the large trade, and especially the large fruit business, which is conducted in the Caribbean coast region.

LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS IN EVOLUTION

The unsettled state of Mexico offers the problem of most direct interest to the United States today. Thousands of people in Mexico have been killed by revolution and banditry, thousands of others impoverished, political opponents imprisoned, and foreign debts neglected. It is contended that investments in mines, oil fields, and cattle ranches, if these have been honestly acquired and administered, should have security. American losses of all kinds in Mexico during the past few years have a total value of nearly half a billion of dollars. The total number of Americans killed on the border or in Mexico in recent years runs into the hundreds. The number of Americans in Mexico was reduced, chiefly by emigration to escape death or avoid the confiscation of property, from 75,000 in 1910 or 1911 to 12,000 by September 1919. These devastating results have not yet run their full course. They have grown out of a civilization almost totally unlike our own. They can be understood in part by a reference to the deeper motives and the historical setting of Spanish peoples in the New World.

At the time of the founding of Spanish settlements in the New World the traditions of military conquest and glory and the devotion to a militant church (a reflection of the long struggle with the Moor) were among the dominating ideas of Spanish life. In the New World there was resistance enough on the part of the Aztec and Inca political organizations to fire the imagination and invite the prowess of the Spaniard, so recently successful in expelling the African invader from his own soil. The existence of such empires stirred alike the military adventurer and the crown. Gold and silver that represented the spoils of conquest had disastrous after-effects, but their immediate effect was to spur on further military endeavor until the whole tropical belt of America had been explored by Spanish adventurers, soldiers, and settlers. While settlement proceeded slowly, it was remarkably widespread. In a century there had been established Spanish colonies from central Chile and the Argentine northward to central California. The church played a highly significant part, first by associating itself with the traditions of military success, second by giving a religious aspect to conquest in most of its forms. But it went even further, because it provided through its friars a pioneer edge to permanent settlement. Throughout the whole Spanish realm in the Americas the missionary friars established outposts where the natives were converted to the Christian religion and even organized into large and

small communities, where farming was taught and European plants and seeds were introduced. It was in this way that a great impetus was given to settlement and communication, to the use of the natives in exploitation undertaken by whites, to the spread of domesticated plants and animals, and to the knowledge of the geography and the natural resources. Of these religious organizations the most powerful came to be the Jesuits, whose degree of control reached an alarming point and finally led among other causes to the expulsion of the order from America in 1767.

But Spain could not support the vast empire that the courage of the conquerors had blocked out for her. The settlements were too widely extended to be of help to each other. In the European world seaborne commerce came to have greater and greater importance. English sea power was a rival that had to be reckoned with to an increasing degree. New economic forces were coming into play and new political ideas took a leading place in the thought of the centuries following the Spanish conquest. The Spaniard lived according to a group of medieval standards; these controlled his family life, his government, and the organization of New World communities; they established his relations to the Indians and his views as to land tenure, irrigation, and pastoral pursuits. Spain might lay an embargo upon her trade with her colonies in the New World, but trade they were bound to have in an increasing degree as they grew in strength and as the full force of the mercantile system of modern times came into play. Ideas may not be kept out by embargoes. It was evident that through trade and the advance of industry in Europe there would be an increasing commercial penetration of Spanish colonies. Less than three centuries after the Spanish conquest the colonies revolted one by one from Spain and adopted the forms and shibboleths of democracy, while at the same time keeping many of Spain's ancient views respecting land tenure and the natives.

THE LAND QUESTION

It is the essential weakness of the countries south of the Rio Grande that the social structure is not adapted to the needs of a new land. Large landholdings have been the rule, and these have required a system of enforced labor that is called peonage but is in reality a mild form of slavery. The native and the soil upon which he lived were considered as natural resources at the disposal of the government. Large estates were allocated to Spanish settlers with the right to demand labor from the native or to require him to pay a tax upon his

holdings. In some instances the native was not permitted to have title to land. In the course of time each main political group worked out variations in government and society from the general scheme. In Chile the mixture of Indians and whites proceeded to such a degree that practically no pure Indian population is left except in southern Chile. Social distinction took the place of racial distinction. The *roto* class came into being — laborers of the poorest sort who do the rough work of the landed estates, the nitrate fields, the mines, and are kept in economic bondage as severe as if they were primitive Indian stock of centuries past. Guatemala, Bolivia, and Peru, with their large Indian populations, took a different course. No matter what degree of admixture there may be in these countries, the so-called whites are the exploiters who also control political power. Socially they form a class apart and respond to foreign economic stimuli, chiefly of European and United States origin.

The Situation in Argentina

The land question in one form or another has troubled most of the Latin American republics, widely different though its aspects may be in the various parts of Latin America. Since the World War, Argentina has attacked the problem of the large estates, for there is a growing prejudice on social and political grounds against *terratenientes*. Agriculture seemed to have come to a standstill, for the cost of producing cereals had increased far more rapidly than the sale price. The rural population is tending to diminish and urbanization has been an outstanding difficulty in Argentina for decades. It is sought to encourage mixed cultivation upon smaller holdings. By far the greater number of cultivators lease the land they occupy. It happens that in the most populous and climatically the most suitable parts of Argentina, for example in the province of Buenos Aires, the large holdings of cereal lands are most conspicuous; for it is here that permanent settlement has developed, and a more intensive cultivation (rainfall, 20 to 40 inches). The railway net is closely spaced, ports are nearer, there is adequate machinery for financing and distributing crops.

Through agricultural schools, credit and coöperative societies, and a national land settlement bank, the government is encouraging small ownership. Working toward the same end is the development of highway and railway systems in the pioneer lands on the fringe of settlement. Thus Argentina seeks to offset the urbanization that has marked her past. For example, in the twenty years from 1895 to

1914 the population doubled, but the increase was 167 per cent in the towns and but 86 per cent in the country.

The Land Question in Mexico

In Mexico, to take another example, there has existed a large landed class since the time of the Spanish conquest. The Indians were unable to retain holdings that were gradually absorbed in large tracts by the whites, they themselves remaining as serfs upon the estates of others or as agricultural laborers without farms of their own. With the breaking up of the agrarian communities after the middle of the 19th century, the process of dislodging the aboriginal owners was hastened. It is estimated that among the Indian population some 5,000,000 were without agricultural holdings. By 1910, just prior to a long period of revolution, the rural inhabitants of Mexico who had no landed property were probably in a worse condition than they had been at any time since the conquest.

Thus agrarian reform became one of the aims of the Madero revolution that overthrew the long established Díaz régime. The rural population was stirred to its depths. The peon had at last his chance to fight the master. The reform measures that followed the revolution took account first of public lands given to companies or individuals in violation of the law. It has been estimated that by the end of 1918 at least 15,000,000 hectares had been restored to small private ownership. That this return was in part by violence goes without saying, because that is the natural concomitant of revolution. By the constitution of 1917 individual states are permitted to enact reform legislation that is intended to break up the large estates and create a growing class of small proprietors. The tendency has been for the large hacienda to be diminished in size, though there can be no question that large holdings will still be the rule in certain parts of Mexico, as they ought to be. Much of northern Mexico is semi-arid, and Mexican experience has pointed in the same direction as the experience of settlers in the western United States — that an economic holding of semi-arid or arid land must be of large size. Intermediate holdings are also permitted upon lands that are better favored, and small holdings upon lands capable of irrigation and intensive cultivation. By this means the system of cultivation is adapted to geographical circumstances.

It was inevitable that so drastic a change should involve foreign influence on the one hand and the church on the other. Not only

were both these classes holders of large estates but they also affected, the one the economic life of the people, the other the social life in ways that made them objects of revolutionary attack. Foreign capital had flowed into Mexico at an unprecedented rate, as we noted above. It had long been expended chiefly upon mining and, in the last quarter of the 19th century, upon railroad building. More recently it had exploited the oil resources of Mexico, and here it touched the problem of land. The petroleum law based upon the constitution of 1917 provided that rights arising from lands in which exploitation work was begun prior to 1 May 1917 should be confirmed through government concessions newly drawn up, each owner to apply to the government for the confirmation of his rights. It has been the contention of the oil companies that they should not be required to jeopardize, through the process of fresh application, a right already confirmed by law. After years of controversy the first decisions under the new law were made in 1927 by the Supreme Court of Mexico, which declared the law unconstitutional. In any event rights obtained after 1917 are on a different basis, since they must conform to the constitution of that date.

The conflict with the church involved not only church properties but the more serious charge that the church had become an instrument in the exploitation of the peon class. The material power of the church had grown so large, its political influences so many and far reaching, that it was in natural opposition to the revolutionary class that sought to end institutions enjoying special privileges. As in all revolutions, the Mexican revolutionary leaders have been extremely anxious respecting the use of power by conservative elements in the country, whether these were foreigners, the church, or the holders of political philosophies at variance with the principles of a democratic revolution. Believing that robbery and self-aggrandizement, disorder, and a downward leveling of classes would wreck Mexican life, the conservative elements naturally were sympathetic towards each other even though they did not work together. Of all the conservative elements the church was the most extensive, the most deeply entrenched, the one most capable of swaying the populace by appeals to feeling and religious sentiment. It naturally drew upon its head the opposition and at length the bitter attacks of leaders of successive Mexican governments. The relation of church to government reached its critical stage in July 1926, when by presidential decree the constitutional provisions respecting religious organizations were put into effect. The government leaders openly charged that Spanish and Italian Catholic priests sought to make the people fanatic and, while fostering

ignorance among the natives, to absorb more and more of native property. They charged meddling in national politics and attempts to absorb economic strength and disrupt the government organization. It is not our purpose to prove or disprove these assertions but only to express them as the basis for government action. Holding these views, the government blamed the church for the ensuing strife and resisted all efforts at compromise and parley, eventually laying the most severe restrictions upon ecclesiastical forms and the conditions of public worship.[1] All these things bear a near resemblance to the excessive acts of the Soviet government of Russia, but it is a mistake to assume a close parallel. The historical backgrounds of the two peoples are quite different. The cause of revolution in both countries sprang in part from a bad state of society and a bad economic relation of population to land, but the sentiments that sway government leaders are quite unlike in the two cases. The ideal forms which they have set up for government and for society differ widely in spirit and in practical application.

SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS

Each Latin American state has what may be called its vital economic center, located favorably with respect to the natural environment. That is to say, however the boundaries have fluctuated, the chief cities and the denser populations occupy positions where nature offers man the best she has. In Chile this is the fertile central valley between the wet, cold south and the hot, dry north. In Bolivia it is the rich basin and valley floors of intermediate and high altitudes (rather than the hot and remote plains on the east) that support the principal cities and the older established life. The case of the Mexican capital is particularly interesting because it is a site whose advantages were

[1] Following are the outstanding provisions of the decree of 3 July 1926, which regulates and defines but adds no new provisions to the constitutional clauses and existing statutes relating to religion and education:

Only native Mexicans may function as ministers of any religious creed. In order to conduct religious services ministers must register with the civil authorities. All churches and other buildings designed for religious purposes are declared the property of the nation, and no religious order or creed may possess property or capital. Churches shall have their use determined by the Federal Government; other buildings designed for religious purposes shall pass immediately into the possession of the nation. Religious acts must be celebrated in churches authorized by law. Ministers are forbidden to express political views or to criticize the fundamental law of the country or acts of the authorities or the Government. Severe penalties are prescribed for any minister or priest who through writings or statements incites the public against the political institutions or to disobey the law. Education must be given in official schools. No religious corporation may establish or direct schools of primary instruction. Establishment of orders of monks is forbidden. Provisions are made for the dissolution of religious orders, convents, and monasteries now established.

recognized even in pre-Columbian times. They are so marked that Mexico City still remains the natural center of the country.

Although the sites of the economic, political, and geographical centers of the Latin American countries are favorably located with respect to production, the various republics are neighbored in an unfavorable manner. As a rule there are natural barriers of desert or dense forests or lofty and cold mountains between nation and nation. Of course direct communication is hindered, where it is not obstructed, between the several countries. Venezuela and Colombia are completely shut off by Amazon forest and Andean tableland and mountain from the southern Latin American republics. Chile and Brazil are about as far removed from each other by the natural or geographical conditions of southern South America as if they were situated in two different worlds. These geographical conditions might be easily overcome if the products were complementary and active trade were maintained. On the contrary, all South American states are characterized by the production of raw materials rather than manufactured goods. This means that they are economically tied to the manufacturing countries of the north temperate zone, that is, the United States and western Europe. In the strength and permanence of these economic bonds is seen a clear warning of the uphill struggle that must ensue to achieve Latin American hegemony. There is no natural compulsion to build means of communication, and especially railroads, from country to country. Peru and Ecuador, like Guatemala or Costa Rica, are much more eager to build railways connecting their eastern and western territories than they are to construct north-south lines that tie them more closely to their neighbors. Chile has built a longitudinal system which might be mistaken for a projection toward her neighbors; but its purpose is domestic or internal — for the development of the soil and as a defensive measure, providing as it does an alternative north-south route for the narrow strip that is Chile in case she should meet with unexpected difficulty in maintaining her naval superiority over Peru. This line also provides her the means for the more successful prosecution of the economic penetration of Bolivia, which has been one of her ruling motives since the World War and is in opposition to the Argentine penetration of that country. Both Chile and Brazil are watching the Argentine advance with the most active interest. This, in fact, was one of the reasons why Brazil pushed her Northwestern Railway connecting São Paulo with the Paraguay River and the branch line that runs into Paraguay. Another reason for this long extension

was the desire to offset Argentine influence in Paraguay. Upon that country three states converge — Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia. It complicates the situation that there is a boundary dispute between Paraguay and Bolivia involving the question of ownership of the extreme southwestern corner of the Gran Chaco. Argentina has marked advantage in Paraguay because of her river and rail connections and the dependence of trade and currency upon the Argentine. Paraguayan currency is quoted abroad in terms of Argentine money.

THE WEST INDIES

At the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico there begins an island chain that runs eastward until it curves sharply southward to the coast of Venezuela. The larger islands in the chain — Cuba, Jamaica, Haiti, and Porto Rico — lie nearest Mexico and the United States. On the outer side of the arc, and near Florida, lie the Bahama Islands, almost parallel with Cuba and Haiti. Southeast of the Bahama Islands are the Leeward Islands, which are on the turn of the curve downward toward South America. Next, running almost directly south, comes the chain of small islands, the Windward Islands, that ends with Trinidad near the mouth of the Orinoco. (See Figures 19 and 229.)

The largest and most valuable islands of the entire group of the West Indies were in Spanish possession from the Age of Discovery. Some of the smaller islands, particularly those farthest east, were transferred from power to power in the days of the struggle, first between Dutch and English, later between English and French, for colonial and naval supremacy. Up to 1898 possession of the islands had remained settled for some time: Cuba and Porto Rico were Spanish; the Bahamas and Jamaica were English; on the island of Haiti two republics had been established, Haiti and the Dominican Republic; of the Leeward Islands one small group — the Virgin Islands — was Danish, and the others were divided about equally between France and Great Britain, while the Windward Islands were entirely English. The Dutch also held a smaller group, one of which is Curaçao, to the west of the Windward Islands near the Gulf of Venezuela.

Since 1898 there have been several changes in the ownership of these islands. Cuba is now a republic practically under United States protection, as are also the republics of Haiti and Santo Domingo. Porto Rico has become a part of United States territory. The latest change was the purchase from Denmark in 1917 of the Virgin Islands, the group immediately to the east of Porto Rico, by the United States.

The purchase of the Virgin Islands from Denmark, like the Panama

Trinidad
Colon
Cartagena
Caracas
Panama
VENEZUELA
Orinoco
Georgetown
Paramaribo
Cayenne
Bogotá
COLOMBIA
Dutch Fr. GUIANA
Rio Negro
Quito
Amazon R.
Manaos
Pará
Guayaquil
ECUADOR
Iquitos
Marañon
Ucayali
PERU
BRAZIL
Madeira R.
Tapajos
Xingu
Tocantins R.
Pernambuco
Lima
Callao
Cuzco
Madre de Dios
BOLIVIA
Matto Grosso
S. Francisco R.
Bahia
Arequipa
La Paz
Arica
Sucre
Paraguay R.
Iquique
Paraná
São Paulo
Rio de Janeiro
Antofagasta
Concepcion
Asuncion
Santos
Tucuman
PARAGUAY
Parana R.
CHILE
ARGENTINA
Cordoba
Valparaiso
Rosario
Rio Grande do Sul
Juan Fernandez Is.
Santiago
URUGUAY
Buenos Aires
Montevideo
Valdivia
Rio Negro
Falkland Is.
Punta Arenas
0 500 1000 M.

Canal transaction in 1903, notified the world that America regarded herself as having special and rightful interests in the Caribbean and along its shores. In a similar case, the general recognition of the British protectorate in Egypt in 1919 acknowledged Great Britain's special and rightful interest in the route to India and especially the Suez Canal. Experience with Spain in Cuba before 1898 justified the United States in undertaking to maintain order since that time in the whole of the American Mediterranean.

In the days of sailing vessels the presence of European powers in the island groups was not felt by the United States to be a source of great danger. Swifter means of communication increased the fear that a foreign power might use the islands as a base of attack on the United States. With the acquisition of the Panama Canal, the presence of other powers in the chain of islands separating the Atlantic Ocean from the Caribbean Sea became troublesome, a possible menace to the safety of the canal.

The use that was made of the submarine by Germany during the late war and the powerful strides in aërial navigation and radio communication have greatly increased the width of those border protective zones that all commercial nations seek to control.

FRONTIER ZONES OF FRICTION IN LATIN AMERICA

Every boundary dispute is a possible cause of war, and boundary disputes grow out of ignorance as well as ambition. "Frontiers are indeed the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death for nations." The unsettled boundaries of the Latin American nations are therefore matters of general concern. If the frontiers of the Latin American states were well-known through exploratory surveys, and if their history were carefully worked out, an impartial tribunal could very soon make a decision that would commend itself to the world, if not to the nations in the dispute. One of the prime functions of an international court of justice will be the settlement of boundary disputes by peaceful means, making use of the resources of geographical research and exploration.

Proof of this argument is found in the settlement of Latin American boundary disputes in the past. In 1900 Chile and Argentina

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Fig. 230. The zones of friction in South America: 1, territory in dispute between Peru and Ecuador; 2, territory ceded to Peru by Colombia by treaty of 1922, north of boundary established by Colombia and Ecuador in 1916; 3, Tacna-Arica; 4, areas in Gran Chaco in dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay. There is also the dispute over the boundary in the La Plata estuary (Fig. 234). Discarded elements of former boundary claims of Peru are shown by a line of dots and dashes.

were on the verge of war over the interpretation of the treaty of 1881, which defined the boundary in Patagonia as "the crest and watershed" of the high cordillera, though the divide between the Atlantic and Pacific drainages in places lies not on the crest of the Andes but east of them. As neither side knew the country thoroughly, they agreed upon field studies as a basis for arbitration with King Edward VII as arbitrator. A party of surveyors was sent out under Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich, that traversed the disputed zone. Within a year an award was made that has satisfied both sides.

The Peruvian-Bolivian boundary north of Lake Titicaca has had a similar history. In 1910 the newspapers of La Paz and Lima were full of war talk. In 1911 a party of English surveyors was in the field to establish a line that has since proved satisfactory.

The boundary between Bolivia and Brazil in the wooded country of the southwestern Amazon plains was settled and surveyed after armed forces had faced each other across the Acre River for months.

What unsettled boundaries remain to be surveyed? Where are the frontier zones of friction? What are the chief differences of opinion as to land titles? In the succeeding pages are discussed those boundary disputes that have seriously threatened or at this moment are threatening the peace of Latin America. Some of them involve vast wealth; others affect few people and small tracts of territory.[1]

The Tacna-Arica Boundary Dispute

The greatest territorial dispute pending in Latin America, the one most interesting in its history and its economic bearings, and most likely to lead to war, is that between Chile and Peru in the Tacna-Arica district. Before 1879 the southern frontier of Peru included the province of Tarapacá, south of which Bolivia held the province of Antofagasta (Fig. 231). Within Tarapacá lay much of the nitrate deposit that, until the discovery of the process for the recovery of nitrogen from the air, produced 99 per cent of the world's supply.

For three hundred years the frontiers of Peru, Bolivia, and Chile remained ill-defined because almost no people lived in the region. Indeed, most of it is worthless desert. It is partly owing to the extreme aridity that nitrate salts have accumulated there. By 1850 these salts had become commercially useful and, with the marked advances of industrial chemistry (1860–1880), they had become so valuable

[1] For a fuller statement of South American boundary disputes than can be given here, see Raye R. Platt, "Present Status of International Boundaries in South America," *Geographical Review*, Vol. 14, 1924, pp. 622–638.

that they formed a great natural endowment to the country owning them. Naturally this state of affairs led to dispute, and, in 1879, to war. Chile had a powerful fleet, Peru had inferior ships of war, and the sea is the great highway along the west coast of South America, where a stretch of desert sixteen hundred miles long makes land travel arduous and costly. Within a year the Chilean army had captured Lima, all the coast ports of Peru were destroyed or in Chilean hands, and the Chilean government was in possession of the nitrate fields, which Chile has held ever since. Bolivia offered very little resistance and until recently accepted exclusion from the sea with only nominal protest.

By the treaty of Ancón, signed in 1883, Chile agreed to hold a plebiscite and thus let the inhabitants (38,000) of Tacna-Arica—the part of the captured territory that is unquestionably Peruvian—decide whether Chile or Peru should own the region. Once in possession, however, Chile could not let go her hold. The plebiscite, for one reason after another, has never been held. In the meantime diplomatic relations between the two countries have been suspended again and again, there have been frequent local mobilizations and strategic disposals of naval units, and, worst of all, serious persecutions of Peruvians. Thousands of persons have been mobbed and robbed and driven into Peru. In 1910 Chile expelled all Peruvian priests in Tacna-Arica and



Fig. 231. Production areas in the nitrate fields of northern Chile. From *Economic Geology*, April-May 1920, and later sources.



FIG. 232. Production of nitrate in Chile by five-year periods, running from the beginning of 1830 to the end of 1914. Figures for 1830–1839, Paz Soldan, *Geografía del Perú;* 1840–1894, Ortizar, *Chile of Today;* 1895–1914, F. López Loayza, *La Provincia de Tarapacá.*

closed their churches. In 1919 Chilean mobs closed Peruvian stores in the towns of Arica and Tacna and Chilean authorities expelled influential Peruvian residents. The two countries have remained in a warlike state, and but for the terrible expense of war and the influence of business men and foreign diplomats they would long since have reopened the struggle. So violent became the differences between the two countries that war seemed bound to follow, and to avert such a calamity a protocol of arbitration was arranged in July 1922 through the good offices of the United States. Its chief provisions were:

(1) The President of the United States should arbitrate the question of the unfulfilled provisions of Article 3 of the treaty of Ancón.

(2) He was to decide whether in the existing circumstances of the time, a plebiscite should or should not be held.

(3) If he decided in favor of a plebiscite, he was to have full power to determine the conditions under which it should be held.

(4) Should he decide against a plebiscite, Chile and Peru were to discuss the situation created by that decision; and in the meantime the administrative organization of the provinces was not to be disturbed until an agreement had been accepted finally disposing of the territory.

(5) If the above-mentioned discussion did not result in an agreement, the Government of the United States was to be requested to exercise its good offices to reach an agreement.

(6) Pending claims relating to the districts of Tarata and Chilcaya were included within the scope of the arbitration.

When the case was submitted to the President of the United States in 1923, he decided that a plebiscite should be held in the disputed territory. To carry out fair conditions the President appointed a plebiscitary commission and a boundary commission, the one to determine the will of the inhabitants, the other to establish a new boundary in accordance with that will. The commissions established themselves at Arica and entered into negotiations with Peru and Chile

for the organization of a plebiscite; but the continued hostility of Chileans to the return of Peruvians and toward Peruvians already established in the territory led to repeated protests and finally to the complete discontinuance of further effort. It is gravely to be questioned whether a plebiscite can be carried out or whether the highly controversial conditions of voting may not result in the non-acceptance of any boundary laid down in accordance with the vote.

On 14 June 1926, General Lassiter (in succession to General Pershing as head of the plebiscitary commission) moved that the plebiscite be abandoned as a means of settling the dispute between Peru and Chile because there was no reasonable approach to a quiet situation which would permit Peruvian adherents fairly to register their vote. He did not even believe that the approach would be sufficiently close to give valuable information on the general question of popular sympathy. Peruvian sympathizers were without proper protection; they were subjected to systematic outrages and terrorization by two societies organized to keep the area in Chilean hands; and the Chilean police and military authorities, though informed of the outrages, did nothing to stop them. Not because of these recent acts alone but because of earlier outrages as well, the conclusion was reached "that the Peruvian electorate has been physically reduced below its proper figure . . . that Peruvians have been driven or frightened out of the plebiscitary territory" without proper facilities to return and vote.



FIG. 233. Location and railway connections of the Tacna-Arica, Tarapacá, and Antofagasta districts. The focus of the present difficulty is Tacna-Arica, where Bolivia seeks a territorial outlet, or "window on the sea," and where Peru insists on complete ownership in view of Chile's broken promise to hold a plebiscite according to the treaty of Ancón, 1883. Before the war of 1879 between Chile on the one hand and Peru and Bolivia on the other, Antofagasta was a Bolivian province and Tarapacá and Tacna-Arica were Peruvian territory.

Into the conflict between Chile and Peru for the possession of the Tacna-Arica territory there has been introduced a third element — landlocked Bolivia's claim for a commercial outlet at the port of Arica. Bolivia (with Chilean coöperation) has built a railroad from La Paz

direct to the sea, across lofty mountains and barren desert to Arica, and now claims the right to have an outlet to the sea and to a strip of land on either side, so as to take control of the railroad out of foreign hands. So much seems to be needed to give this landlocked state, the only interior country of South America except Paraguay, undisputed access to the sea roads of the Pacific.

On 19 April 1926, the President of Bolivia attempted to involve the President of the United States in an expression of Bolivia's right that in the settlement of the Tacna-Arica dispute the desire of Bolivia for a port be taken into account; but President Coolidge replied that such a question lay outside the terms of the protocol and of the award thereunder to be made by himself as arbitrator, and that the negotiations had to be confined to the governments of Peru and Chile. The failure of the present negotiations would probably make the holding of a plebiscite impossible in the future, for while the population of the disputed territory was undoubtedly Peruvian in 1892, in 1893 (when the plebiscite should have been held), and even as late as 1900, it is now fairly certain that the population is predominantly Chilean. Only a small population and a poor territory are involved, and it is in every sense tragic that so costly a conflict is waged for stakes so insignificant.



Fig. 234. The disputed entrance to Buenos Aires. Uruguay wishes to establish the median line of the La Plata as a boundary with Argentina. This would give her possession of the ship channel near Montevideo and above Colonia. The channel was dredged and buoyed and is maintained by Argentina at great expense, owing to the large amount of river silt constantly being deposited in the estuary. Hitherto the boundary has run close to the northeastern bank of La Plata. The broken lines represent ship channels.

The La Plata Estuary

A dispute still unsettled between Argentina and Uruguay involves an artificial channel 120 miles long and extending from a point northeast of Buenos Aires to English Bank at the mouth of the La Plata estuary. This is the main outlet of Argentine commerce. In 1828 Argentina and Uruguay agreed that the natural channel of the Uruguay and the northeastern bank of the Rio de la Plata should be the frontier of Uruguay. Uruguay now claims the median line of the estuary, which would give her control of the channel built, lighted, and buoyed by Argentina and maintained at Argentina's expense. The estuary is so shallow, with a depth varying from 8 to 18 feet, and the shoals are so extensive that navigation is limited to an artificial channel. Paraguay, Bolivia, and Brazil also are interested in the matter, because an increasing portion of their interior commerce must pass by this route. Questions of law and of international policy as to problems of this class remain to be determined before the dispute can be settled. Particularly important in the settlement is the question of the proper present-day limits of territorial waters, in past practice a three-mile zone (Fig. 234). A convention signed in 1918 provides for a triangulation of the Uruguay River and the La Plata estuary, but this preliminary work has not yet been done.

The Bolivia-Paraguay Boundary

Bolivia and Paraguay have a dispute in the Gran Chaco region, between the Pilcomayo River on the south and the Paraguay River on the east (Fig. 235). The disputed zone is virgin grassland in part and will have high commercial value in a short time. Bolivia has occupied the right bank of the Paraguay River in the Gran Chaco, establishing a fort and telegraph station and maintaining troops there. She has effectively occupied the country for many years, one of her main streams of commerce passing across the Gran Chaco to the Paraguay River. On the other hand, Paraguay claims territory west of the Paraguay River to the limits of her old colonial boundaries. She has also granted or sold foreign concessions on the west side of the Paraguay River for the establishment of sawmills (for quebracho wood) and cattle ranches. At a few places she has penetrated at least a hundred miles west of the river.

In 1913 the two nations agreed to annul all former arrangements and to try to settle affairs directly between themselves; if they failed,

FIG. 235. The areas in dispute (1) between Bolivia and Paraguay and (2) between Bolivia and the Argentine Republic (Yacuiba and overlapping claims west of La Quiaca). Scale 1 : 12,000,000. From the *Geographical Review*, October 1924.

they were to submit the matter to arbitration. The boundary is still in dispute.

The Peru-Bolivia Boundary

The boundary dispute between Peru and Bolivia appears now to be happily disposed of. It concerned the region north of Lake Titicaca, over the eastern Andes and into the lowland forests at the edge of the Amazon basin, the cordilleran section including the valuable alpaca pastures of Apolobamba. In 1910 the trouble was so serious that both governments mobilized forces at the frontier.

The boundary survey was begun in 1911 and concluded in 1913 by English surveyors. The two countries agreed that any dispute between the commissions of their respective governments should be submitted, without the right of an appeal, to the President of the Royal Geographical Society of London. The reports were published in 1918.

The Colombia-Ecuador-Peru-Brazil Boundaries

The treaty of 1922 between Peru and Colombia has also settled a long-standing dispute between Brazil and Colombia (Fig. 230). In 1851 a treaty between Brazil and Peru established the boundary between Brazil and the Peruvian claims north of the Amazon River as a straight line from Tabatinga on the Amazon to the mouth of the Apaporis in the Caquetá River. Colombia, in addition to her dispute of the Peruvian claim to territory north of the Amazon River, claimed the point of land between the Putumayo and Amazon rivers east of the Tabatinga-Apaporis line. By the treaty of 1922 Colombia now, in return for the strip of territory by which she is given access to the Amazon River, recognizes the Tabatinga-Apaporis line as forming part of her boundary with Brazil and relinquishes her claim to territory east of this line. In return Brazil has agreed to grant to Colombia freedom of navigation in perpetuity to all rivers common to the two countries.

The area long in dispute between Peru and Colombia is shown in Figure 230. If one or the other party had secured its full claim, or if a compromise had been arranged on a common line of division, Ecuador would have been reduced to a mere coastal strip. A large part of the region, while densely forested country with a scant Indian population, has become important recently because of its rubber resources. At one time or another Peruvian, Ecuadorian, or Colombian officials have nominally controlled the same region.

In 1900 a Peruvian navigation office was established on the Napo, and from that time Peru took active steps to extend her authority over this river, as well as over the Putumayo and Caquetá rivers, establishing custom houses and military posts, and offering armed resistance to the Colombians who attempted to navigate those rivers. In 1910 there was a quarrel amounting practically to a battle between the armed forces of the two republics. In 1911 the two agreed to make no further attacks upon their respective settlements, since which time neither country could enforce the law without armed opposition from the citizens of the other.

In 1916 (treaty of Bogotá) Ecuador and Colombia came to an agreement on their common boundary, and this agreement has subsequently been confirmed (1920) and the boundary partly demarcated. The eastern extremity of the line, however, could not be regarded as settled until confirmed by Peru, since her claims overlapped those of both Colombia and Ecuador. By a new treaty ratified in 1922 by Colombia and in 1927 by Peru, the latter gave up all claims north of the Putumayo River (Içа River on Brazilian maps and in Figure 230), and gave to Colombia access from the Putumayo River to the Amazon by a strip of land along the Brazilian boundary. This narrows the zone of the dispute to the area marked 2 in Figure 230 and confines it to Ecuador and Peru. The known occurrence of valuable oil deposits on one border of the zone will no doubt intensify the contest as soon as development reveals the extent of the oil pools.

The Guatemala-Honduras Boundary

The boundary between Guatemala and Honduras was never determined by surveyors except over a short distance, and the administration of the frontier zone was left to chance or tradition. Some towns had been under Guatemaltecan, others under Honduranean governors for many years. The ecclesiastical districts did not always conform to these arrangements, nor was the political boundary always

a line separating citizens of Honduras and Guatemala. Some of the frontier land was mountainous, with swift encanyoned streams; some of it was low, hot, swampy, and unhealthful. Government by tradition might have gone on for many years if the low country had not become valuable to banana-growers. The United Fruit Company, an American corporation with property at various points between northern Colombia and Guatemala, has established a line of steamers to many ports that are the outlet for the banana lands of the Caribbean. The company desired concessions, that is, the right to own and cultivate plantations and erect port works. Suddenly the lowlands on the frontier became valuable. Each government was eager to draw the boundary to its own advantage.

In earlier times war would surely have ensued, and it seemed indeed very difficult to avoid. Both governments were persuaded a few years ago to submit their claims to the Secretary of State of the United States for recommendation. The first necessity was a survey to clear away ignorance and establish the facts of history and of actual administration during past years as well as the nature and value of the economic resources involved. The work was placed in the hands of a scientific party administered by the American Geographical Society of New York. In 1928 the two governments sought to agree upon a definitive boundary through a commission headed by an American minister. When this attempt failed, the Secretary of State of the United States recommended to both governments that the dispute be referred for arbitration to the International Central American Tribunal created by the convention of 1923. It was further recommended that the decision of the tribunal be made "conclusive and binding" upon both parties (June 1928).

The Panama-Costa Rica Boundary

The governments of Colombia and Costa Rica, wishing to settle an old frontier dispute, agreed to submit their rival claims to President Loubet of France for arbitration (1900). The application of President Loubet's decision proved difficult, owing to lack of detailed knowledge of the wooded and partly swampy terrain and the different interpretations that might be placed upon the language of the award. After Panama gained its independence (1903) by secession from Colombia, the old boundary dispute became an issue between Panama and Costa Rica. In 1905 there was concluded a treaty between Costa Rica and Panama which sought to amend, in the interest of

both parties, the award of 1900; but unexpected difficulties arose, and it was agreed that the question should be submitted to Chief Justice White of the United States Supreme Court for arbitration. The disputed points related to that part of the boundary between the central watershed and the Atlantic coast, a part about which little was known. Once again a territorial dispute depended in large measure upon ignorance of local geography. Unfortunately the contestants could not more readily agree to accept the decision of Chief Justice White in 1913 than that of President Loubet in 1900, or their own partial agreement respecting the southwestern end of the boundary in 1910. Long negotiation having failed to compose the differences, resort was made in late February 1921 to threats and warlike preparations, in spite of the fact that both countries are members of the League of Nations, whose covenant provides the means of peaceful settlement in such cases.

The problem is complicated by the responsibilities of the United States to maintain order in Panama and *to guarantee its independence* in accordance with the Canal Zone purchase agreement of 1904. At that time the government of Panama, needing protection in view of its obvious weakness and its recent secession from Colombia, was willing to assent to restrictions which it was later to repent. Repeated attempts have been made to secure freedom from full American control, but without success The United States is therefore confronted with the possibility of direct interference not only with Panama, but also with Costa Rica should the latter attempt aggressive acts against Panama. On the other hand, to resist such acts is to invite the criticism of Latin American countries. After hostilities between Panama and Costa Rica had actually begun, though on a very small scale, the American government pressed the issue of peace (March 1921) and the trouble subsided at least temporarily. The problem illustrates anew the delicate position of the United States as a consequence of its advance into the Caribbean and the grave issues that are linked with the ownership and protection of the Panama Canal, in every way vital to its commerce and defense.

The quarrel of these two states is an example of the difficulties in the way of confederating the Central American countries, as proposed in 1907 and again in 1920. Interstate trade between the small countries of Central America is greatly hampered by frontier regulations, especially irksome on account of rapidly changing national policies and governments and the inexperienced character of the officials. The first attempt was made on the initiative of Mexico and the United

States; the second attempt was in response to a circular telegram from Salvador to the other republics of Central America, suggesting a conference for the purpose of unifying their constitutions, of equalizing customs and moneys, and adopting one national shield and flag. While the idea of the conference was accepted in principle, disagreements as to the precise nature and limits of the program of the conference and the repeated disturbances growing out of boundary disputes have prevented the consummation of the plan, though the tendency appears to be steadily in favor of confederation.

CHAPTER THIRTY-FIVE

THE SITUATION OF THE UNITED STATES

In preceding chapters we have frankly described the situation of other powers — their geographical and historical setting, their handicaps, their problems, their dangers. With equal frankness let us turn the light of criticism upon ourselves. What are some of the gravest weaknesses in the structure of our domestic life that affect our unity and our foreign relations? Where are our problem areas and zones of friction? Intent in the past on dealing with the internal problems of the United States, have we had the training to treat other nations in a spirit of fairness? In our foreign relations do we behave so as to elevate the prestige of democracy, or do we emphasize its waywardness and its tyrannies?

Our problems have long been of the pioneering and experimental type; and they have led naturally to the growth of independence and self-reliance. These qualities are especially helpful when pioneers are breaking down the obstacles of a wilderness. Can they now be turned with equal effect to the solution of the subtler problems of national spirit and of foreign relationship? In dealing with another nation, is independence or power of understanding the greater quality? Only to a few is light given. Creative thought does not come by invocation or popular election. Do we recognize and follow the better type of leader? The people of the United States are unknown even to themselves. In their policy of expansion, especially since 1898, they have had not a single misadventure up to this time. While such an experience has left them in an amiable and generous mood, no one knows what fires of passion may be lighted by active opposition.

The End of Cheap Land

It follows that the end of the free range for the stockman and of well-nigh free lands for the farmer finds the United States confronted by a new set of problems or by old problems that have taken on a new intensity. From 1850 to 1900 our population increased from twenty-three to seventy-six millions; but our farm area increased almost as fast, and the improved farm area even faster. A change in the situation followed upon 1900. In the decade 1900–1910 the country's population increased 21 per cent, while the total farm area increased only 4.8 per cent. In the two decades from 1902 to 1922 the area of the vacant public lands in the West diminished to the point where those tracts that



FIG. 236. The public domain in 1902 in the western states. (After map by U. S. Reclamation Service.)

are still unappropriated have little economic value except for limited grazing. Figure 237 indicates that there are still extensive tracts of vacant land, but a physiographic map shows that the land which the black patches represent is located on half-barren mountain masses or in desert tracts with a vegetation too sparse to support live stock.

There is still an economic frontier, however, and its character may be judged by a brief reference to a national policy of the past quarter century and more. Since 1902 settlement upon selected irrigable lands of the West has been supported by national funds. These were invested in a great reclamation experiment whose effects we may now measure.



FIG. 237. The public domain in 1922 in the western states. (After map by U. S. Reclamation Service.)

Reclamation has increased the number of homes on the land and the city populations as well as in the reclamation districts. It has afforded no outlet for the mounting populations of the East and Middle West. Nor are the reclamation projects themselves in a healthy state, for some exceed in maintenance cost the productive capacity of the reclaimed land. They are in a sense beyond the economic frontier.

How we take our world relations, in what spirit, with what sense of responsibility, is no longer an academic question. Our economic system has become complementary to that of Europe. In addition to vast quantities of foodstuffs that we shipped to Europe, half our exports

before the World War — to take a single item — were raw cotton, whose production and sale annually affected at least one quarter of our whole population. Whether or not we realized it, we had become commercially tied to Europe. And the tie is one that cannot be broken lightly, because we are even now well past the turn of the road in relation to land. Our virgin agricultural soil is almost entirely occupied. Hereafter the reclaiming of swamp, forest, and desert will be a much more expensive process. Moreover, improvement of the land already under cultivation, of increase in its yield, must come through intensive methods, at an expense that can be met only by cheapening labor or extending our foreign markets. We need not necessarily sell wheat or maize in greater quantities, but we must sell *something* abroad in greater degree — if not wheat or maize, then steel or copper.

(A) The Internal Situation

LAND AND POPULATION

No government at Washington can afford to leave either the land question or foreign policy to itself or to natural forces. They are vitally related questions and affect American living much more immediately than ever before. The simple or primitive life of the border settler was acceptable to him as the common lot of men who found cheap homes beyond the fringe of established communities. Accepting his primitive life as a necessary consequence of his situation, such a settler produced raw materials and foodstuffs cheap and to this extent contributed indirectly (1) to the extension of the railway network that gave him economic outlets and (2) to the building-up of industries that furnished him with manufactured goods. In such a scheme of things a rather primitive and narrowly nationalistic organization will work when the same economic organization will fail altogether in denser communities like those of today, where social and economic complexes of great intricacy have been developed.

Reclamation as an Outlet for Population

By Act of Congress, 17 June 1902, it was provided that money received from the sale of public lands in sixteen western states, beginning with 1 July 1901, should be set aside as a special fund for the construction and maintenance of irrigation works. The purpose was to reclaim the arid and semiarid lands of those states by the use of water which would otherwise be lost. At the same time the Reclamation Service was organized as a special agency to provide the necessary

engineering skill. In order to insure a healthy condition of settlement it was provided that distribution of the irrigated lands was not to be free but at a price. The settler was required to pay for what he got, with provision for small payments over a period of years. The settler's agricultural and horticultural activities had naturally to be specialized. Production upon irrigated land in the West is more intensive on the whole than in the humid East. There were social problems and conditions of a special character, owing to compact settlement upon irrigated tracts, and there was the question of communications and of marketing in districts often remote from great cities. This type of settlement was not a thing of slow development like the conditions of civilization in the older communities of Europe, but was created by legislative enactment and supported on a great scale by national funds. As in Canada, South Africa, and Australia, the government has given direct support to the peopling of the land. That the national policy has succeeded is not merely proof of the soundness of the plan but evidence of the flexible spirit of the people involved in it and of the responsiveness of the government to new situations as they arise one by one.

Constructive and praiseworthy as the Reclamation Service has been, the land it has reclaimed affects national trends of population hardly at all. On the 24 national irrigation projects there were in 1921 but 32,964 irrigated farms, with a population of 125,883.[1] How small is this result in relation to the total population and development of the West the following comparisons will show. In the period 1902–1922 there were 686,745 final entries under the homestead act. In addition there were thousands of timber and stone entries, coal-land entries, and desert-land entries. If we take the eleven states shown in Figure 237, we find the United States Census reports giving a rural population in 1900 of 2,427,630, in 1910 of 3,495,981, and in 1920 of 4,216,509, or a total increase in 20 years of 1,788,879.[2]

[1] This total represents clear gain, however, for few of the present projects had been developed privately by 1902, when the Reclamation Act was approved. The population figure takes no account of the increased rate of growth of the cities that are the natural outlets of the new settlements. The revised total of farm population in 1926 was 137,000.

[2] To these figures a correction or adjustment must be applied. They show the population of *rural territory at each census date* and they exclude all places having more than 2500 inhabitants and all incorporated territory. But since such places and territory grow constantly, they change their classification to some degree from one census to another. In order to show the precise rate of growth of rural population it is necessary to consider the changes in population which have taken place from one decennial census to the next *in the same territory*. The same territory that had a population of 3,366,180 in 1910, in 1920 had a population of 4,216,509, an increase of 850,329. Similarly the same territory that in 1900 had a population of 2,335,370 had a population of 3,495,981 in 1910, an increase of 1,160,611.

The Population Problem a National, Not a Regional One

Upon the former public lands occupied during the last few decades there will be in time a natural increase of population. And the extension of settlement means a corresponding growth in related cities and industries. Without detailing the process, it may be accepted that the reflex effect of this will be to increase the actual productivity of the land through better methods of farming, and particularly through the increase of crops requiring an expenditure of human labor. Unlike the first stage of the process of settlement, this second stage of population increase to full capacity will be a slow one and *it will not take care of a large influx of population from the outside.* The West will no longer furnish an outlet for eastern population, except indirectly by reason of the increased economic demands it makes upon the East and particularly upon its industries. Eastern social and industrial problems cannot be solved in the historical manner by a flow of population to another region. They will have to be met in the fields of their origin.

We conclude that the creative energy, initiative, enterprise, and spirit that have led to the occupation of the land of the United States must now be expended upon a new group of problems which result from denser populations that have no outlet upon cheap land. Otherwise we shall find ourselves increasing the power of our material life and the forces, many of them destructive, that flow from it, faster than we develop intelligence with respect to the social problems that such forces engender. These are matters that cannot wait. Our population is increasing at the annual rate of 1,500,000. Even allowing for a substantially diminished rate of growth, we shall have 150 millions by 1950 and 185 to 190 millions by the end of the century. This will be half the present population of China.

The withdrawal from a fast-growing population of its accustomed frontier and free or cheap land has already had consequences of public concern. We can (1) limit the population; (2) develop our industries at an accelerated pace; (3) increase the yield of the land, in part by intensive methods and in part by further reclamation of swamp and desert. But all three affect our foreign policy either directly or indirectly, through immigration, labor, trade, and the tariff. One eighth of our agricultural land is required to produce the farm products that we ship abroad, and it is largely this surplus that is the foundation of existing standards of farm living. When our population becomes stationary through the operation of forces that eventually limit any nation's growth, we shall tend strongly toward European standards

of living. Before that point is reached our social structure will necessarily be strained to the utmost and our foreign policy will become of acute public interest, for its relation to the standard of living will then be more generally recognized.

We should not be deceived by the first statistics of machine effects upon the increased yield of farm crops, especially marked in the past ten years. The results do not prove that capital in the form of machinery and fertilizer can go on indefinitely taking the place of labor. Between 1910 and 1920 there was cultivated in the United States 14 per cent more crop land by 14 per cent fewer farmers and laborers. This was made possible by an increase of 40 to 50 per cent in the use of machinery and fertilizers. Such a tendency cannot be permanent. The expensive farm machine is playing a unique but temporary rôle. We must come at last to more intensive work upon the land and a lower standard of living, unless we develop our foreign markets in competition with European nations long in the field and expert in the use of cheap native labor and the production of crops in every zone.

Until manufacturing and commerce gained an ascendency over agriculture the United States had a relatively isolated position in the world, and its need for markets and distant raw materials was not really acute. The national need for commercial outlets was first evident immediately after the war with Spain (1898) and since that time has rapidly increased, until we are now actually participating in general overseas commerce in active (and in places acute) competition with the other nations of the north temperate zone. With us the land and population problem has a more important relation to foreign affairs than in the case of other countries, because of our size and strength, but it is really part of a world problem. Though certain parts of the world may be practically empty, the best places are pretty well occupied.

A Limited World Capacity

The total land area of the world is more than 52 millions of square miles, of which less than 30 millions are considered fertile; and half of the fertile land is to be found in tropical and sub-tropical regions. Every new fertilizer or every new source of known fertilizers adds to the habitability of the temperate zone, and it is a fact that our mastery of fertilizing agencies is capable of great commercial development through lines of management laid down by applied chemistry. A second source of arable land is found in the swamp lands, capable of being drained.

Of these there are in the United States 90 millions of acres; but two thirds of this amount is forested and requires clearing, and much of the rest is peat bog, which requires a specialized farm practice. Qualifying conditions of a similar sort affect the swamp lands of the rest of the world. A third source of food supply will undoubtedly come from a limited extension of both agriculture and grazing — but particularly grazing — into the sub-Arctic. The grassy tundras of northern Alaska, like those of the "barren" grounds of Canada, are capable of supporting millions of reindeer and caribou. In the southern hemisphere we have no habitable lands from which man has been excluded by sheer inertia of opinion. South Africa, Australia, and Patagonia have been crisscrossed by the pioneer, and though their lands are capable of higher development, at least we know the lines along which development will occur and is even now proceeding; and we know also that their white population will have a relatively low limit of increase because of the unfavorable climatic conditions.

City Growth and Foreign Trade

The strongest internal movement of population in the United States is toward the cities. In 1890, 36 per cent of our total population lived in towns of more than 2500; in 1910 it had risen to 46 per cent, and by 1920 to 51 per cent. For thirty years the number of persons engaged in agriculture did not vary by more than 15 per cent, and from decade to decade during that time the change was very small; but in the period from 1910 to 1920 there was an actual decrease of 14 per cent. Of the total number of counties in the United States one third declined in population (1910–1920), and those counties were largely rural. They represented one sixth of the total population of the United States.[1] The problem of the city versus the country and of the nation against the world is now before us. At just the time when we need to open our gates and admit on more favorable terms the raw materials of industries that support our city populations, we put up a tariff barrier that is higher than ever. A fast-growing population is steadily demanding higher standards of living in the period in which it is passing the point of greatest average income per capita. A new orientation of foreign policy seems imperative, and likewise a new land policy, not merely regional in scope as in the semiarid West, or national as in the matter of farm credits, but having regard for the whole world. Our future situation is now being determined, — what outlets we shall have,

[1] *Increase of Population in the United States, 1910–1920*, Census Monograph 1, 1922, page 182.

what sources of rare minerals, what hold upon tropical production, what tributary streams of commerce.[1]

The United States has now become a great trading power. There are necessities of foreign origin such as rubber, manganese, and the like, upon which many of our industries depend. Our exports now total billions a year. Our imports are four and one half billions and nearly one third of them are now brought in British ships. We import half a billion dollars' worth of British rubber. Our imports of wool, chemicals, hides, tin, copper, petroleum, coffee, sugar, paper, and silk range from $50,000,000 to nearly $400,000,000 each, with silk and coffee at the top of the list. Where we had less than 10 per cent of the world's tonnage of maritime shipping in 1914 we now have more than 20 per cent. To protect our foreign investments, shipping, trade facilities, and physical properties; to span the distances between the territories in which they lie; to control our own territories and to maintain our neutrality rights in time of war: these are the things that have pushed us forward to take the initiative in international relations so far as naval affairs go. Our declared object has been not to seek superiority but parity; not to gain more than our share but to see that our share is properly protected and that we have a share. These constitute some of the most powerful elements in the new situation created by our tremendous national growth, the relatively greater material power of the United States since the World War, the increase of industries and city populations, and our steady and rapid advance into all the world's markets to satisfy both our needs and our desires.

A RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION POLICY

The Magnet of Opportunity

As long ago as 1907 more than a million and a quarter immigrants entered the United States, and in that year President Roosevelt directed public attention to the importance of regulating immigration and appointed a commission to study the subject. In 1917 a literacy test was introduced and the admission tax raised. The World War of course stopped the flow for a time, and, in the first half of 1919, 4000 more people left the United States than entered it. In 1920 the tide

[1] Though the need for a general land policy is felt, none has yet been developed. The states have legislated independently respecting their several problems. Michigan is making an economic survey of its land. Washington, California, Oregon, direct agricultural colonies and provide means for them. In the Dakotas, Minnesota, and Oregon there is in effect a policy of granting loans to settlers in part payment of land and the purchase of equipment for buildings and to liquidate debts.



Fig. 238. Percentage of foreign-born whites in the total population of the United States in 1920. (Courtesy of the Bureau of the Census.)

had again set this way, with 430,000 arrivals, though 288,000 aliens also left the United States in that year.

We thus see the disarrangement of war in still another of its aspects — its effect upon the movement of peoples. Before the World War a complex, widely extended economic system had been developed. Its success depended upon a continuance of that security which had brought it into being. Instead of stopping the flow of emigration from Europe and Asia, the results of war tended to hasten it. Agriculture alone cannot absorb a notably large number of people immediately, and it is immediate relief that the would-be immigrant desires.

From being largely an economic problem, as before the World War, the migration of peoples has now become also a political and a social problem. America has built up her railways, her municipal improvements, and her great mills and factories to a very large degree upon imported labor. At the same time that the streams of labor were pouring into the country, her agricultural production was so high that streams of agricultural products were crossing the ocean to industrial Europe. With the continued industrialization of the United States the ratio of export declined, but the manufacturer still clamored for cheap labor. The native-born American did not wish to engage in the

low-paid work requiring little intelligence or skill, and it fell naturally into the hands of the immigrant. Rapidly expanding industrial enterprises absorbed the incoming laborer and many of the second generation of laborers also.

By contrast, in European lands there was a more delicate balance between population and capacity to sustain it, either by agriculture or commerce; and this made population sensitive to stimuli abroad whenever economic conditions pressed with undue severity at home. In the case of the United Kingdom, about 50 per cent of the foodstuffs consumed were imported (for 1913). Germany imported nearly the same percentage of her foodstuffs, and France about 10 to 15 per cent. The question of food is fundamental to the question of the movement of people in those countries, just as it is in Japan, where both direct and indirect outlets have been sought in recent years.

So long as we were confident of our political and social systems, so long as they seemed to work to our advantage regardless of the plight of the incoming laborer, we bothered little about his influence upon our life, even though we knew that our democratic institutions and ideals meant little to him. It is a commonplace that the World War showed the old bonds between the immigrant and the home country to be so strong that we could not count upon a united country when wide-ranging destructive forces were loosed, as in 1914–1918. This focused attention upon the character of our alien elements. "Much as our vineyards need laborers, we have a lamp to keep alight."

Two Streams of Unequal Character

At first our immigrants were chiefly from northern Europe. Later they came in larger numbers from southern and southeastern Europe. The grand total of American immigrants from the British Isles is still larger than that from any other country. It has stood at almost 25 per cent for the last hundred years, and about half of our entire population is reputed to be of Anglo-Saxon origin. All this is changing, with effects not merely upon political forms and social institutions, but also upon the quality of our people. It would be rash to say that the last word in democracy will be spoken by Anglo-Saxons; the ultimate goal may be reached by some other race. But the American public and its leaders are profoundly convinced that the low state of education and social character of the populations of southern and eastern Europe is an assurance that streams of immigration from that source dilute and weaken our national character, if they do not introduce a positively harmful element.

When we consider further that the birth rate among the foreign population is higher than among other classes, we may well wonder if the United States may not become a congeries of races like Europe and yield at last to the same divisive influences. Opposed to such a tendency is the fact that the foreign elements are not grouped in states in such numbers as to capture the government machinery. Though the politician caters to them at election time and wins their votes on racial issues that may arise in the development of national policies, yet on the whole these are but temporary and local reactions. No continuing policy could be built upon such reactions that would appeal to the general electorate, nor has there ever been any combination of racial groups to threaten the established order.

For nearly a century before the World War about 90 per cent of our total immigration from overseas came from northwestern Europe. In the period 1901–1910 the immigration from Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia (including Finland) was 66 per cent of the total. In 1913 (normal year, before the World War) there were admitted of all races or peoples 1,197,892 immigrants, of whom 174,365 were Polish and 51,472 were Russian, the two highest figures in the list. In 1921 (taking figures for the fiscal year previous to that in which the first restrictive act went into effect) there were admitted 222,260 immigrants from Italy alone.

What the immigrants of earlier years thought about our institutions would hardly have interested us even if we had known it; the later arrivals have come in such numbers and from such totally different motives that they have obliged us to think about racial and political values. But for the law of 1921, limiting the number of immigrants from a given country to 3 per cent of the total from that country established here in 1910,[1] there is little question that the unhappy state of Europe following the World War would have swelled the number of immigrants to unheard-of proportions and that at least a million and a half would have sought entrance each year.

The law of 1924, under which immigration is now controlled, reduced the percentage of admissions from 3 to 2 and changed the basis of this percentage to the number of a given nationality residing in the United States in 1890 rather than 1910. Under this law Poland was reduced in quota from 30,977 to 5982; Russia from 24,405 to 2248; and southern and eastern Europe generally was reduced by 87 per cent, or from

[1] This law applied to immigration from Europe, Transcaucasia, Turkey, Persia, Africa, Australasia, all Atlantic and certain Pacific islands, but not to immigration from the countries of the New World or to Asia generally, the latter being regulated by special treaties or agreements.

158,540, to 20,447. The quota law does not apply to Canada, Newfoundland, Mexico, Central America, South America, and the West Indies. Even the countries of northern and western Europe were reduced somewhat by the law of 1924. (See Fig. 249, page 783.)

Social and Political Aspects of Immigration

Of a total of 12,500,000 foreign-born inhabitants of voting age in the United States only 5,500,000 are naturalized citizens, leaving much more than half the total without voice in either the local or the national government. If we add to the non-voting class those of the voting class that have limited understanding or sense of responsibility toward the institutions of the country, we shall have to conclude that at least 10,000,000 foreign-born of voting age, or 20 per cent of the adult population of the United States, create rather than solve social and political problems (Fig. 238). To argue that many native-born of every stock have no greater sense of responsibility does not help the problem, for we are not now tabulating the virtues and vices of the foreigner for comparison with those of the native-born. The low intelligences of a part of the native-born are without doubt fairly well disseminated through the mass of the total population; whereas the foreigner is grouped in the cities, in large part, where he participates in what is really an artificial life, perpetuates unduly the use of his language, has his own newspapers and his separate community existence, and, most important of all, is subject to easy manipulation by political bosses and office seekers of all types. This was made clear both throughout the World War and, to an increasing extent, at its close, when with conspicuous success foreign-born groups one after another memorialized congressmen respecting alleged demerits of the terms of the treaties of peace and otherwise manifested their purely nationalistic and European preferences.

There must be mentioned also foreigners living in mining and manufacturing districts where the nature of their employment keeps them socially and economically apart from the rest of the people. In such communities, often wholly immune to American ideals, they may be exploited by the preachers of disorder and also by politicians and employers. As it happens, the people most often found in such communities are Italians, Poles, Hungarians, and the like — peoples far more ignorant and more restless in disposition than the immigrants from the countries of northwestern Europe, who tend to settle upon the land.

While we habitually deplore the congestion of aliens in cities, it should not be overlooked that there they enjoy superior educational advantages. Because the foreigner takes the learning of English in American schools as a natural part of the process of Americanization and the winning of better economic advantages, he makes no protest against it; whereas if the learning of a second language were imposed upon him in his home country he would take it as one of the tyrannies of government. Along with the learning of English he learns many things calculated to make him a better citizen. The effect is of course more evident in the second generation. In the meantime, dangerous social, economic, and political tendencies are exhibited by the foreign-born city groups; but in truth these originate not altogether in the foreigners themselves — a part of the charge must be borne by unscrupulous politicians and industrialists.

America can be a refuge for the oppressed only if she continues to be America. Were all the oppressed of the earth to gather here, we should be able to keep merely the letter of freedom, not the spirit. We have many faults: on the other hand, since our land is so desired of alien comers, it must offer advantages. It is economic opportunity that attracts most strongly. Having won a better living than he has ever known, it is in the nature of things that the immigrant should desire more. Coming from an unsettled and revolutionary Europe, he has



Fig. 239. Percentage of negroes in the total population in 1920. (Courtesy of the Bureau of the Census.)

no background of experience and tradition that fits his American environment. The traditions of the fathers mean nothing to him. He has probably read one of the many translations of James Fenimore Cooper, but he looks in vain for an Indian; though he has read *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, he sees no slaves. He responds readily to ignorant and to vicious political appeals. He is likely to take sides with the country of his origin when a question of national policy that affects his fatherland arises here, no matter what part of Europe he may represent. It takes *time* to grow in any respect, and it takes time to become patriotic, not in a chauvinistic sense, but in the best sense of the term. And it takes real thought to appreciate what worth there is in the institutions of liberty. Our present policy is to receive the immigrant only as fast as American institutions can absorb him. In respect of liberty and democracy America is still the best hope of the world. The foreigner may realize this fact more clearly if he finds the privilege of entry more difficult to obtain.

THE NEGRO PROBLEM

Next to foreign immigration our most important racial question pertains to the negro. In the northern cities he lives for the most part in poor and unhealthful surroundings where there has developed in many instances an acute and increasing antipathy between black and white. In the South the large number of negroes in some states is a political matter of the first importance; and through fear of black dominance special laws have been skillfully devised that measurably exclude the negro from the privileges of the suffrage and from equality of treatment. His education and his economic relation to the white are anxious questions both to the white and to him. He is undoubtedly inferior, on the average, to the white, — whether from lack of opportunity or racial character or historical experience does not concern us here. Yet he is now living and must continue to live through the centuries side by side with the white. The mixture of the races goes on with increasing momentum and it is chiefly the lower elements of each race that are involved in the process.

In dealing with the negro problem we confront at present not one grand problem but a number of distinct problems. They are all related, but they have different regional significances. The negro as a part of our industrial problem in northern cities is one thing; negro landholding in the South is another; the social problem the negro presents in both northern and southern cities a third, and so on.



FIG. 240. Distribution of negroes in the South, in northern states, and in northern cities. Two of the total of 26 cities having the total shown in the legend do not appear on this map. They are Oakland, California, and Seattle, Washington.

FIG. 241. Area in the South occupied by negroes to the extent of 50 per cent or more of the total population.

Negro Population in the South

If we omit the states having less than 10 per cent of negro population, we have left thirteen states in all that constitute a distinctive belt of black population. They are as follows: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia (Fig. 239). The population (black and white) of these thirteen states in 1920 was 28,870,000, or approximately one quarter of the total population of the United States. But two states, South Carolina and Mississippi, had a negro population in excess of white population, in the one case 2.8 per cent and in the other case 4.5 per cent. In the decade 1910–1920 the negro population declined, relative to the white population, in every one of the states mentioned above. The relative decrease ranged from 1 per cent in Arkansas to nearly 10 per cent in Florida, and the average decrease in all thirteen states was 5.4 per cent. The average relative increase of native-born white population in the thirteen states in question was 5.24 per cent. In the states of the negro belt (Fig. 241) the number of children of native whites born between 1910 and 1920 and surviving on the latter date, is higher than elsewhere in the United States, forming 26 per cent of the population as against regional percentages of 13 to 24 for the rest of the country. At the rate of increase of the whites and of relative decrease of the black population that prevailed from 1910 to 1920, even South Carolina and Mississippi will by 1930 have a slight preponderance of white population; it has been reported that South Carolina has already reached that condition.

It should be emphasized that in all of the thirteen states in question the negro population has increased over the absolute figures for previous decades. The decrease in the figures given above is relative only, but it is their relative value that is most critical. The chief increase of the whites has been in the cities, the urban population in the thirteen indicated states having increased from 1.6 per cent on the part of the whites in Maryland to 12.3 in the case of Tennessee, and almost the same in Florida; while the average for the whole group is 7.2 per cent of increase on the part of the white urban population and a corresponding relative decrease of the urban negro population. Taking the figures for rural population we discover that there has been an absolute decrease of negro population in nine of the thirteen negro states and only a slight increase in four states. Nowhere has there been a marked increase in rural negro population. The average increase of the rural white population in all thirteen states is 4.8 per cent.

Increase of Negroes in Northern States and Cities

The greatly diminished increase of negro population in the thirteen negro states, as shown by the census of 1920, is obviously connected, to some degree at least, with a northward migration. We can discover where the negro has gone by examining two sets of census figures: (1) the statistics of increase of negro population by states; and (2) the increase of the negro population in cities, especially those with a total population of 100,000 or more, for it is chiefly in such cities that the attracting industries are located. In the first case we discover that there are only six states out of a total of forty-eight that show a relative increase of negro population of 0.5 per cent or more.

In Figure 240 are shown only the first four of the states given in the table below, because in the last two, New Mexico and Arizona, the increase of negro population (4000 and 6000 respectively), though sufficient to be given a place on a percentage basis, is too small numerically to be comparable with those for the first four states. In all, 19 states show an increase in negro population of more than 1000 and at a higher rate than the increase in total population. In noting this increase it should be borne in mind that the percentage of negro population in the United States as a whole diminished from 10.7 of the total in 1910 to 9.9 in 1920.

Turning to the list of cities of 100,000 or over, we discover that 26 out of a total of 68 show a relative increase of negro population of 0.5 per cent or more of the total population (Fig. 240); and the average increase is from 3.56 per cent of the total in 1910 to 5.8 per cent in 1920. The total negro population of the 24 cities shown in Figure 240 is now 774,650, and of this amount only a little less than half was gained in the ten years from 1910 to 1920. This is a large gain, but it has affected

INCREASE OF NEGRO POPULATION BY STATES

STATE	ABSOLUTE INCREASE OF NEGRO POPULATION	TOTAL POPULATION OF STATE	PER CENT OF INCREASE OF NEGRO POPULATION	
			1910	1920
Ohio . . .	75,000	5,759,000	2.3	3.2
Indiana . .	20,500	2,930,000	2.2	2.8
Illinois . .	73,000	6,485,000	1.9	2.8
Michigan .	43,000	3,668,000	0.6	1.6
New Mexico	4,000	360,000	0.5	1.6
Arizona . .	6,000	334,000	1.0	2.4
	221,500	19,536,000	1.4 (av.)	2.4 (av.)

a total population — in these 24 cities — of 17,120,000. It should be noted that it is a gain far greater than that for the negro in the whole United States. Even taking Dr. Miller's [1] corrected figures into account, we should have a percentage increase of the negro population of 11.2 according to the census of 1910 and a corrected percentage of 9.6 for 1920.

In the period 1910–1920, 235,000 negroes removed from farms to cities, in the South Atlantic states. If we add similar figures for the whole South it will be seen that the city tendency is expressed in higher absolute figures in the South than in the North, but the percentages are in general comparatively smaller because of the large negro element already there. Taking cities of all classes and situations in the whole of the United States, we find 24 [2] that had more than 25,000 negroes in 1920. The total negro population in these 24 cities in 1920 was 1,508,061.

The northward migration of negroes to the large industrial centers was partly a response to the conditions of the World War, when unskilled foreigners suddenly ceased coming. Under the restrictive immigration act and in face of continued industrial expansion, the demand for cheap labor will continue to attract southern negroes, with probably marked effects upon southern industry and agriculture and a no less marked effect upon the negro himself. In the period 1915–1919, the number of negro births in the north was less than the number of deaths,[3] the ratio varying in different sections from 100 : 105 to 100 : 165. In the southern states the condition is in general reversed, except in the cities, where negro deaths are again more numerous than negro births. The continued urbanization of the negro would appear almost certainly to lower his percentage of the total population; and taking into account likewise the effect of immigration and the continuing fertility of the whites, it is thought likely that by the end of this century the negro will constitute not more than one twentieth of the total population of the country.[4]

[1] Kelly Miller, "Enumeration Errors in Negro Population," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 14, 1922, pages 168–177.

[2] Not to be confused with the 24 cities of 100,000 or more mentioned in the preceding paragraph and shown in Figure 240.

[3] ". . . the condition of physical welfare of the Negro people . . . is probably the most outstanding problem that confronts [them] today. . . . It is a determining factor in the general health standards of the South . . . it is a controlling factor in vice and delinquency . . . [it] is of concern . . . to the community as a whole. Negro health is a national as well as a racial problem." E. B. Reuter, *The American Race Problem*, 1927, page 165.

[4] W. F. Willcox, quoted in W. S. Rossiter, *Increase of Population in the United States, 1910–1920*, Monograph I, Bureau of the Census, 1922, pages 130–162.

Tendencies of the Race

Brought to this country originally against his will, set free through virtually no effort of his own, given a place in the political and economic scheme of things that he was wholly unprepared to fill, the negro has lived under very great handicaps. Had his labor and his products not been vital to the South, far graver issues would have developed long since. Seeing his situation clearly, his leaders, especially those from among his own race, have tried to develop latent powers in the race itself. We turn to land ownership by way of illustration.

A complete analysis of the statistics of negro population based on the census of 1920 has not yet been made, but Cummings has noted [1] that in the decade 1900–1910 negro farm operators increased 19.6 per cent, whereas the increase of the negro population was 11.2 per cent. In the same period white farm operators increased 9.5 per cent, while the rate of increase of the white population was 22.3 per cent, showing that agriculture had become less important for the whites and more important for the negroes so far as numbers of negroes can be taken as an index. The acreage of negro farms reflects a corresponding increase, though the average holding of land in the South is declining, as part of a country-wide tendency which acts as a limiting force for negro as well as for white. The negro's growing economic bondage is an unmistakable fact and is owing largely (1) to the growth of industrial cities and city population in the South, where he is confined more and more to the lower and less remunerative occupations, and (2) to the ruinous and apparently ineradicable system of credit advances to farmers for seed and food.

That the birth rate among negroes is higher than among whites, at least in the South, most students of the problem concede; but it is offset principally by the high infant mortality. This suggests that the spread of hygienic knowledge and measures will give the negro in time a chance to win numerical supremacy. But it remains to be proved that he is capable of adopting in the mass the necessary social and health measures. In any case health improvement is a long and slow process, and statistics for the next two or three decades will be required to reveal its rate. If the present population tendencies persist, the negro problem will become of diminishing concern so far as numbers go. The *intensity* of the problem, however, does not depend upon mere numbers, at least in short periods of time. Certainly it would appear that, however serious it may be, it is not a problem with tendencies that strike at the foundations of government or civilization.

[1] *Negro Population in the United States, 1790–1915*, pages 553–554.

THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL UNITY

The Habit of Experimentation

The break in the historical traditions of the people who settled in America gave them an opportunity to develop institutions and particularly the state, without reference to tragic historical wrongs and the hatreds they engender. Many fortunate circumstances helped us to keep our life free from the blight of revenge. Mere distance from older European communities gave the United States a detached view of conditions and quarrels that repeatedly shook western Europe to its foundations. There was no large native population to assimilate. Such as there was gave way rapidly to white advance or was destroyed. An Indian is today regarded as an object of curiosity and interest rather than the possible descendant of one of the bands responsible for the Deerfield or the Wyoming massacre. The demagogue is fast losing the advantage he once enjoyed by invoking the tyrannies of England, now a pale tradition. Above all there were no conscript armies with which to fight ideas. We have been charged with too facile acceptance of new ideas of government, but we are complacent in face of the charge. The public mind is kept elastic rather than rigid by experiment when there is real participation in public affairs. This is a result of incalculable importance in a country so large and varied that government would long ago have broken down without the habit of mutual accommodation.

Divergent Tendencies

The geography of the United States has not been favorable to our national unity. A wide range of climate and products, and a corresponding difference in farming practices and seasonal labor needs, were among the basic conditions that affected the slave trade and brought on the Civil War. The fear was repeatedly expressed and widely felt in the years following our War of Independence that a union was impossible without sacrificing sectional needs more nearly vital than the benefits of unity. The trans-Appalachian settlements for a time looked toward independence and an understanding with the Spanish settlements at the mouth of the Mississippi. But if there were difficulties there were also concurrent advantages. We were free from the dangers of close contact with rival groups in Europe. The Far West was bordered by an ocean of great breadth, and beyond it were peoples too weak to become a menace until our own national life was fully developed and settlement had filled the land and railways had tied its parts together.

To a much greater degree than an outsider might suppose, and in

spite of all the patriotic assurances to the contrary, there is a deep underlying question in the minds of thoughtful men in the United States about the continued unity of the nation. The Civil War settled the slave question, but it could not settle sectionalism. The South is as strongly opposed to the dominance of New England in national affairs today as it was in 1860. The only difference between then and now is that the South has reconciled itself to a contest without war. There is a geographical basis to sectionalism as well as an economic basis, and each group of forces has influenced the historical development of the nation.

In the time of Aaron Burr the threatened defection of the trans-Appalachian settlements of Kentucky and Tennessee was in a measure a natural response to the isolated position of the settlements, to the lack of good roads between them and the towns of the Atlantic seaboard, and above all to the relatively easy communication, for that day, between the outlying settlements of the Ohio valley and its tributaries and the settlements of Spain on the lower Mississippi. This was but one of a number of separatist tendencies in our history. In all cases there was a sectional spirit coming from a difference in products, in outlook, and in views on the form and extent to which national responsibility for sectional welfare should go.

To study these forces at work and in the light of their times is to gain a new conception of the impressive strength of sentiment in support of the continuing unity of the United States. Long before railway building had made it possible to extend American settlement to the Pacific in unbroken bands, American settlers had made their way either by sea or across the semiarid and arid West to occupy mining districts and valleys that at length became a part of the national domain. It is striking testimony to the unity of spirit that they felt in common with the rest of the country that there should have been hardly a thought among them of a separate national government. Adherence to a national ideal was a constant feature of pioneer life; and railways and spreading settlements effectively joined with the rest of the country even those most distant from the seats of power.

The Practice of Adjustment

The manner in which the sections work together while yet maintaining their sectional traits and independence has been analyzed by Turner.[1] He calls the United States a federation of sections rather than of states, for the states act in groups [1] rather than as individual members

[1] F. J. Turner, "Sections and Nation," *Yale Review*, Vol. 12, 1922, pages 1–21.

of the union and have sectional leaders in Congress. He finds that a map of votes roughly outlines the great geographic provinces of the country. He finds at work two great forces which, despite the fact that they are opposed to each other at times, have yet been able to work parallel with each other and leave the nation stronger for it. On the one hand are the often rival and divergent sectional interests, and on the other a common historical inheritance, a common set of institutions, similar laws, a common language, a truly American spirit, and a body of American ideals. Though we periodically think fiercely in terms of party issues and though the parties maintaining them are nation-wide in adherence, yet so flexible is sectional spirit as well as class spirit that unity and progress are maintained "along the diagonal of contending varieties." However much the Middle West may characterize the Northeast as selfishly sectional, or however much New England may denounce the Agricultural Bloc, the two regions work together and the most outspoken leaders in each are sometimes members of the same party.

It has worked out that adjustments between states are no longer of the first importance, but adjustments between sections are all-important. The present reserve system of banking gives a sectional organization to credit, and before the end of the Wilson administration (1921) a plan was under way for the regional administration and regional consolidation of the railroad systems. The New England states have discovered their community of interests, geographical, historical, political, and industrial; and the governors of the six states have associated themselves repeatedly to further New England regional interests.

[1] An interesting recent example of group interests is the signing of the Colorado River Compact at Santa Fe, New Mexico, 24 November 1922, by seven states (Colorado, Nevada, Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, and California) for the equitable use and control of the waters of the Colorado River. (See the *Geographical Review*, Vol. 17, 1927, pages 453–166, for a map showing sites of power plants and irrigated and irrigable lands in the Colorado River Basin.) California's adherence was conditional and Arizona and Utah later withdrew.

In January 1927 a treaty, or agreement, was signed by commissioners from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania for the division of the water of the Delaware River to the extent of about one third of the available supply. The signatory states agreed not only to regulate the flow of water in the tributaries of the Delaware but also to maintain an adequate forest covering throughout the Delaware drainage basin. This is to be accomplished chiefly by afforestation and protection from fire. The rapid increase in city populations dependent upon Delaware River waters led to the agreement.

The Great Lakes Waterway controversy over the right of Chicago to divert to the Mississippi basin up to 4 per cent of the outflow of the Great Lakes, is marked by the opposition of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York *against* Illinois, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Mississippi. The first group wishes to restrict such division, the second to maintain it. For an excellent summary of the geography of the case see "The Great Lakes — St. Lawrence Waterway," by Philip W. Henry, *Geographical Review*, Vol. 17, 1927, pages 258–277.

Sometimes there is a combination of sections or regions along broader lines. In Cleveland's second administration (1893–1897) the "hard times" and the associated dryness and crop failure of the dry western border of the Middle West gave rise among other consequences to the Populist party, arrayed not against a section or a state but against the whole East; it declared the cities, the manufacturers, the capitalists, and the politicians to be all part and parcel of a tendency on the part of the East to dominate the West and fatten through its dominance.

Sometimes the regional or sectional spirit has a more specific and justifiable economic basis. In Taft's administration (1909–1913) there was a steady movement on the part of the President and his advisers toward a reciprocity agreement with Canada. The result would have been a marked cheapening of grain and grain products for the population of eastern cities. Though Taft had been elected on a great wave of popularity, inherited from Roosevelt, that wave did not carry along the agreement. In fact, he entirely misjudged the character and strength of the opposition to reciprocity in the Middle West. He forgot or did not know that the farmers of that region were just finding economic independence within their grasp. Long delayed mortgage payments were being resumed and the end of many farm mortgages was in sight. This was true for hundreds of thousands of farmers throughout the Middle West. To them reciprocity was a closed issue the moment it was started. The cry of cheaper foodstuffs for the eastern cities fell upon deaf ears. The attitude of the Middle West shocked the party leaders and gave a new appreciation of the economic forces that exercise a divisive influence in national political questions.

The Example of City Growth

In our whole domain there is great flexibility of thought, such as younger settlements often exhibit. The conditions of a new country practically force experimentation on a great scale. The mere fact of rapid growth itself acts as a stimulating influence. Our cities illustrate one aspect of this condition, for half of their annual increase of population is by migration from country to city. Where London adds about 10 per cent to its population per decade (1901–1911), Paris 9 per cent (1901–1911), and Berlin 10 per cent (1900–1910), Chicago gained 29 per cent in the decade 1900–1910, Milwaukee 31, Detroit 63, Cleveland 47. Seven Pacific states gained on an average 193 per cent in the same time, four cities of the South 99 per cent, and so on. Not all American cities have had this extraordinary growth. Mark Jefferson classifies American cities in three grades — vigorous, halting, and

exuberant — and the predominance of vigorous and exuberant types is the most striking fact. Even those that have a halting growth have had a more vigorous past (Fig. 242). There is a common spirit of enterprise in and because of all this. The city stands as a symbol as well as a fact. It has a vital relation to its environment, to the region that it serves. Between region and city there is an interaction that stimulates the life of both. These are forces that offset the dangers that might arise from unrestrained sectionalism. They spread over our whole life a unifying influence.

Likewise there spring from these nation-wide conditions several problems of the first order. The rapid increase in city population has corresponded with the period of great industrial development. The manufacturing areas of the United States are not mere districts or spots upon the map. They have grown to the point of coalescence. A belt of territory sprinkled with manufacturing establishments extends all the way from New York to Pittsburgh and west through Ohio. It borders the southern shore of Lake Erie, crosses Indiana, and embraces the whole Chicago district. One after another of the districts in this belt has its specialty or its special advantages, in relation to a natural resource.

The great change in our industrial development, particularly from 1880 to the World War, and the corresponding increase of city development, meant the rise of a proletariat, not so much through the trans-

FIG. 242. The map shows how the cities of the three main types fall into geographic groups: the exuberant ones on the Pacific, the vigorous ones in the humid East, the halting ones on the rivers and lakes, with the two seaports, San Francisco and Baltimore. As the lake cities are only a little checked in their growth, and mainly in the two or three last decades, their circles are drawn more nearly solid than those for the river cities. Albany and Washington are located by crosses. From Jefferson, "How American Cities Grow," *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society*, Vol. 47, 1915.

formation of our people as through the importation of the raw material for a proletariat from Europe. Large populations housed in cheap dwellings became organized into trade unions and labor parties, and almost periodical hardship imposed upon this population through unemployment and an inefficient industrial system has fostered the movement. Though most of the industries had some sort of organization after 1860, it was not until after 1880 that labor organizations had their chief development. All these forces were operative long before cheap land gave out, but they did not have acute effects until unrestricted immigration and the end of cheap land combined to throw the population back upon itself and focus its attention, particularly in the cities, upon the structure and destiny of its life.

(B) Foreign Relations in the Americas

The End of Territorial Expansion

In the earlier stages of American life territorial changes were relatively easy to make, because they involved few people and the exact limits of ownership were often not known. It was not until after 1742, following Vitus Bering's second voyage of discovery for the Russian government, that the coastline of the northwestern quadrant of America could be even roughly indicated. Spain, France, and England had bartered among themselves, or as a consequence of war had won or lost, vast tracts of land which, however rich they were potentially, could long be of little value save as they supported a specialized trade — sugar or furs or silver — localized at a small number of points. Problems of religion there were, and likewise those of strategy with respect to war and the control of seaborne trade in time of peace; but there was no word of irredenta or historic wrongs, for everything was in the making and the land and the problems were new, so far as they pertained to the western hemisphere. Freed from European quarrels, the early international life of the nation was remarkably simple, viewed from the standpoint of today. Indeed the whole world was young, relatively. For one thing there were only half as many people in it then. On an immensely wide frontier there was outward pressure until at last the pioneer had occupied most of the empty spaces and pretty well rounded out the inhabitable world, our own domain with the rest.[1]

[1] The location and extent of the remaining pioneer lands of the world are shown upon a map published in "The Pioneer Fringe," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1927.

OUR NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN BORDERS

Our national boundaries are well worth special consideration for the contrasts they afford in geographical circumstance and national spirit. They also reflect the changing character of our border relations, now that the country is more nearly filled up to the frontiers of Canada and Mexico.

The Canadian Frontier

One of the most significant facts in the history of North America is the peace that has reigned for more than one hundred years between the two great English-speaking units that occupy by far the greater part of it, — Canada and the United States. Such fortifications as once existed at a few points have been dismantled. As early as 1817, the governments of Great Britain and the United States by an exchange of notes banished war vessels from Lake Champlain and the Great Lakes, and since then nobody in either country has seriously proposed that the one need arm against the other. To this happy condition a number of forces have contributed. First of all is the matter of speech. When difficulties arise there is no broad border of misunderstanding due to differences of language and of habits of thought underlying them. Shades of meaning can be exactly understood. Of similar import is the fact that both commonwealths adapted to the conditions of the new world and their own governments a heritage of English law, custom, and spirit that has contributed to a parallel development with respect to most qualities that affect international relations.

Of equal force is the interpenetration of population and business.[1] In the ten years between 1910 and 1920, there emigrated to Canada 562,000 Americans, purchasing land as settlers upon the newly opened territories, chiefly of the Canadian Northwest, or engaging in business in the industrial cities. Toronto has 140 branches of American business houses and Hamilton 53. Canada sells us more goods than any other single nation, taking precedence over both the United Kingdom and Japan. She has invested half a billion in enterprises in the United States, and citizens of the United States have invested more than three billions in Canadian enterprises. The physiographic provinces of the one merge into those of the other. On crossing the boundary line the traveler finds no marked difference in the way of life of the people, in the methods of business, in enterprise and character. The boundary

[1] The great population and industrial power of the United States have laid serious economic servitudes upon Canada. These are discussed in relation to the United States on pages 65–67.

between them is one of the easiest in the world to cross. Formalities have been reduced to the lowest possible limit consistent with the collection of customs and the administration of the immigration laws. British Columbia is as interested as California in the exclusion of colored races, particularly Chinese, Japanese, and the natives of India. Both nations use the Great Lakes, where a commerce of the first magnitude has been developed, the character of which is similar on both sides of the line. Iron ore is shipped from the head of Lake Superior to distributing points on Canadian and United States soil at the eastern end of the lake system. Coal (chiefly anthracite) is transported in the opposite direction. Grain and lumber are shipped in colossal quantities to the cities and ports of the eastern seaboard, and, if the stream divides at the eastern end of Lake Erie, the one branch going to Montreal and the other to New York, the fact has a purely commercial significance.

The 5400 miles of frontier between the two nations has been called "the unguarded boundary." While there have been many boundary disputes with Canada and Great Britain throughout our history, they have been settled without war, serious as some of them were. No part of the boundary is now in dispute or is likely ever again to be in dispute. There is hardly even an economic frontier between the two neighbors, so thoroughly has business interpenetrated. So far as such a frontier exists it is interesting to note that it has, among others, a West Indian aspect. Canada has been consciously and effectively developing a reciprocal trade with the West Indies, furnishing lumber, flour, fish, and the like in exchange for sugar, tropical fruit, and fiber. Her trade with Jamaica doubled in the period 1909 to 1919, and a notable development has taken place between Canada and British Guiana. Contributing to these effects is a tariff arrangement whereby a preference is enjoyed by certain tropical products and a like per cent on certain exportations from Canada to the West Indies (page 81). Though it may be said that our interests in the West Indies are parallel with those of Canada, it is equally noteworthy that the two are not in serious competitive relation, and it is hardly conceivable that they could be.

In conclusion we may note that the questions that are now discussed between the two nations, of immigration, of preferential treatment of certain vital products — for example, anthracite coal, which Canada obtains almost exclusively from the United States, and wood pulp, which the United States obtains in enormous and increasing quantities from the eastern provinces of Canada — are of a minor nature, and though they have at times acute phases, the good sense and the equality

of commercial interest in the two countries cannot fail to bring them to an amicable settlement as heretofore.

The Latin American Border

On the southwestern border the course of expansion had been marked by a war with Mexcio, and the effect was that of conquest; for the United States gained thereby a land long inhabited by another stock with a different civilization. There could be no thought of reconquest, not merely because of the disparity of strength between Mexico and the United States but also because the center of Mexican strength and the seat of the densest population is at the southern end of the central plateau. Between the main body of Mexican people and the Rio Grande there was long a barrier of the first magnitude: waste or desert lands with a light and scattered population in the states of Sonora, Chihuahua, and Coahuila. To project either military or economic strength across this great natural barrier was an impossibility for the Mexican people. American occupation of the lost territory became complete and all the original circumstances of the case were altered. Moreover, the economic condition of Mexico improved almost in proportion to the degree that trade with the United States developed. The first railroad in Mexico that connected with the railway net of the United States was built in 1884 and connected Mexico City with El Paso, Texas. Two others opened in 1888 further increased the flow of the commercial current between the two countries. By 1889, or five years after the first railway was completed, the exports of Mexico to the United States had increased from $5,490,000 to $17,330,000; and the imports from $6,752,000 to $9,898,000. By 1910 the imports of Mexico from the United States amounted to $56,439,000, or 58 per cent of the total; and in the same year Mexican exports to the United States were valued at $98,489,000, or 76 per cent of the total. Our capital flowed into productive enterprises, first into mining and railroads and then into ranches and oil.

When the American "invasion" of Mexico by capital was at full tide there was brought about a complete change of political and economic life and at length even a change in the Mexican constitution itself. The causes of this great change from an organized to a disorganized state lay deep within the structure of Mexican life; they ran back, one may say, practically to the time of Cortez. In many ways (and some of them were altogether reprehensible) the primitive owners of the soil were dispossessed of their fields. The process that had been going on gradually through the centuries was accelerated in the past fifty years,

a period corresponding to the industrial development of the country and the sympathetic and very great increase in land values. The foreigner was implicated in much corruption in this process and was associated with the exploiting element of the Mexican people themselves. The effect was disastrous for the United States investor. When the trouble was at its height in 1916, use was made of the very territory that had long been a sort of moat for us and it became instead a moat for Mexico. The deserts bordering our Mexican frontier were an ideal refuge for the bandit; and outrages of every sort — brigandage, cattle running, and intimidation and murder — continued until a military expedition under Pershing crossed the border in pursuit of Villa, the leader of the irregular forces, in March 1916.

A Special Frontier Régime

The "Free Zone" in Mexico illustrates the special nature of our Mexican frontier and of the northern part of Mexico itself. In a strip twelve and a half miles wide on the Mexican side, imports from the United States were long admitted at a rate which amounted to only $11\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the Mexican tariff. The low rate was in recognition of "the isolated condition of the Mexicans along the border," who were much more dependent upon the American side of the boundary than upon the rest of Mexico and therefore demanded a special régime. Had it not been for this special rate, goods of many kinds would have cost from two to four times as much in the towns on the southern side of the Rio Grande as in the towns of Texas across the river. Until the Free Zone went into effect in 1851 there was immigration into the United States on such a scale that adjacent parts of Mexico promised to be depopulated. When Mexican railways became widely extended and domestic Mexican goods could be shipped almost anywhere, the need for this special treatment of the border people disappeared, and on 1 July 1905 the Free Zone was abolished.

TERRITORIAL EXPANSION SUCCEEDED BY ECONOMIC EXPANSION

With the United States rounded out from ocean to ocean there was no longer opportunity for territorial expansion of the type that had marked our history for over half a century. During the fifty years from the Mexican War to 1898, there was no important territorial acquisition save Alaska in 1867; and that territory was too distant to serve any nation as a basis for imperial designs. Though it has had a great development fully justifying its purchase, it was long a relatively poor possession. With few exceptions its products, such as timber,



Fig. 243. Distribution of cities in Mexico.

fish, ores, were those that could be obtained nearer the seats of industry in the United States. It was natural therefore that our greatest development should be toward the tropics. With title to all the Caribbean lands established, there was no chance for a change of ownership until the war with Spain in 1898. Thereafter we stood deep in the midst of a host of new problems arising from the fact that we had become at one stride a colonial empire. Following a sudden and national burst of enthusiasm we bought the Philippines and gained perpetual dominance in the affairs of Cuba (Platt Amendment, see page 717); Porto Rico became ours, and a few years later the Canal Zone also, with which we acquired certain rights of protection and semi-sovereignty that give us control of Panama. Our last acquisition was the Virgin Islands, purchased from Denmark in 1917 for $25,000,000.

Our economic interests have been extended much farther. Almost every mining center in South America and Central America, every oil field, every public service in need of foreign capital, has felt the American influence. It could not be otherwise. With capital to spare, with a mounting need for tropical products, and with geographical

position in our favor, it was entirely natural for us to enter and develop the Latin American field. In this field, however, we entered not a practically empty wilderness, as when the pioneers pushed our frontier westward, but states organized on modern lines and with at least nominally democratic forms of government. Every importation of capital in such a case sets up all sorts of complex reactions. It affects the social life, it arouses jealousies and fears, it invokes the idea of aggression and deep-laid territorial designs, and it lends itself to real exploitation and the sense of wrong that follows exploitation even among primitive people. Added to these barriers to friendship are the wide-reaching effects of contact between different races and civilizations.

Though the management of its relations to Latin American nations is one of the greatest problems of the United States, no headway at all has been made toward its basic solution, with the single exception of our extension of the benefits of public hygiene through the medical service of one of our largest philanthropic foundations. Successive national administrations take up the Latin American question only to end with an official visit and much trumpeting forth of good will. If the present processes continue unchecked, we shall have the case of Mexico repeated in other countries where we are making heavy investments. And with every increase of distance the problem of force (such as we have used in Mexico) is so much the more difficult. Investment made regardless of the soundness of the social and political life of the country involved is gambling, not business, unless — as in the Caribbean or in Central America — particular business ventures are made dependent upon loans guaranteed by treaty with the United States, in which case the business itself is abnormal.

Our government should be studying the land question everywhere in Latin America, for this is fundamental to the whole social structure of the people. If the people own less and less of the land it is only a question of time until they take it back by force or by changing the fundamental laws, which amounts to the same thing. In the resulting revolution the foreigner loses like the native. Moreover, if the government in a given instance is a military dictatorship in fact, it must be recognized that it may be displaced at any time and that the rules and laws affecting property rights may change as frequently as the administrations. Adopting a new constitution is often not the orderly process that we see in the United States. It is in such questions that our diplomatic representatives should engage themselves so that storm warnings may be identified and rightly interpreted. No fundamental

study of Latin American problems has yet been made by any branch of our government. We have dealt so far only with manners, the amenities of life, and the opportunities to do a profitable business.

Land ownership and the social structure are not questions for the Latin American scholar alone: they should be studied in the United States. Our interests bring us to the doors of Latin America as the strong and dominating power, and it is our behavior toward the Latin Americans that will be the subject of world discussion, not their shortcomings toward us.

THE CARIBBEAN LANDS

Our economic advance into the West Indies was notable before the Spanish-American War in 1898; but the rapidity of the movement was greatly hastened by that event, until today we have been brought into the closest political relations with Caribbean lands because of our widespread investments and our entire scheme of naval defense. The reader is referred to the preceding chapter for the general setting of the Caribbean problem in relation to the United States and for a map (page 658) that illustrates our advance; but there are certain general features to which attention may be called here, if only for comparison with our situation elsewhere in Latin America and in the Philippines. The part we played in freeing Cuba gave us the opportunity of inserting in her constitution the Platt Amendment as a condition precedent to the ending of American military occupation. By its terms (disregarding the conventional words we employ in describing our relationship) Cuba is virtually a protectorate or dependency of the United States, since we have construed the amendment to give the United States the right to intervene in case of disorder and to exercise supervision of the elections and finances of the island in case of need; and we reserved to ourselves by agreement with Cuba the right to lease lands necessary for coaling or naval stations. Included in the reservation is a first-class naval base at Guantánamo Bay where the winter manœuvres of the Atlantic fleet are regularly held.

In similar fashion we participated in effect, if not in name, in securing independence for Panama in 1903, with the consequence that the cherished American plan of building an interoceanic canal was at last realized, the way having been cleared by the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901 (page 663). By treaty with Panama we secured the right to construct and own a canal across the Isthmus of Panama and to own a strip of territory measuring ten miles wide from ocean to ocean exclu-

sive of the cities and harbors of Panama and Colon, which lie within the boundaries of the zone.[1] The United States also reserved, as in the case of Cuba, certain rights as a protecting power. They relate to the election laws, to the policing of Colon and Panama and the management of the sanitary establishments of those cities, and to the fortification of strategic points at either end of the canal, particularly the Pearl Islands in the Bay of Panama. Porto Rico we acquired outright as a result of the treaty of Paris (1899) terminating the Spanish-American War, and by agreement we first supervised the customs (1905) and then occupied the country (1916) in Santo Domingo, and also in Haiti, supervising the police arrangements of both countries, mapping portions of the territory, building roads, administering the customs and foreign relations, and maintaining occupying forces of marines.

Parallel with these political developments there has been a great economic development in a coastal strip of fruit lands about the border of the Caribbean and also in the railways, oil fields, and mines. Our penetration of this broad belt of tropical country by outright ownership, by lease, by concession, by economic development, and by the extension of strategic plans, has contributed to building up what is in effect an American policy with reference to the Caribbean. We regard it as a region in which we have paramount interests; and it follows, whether rightly or wrongly, that we look upon all political and international relations that affect the Caribbean as matters of primary interest to the United States and feel that our rights must at all times be taken into full consideration.

We have done these things, not because our government or people at any time formulated, or at any rate expressed, a well-defined policy of political or economic penetration generally accepted and consistently followed. We have taken one step at a time along the line of natural development and in the light of the circumstances surrounding each particular territory and episode. Secure as this statement undoubtedly is, it is equally true that from the outside the whole picture has at times presented a quite different aspect, because the effect of our advance has been cumulative and the advance itself has been steady. Moreover, it is obvious that the process is a continuing one so long as the United States increases in population and resources and has the national energy to press out into new fields of economic development. This makes it seem to the foreigner that there exists a settled American policy of advance into the Caribbean and of increasing political control.

[1] The boundaries of the Canal Zone were subsequently modified in detail in several places; for example, about the border of Gatun Lake.

To the Caribbean republics also, the future appears filled with unpleasant possibilities of repeated occupation.

Geographical proximity to the United States has made it possible for us — indeed, has in a sense impelled us — to do these things; for the Caribbean region lies at our threshold and on the sea route between our eastern and western coasts. The economic attraction which the United States exercised upon these rich lands is an illustration of what amounts to a natural law. Certainly a nation cannot be expected to forego the advantage that proximity brings. If we apply this principle in the case of America we are also required to recognize it wherever else it is illustrated upon the political map, and with respect to countries in competition with us or in opposition to us no less than with respect to countries in which we have no commercial interest.

To accept this principle is not to close one's mind to the manner in which the penetration of near-lying lands is effected. The important thing in our relation to the lands of the Caribbean is not that we are there, but how we got there and how we are comporting ourselves. We have a duty toward independent governments, and it consists chiefly in recognizing possibilities of real self-government on their part and helping in their development. Unfortunately it is just in these lands that there is going on today the most severe test of democratic government in the western hemisphere. An intelligent electorate does not exist in some of the political groups. It is a fact, indeed, that certain populations have retrograded. Haiti is a black republic and its government has devoluted to the point where the United States felt itself obliged to take over by treaty (1915) the management of the financial and military affairs of the country. The structure of Mexican life has been badly shaken by revolution and financial disorder. Yucatan is essentially an independent state with socialistic practices and a strong communistic tendency. Santo Domingo was heading toward financial chaos and civil war before the American occupation in 1916. We are perpetually involved in the internal affairs of Nicaragua and Honduras because of revolutions that affect American financial investments and government loans guaranteed by treaty.

This is not the place either to praise or to condemn our course of action in particular instances. Moreover, it is not the detail of a given instance that is of chief importance in connection with our foreign relations. It is rather that the total effect of our occupation and penetration has been unfavorably viewed by the larger and more advanced of the Latin American states. Not only does this make it difficult for us to participate in the development of South American and Mexican

resources, but it gives the Caribbean peoples themselves an assurance of moral support from men of like tradition elsewhere in Latin America and, they would like to think, from men of their own race. But it is not really a question of race, for the peoples of the Caribbean are of all shades of color. The Spanish element is distinctly limited, the foreign element small, while the Indian and Negro elements, if we count the blends as well as the pure stock, are in many places large and in some places dominating. The right to have a poor government if they choose to have one, is the basis of much of their opposition to American occupation. Yet the United States cannot stand by and let investments of European capital go unsecured and bankruptcy be brought about. Questions of territory and of special privileges and concessions would inevitably arise, and the vital interests of the United States would be endangered. War must be the outcome of such a course: we saw ourselves pushed to the verge of it (1895–1896) in the sharp dispute with Great Britain over the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana.

That this line of political thought corresponds with one of the natural economic tendencies of American capital should not blind us to the fact that national safety is as real a consideration to the American people as commercial opportunity. The importance of the shortening and cheapening of the transportation service from the western coast of the United States to the eastern is recognized, and the necessity of protecting our fifteen hundred miles of Pacific coast, situated far from eastern industrial fields and centers of population, is appreciated by every thoughtful citizen. We cannot believe that these vital economic and strategic considerations should be lightly treated even if they are involved in subtler questions of economic imperialism and the rights of small backward independent states, some of which seem to be incapable of managing their own affairs.

A firmer basis of criticism of America is our lack of a defined policy respecting Latin America. Partly this is owing to our refusal to consider the United States a colonial power. It results that there is no continuity of practice in dealing with our possessions or our Latin American neighbors. More important still, we put no premium on experience, offer no inducements to able men interested in colonial administration. Differences of race, temperament, and standards of life make our relations with Latin America hard enough. It may be that they will always be a problem of political life. But they can surely be reduced in scope by training men and perfecting our diplomatic service in a branch that has always been deplorably weak.

(C) American Interests in the Philippines and the Pacific

Philippine policy a partisan issue

In the first volume of the *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President*, transmitted to Congress for its information on 2 February 1900, there is the following significant paragraph:

> Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the commission believe that the government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the intervention of other powers and the eventual division of the Islands among them. Only through American occupation, therefore, is the idea of a free, self-governing, and united Philippine commonwealth at all conceivable. . . . Thus the welfare of the Filipinos coincides with the dictates of national honor in forbidding our abandonment of the archipelago. We cannot from any point of view escape the responsibilities of government which our sovereignty entails.

In the *Report of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands* for the fiscal year ended 31 December 1921 (published in 1922), there is quoted a letter to General Leonard T. Wood from the Secretary of War which contains the following instruction to the special mission to the Philippine Islands, of which General Wood was chairman:

> Certainly it would be a vain thing to turn the Philippine Islands over to the Filipino people without reasonable assurance that the resources of the Islands would remain the heritage of the people of the Islands. The pleasing of the Filipinos of this generation would be a minor satisfaction if it were believed that it would result in the bondage or destruction of the Filipino people for all time hereafter.

General Wood himself wrote, under date of 8 October 1921, as follows:

> . . . we are convinced that it would be a betrayal of the Philippine people, a misfortune to the American people, a distinct step backward in the path of progress, and a discreditable neglect of our national duty, were we to withdraw from the Islands and terminate our relationship there without giving the Filipinos the best chance possible to have an orderly and permanently stable government.

The first quotation is separated from the other two by a period of more than twenty years, and the argument against giving the Filipinos complete independence is now precisely what it was at the beginning of the American occupation. The identity of policies is so close that practically the same language is employed in describing them, now as then.

It should be noted that the quoted paragraphs from reports at the beginning of American occupation and twenty years thereafter are both by Republican administrations. By contrast, President Wilson transmitted to Congress, on 7 December 1920, a message in which he said:

> Allow me to call your attention to the fact that the people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since the last action of the Congress in their behalf, and have thus fulfilled the condition set by the Congress as precedent to a consideration of granting independence to the Islands. I respectfully submit that this condition precedent having been fulfilled, it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of those Islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet.

Previous to President Wilson's message there had been a long period of administration during which Governor-General Harrison diminished the number of Americans among government officials, substituting Filipinos, and also turned over to the Filipinos many rights and powers formerly exercised by the governor-general himself. The whole trend and purpose of these and related acts was to prepare the way for the turning over of the Philippines to the Filipinos themselves.

We have placed in juxtaposition the Republican and Democratic points of view because it is through the adoption of first one policy and then the other, as a change of administration has occurred at Washington, that many grievous troubles have been brought to the Filipino people. Ever since the treaty of Paris in 1899, which terminated the Spanish-American War, the Philippines have been one of the major points of difference between the two leading political parties. Because of this situation the two broad aspects of the Philippine question have heightened interest:

(1) What capacity have the Filipinos for self-government and for self-defense in the face of covetous Far-Eastern and even European powers?

(2) Can the United States government follow a consistent Philippine policy, free from partisanship, so as to steady American influence and, through it, the Filipinos themselves? Or will there be violent and wayward changes of policy alternating with Democratic and Republican administrations?

There can be little question that the Philippines should not be left to themselves either to frame a foreign policy independent of American interests and possibly inimical to them, or to become the prey of an unscrupulous power. The latter possibility is not a remote one, but an immediate one, for the most desirable portions of the formerly empty

lands of the earth have been filled up. There remains but little free territory to be staked out, and the present wealth and potentialities of the Philippines would inevitably sharpen the activities of a power in need of tropical products to sustain a growing list of industries and an increasing volume of overseas trade. Such being the case, the peace of the world demands that so tempting a bait shall not be left lying at hand. If these things be true, it follows that the duty of the United States is clear. It was through us that the Islands were freed from Spanish influence; it is to us that the best thought of the world turns for a safe and fair solution of the Philippine problem, no matter if we be charged with the crimes of imperialism and with selfish business purpose. Just how tempting are the islands may be shown by a brief geographical sketch.



FIG. 244. The Philippines superposed on a map of the Caribbean region.

GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION AND RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

The wealth of the Philippines is suggested by a population of more than 12,000,000, increasing at the rate of 2.3 per cent annually, living upon territory 115,000 square miles in extent, of which 10 per cent is under cultivation. It is estimated that the total wealth of the islands is five and a half billions of dollars. Figure 244 shows the situation of the islands and their area in terms of the lands about the Caribbean and our own southeastern states. The two largest islands in the group (7000 if we count all the islets on the map, or 30 if we take only those having 100 square miles or more) are Luzon on the north with 40,814 square miles, and Mindanao on the south with 36,906 square miles. (New York, 49,204 square miles; Georgia, 59,265 square miles.) There is sufficient rainfall everywhere for agriculture, which is far and away the principal industry. There are no dry regions of any extent and no long periods of extraordinary drought. There is almost everywhere a rich volcanic soil on the valley floors and the lower slopes of the intervening ridges, and so wide a range of climate and elevation

that tropical and subtropical products of every variety may be produced (Fig. 244). Luzon is in the latitude of Guatemala; Mindanao corresponds with Panama. The range in latitude (1000 miles), taken together with the range in longitude (700 miles), gives the islands possibilities of very wide scope.

The six principal crops are rice, sugar cane, coconuts, hemp, corn, and tobacco, and their importance is in the order named. The area of land under cultivation in the production of these six crops has increased each year almost without exception. In order of importance on the export list of Philippine products are sugar, hemp, coconut oil, copra, and tobacco, the percentages of the total being 31, 22, 14, 11, and 8 respectively. From 1899 to 1921 inclusive there was a balance of trade against the islands for twelve of the years and a balance in favor of the islands for eleven years, and the totals are in favor of the Philippines. In 1926 the overseas trade of the islands exceeded $256,000,000, the exports exceeding the imports by $17,500,000, a condition maintained since 1915.

From an agricultural point of view the Filipinos need to cultivate more food plants in order to obtain relief from the present burden of importing great quantities of foodstuffs, some of which they are well able to grow, not only to satisfy their own needs but to furnish for export. Twelve per cent (in value) of the total imports of 1920 were foodstuffs (exclusive of meat and dairy products). They now import coffee, peanuts, and rice, for example, when these crops could be grown for export, since climate and soil are altogether favorable. This is particularly true of rice, imported to the value of 16,000,000 pesos in 1920 and 6,500,000 pesos in 1921, chiefly from Siam and the French East Indies.

TRADE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The foreign commerce of the islands is chiefly in the hands of the United States. In the total trade for 1926, amounting to $256,000,000, the United States led with $200,000,000. Japan and Great Britain followed with $14,500,000 and $13,500,000, respectively. Imports and exports are carried chiefly in British ships, American vessels having held the lead until 1921. The United States is now second and Japan third. The tonnage of British vessels entering and clearing at Philippine ports in 1926 was more than 1,500,000, out of a total of more than 4,000,000. The tonnage of American vessels has fallen to about 1,170,000 tons, Japanese 506,000 tons, German 292,000 tons, Dutch 182,000 tons, and Philippine vessels 107,000 tons.

It is interesting from both the political and the economic point of

view to note some of the details of American participation in Philippine trade. The United States furnished in recent years about 55 per cent of merchandise imported into the Philippines and has taken about 70 per cent of the total exports. Siam furnished the principal imports of rice, Japan and Australasia supply coal. The United States takes more than 50 per cent of the total hemp exports, 90 per cent of the coconut oil, 90 per cent of the total value of copra, and 55 per cent of the tobacco and tobacco products.

THE QUESTION OF GOVERNMENT

The capacity of the Filipinos for self-government has proved as remarkable as the deliberate and intentional development of that capacity by the American government. We shall now outline the successive steps in the process.

Directly after the Spanish-American War there was a period of military occupation and government, following insurrection against the United States. There was the gravest public concern over the state of affairs then existing. In the autumn of 1900 we had in the Philippines an army of 75,000 men divided into more than 550 separate detachments and with an average of three engagements a day. Yet the main military effort was over by 1 July 1901, though guerrilla warfare continued through the following year, and it was not until 1906 that various subordinate chieftains ended their practice of raid and pillage and that the Philippines could be said to be really pacified. The southern or Mohammedan section of the islands (Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago) required a military government until 1913, not on account of insurrection but because of resistance on the part of its people to the idea of overlordship by Christian Filipinos. In that year there was a change to a representative civil government that has continued down to the present, as with the rest of the Philippines.

Happily, the next period in the development of the government was brief. From 1901 to 1907 the sole legislative body was the Philippine Commission, appointed by the President of the United States. While the work of the commission was beneficial and a civil government of admirable character was organized, there was no substantial participation by the Filipino people and there could easily have been laid the foundation of enduring mistrust. Instead, no sooner had the civil administration been perfected and the people accustomed to organized government than a constructive plan of generous scope was made effective. From 1907 to 1913, the lower house, or Philippine Assembly, consisting of elected Filipinos, was made responsible for half the legislative powers,

the Philippine Commission constituting itself the upper house, or Senate. Railroads, roads, telegraph lines, bridges, irrigation works, schoolhouses, lighthouses, and land surveys, were pushed forward with diligence and success. The University of the Philippines was founded. The administration of justice was standardized, and the Filipinos were put in the less responsible positions and trained for promotion. At the end of this period Filipinos filled 72 per cent of the government positions and Americans 28 per cent, including those of greatest influence and importance.

From 1914 to 1921 took place the Filipinization of the islands preparatory to independence. Provision was made for an elected senate as well as an elected house. Americans in the Philippine service were greatly reduced in numbers, and by 1921 Filipinos filled 96 per cent of the positions, Americans but 4 per cent. Unfortunately the Filipinized government of the period failed in the fields of economics and finance. The government bought a railroad, supplied capital for a number of developments that had been run on a deficit, and incurred debts at a rapid rate. The government lent money to the Rural Credit Associations rather than to industrial enterprises that would have been able to offset the evil effects of a long-established system of loans to farmers from local bosses who keep large numbers of their dependents in economic slavery. Governor-General Wood at the beginning of a new administration insisted that the government get out of business. Filipino leaders who favor independence want to subordinate the executive branch of government to the legislative. Thus the governor-general would be a mere figurehead. To this end under Harrison the Council of State was devised, consisting of the governor-general, the heads of six executive departments, and the presiding officers of two legislative bodies. The Council of State so entangled the routine of administration that government came almost to a standstill. In 1923 the members of the Council resigned and the Governor-General administered the government of the islands in the spirit of the Jones Law.[1]

The intense appreciation of the benefits of schooling has been a remarkable feature of Filipino life in the period of self-development and of progress toward self-government. It is one of the most remarkable features of colonial life in the world. That the protecting power should have encouraged and fostered this tendency is one of many proofs of its beneficent intentions. The enrollment of school children was doubled in the period 1914–1921, the number rising to a million, or 10

[1] The legal status of the Philippines today is that of an "unorganized territory of the United States."

per cent of the total population. (In the United States the school enrollment comprises 20 per cent of the population.) By 1926 the number of school children had risen to 1,300,000, and more than a quarter of the total public revenue is now spent in the public schools.

The situation of the islands, widely separated over a distance of a thousand miles, and the unlike character of the people afforded the possibility of trouble in administration. While sea communications are an offset to the lack of good roads, they are of less practical importance in the coördination of agriculture than interior highways. It is important to note in this connection that the islands had few good roads and only one short railroad (120 miles out of Manila) at the beginning of American occupation. There are now of roads of the first class 2920 miles and of railroads under operation 755 miles.

The economic growth of the Philippines has been remarkably rapid. From 1903 to 1909 the gross trade of the islands was almost stationary. In the latter year, free trade between the Philippine Islands and the United States was established, and in the period from 1909 to 1912 the Philippine trade with all countries nearly doubled. The gross business done with the United States has steadily increased until it is now $200,000,000, two thirds of the total.

Contributing still further to Philippine welfare has been the fact that the United States has borne the costs of military and naval establishments necessary to the defense of the islands and has also relieved the islands of the burden of maintaining a diplomatic and consular service. Otherwise the United States has not contributed directly to the islands, except in the appropriation of $3,000,000 by Congress as a relief fund in 1903.

Ninety-three per cent of Filipinos are of pure Malay stock. Seven per cent are half-castes, or mestizos, and it is from this class that the native political leaders come. There are at least five main language groups represented in the Philippines,[1] each of which is used by not less than a half million people, while several score dialects are employed by smaller groups. The persistent efforts of the American government and the receptivity of the Filipino people have led to a wide extension of the use of English; and the continuation of the process would seem to be one of the prime necessities for a unified, centralized government of and by the Filipinos themselves. To differences of language must be added those of religion. Northern Luzon, Mindoro, and Palawan have large blocks of pagan peoples (300,000, about 3 per cent

[1] A. L. Kroeber, *Peoples of the Philippines*, 1919, page 70. Barrows notes eight principal languages and Beyer six that have an extensive printed literature.

of the total population), among whom the Igorots of Luzon are the most important, while the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao in the southern part of the Philippines are inhabited principally by the Moros, a Mohammedan people (420,000, about 4.5 per cent of the total). Both pagans and Mohammedans were placed (1901) under the direct administration of the Philippine Commission, which organized first a government board and then a Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. Four of the governors of the nine provinces that embrace the non-Christian tribes are elected (since June 1922) by popular vote, while the remaining five are appointed by the governor-general, subject to confirmation by the Senate. In addition there are two senators to represent the non-Christians and, while appointees, they have been for the most part non-Christians and influential men of integrity. Excellent relations between Christians and non-Christians have been maintained and the organization of scattered people into settlements has contributed greatly to their social and material welfare. Contributing to the same end is the policy of planting colonies of Christian Filipinos from the overcrowded north on the fertile agricultural lands of Mindanao in the south, where they have established good relations with their Mohammedan neighbors.

It must be said that if the Filipino people were not law-abiding their separation among different islands, their differences of language, their independence of spirit, and their very great and sincere desire to be independent, would have brought the gravest trouble upon the American government. As it works out, they have exhibited remarkable self-restraint and they have made a greater advance than any other colonial or dependent people in the tropics. A full share of credit belongs to them, however beneficent American occupation and tutelage may have proved. The process of self-government by the Filipinos cannot fail to involve both them and the United States in continuing difficulties. The agitation of 1923 and the differences between Governor-General Wood and certain Filipino leaders are an index of a desire for a greater measure of independence that will not be satisfied with the perpetually deferred fulfillment of promises. It is surely not good policy constantly to hold out the hope of ultimate complete independence while an increasing volume of American investments makes it practically certain that only conditional independence can ever be granted.

American commercial penetration in the islands has progressed not by immigration of an American population but by economic organization and investment, particularly after free trade between the Philippines and the United States following the tariff act of 1909. It is the

American economic interest that distinctly complicates the question of even qualified independence for the Filipino. There are but 7000 Americans in the Philippines. If our people do not go to the tropics and to our tropical colonies, we must rule through political and economic relations and controls that are new to the people of the United States and that may easily become a source of injustice. As our population expanded westward, the flag and the same political controls went into the fields of new production and we dealt with the same type of people. All these circumstances are changed in our tropical relations. In this respect we have a problem that is old to the French, Dutch, and British.

THE PHILIPPINES AS A PART OF THE PACIFIC PROBLEM

The shortest steamship route from San Francisco to Manila is nearly 7000 miles; the northernmost of the islands are separated by only 100 miles of sea from Formosa, a Japanese possession. Luzon is 500 miles from China; the distance from Manila to Hongkong is 640 miles. Guam, 1500 miles east of Manila, is the nearest American possession. Still farther east is Wake Island, and more than 3000 miles east of Manila lies the first of the long chain of the Hawaiian Islands. Honolulu is more than 2000 miles from San Francisco. We own a part of the Samoan Islands, nearly 1000 miles south of the equator in the mid-Pacific. Our possessions may be said to lie in a chain athwart the Pacific with the Philippines, the largest and richest of all, at the farther end, near the doorsteps of Far-Eastern powers. What we do there concerns them and it concerns also the Netherlands, whose government has extensive possessions in the East Indies; and Australia and New Zealand are vital elements in the territorial layout of British possessions south of the equator.

On the map of the Pacific we see the Philippines, therefore, as one of a number of possessions of powers that are rivals in the present state of political organization of the world. We see them also as a rich possession. They have a population one tenth as great as that of the United States; their products are in large part complementary to our own. We benefit by their trade, of which we have the greater part. In case of war they would form an advance base, though it is probably correct to say that they are so far advanced that they would constitute a source of weakness rather than strength if we were in conflict with a first-class power, particularly Japan.

The position of the Philippines was brought definitely before the American people at the time of the Conference on the Limitation of

Armament at Washington (1921–1922). The fortifications of the Philippines and of Guam had been neglected by the American Congress, in spite of the fact that the question of increasing the strength of our defenses was an anxious one. The American people had lost confidence in the good will of the Japanese government and suspected hostile designs. We were in conflict particularly with Japan over the question of the Open Door in China, and there were many acute differences between the United States and Japan over the economic penetration of Manchuria and the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Moreover, it is idle to suppose that the United States can successfully defend the Philippines in time of war. While almost anything in this world can be done if the individual or the nation is willing and able to foot the bill, yet to defend the Philippines against Japan would require such an outlay of capital strength as to leave us enfeebled for a century. A war with Japan would call for the establishment of a base on the mainland nearer Japan than the Philippines lie. The machinery of such a base and the establishment of connections with it requires not merely an initial outlay but a long-continued military service involving colossal costs. At the Conference on the Limitation of Armament it was easy to agree that we would carry the defensive works of these outposts no further toward completion.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921–1922

When to these considerations were added the disordered state of the world and the continued rivalry in armaments, the duty of the American government in 1921 lay plain before it. Either a positive constructive act had to be performed or war in the Pacific would follow. The probability of such a war was perceived by all. The result was the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament and Far-Eastern Questions (1921–1922). The history of the conference is altogether too detailed even to outline here (page 26). The net result was an agreement, between the principal powers, to keep their navies in definite ratios and to limit the size of the biggest guns. The ratios adopted were 5 : 5 : 3 for Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. Nothing was done about land armaments and the size of armies, and wide limits were set for the development of the smaller craft of war, particularly submarines. It is this phase of the conference that is the weakest from the American standpoint, assuming a policy of continued possession of or responsibility for the Philippines. There is every possibility that Japan will develop her smaller craft, including her submarines, to the point where American commerce in time of war

would be entirely cut off from the Philippines as well as the rest of the Pacific and closely restricted to its own shores. Our ships of war would likewise find themselves vitally hampered and excluded, the more because we have agreed not to enlarge the defenses of Guam and of the Philippines. Limiting our own action in this respect and setting only the widest limits to certain types of naval preparations in Japan puts us in a position of marked disadvantage should war with Japan ever come about.

The conference had a number of successes with respect to questions on the mainland of eastern Asia. An agreement was made with Japan concerning continuing coöperation in the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway (now terminated). A friendly triangular understanding between the United States, China, and Japan led at a later date to the evacuation of Shantung, which had been a bone of contention ever since 1915, when Japan made her Twenty-One Demands, and which had become a question of acute difference in 1919 at the Peace Conference of Paris. The question of American rights in Yap was settled by an agreement with Japan (1922), giving the United States the same rights that Japan enjoys in the matter of cable or radio communication, though the United States is not to exercise that right so long as Japan maintains an adequate service. The island is valuable only as a station for such communication, controlling the more important of the two cable routes to China from Guam, and the only direct Pacific cable connection between the United States and the Dutch East Indies.

A step of far-reaching importance is with respect to the Japanese mandate as a whole in its relation to American interests. The same treaty that disposes of the Yap controversy gives American consent to the exercise by Japan of mandatory power over former German islands north of the equator in the Pacific. In return the United States is to enjoy all the rights that it would have enjoyed as a member of the League of Nations. In addition, American missionaries are protected, American property rights are respected, and the United States is given most-favored-nation privileges in tariff duties and in commerce and navigation. It is also to be furnished with a copy of the annual report on Japanese administration which that government makes to the League of Nations.

The effect of the conference has been to diminish, so to speak, the area of our troubles in the Far East, to lay the basis of a better understanding, and to give experience in the frank negotiation of acute difficulties — and to leave us at a distinct strategic disadvantage should war come. Probably this is as far as it was possible to go in the

state of the world at that time and, if there are dangers against which we have not guarded ourselves, at least there are corresponding hopes in which we have been willing to place our trust.

(D) Foreign Relations Imposed by Civilization

some european relationships

In international relations it is still a sound principle that the European situation vitally affects the rest of the world. There is no reality to a policy of isolation for a nation of significant size anywhere in the world today. The World War having brought Europe to the verge of disaster, the effects are felt in every economically related unit. While the world basis on which commerce had been organized to serve a complex civilization had largely displaced the purely nationalistic basis of commerce, the World War interrupted the natural trends of commerce and to a marked degree turned men's minds again to the nationalistic view of it. The effect has been in every sense disturbing. The European nations have become so absorbed in their mutual relations — with their fears, penalties, debts, guarantees, and social and mutually antagonistic political systems and doctrines — that they have noticeably diminished their domination of distant lands and alien peoples. Compromise with India and Egypt may have been on the way in 1914, but it was vastly hastened by war's aftermath of domestic and foreign troubles.

This state of affairs may be expected to have little effect upon the extension of American influence abroad, partly because of a widespread ignorance among Americans of world politics and geography, but chiefly because of a lack of imagination regarding the future. The American habit of thought in relation to international things is not imperialistic; it is commercial and it seeks above all commercial equality. Materially we have been so well supplied with resources that we have not troubled ourselves to live among or to trade with foreigners except in limited degree. By contrast, in colonial times and in proportion to our numbers we were far more interested in seaborne trade than we were during the time of most rapid development of industries or of expansion westward to occupy cheap land. Now that the empty lands are nearly filled up, the sea is once more an object of national concern. The interest of Congress in the problem of Panama Canal tolls (1917), of the Department of State in the Japanese and British mandates in the Pacific (1921), of the government and people in the limitation of armament and in Far-Eastern problems (1921–1922), are late examples of at

least a mild realization of the meaning of foreign trade. But we have still far to go, and the standards of domestic politics have not moved much beyond a division upon the conventional tariff question. We have yet to realize that the United States is a part of that fifth of mankind that rules the rest of it either politically or by virtue of economic power.

SIX CHIEF GROUPS OF POPULATION

Our future relation to the general development of land and the growing significance of foreign relations is suggested in Figure 245. The world even now exhibits the tendencies that the map forecasts. Six principal centers of population are developing toward full capacity. Three in the southern hemisphere form a secondary group and three in the northern form a primary group of overshadowing density and importance. With the intensity of life greatly increased by modern industry, the mutual relations of the three northern groups have grown progressively more important. The American and British navies, the two strongest in the world, are supported by two of the three centers of dense population. Japan was hurrying forward a naval program that was absorbing 30 per cent of her national budget after the World War. American participation in the World War and in the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament and Far-Eastern (Pacific) Questions are direct indices of a triangular relation of the three northern groups represented on the map of future white settlement.

The relation of the six regions to each other is even now the basis of a vast amount of political study and management. There is the strong probability that there will come about a natural division of the world into a few economic regions, the boundaries of which will break across the population regions of Figure 245 because of the unequal distribution of resources vital to the industries upon which our high-tension civilization has been built. Great Britain and the United States now constitute two such regional groupings, and there is more than a possibility of a similar regional grouping in the Far East and the Pacific. Even if we increase the food supply and the earth's capacity for additional population by controlling tropical labor (and the tendency to do so will be constantly stronger), the best places in the world will continue to be the centers now shown upon the map, and it is from these, not the tropics, that world influences will radiate and regional combinations be brought about.

Since 1900 there has developed a process of world competition that must inevitably increase, and the map, Figure 245, when compared with the distribution of any important mineral, makes this clear. National



FIG. 245. The distribution of future white settlement according to the economic value of the world regions. The area within the heavy black line is not available for white settlement but has been treated uniformly here. The facts of the distribution shown in this figure may be expressed by degree of habitability, shown by "isoiketes" (see legend to the left) where the optimum of habitability is 1000, or by the corresponding potential population density (see legend to the right). Griffith Taylor, in the *Geographical Review*, July 1922.

boundaries are not run so as to furnish nations with a balanced supply of necessary minerals, fibers, food, and the like. There is the further complicating fact that a nation organized mainly out of an agricultural society requires one set of resources, markets, and routes of access, and therefore one kind of territorial layout; a grazing society another; an industrial society a third. These conditions are not represented by pure types, but the problems they represent are real and complicate international dealing. Added to these problems are the geographical situations of the chief population groups themselves (Fig. 245) and the relations they must sustain to each other in order mutually to satisfy their wants by access to resources that only one or the other can supply. How we shall reach a coördinated relation of these complex and often conflicting interests we do not know; but that coördination and war are alternatives in determining such a relation seems to admit of no question.

THE EXAMPLE OF OIL

At just the time when new problems of land and population press upon us with grave social and political complications, our national outlook is disturbed by the state of foreign affairs. Formerly our international relations concerned us little, largely because we had plenty of natural resources at home; now they concern us much, for we have now to give earnest thought to ultimate resources, wherever they may be in the world. Take oil, for example. As our industries increase in importance and in dependence upon oil for fuel and lubricants it is obvious that we shall more and more look outside our own borders for future supplies. Though we have high production our chief reserves will last hardly more than twenty years. It has thus come about that oil has taken the lead in recent public thought concerning our rights abroad. In Mexico, for example, American capital has been invested to the extent of $500,000,000, and in 1922 the United States imported from Mexico 132,000,000 barrels of oil. Without that supply it would not have been possible to maintain our normal reserves and meet the foreign and domestic demands for oil. Naturally, the conditions under which we invest money in Mexico and the laws controlling ownership or development of oil lands become a matter of great importance and of governmental concern.

When the World War came there was revealed in clearer light the extent to which modern industrial life and civilization itself have become dependent upon a continued supply of oil. It was then first realized that petroleum resources are limited and exhaustible. There is less concern about selling the finished produce and greater concern





FIGS. 246 and 247. From *Welthandels-Atlas: Erdöl und Benzin*, 1925. The statistics given on the maps are for 1924. The probable exhaustion of known American reserves in twenty years at the present rate of production, and the limited knowledge that we have of oil reserves in underdeveloped foreign fields, lend to the present distribution great interest from the standpoint of international relations.

about finding a continuous supply for the future; and it is the latter aspect that brings about international rivalry in oil. America supplies a substantial part of all the petroleum used in Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. The Mexican problem is largely the product of oil exploitation by foreign interests, chiefly those of the United States. Since the World War we have heard a great deal about rivalry between oil companies of different nationality operating in Persia and Mesopotamia, and seeking concessions in Russia. The deterioration of the facilities for oil production in Russia is responsible in part for the breakdown of interior communications and industry in that country. In the Dutch East Indies there has been a long controversy over the rights of American citizens to obtain and exploit oil lands on a basis of equal opportunity with British and Dutch owners, part of a wider contest involving the leading producing companies.

In fact, it would seem that oil may furnish the first great test of the ability of the world to agree upon a basis of common action in the case of unevenly distributed and limited resources desired by all. The alternative to such a view would be a scramble for the richest and most accessible oil fields, with war inevitably to follow. Certainly there cannot be arbitrary discrimination in favor of the citizens of one country and in opposition to those of another without the most serious consequences. American policy respecting the oil situation culminated in a report by the Federal Trade Commission to the Senate early in 1923, in response to the order of the Senate requesting light on foreign ownership of oil properties in the United States and on discrimination against the United States in oil-producing countries. This action followed that of 1920, in which Congress passed a leasing law preventing ownership of stock control by foreigners of leases acquired under the provisions of the act.

The exclusive policies of Great Britain and the Netherlands in India and the Dutch East Indies respectively are made the subject of special comment in the Federal Trade Commission's report. The Secretary of the Interior early in 1923 denied certain foreign companies the right to operate in Oklahoma under the terms of the law of 1920. Further action of a more drastic kind may be expected from both sides if agreement does not speedily take the place of international rivalry. In the international field the sharp contest between British and American companies over Russian oil in 1927 showed how sensitive to special advantages the whole industry has become. Inevitably this involves the governments, however disinterested they for the moment appear to be.

INTENSIFIED COMPETITION FOR RAW MATERIALS

The need of international coöperation in the use of raw materials will rapidly become more acute because it is first apparent in the field of mineral resources, which touch key industries upon which our city populations depend. Not only are these city populations increasing out of proportion to the rural population, but they are also organizing with growing effectiveness in groups and becoming far more vocal and powerful than ever before about group interests. City growth is especially rapid in this country, as shown in our analysis of population trends in the United States (pages 692–693). More than that, nearly two fifths of the total mineral production of the world is in the United States; and upon a continued hold on foreign markets for that part which we export depends the welfare of large numbers of our home population. For that far larger part that we consume at home there must be constant and basic sources of supply to maintain our present standard of living and state of civilization. Our use of machines for the saving of labor charges and for increasing production has developed to such an extent that the whole structure of our material life depends upon its continuance (Fig. 248). How high a place the machine holds in American life may be judged in part by the fact that in the past forty years our per capita consumption of minerals has multiplied ten times.

When the international effects are felt of the great forces which lie back of these conditions in the United States, there must necessarily come either war or a pooling and rationing system with respect to those waning resources that are most nearly vital. Minerals do not grow; they are diminishable assets; and their geographical distribution cannot be altered. No one country is wholly self-sufficient in minerals, and all countries therefore ought to recognize both the immediate and the ultimate advantages — and certainly the fairness — of the principle of agreement respecting their ownership and use. These facts apply with greater force to the United States because modern industry is here developed to its highest state. It is also held under central



Fig. 248. Percentage of increase in implements and machinery in the United States in comparison with other data: 1910–1920.

control to a far greater extent than elsewhere, or can be so held in time of war. The United States has no more severe test of character to meet than that which it will face when it comes into real conflict with other powerful industrial nations over the sources of basic supplies of imported raw material, whether minerals or others. By the same token there is no more important question for the United States to watch in the conduct of others toward itself. This view of the case has already stirred up questions regarding oil, platinum, rubber, and nitrate.

The watchfulness of the government of the United States with respect to the sources of raw materials is shown by the scrutiny it has made of every move of the mandatory powers operating under the system established at Paris in 1919. It has stipulated (as in treaties with Japan and Great Britain, for example) that we are to have the same trading rights and privileges as the subjects of the mandatory powers. We have warned others that we shall deem their title clear only as we are given the same privileges in the territories recently placed under their control. We have taken these steps even in places where our trade at the moment amounts to little if anything. All this can only mean that as time goes on commercial operations will be increasingly extended and the activity of the government will be necessarily increased rather than diminished.

Because a policy opposed to such a trend will eventually affect the whole country, it cannot stand. Otherwise the time will surely come when our refusal to take responsibilities along with others will exclude us in critical places from vital economic benefits and privileges. A nation becomes predominant in any region it takes under its care when such a step is both costly and difficult.

HAVE WE AVOIDED FOREIGN ENTANGLEMENT?

If the impression prevails that the United States has really avoided entangling alliances and that the Monroe Doctrine embraces the only definite part of our foreign policy, it is time that a broader historical view were acquired. By the end of the 19th century we were involved in the problems of Samoa, Tangier, and Liberia Our relations with Japan in the Far East are the result of a policy respecting China. We have repeatedly joined the great powers of Europe in making demands upon the Chinese government. In 1900 we participated with Germany, Great Britain, France, and Russia in the relief of Peking. In 1919 we assumed, in coöperation with Japan and four other powers, responsibility for the supervision of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In

1922, at the Conference on the Limitation of Armament and Far-Eastern Questions, we agreed that the 1919 arrangement respecting this railroad should continue in force. The Conference on the Limitation of Armament (1921–1922) itself grew out of a tense situation involving us in the Far East with the European powers and Japan. How could it be otherwise in view of our persistence with reference to the Open Door and our acquisition of the Philippines, only a few hundred miles from the coast of Asia? Partly because of relationship to the interests of other powers we occupied Haiti in 1915 and bought the Virgin Islands in 1918.

If these occurrences were inevitable when we had our eyes fixed chiefly upon domestic development, how much more important and far reaching may we expect our foreign relations to become from year to year as the provisions of our new treaties require supervision and revision? In the three and a half years after the World War, or from November 1918 to June 1922, the United States ratified twenty-eight treaties, conventions, and agreements with no fewer than twenty-four powers. Treaties inevitably follow business relations. Money that we loan abroad is speedily involved in business exchanges and the development of resources. Including advances to our war-time associates of 1917–1919 and loans of money for food, as, for example, to Austria, twenty-one European countries borrowed from the United States, or from investment companies or citizens of the United States, in the five-year period 1918–1923. Of this number, ten were government loans. There were offered by foreign governments, municipalities (including possessions of the United States), and companies for public subscription in the United States during the years 1920–1927, loans totaling $6,836,000,000. When loans of such magnitude continue to be made, the national government is compelled in case of need to use the diplomatic service constructively in securing consideration of the question of a reasonable service on the loans.

INTERALLIED INDEBTEDNESS AND REPARATIONS

Two things stand out in the international relations of the time that have more far-reaching consequences upon the present economic situation than all others combined. The first is Interallied indebtedness and the second is German reparations. The United States has an interest in both because the British debt to us, amounting to four billions of dollars, is a part of the issue, likewise the French debt to us of almost equal amount and the Italian debt of less than two billions.

This relationship of the United States to European problems has great potentialities. Upon our attitude will depend the course of the European powers, and no one can yet be sure that their course will not lead to general ruin. Seeing this clearly, the European powers again and again invited the United States to participate in European conferences called to solve the general economic problem. But the United States declined, and when an unusually strong invitation was issued to attend the Genoa conference in 1922 it declined on specific grounds: namely, that the general European situation was a European problem and that until that problem was forwarded toward a solution by Europeans themselves and definite policies of peace and disarmament became a part of national practices, the United States could not participate.

Our steadfast refusal at last had the result of bringing about, with respect to the main question of Interallied indebtedness, an almost direct appeal from Great Britain through the so-called Balfour Note, a circular note addressed to all the European governments indebted to the United States as a result of the World War. It indicated a general willingness on the part of the British government to cancel the French debt to Great Britain and thus reduce the amount of reparations to a figure which Germany could reasonably pay, but pointed out that such a course was not possible unless the United States took the same generous attitude. This was the logical culmination of long-sustained and vigorous propaganda launched on a great scale in the United States with the publication of Keynes' *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1920). The purpose of this propaganda was to have the United States agree to the cancellation of Interallied indebtedness, in its own interest as well as in the interest of its European debtors.

It is clear that whatever leaders might wish to do and whatever economic principles might dictate, the cancellation of Interallied debts is politically impossible. It is not intended either to justify or to condemn the American attitude in this respect, but only to describe its basis. There are those who argue that we entered the World War late and that the cost of the war to us was disproportionately small, considering the fact that our national interests were endangered equally with those of our European allies. On the other hand, it is the common opinion of our people that our interests were really more remote than those of Germany's immediate neighbors; and that when we did enter the war we accepted our responsibilities in a generous spirit, furnished funds at a time when international financing had reached the breaking point, lavishly supplied raw materials, finished products, and

a vast army, and undertook a shipping program that was without parallel in the history of the world. The climax of our policy came at the Paris peace conference, when we declined to accept anything for the United States in the way of reparations and exercised our influence to have France, Italy, Belgium, and Great Britain diminish the total of reparations from the fantastic terms at first proposed, or even those written into the treaty, to those that were economically possible or desirable from the standpoint of international trade.

It is quite generally believed in America that wrong thinking has resulted from too great attention to the sentimental aspects of the case. Though it is universally agreed that Interallied indebtedness is impossible of payment in full, it is equally agreed that it can be paid in part. Much as we should like to see British and French trade in a better state, unemployment extinguished, and regular indemnities assured, these difficulties are believed to have grown out of original errors of judgment and policy respecting the amount of indemnity that Germany should pay.

The reception accorded the Balfour Note in America was quite unfavorable, and it gave those elements of our population and those political leaders with whom hatred of England is traditional a chance to express themselves with such political effectiveness as to create a deep impression abroad; and this and other reasons led to the sending of an English debt-funding commission. The businesslike approach of that mission was matched by entire frankness on the part of the American government. It was to our advantage that England should pay, but it was also to her own advantage if she wished to maintain her accustomed standard of credit. A friendly agreement was reached that provides for a long funding period.[1] During the next few decades we shall be in a position to test the strange theory that economic dislocation follows upon the payment of vast debts.

The following quotation supplies the best answer to those who see only disaster to American industries by the payment of European debts:

> We may safely conclude that those who have feared that the debts, whether reparation, inter-ally, or commercial, cannot be paid because the debtor countries will not have an export surplus, have been unnecessarily concerned. For, so long as the debtor countries have no export surplus, they will be in the market for new foreign loans, and the debts will be paid by the new loans. And, when, by the aid of

[1] Of the remaining countries of Europe that owe the United States, all have made funding arrangements except France and Russia. The French are paying annually but on no agreed basis, the Mellon-Bérenger agreement not having been ratified by the French Parliament. The scale of European debts and repayments is shown by the table in Appendix *B*.

the loans and other natural recuperative processes, those countries have built up their productivity and come to the point of being natural creditor nations, with export surpluses of their own, the debts will then be paid by means of export surpluses . . . if we do in the future decrease our exports and increase our imports it will be for reasons unrelated to the debts and connected solely with the matter of capital supply and demand, in circumstances which we in the past as a debtor nation and Europe in the present as a debtor continent have found to be thoroughly healthy and stimulating.

AULD, *The Prospect in Europe*, 1928.

EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A MERCHANT MARINE

The United States has taken a number of steps to establish an American merchant marine on a tonnage scale several times above that which was maintained before the war. Every effort has ended badly. We are not now a shipping nation; our people do not readily go to sea; the American sailor's standard of living is high and is fixed by law, not by open competition — these are some of the difficulties in the way.

Though it has been to our advantage to sell our wheat, maize, and pork in Europe, it was so much more to the advantage of Europeans to buy that we could wait for their ships instead of building our own on a scale corresponding to our commerce. It seems certain that this situation will not continue. In view of the European labor and shipbuilding conditions we shall have little to say regarding the prices at which our commodities are carried to foreign markets unless we build and subsidize a merchant marine corresponding to our growing interests overseas. The end of cheap land and the rapid growth of city industries and city populations actually compel us to take thought of the morrow or we shall be servants where now we are masters. The lower standard of living in European countries pushes many of their people out upon the sea, and the cheaper fare and pay of the common sailor helps lower the freight rates. Excluding bulk oil, which is shipped in specialized tankers, the tonnage of the imports of the United States is but a third of the exports. Since this means that cargo ships outbound must come back largely in ballast or light cargoes, it is chiefly the outbound freight that pays the cost of the voyage. One-way traffic in bulky exports cannot support a merchant marine. In these circumstances, why build more ships? This became clearer when, soon after the close of the World War, we found ourselves with more than 10 million tons of shipping registered for foreign trade instead of 735,000 tons as in 1914. The problem was not so much one of foreign trade as of what to do with accumulated shipping.

To better the situation an effort was made in 1922 to secure the passage of a ship-subsidy bill. Such a measure would have at least serious consideration in a maritime country like Holland or England, but it had no support from the American people, first because the population of the interior of the United States has no real understanding of the importance of seaborne trade, and second because the American people had been accustomed for twenty years, largely as a result of Roosevelt's initiative, jealously to watch any government action that seemed to favor large business corporations, as the ship subsidy would appear to do. By contrast, European life is so much more dependent than ours upon seaborne trade that the governments are accustomed to the giving of direct assistance to shipping interests, either in the form of construction or operation bounties or through postal subventions to fast passenger steamers. Congress declined to favor the ship-subsidy plan; and the development of our maritime trade was thrown back once more into the condition of open competition with the shipping of other powers. The great length of our coastline, the prosperity and size of our largest ports, and the magnitude of our ocean trade are all most impressive in comparative tables; but when taken in relation to the total of our domestic commerce and the size of our inland population, they are relatively small. This is the outstanding fact that underlies, if it does not determine, the views of the American people respecting a merchant marine.

SPECIFIC AMERICAN POINTS OF VIEW

The open-handed policy of the United States in the past with reference to the admission of aliens, many of whom returned to their native country better off for the economic opportunities that they found in America, and the generous scale of our assistance to suffering people in Europe, the Near East, and China, have deceived Europe as to the nature of the impulses upon which America seems to act. An altogether erroneous interpretation of American generosity was the chief cause underlying the European attitude toward the United States at the Peace Conference at Paris in 1919. In addition it was supposed that government and people were more intimately related than they really are. The policy of the American government at Paris appeared to Europeans to be dependable because American participation in world affairs has been the traditional attitude of the Republican party, and if such a program was being put forward by a Democratic administration it would seem naturally to command the overwhelming support to the American people.

The European view failed also to take into account how immense a foreign-born population resides here. At least a quarter of the American people have a European outlook. Out of twelve and one half millions eligible to citizenship among our foreign-born, five and one half millions have become naturalized. This does not mean that they have taken a fresh view of international problems and that this view is distinctively American in character. For the first time in our history this large mass of voters was called upon in 1920 to help decide American relationship to foreign issues that it but dimly understood and that it sought, as did most native-born Americans, to settle in large degree on a basis of pure partisanship. When we reflect further that the great mass of our people live distant from the seacoast and have no conception of world organizations that exist for trade, we realize that we have a domestic political situation whose reactions upon our foreign relations are as little predictable by American leaders as by Europeans.

It is clear that whatever degree of participation we may finally come to have in world affairs, it will be conditional in many respects and limited in all. The advice of George Washington, whether or not it is wisely applied at the present time, is still a widely held principle in our public life. No government will be supported that advocates intimate relationship with European problems, which are interpreted as quarrels. A quite realistic point of view should be maintained by foreign powers in their dealings with the United States; just as a realistic point of view is now dominating the sentiment of the United States with respect to foreign relations. It would not be constructive for the American government to embark upon any plan which public sentiment would not sustain.

Above all, our post-war difficulties reveal the inconsistencies of democratic government in international dealings. We cannot even steady our course by a referendum. The political machinery and the party programs are too complicated for that. An election issue is almost never clear-cut. The results of an election are therefore open to different interpretations. What the United States thinks of France or Germany and their conflicting policies no one knows. The ex-soldier has one point of view, the citizen of German birth, the exporter, the farmer, and the politically irreconcilable senator have other views — or none. Thus America finds itself in a continuing series of paradoxical situations.

American rejection of the treaties of 1919, the reservations to the treaties framed by the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, the unwillingness to subscribe to guarantees for France — all this recalls

not a little discussion, bound to be echoed again and again if we enter a European agreement in any degree whatever, respecting our peculiar views on treaties in general. In common with other democratic governments we are not infrequently charged with failure to keep our treaty obligations when new conditions arise. The late Sir Harry Johnston put the case plainly:

> Treaties, in fact, only bind the polity of the United States as long as they are convenient. They are not, really, worth the labour their negotiation entails or the paper they are written on. It is as well that this position should be realized, as it may save a great deal of fuss and disappointment in the future.[1]

His impatience no doubt springs from our determined attitude toward the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and the Panama Canal (page 663). But on this point it is the American view that no treaty should ever be signed that does not provide the machinery of revision. The future cannot be foreseen, and the indefinite maintenance of a fixed policy is nonsense when all the conditions that inspired it have become archaic. This to us seems axiomatic. Opinion is certainly tending more and more strongly in this direction. Moreover, when we revised the Clayton-Bulwer treaty at least it was by negotiation, not evasion or war; and that is the essential point.

The American people have seen their own land and life substantially change almost from decade to decade. In the geographical environment of North America there would have been no growth if the whole national and community thought had not been flexible. Through infinite social and political experiment there was maintained a wide public interest in the structure of life. As we faced new conditions, new arrangements of all sorts had to be made. The principle is embedded in our policies toward others. We ask that treaties should stand for the thing that is fair now. That procedure we believe to be sounder than adherence to the letter of an outworn document. In maintaining this view we have not rushed into war on every occasion. More than seventy times in our history, by referring our disputes to arbitration, we have given proof of an essentially fair attitude.

[1] *Common Sense in Foreign Policy*, 1913, page 89.

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(Acknowledgments and References)

CHAPTER I. MAJOR PROBLEMS

A HIGH quality of geographical writing is attained by two especially noteworthy series: *Géographie Universelle*, published (Paris) under the direction of P. VIDAL DE LA BLACHE and L. GALLOIS, a regional geography of the world consisting of 15 tomes divided into 22 volumes; and *Das Erdbild der Gegenwart* in 2 volumes (Leipzig, 1926) produced under the direction of WALTER GERBING. ALFRED HETTNER'S *Grundzüge der Länderkunde* is available in a recent (3d) edition, Vol. 1, 1925; Vol. 2, 1926 (Leipzig and Berlin). H. J. FLEURE, *Human Geography in Western Europe*, 2d ed. (London, 1919), JEAN BRUNHES, *Human Geography*, Engl. ed. (Chicago, 1920), and J. K. WRIGHT, *The Geographical Basis of European History* (New York, 1928), will be found valuable in supplying a geographic framework for European studies. W. Z. RIPLEY, *The Races of Europe* (New York, 1900), is a standard reference on the anthropology of European peoples, with a series of clear and valuable distributional maps.

An admirable brief statement of the origin and character of European peoples is found in H. J. FLEURE, *The Peoples of Europe* (London, 1922). LEON DOMINIAN, *The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe* (New York, 1917), and A. J. TOYNBEE, *Nationality and the War* (London, 1915), deal with ethnic and political problems; but they were written before the present boundaries were established. ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, *Traité comparatif des nationalités*, Vol. 1: *Les éléments extérieurs de la nationalité* (Paris, 1922). PAUL LANGHANS, "Sprachen und Religionen in Europa und die Grenzen zwischen west- und osteuropäischer Kultur," 1:10,000,000, *Petermanns Mitt.*, 1917, Pl. I, contains among other things a line showing the western limit of the distribution of the Greek Orthodox Church and the line of division between the Roman and the Cyrillic alphabets. ALFRED SÖDERLUND, editor, *Europe: Population Map*, 1:4,000,000 (Stockholm, 1926). SIR EDWARD HERTSLET, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, 4 vols., with maps (London, 1875 and 1891), contains the basic treaties and agreements for the period 1814 to 1891. RAMSAY MUIR, *The Expansion of Europe* (London, 1917), is philosophical in tendency. The *Cambridge Modern History*, 14 vols., incl. atlas (1902–1912), is a large standard work of importance to the student of history and political geography; it contains especially useful bibliographies, but its articles vary greatly in value. JEAN BRUNHES and CAMILLE VALLAUX: *La géographie de l'histoire: géographie de la paix et de la guerre sur terre et sur mer* (Paris, 1921). HALFORD J. MACKINDER, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York, 1919), is a striking philosophical essay by a distinguished English geographer; it puts into high relief two contrasting aspects of world conquest — routes and methods of warfare upon the land and upon the sea.

A. C. COOLIDGE, *Ten Years of War and Peace* (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), reviews the first decade after the World War. P. T. MOON, *Imperialism and World Politics* (New York, 1927). *A Political Handbook of the World* (Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1928), edited by M. W. DAVIS and W. H. MALLORY of the Council on Foreign Relations, presents annually a brief and extremely valuable statement of parliaments, parties, and press. In the *Geographical Review* for July, 1927 (pp. 511–513) there appeared a critical review of the following works: OTTO MAULL, *Politische Geographie* (Berlin, 1925); WALTHER VOGEL, *Politische Geographie* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1922); WALTHER VOGEL, *Das neue Europa und seine historisch-geographischen Grundlagen* (Bonn and Leipzig, 1923); RUDOLF REINHARD, *Weltwirtschaftlichen und politische Erdkunde* (Breslau, 1925); and in December, 1924, of ALEXANDER SUPAN, *Leitlinien der allgemeinen politischen Geographie: Naturlehre des Staates* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1922). "Rechtliche und tatsächliche Machtbereiche der Grossmächte nach dem Weltkriege," *Petermanns Mitt.*, Vol. 70, 1924. The principal value of the paper lies in the two large world maps (in color) showing, one the *de jure* realms of power in the

world and the other the *de facto* realms. Spheres of influence or of power are shown in a broad way, and insets give details, such as the free zone of Haute Savoie, the special régimes in the Zone of the Straits, Central America, and northern Morocco. As a synthetic expression of the distribution of force as exercised in the world the maps have undoubted value. They are left blank except so far as the five Great Powers are concerned: the United States, France, Great Britain, Russia, and Japan. Manfred Langhans-Ratzeburg, "Herrschaftsverteilung und Herrschaftsformen auf der Erde 1914 und 1927," 1:100,000,000, *Petermanns Mitt.*, Vol. 73, 1927, Pl. 14. Charles Seymour, *The Diplomatic Background of the War* (New Haven, 1916), has become a standard work in its field. C. H. Haskins and R. H. Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference* (Cambridge, 1920), is the best brief treatise on the historical bases of European territorial disputes that were affected by the peace treaties of 1919–1920. H. V. Temperley, editor, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (6 vols., London, 1920–1924), published under the auspices of the Institute of International Affairs, contains much documentary material bearing on the peace conference, together with interpretive chapters. The British Foreign Office has published as Peace Handbooks the material prepared for the British delegation at the Peace Conference of Paris. A series of handbooks has also been compiled by the Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division of the British Admiralty. The geographical commission of the French Service Géographique de l'Armée has published a valuable series of military handbooks on various parts of the world.

For many international problems the League of Nations publications are the standard works of reference. They are now so numerous that a guiding word as to their use seems essential. The *Treaty Series* contains the texts of all the treaties and international engagements registered with the League of Nations by the associated members. A wide range of population and production statistics are represented in the *International Statistical Yearbook* published by the League. A special group of publications on coal, shipbuilding, trade barriers, cotton, iron, steel, and agricultural problems in their international aspect, was published for use in 1927 at the International Economic Conference. There are also reports on special inquiries made by the League, as, for example, *Report on Economic Conditions in Russia with Special Reference to the Famine of 1921–1922 and the State of Agriculture.* The Information Section of the League Secretariat publishes a series of bulletins that are especially useful to the general reader who does not need the lengthy documented reports. Among them are pamphlets on the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Political Activities of the League, Reduction of Armaments, Financial Reconstruction of Austria, Communications and Transit, Mandates, Minorities, etc. In 1922 there was published a General Index to Treaty Series (1917–1921), known as *Treaty Series No. 14.* Part I deals with "Treaties Resulting from the War of 1914–1918." Part II is entitled "General Treaties." A valuable feature of this publication is an "Index of Countries and Subjects" published as Part III. The World Peace Foundation of Boston periodically brings up to date a useful pamphlet entitled *Publications Issued by the League of Nations;* and the *Annuaire de la Société des Nations 1920–1927*, published at Geneva, but not an official publication of the League, contains a summary of the League's activities. The Royal Institute of International Affairs publishes a comprehensive series of volumes, begun in 1920 with an annual volume entitled *Survey of International Affairs.* The text is thoroughly documented and broad in its point of view. The volumes take up international affairs where the sixth and final volume of the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris* left off. An annual *Survey of the Foreign Relations of the United States of America*, begun in 1928, is published by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. The purpose of the volume is not to give a connected account of practically all contemporaneous international problems, but rather to present an impartial statement on selected topics in which the United States has a primary interest.

Special note should be made of the *Report of the Agent General for Reparation Payments*, of the widest international interest because it presents a comprehensive view of German finances under the scheme of reparation payments and deliveries worked out in the Experts'

(Dawes) Plan. The best critical account of the bearing of the relation of the debt settlements to trade is in G. P. Auld, *The Prospect in Europe* (1928). An excellent summary of the purposes and probable results of the Economic Conference of October 1927, is given by Sir Arthur Salter in "The Economic Conference: Prospects of Practical Results," *Journ. Royal Institute of Internatl. Affairs*, Vol. 6, 1927, pp. 350–367. See also the Appendix of "Europe in 1927: An Economic Survey," *Annals Amer. Acad. of Polit. and Soc. Sci.*, Vol. 134, November, 1927. *Memorandum on Production and Trade*, League of Nations (Geneva, 1926). Comparisons are made between the world population (divided regionally) on the one hand and production and trade on the other between the years 1913 and 1925. *World Atlas of Commercial Geology, Part I, Distribution of Mineral Production*, by the United States Geological Survey (Washington, 1921), is a world survey (text and maps) of the chief commercial minerals; Part II (1921) similarly deals with *Water Power of the World*. Finch and Baker, *Geography of the World's Agriculture* (Washington, 1917), is a useful study of the sources of the world's supply of food and other agricultural products. F. Lange, *Landwirtschaftlich Statistischer Atlas* (Berlin, 1917), contains a valuable series of production maps. F. R. Eldridge, *Trading with Asia* (New York, 1921), is invaluable for economic material not only in the development of the Far East but in a study of present-day conditions. There are 9 appendixes (over 100 pages) that give statistics, treaty terms, and the like. The transactions of the World Power Conferences held in London, 1921, and Basel, 1926, contain many valuable articles. A. D. Brokaw, "Oil," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 6, 1927, pp. 89–105. Karl Krüger, *Erdöl* (Stuttgart, 1924). Fernand Maurette, "Le pétrole: Étude de géographie économique," *Ann. de Géogr.*, Vol. 35, 1926, pp. 1–26. "French Diplomacy and Petroleum," *European Econ. and Polit. Survey*, Vol. 3, 1928, pp. 384–391. G. G. Chisholm, *Handbook of Commercial Geography*, 11th ed., revised and edited by L. Dudley Stamp (London, 1928), is the best single reference in its field.

Albert Demangeon, *Le Declin de l'Europe* (Paris, 1920), pictures the changes in world trade that the World War caused; Engl. ed. (New York, 1921) entitled *America and the Race for World Dominion*. Karl Andree, *Geographie des Welthandels*, is a very satisfactory general treatment of its subject: there is a new edition edited by Franz Heiderich, Hermann Leiter, Robert Sieger, Vol. 1, *Europa* (1926); Vol. 2, *Die Aussereuropäischen Länder* (1927). Marcel Henry, "Le commerce international avant et après la guerre," *Bull. Statistique Gén. de la France*, Vol. 16, 1927, pp. 409–440. *General Transport Situation in 1921*, 2 vols., League of Nations (Geneva, 1922). *Verbatim Records and Texts relating to the Convention on the Régime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern and to the Declaration recognising the Right to a Flag of States Having no Sea-Coast*, League of Nations Barcelona Conference (Geneva, 1921). *Verbatim Reports and Texts relating to the Convention on Freedom of Transit*, League of Nations Barcelona Conference (Geneva, 1921). P. M. Ogilvie, *International Waterways: [Part] I, The Evolution of the Principle of International Waterways; [Part] II, A Reference-Manual to the Treaties, Conventions, Laws, and Other Fundamental Acts Governing the International Use of Inland Waterways* (New York, 1920). G. Kaeckenbeeck, *International Rivers: A Monograph Based on Diplomatic Documents* (London, 1918). J. P. Chamberlain, *The Régime of the International Rivers: Danube and Rhine* (New York, 1923). "The European Commission of the Danube," *Contemporary Rev.*, Vol. 132, 1927, pp. 789–792, contains a summary of the present problems confronting the European Commission of the Danube. *The Peace Treaty Provisions on the River Rhine versus International Interests of Industry and Commerce* (The Hague, 1919). E. S. Gregg, "The Influence of Geographic Factors on Ocean Shipping," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 12, 1922, pp. 424–430; a brief and clear discussion of the present shipping situation of the United States. "Migration Movements throughout the World in 1913, 1920, and 1921," *Internatl. Labour Rev.*, Vol. 7, 1923, pp. 515–540. "Migration movements 1920–1924," *Internatl. Labor Office Studies and Repts.*, Ser. O (Migration), No. 2, Geneva, 1926.

The mandatory powers responsible to the League of Nations for administration of former German colonies (and other territories held in trust) issue annual reports: those of

Great Britain are published by the Colonial Office and deal with Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Tanganyika Territory, the British Cameroons, and British Togoland. There are also reports by the Administrator of South-West Africa (published by the government of the Union of South Africa), by the Administrator of Western Samoa (published by the government of New Zealand), on New Guinea by the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia (published by the government of the Commonwealth of Australia), and a report on Nauru by the Parliament of the Government of Australia (published by the Commonwealth of Australia). On Ruanda-Urundi there is a report by the Belgian Minister of Colonies (published at Brussels); on French Cameroons and French Togoland, reports by the French Minister of Colonies (published at Paris); on Syria and Lebanon by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (published at Paris); and on the South Sea Islands a report prepared by the Japanese Government (likewise published at Paris). Freda White, *Mandates* (London, 1926). Hermann Detzner, "Die deutschen Kolonien unter Mandatsverwaltung während des ersten Jahrfünftes," *Mitt. aus den Deutschen Schutzgebieten*, Vol. 34, 1926–1927, pp. 129–145. Page 41 gives comparative tables showing the increase in value of various colonial and other products between 1913 and 1925 and the increase in the total trade of former German colonies in the same period. Alexander Supan, *Die territoriale Entwicklung der Europäischen Kolonien* (Justus Perthes, Gotha, 1906). A. G. Keller, *Colonization* (Boston, 1908). M. F. Lindley, *The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law* (London, etc., 1926). P. C. Jessup, *The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction* (New York, 1927). D. H. Miller, "Political Rights in the Arctic," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 4, 1925, pp. 47–60; accompanied by map. For a comparative statistical table showing the burden of taxation in relation to national income in various countries see p. 40, "Europe in 1927: An Economic Survey," *Annals Amer. Acad. of Polit. and Soc. Sci.*, Vol. 134, 1927. "Comparative Tables of Armaments (National Appropriations for All Armed Forces)," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 4, 1925, pp. 158–159. L. P. Mair: *The Protection of Minorities: The Working and Scope of the Minorities Treaties under the League of Nations* (London, 1928). Sarah Wambaugh, *A Monograph on Plebiscites*, with a collection of official documents (New York, 1920). E. A. Freeman, *Historical Geography of Europe*, 2 vols., incl. atlas, 3d ed. (London, 1903), is a classic on the history of political boundaries. Sir Thomas H. Holdich, *Boundaries in Europe and the Near East* (London, 1918), with the same author's *Political Frontiers and Boundary Making* (London, 1916), upholds the idea of the value of barriers as boundaries. L. W. Lyde, *Some Frontiers of Tomorrow: An Aspiration for Europe* (London, 1915), presents the argument for assimilative rather than defensive frontiers. C. B. Fawcett, *Frontiers: A Study in Political Geography* (Oxford, 1918).

The following volumes appear annually and will frequently be found useful: *The Statesman's Year-Book*, especially valuable for its statistical material and its bibliographies; *The New International Year Book*, an annual supplement to the *New International Encyclopedia; Annuaire Général; World Almanac*. For agricultural statistics the *International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics* is the standard authority. For the latest statistics in the production and consumption of mineral products consult the current publications of the U. S. Bureau of Mines. The statistical tables are in almost all cases comparative so that the trends of a given mineral industry may be noted. For a similar series of publications written from the British point of view, consult *The Mineral Industry of the British Empire and Foreign Countries, Statistical Summary*, published yearly by the Imperial Institute, London. The *Commerce Yearbook*, Vol. 2 (U. S. Dept. of Commerce), supplies a panorama of the world's commerce through comparative tables, text, and maps. For most of the countries of western civilization and their colonial possessions official statistical annuals are available. Some of the official yearbooks, as for instance those issued by the governments of South Africa and Australia, with their maps, graphs, and special articles are particularly valuable geographically. *Europe* (an illustrated yearbook of Europe), the *Indian Year Book*, the *China Year Book*, the *Near East Year Book* (treating of affairs in

Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey) are examples of unofficial annuals useful for reference. The annual volume of the *Bibliographie Géographique* published by the Association de Géographes Français in collaboration with the American Geographical Society, the Comitato Geografico Nazionale Italiano, the Royal Geographical Society, and the Société Royale de Géographie d'Égypte and with the coöperation of the Fédération des Sociétés Françaises de Sciences Naturelles under the direction of Elicio Colin is a critical and carefully selected bibliography of geographical literature that appears during the year preceding that of publication.

Among geographical periodicals a number publish valuable articles in the field of political geography and are indispensable to the scholar. *The Geographical Review*, published by the American Geographical Society of New York, includes notes and reviews on current publications dealing with boundaries, new maps, national resources, waterways, ports, economic regions and their relationships, population problems, and the like. Similar subjects are treated in *Annales de Géographie* (Armand Colin, Paris) and *Petermanns Mitteilungen* (Justus Perthes, Gotha). The *Geographical Journal* of the Royal Geographical Society, London, has special opportunities for the acquisition of material on regions of interest in the study of British colonial and foreign policy. The best American publication in the field of international relations is *Foreign Affairs* (Council on Foreign Relations, New York): while most of the articles deal with problems of interest to America, they represent a wide range of international questions; each issue has several maps, notes on minor problems, a list of recent books, and a section entitled "Source Material." *Economic Geography* (Worcester, Mass.) publishes articles of an economic and commercial nature. Articles and notes on economic and political geography appear occasionally in *The American Economic Review; The American Historical Review; The American Journal of International Law; The American Political Science Review; Political Science Quarterly* (issues an annual record of political events); *The Economic Review* (review of the foreign press); *The African World; L'Afrique Française; L'Asie Française; The Near East and India; The Round Table* (devoted chiefly to the British Empire and its problems); *The Contemporary Review; Current History Magazine* (published by the New York *Times*). The Foreign Policy Association, New York, has a biweekly *Information Service* which includes topical pamphlets of good quality containing a certain amount of documentary material and a list of references. The *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* (Berlin) naturally looks upon the present situation from the German point of view. Valuable material will sometimes be found in the *United States Commerce Reports*, in the Reports of the Department of Overseas Trade, and in the annual *Colonial Reports* of the British colonies. The United States Department of Commerce *Trade Promotion Series* contains numbers on such subjects as "International Trade in Wheat and Wheat Flour," "Railways of Mexico," "Rubber Production in Africa."

The post-war editions of standard atlases present new boundaries and recent statistical material. In addition to the well-known atlases, such as those of Stieler, Andree, Bartholomew, and the *Times*, there have recently appeared: *Atlas Universel de Géographie* (Paris, 1923), *Nordisk Varlds Atlas* (Stockholm, 1926), and *The Chambers of Commerce Atlas* (London, 1925). *Grande Atlante Geografico* (Novara, 1927), is a publication of the Istituto Geografico de Agostini; it contains, in addition to each continental group of maps, a valuable series of industrial and commercial maps with descriptive text. Philips' *Mercantile Marine Atlas of the World* (London, 1926) has as distinctive features: harbor plans, shipping routes, and ports, with distances between them. The latter is worked out on a scale that makes the atlas unique. *Welthandels-Atlas* (Berlin) deals with the commodities of trade and routes of transport in a graphic manner and in addition supplies a general bibliography as well as a special list of references relating to each commodity.

CHAPTER II. BRITISH EMPIRE

The Oxford Survey of the British Empire, edited by A. J. Herbertson and O. J. R. Howarth, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1914), is the best general survey of the empire and its parts. In addition there may be noted a series of volumes edited by Sir Charles Lucas under the title, *A Historical Geography of the British Colonies* (Oxford, 1887–). Among shorter treatments of the same subject are the following: Lionel Curtis, *The Commonwealth of Nations* (London, 1918); its subtitle, "an inquiry into the nature of citizenship in the British Empire, and into the mutual relations of the several communities thereof," explains its purpose; admirable in treatment are its maps and diagrams (some in color), which attempt a critical display of distributions and areas by comparative values. Alfred Zimmern, *The Third British Empire* (London, 1926). Albert Demangeon, *L'Empire britannique: Étude de géographie coloniale* (Paris, 1923); Engl. transl. by E. F. Row, *The British Empire: A Study in Colonial Geography* (London and New York, 1925). Erich Obst, *England, Europa, und die Welt* (Berlin, 1927). A. F. Pollard, *The British Empire: Its Past, Its Present, and Its Future* (London, 1909). W. H. Woodward, *The Expansion of the British Empire, 1500–1911* (Cambridge, 1911). On the government of England, see the standard work on that subject, *The Government of England*, 2 vols. (New York, 1912), by A. Lawrence Lowell. A. B. Keith, *Responsible Government in the Dominions*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1912), has a detailed and well-documented account of dominion government. G. V. Fiddes, *The Dominions and Colonial Offices* (London, 1926). For an authoritative survey of the natural resources, trade, and food and raw material requirements of the British dominions, see the *Final Report of the Dominions Royal Commission* (London, 1918). Evans Lewin, "The Resources of the Empire," in *The British Empire: A Survey in Twelve Volumes* (General Editor, Hugh Gunn) (London, 1924). The Imperial Institute publishes a series of *Monographs on Mineral Resources with Special Reference to the British Empire*. The *Bulletin of the Imperial Institute* has many articles on empire commodities. H. Stanley Jevons' monograph on *The British Coal Trade* (London, 1915) is excellent; it contains a chapter on the world's coal resources. A. J. Sargent, *Seaways of the Empire* (London, 1918), gives a clear picture of the geography of transport between the various parts of the great British trade realm; it contains good semi-diagrammatic maps. *The Approach towards a System of Imperial Air Communications*, Air Ministry (London, 1926) has maps in color showing existing and proposed imperial air routes, wind and weather conditions, meteorological stations; separate maps show French, German, American, Russian, and miscellaneous existing and proposed routes. Sir Charles Close, "Population and Migration: A Statistical Study with Special Reference to the English-speaking Peoples," *Geography*, Vol. 14, 1927, pp. 1–24.

Albert Demangeon, *Les Iles Britanniques* (Paris, 1927) and Halford J. Mackinder, *Britain and the British Seas* (Oxford, 1906), are geographical treatments of the British Isles. J. P. Howell, *An Agricultural Atlas of England and Wales* (Southampton, 1925) contains a valuable series of dot maps. B. C. Wallis, "Central England during the Nineteenth Century: The Break-down of Industrial Isolation," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 3, 1917, pp. 28–52, has population density maps for 1801, 1851, and 1901 and a map showing the changes in the distribution of population during the 19th century. R. E. Prothero, *English Farming: Past and Present* (London, 1912). Chapter 14, pp. 290 et seq., "The Rural Population, 1780 to 1813," and successive chapters, outline the conditions of life in rural England during the past century, the cause of agricultural depression, and the state of agriculture. There are valuable appendixes giving a list of early writers on agriculture, statistics of agricultural production, etc. *Report on the Decline in the Agricultural Population of Great Britain, 1881–1906*, Board of Agriculture and Fisheries (London, 1906) includes a colored map showing the agricultural deficiencies that are the subject of study and graphs showing changes in arable land, laborers, cattle, and sheep. J. R. McCulloch, *Statistical Account of the British Empire*, Vol. I (London, 1837) is particularly valuable because it gives a detailed con-

temporary description of processes that were in time to run their course to the detriment of English agriculture. Warren S. Thompson, "Britain's Population Problem as Seen by an American," *Econ. Journ.*, June, 1926, pp. 177–191, is a significant article which concludes that Britain is over-populated and that the development of her agriculture is a prime necessity for relief. Mark Jefferson, "The Distribution of British Cities, and the Empire," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 4, 1917, pp. 387–394. Ernest Barker, *Ireland in the Last Fifty Years* (1866–1918), 2d ed. (Oxford, 1919), is a short but illuminating and rational survey of the Irish problem. Sir Horace Plunkett, *Ireland in the New Century* (London, 1904), is an indispensable reference written by a scholar with practical experience in Irish affairs. W. O'C. Morris, *Ireland: 1494–1905*, in Cambridge Historical Series, 2d ed. (1909), is a review of the entire Irish question. Y. M. Goblet, "La Frontière de l'Ulster," *Ann. de Géogr.*, Vol. 31, 1922, pp. 402–416. A statement is made, accompanied by three maps and statistical material, concerning Catholic population as a whole and certain election and trade statistics. "The Irish Boundary Question," *Round Table*, September, 1924, pp. 767–783, discusses difficulties that involve the boundary question. *Ulster Year Book 1926* (Belfast, 1926).

George Bryce, *A Short History of the Canadian People* (New York, 1914) has as Appendix A, "The Constitution of Canada: Provisions of the British North America Act," which provided for a union of the four eastern provinces and the building of an intercolonial railway to connect Halifax and the St. Lawrence River. A. Siegfried, *Le Canada: Les deux races*, 2d ed. (Paris, 1907). G. M. Wrong, *The Two Races in Canada* (1923), a lecture before the Canadian Historical Association. W. A. Mackintosh, "The Laurentian Plateau in Canadian Economic Development," *Econ. Geogr.*, Vol. 2, 1926, pp. 537–550. Helge Nelson, "The Interior Colonization in Canada at the Present Day and its Natural Conditions," *Geografiska Annaler*, Vol. 5, 1923, pp. 214–308. H. P. Desjardins, "Land Settlement in Canada," *Internatl. Rev. of Agric. Economics*, Jan.–Mar. 1926, pp. 3–19. Sir Henry Rew, *Economics Resources of Canada* (1925). *Canada and Its Provinces* (Toronto, 1914), Vol. 8. *North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration:* (1) *Appendix to the Case of the United States before the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague*, Vol. II (Washington, 1909), pp. 708–723. (2) *The Counter Case of the United States before the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague* (Washington, 1910), pp. 3–17; this outlines the shore treaties with the French, and it was the treatment of the French by the British under these treaties which was made the basis of American claims in the Newfoundland fisheries dispute. Sir P. T. McGrath, "The Labrador Boundary Decision," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 17, 1927, pp. 643–660. Sir Robert Falconer, *The United States as a Neighbour from a Canadian Point of View* (Cambridge, 1925), is one of the best general works on the subject. "American Economic Penetration of Canada," *Canadian Hist. Rev.*, Vol. 8, 1927, pp. 31–40. L. I. Dublin, *Population Problems in the United States and Canada* (Boston and New York, 1926). *Report of the West Indian Conference* (London, 1926). Raye R. Platt, "A Note on Political Sovereignty and Administration in the Caribbean," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 16, 1926, pp. 623–637, shows the division of the West Indian Islands among the several sovereignties. Report of the British Guiana Commission, 1927 (Cmd. 2811); and the reply by the Elected Members of the Combined Court of British Guiana, 1928 (Cmd. 3017).

Lionel Curtis, "South Africa since the Union," *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1927, pp. 253–263, provides an excellent brief treatment of the South African problem. W. H. Dawson, *South Africa: People, Places, and Problems* (London, 1925). Among the interesting maps in *Third Census of the Population of the Union of South Africa, Enumerated 3rd May, 1921: Report with summaries and analysis of the detailed tables, Parts I to IX* (Pretoria, 1921), are maps showing the distribution of the Bantu population, the distribution of the non-European population excluding Bantu, the European population, and increase or decrease of European population from 1911 to 1921. *Fourth Census of the Population of the Union of South Africa Enumerated 4th May, 1926*, Part I: Population, Number, Sex, and Geographical Distribution of the European Population; Part II: Ages of the European

Population (Pretoria, 1927). The Office of Census and Statistics of the Union of South Africa issues a *Special Report Series* annually including statistics of migration. W. M. Macmillan, *The South African Agrarian Problem and Its Historical Development* (Johannesburg, 1919) is a fundamental paper. "The Indian Question in South Africa and the Round Table Conference," *Asiatic Rev.*, April, 1927, pp. 177–190. Lord Olivier, *The Anatomy of African Misery* (London, 1927): the elements of the racial problem of South Africa clearly presented. R. A. Lehfeldt, *The National Resources of South Africa* (Johannesburg, London, 1922). *Union of South Africa: Final Report of the Drought Investigation Commission, October, 1923* (Cape Town, 1923), is an illuminating report with a most interesting series of maps showing areas of decreasing white population, white emigration and immigration, water supply (boreholes, etc.), run-off and rainfall, agricultural and pastoral use of the land. A. C. Jennings, "Irrigation and Water Supplies in Southern Rhodesia," *South African Journ. of Sci.*, Vol. 24, 1927, pp. 21–36, is accompanied by a map showing existing and potential irrigable areas and water power sites.

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CHAPTER III. THE MOHAMMEDAN WORLD

The standard reference is now *Annuaire du Monde Musulman.* This publication has been appearing since 1923 and gives bibliographical references to all of the publications bearing on Mohammedan countries. See also the issues of the *Revue des Études Islamiques*, formerly published under the title *Revue du Monde Musulman. Revue du Monde Musulman*, "Le Domaine de l'Islam," Vol. 55 (1923), contains a great many maps showing distribution of Mohammedans, especially in Africa and Asia. Sir T. W. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, Oxford, 1924. On the Moslem confraternities see G. F. Andrews, "Islam and the Confraternities in French North Africa," *Geogr. Journ.*, Vol. 47, 1916, pp. 116–130, and the titles listed in the accompanying bibliography. C. A. Willis, "Religious Confraternities of the Sudan," *Sudan Notes and Records*, Vol. 4, 1921, pp. 175–194. E. F. Gautier, *L'Islamisation de l'Afrique du Nord: Les Siècles obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris, 1927) has a geographical reconstruction of North African history. The new treaties between the Nejd on the one hand and the Transjordan and Iraq authorities affect the tribes of the Syrian desert and the wells and pastures important to them in their migrations: the boundary zones and the tribes therein are fully described in a new work by Alois Musil on the Northern Neğd, *American Geographical Society Oriental Explorations and Studies No. 5*, 1928.

CHAPTER IV. FRANCE

G. Hanotaux, editor, *Histoire de la Nation Française*, to be completed in 15 volumes, has been announced, and two volumes by Jean Brunhes on the human geography of France have appeared: Vol. 1 (1921) is general and regional; Vol. 2 (1926) is political, economic, and social. Vidal de la Blache, *La France* (Paris, 1908), is the standard work on the regional geography of France. Onésime Reclus, *Atlas de la Plus Grande France* (Paris, 1913–1915), includes maps of the various French departments and colonies, together with descriptive and interpretive text. Raymond Poincaré, *How France Is Governed* (New York, 1914), contains a description of French political institutions and a history of France since the Franco-Prussian War. Harold G. Moulton and Cleona Lewis, *The French Debt Problem* (New York, 1926), analyzes broadly the present economic condition of France: a fundamental reference in the study of post-war France. The introduction to "The Psychology of French Political Parties" by André Siegfried, in *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (Vol. 7, 1928, pp. 12–28), explains with admirable clearness why foreigners find it difficult to understand French politics. The startling effect of the French tariffs upon certain French colonies and the exclusive French colonial policy is given

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407–433. Augustin Bernard, "Recensement de 1926 dans l'Afrique du Nord," *Ann. de Géogr.*, Vol. 36, 1927, pp. 136–142. *Algérie: Carte administrative des Territoires du Sud*, 1:3,500,000, Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie (Algiers, 1927). *Les Territoires du Sud de L'Algérie: Exposé de leur situation*, Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie (Algiers, 1922): accompanied by hypsometric and geologic maps in color as well as a series on rainfall, wind direction, and relief of selected areas. Augustin Bernard and R. de Flotte de Roquevaire, *Atlas d'Algérie et de Tunisie*, Direction de l'Agriculture, du Commerce et de la Colonisation Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie (Algiers, Paris): geologic, hypsometric, climatic, vegetational maps, 1923–1926. Alfred de Tarde, "The Work of France in Morocco," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 8, 1919, pp. 1–30. See also pp. 56–58 of the last-named volume for a note on the progress of French occupation. Georges Hardy and Jean Célérier: *Les grandes lignes de la géographie du Maroc* (Paris, 1922). Henri Le Pointe, *La colonisation française au pays des Somalis* (Paris, 1917?), explains the value of Somaliland's position on the Red Sea and as a point of exit for the Abyssinian hinterland. "Le trafic des chemins de fer et les previsions budgétaires de 1928," *L'Afrique Française*, February, 1928, pp. 73–78, gives the tonnage of merchandise and its value from 1913 to 1926 in French West Africa, together with a railway map. M. Abadie, *La Colonie du Niger* (Paris, 1927) is an excellent monograph on the "Benjamin" of the French colonies. A French statement of the present situation and problems of Madagascar is found in Guillaume Grandidier, "Madagascar," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 10, 1920, pp. 197–222.

CHAPTER V. BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS

Most admirable and thorough of all modern publications on Belgium and the Netherlands is a beautifully executed and extremely well illustrated work by Albert Demangeon entitled *Belgique, Pays-Bas, Luxembourg* (Tome 2, *Géographie Universelle*, Paris, 1927). Raoul Blanchard, *La Flandre* (Paris, 1906), is a regional geographical study of the Flemish plain in France, Belgium, and Holland. V. Bierkens, "Le port d'Anvers: Son avenir, son importance économique pour la Suisse," *Bull. Soc. Neuchâteloise de Géogr.*, Vol. 28, 1919, pp. 5–208, describes the port and its relations to Swiss trade. Aug. Vermeylen, *Quelques aspects de la question des langues en Belgique* (Brussels, 1919). Particularly valuable in a study of Limburg and the Scheldt is C. H. Haskins and R. H. Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference* (Cambridge, 1920), pp. 62–66. A. B. Keith, *The Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act* (London, 1919), is a historical study. "La politique économique au Congo belge," *Rapport au Comité permanent du Congrès colonial*, 1924. For current information regarding railroads, minerals, and political conditions, consult recent numbers of *CONGO et Bulletin de la Société Belge d'Études Coloniales*, published at Brussels. Similar information may be found in *Bulletin Agricole du Congo Belge* (Brussels). The standard statistical source is *Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique et du Congo Belge* (Brussels). M. Warthin, "Transportation Developments in Central Africa," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 18, 1928, pp. 307–309.

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CHAPTERS VI, VII. SPAIN, PORTUGAL

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CHAPTER VIII. ITALY

Count Antonio Cippico, *Italy: The Central Problem of the Mediterranean*, Institute of Politics (New Haven, 1926), takes up modern Italy from the Fascist standpoint, discusses national rivalries and the place of Italy in the Mediterranean realm. Dale Yoder, "The

Real Revolution in Italy," *Amer. Journ. of Sociology*, January 1928, pp. 586–598. E. M. Jamison, C. M. Ady, K. D. Vernon, C. S. Terry, *Italy, Mediæval and Modern* (Oxford, 1917), is a convenient presentation of the essential facts of Italian history. C. E. McGuire, *Italy's International Economic Position* (New York, 1927), contains two maps showing the population distribution and the geographical distribution of Italian agriculture and industry and an excellent economic statement concerning present-day Italy. G. Mortara, *Prospettive Economiche:* a useful Italian annual. W. O. Blanchard, "White Coal in Italian Industry," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 18, 1928, pp. 261–273. R. F. Foerster, *The Italian Emigration of Our Times* (Cambridge, 1919). See pp. 214–215 for Italian immigration in Tunis, a French possession, which has given rise to the saying that Tunis is an Italian colony guarded by French soldiers. Olinto Marinelli, "The Regions of Mixed Populations in Northern Italy," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 7, 1919, pp. 129–148, deals with the mixed language zones on Italy's frontier, in former Austria, in Switzerland and France. It represents the Italian scientific viewpoint and is conservative in form. Cesare Battisti, *Il Trentino*, 2d ed (Novara, 1917), contains 19 maps, and outlines the Italian claims in the Tirol. For a German view of the unity of the Tirol as opposed to the Italian claim that the Brenner divide is a natural wall, see Johann Sölch, *Sociological Rev.*, Vol. 19, 1927, pp. 318–334. Edward Corsi, "The Dying City of Fiume," *Current History*, March, 1923, pp. 975–979. Attilio Brunialti, *Trento e Trieste dal Brennero alle Rive dell' Adriatico* (Turin, 1916), is profusely illustrated, has many maps, and covers all the Italian claims from the Trentino to Dalmatia. Attilio Tamaro, *La Vénétie Julienne et la Dalmatie: Histoire de la nation italienne sur ses frontières orientales*, 3 vols. (Rome, 1918), is the most comprehensive work on the subject, with abundant references to sources, and, although Italian in point of view, it is a basic reference. (See also references under Yugoslavia on the subject of Italy's claims in Istria and Dalmatia.) G. Bevione, *L'Asie Minore e l'Italia* (Turin, 1914), sets forth the Italian view of the Turkish situation and the claims of Italy, especially in the Adalia region.

Aldobrandino Malvezzi, "Italian Colonies and Colonial Policy," *Journ. Royal Institute of Internatl. Affairs*, Vol. 6, 1927, pp. 233–245. For a brief documented note on Italian colonization in Africa, see "Les Italiens en Afrique (Somalie et Cyrénaïque)," *Ann. de Géogr.*, Vol. 35, 1926, pp. 177–179. A geographical description, with maps, photographs, and statistical tables, is found in H. W. Ahlmann, "La Libye Septentrionale," *Geografiska Annaler*, 1928, No. 1–2. Olinto Marinelli, edit., *La Cirenaica: Geografica-economia-politica* (Milan, 1923). Guiseppe Stefanini, *I possedimenti Italiani in Africa (Libia, Eritrea, Somalia)* (Florence, 1923), is a compact little study. *Annuario delle Colonie Italiane*, first published in 1926.

CHAPTER IX. THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

Norden. 1 : 1,500,000, in 2 sheets, with Swedish text, Lithographic Division of the General Staff (Stockholm, 1926). An excellent map: among other features shown is the cultivated land. For a summary presentation of the history of the Scandinavian countries see R. N. Bain, *Scandinavia: A Political History of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, 1515–1900* (Cambridge, 1905). Paul Drachmann, *The Industrial Development and Commercial Policies of the Three Scandinavian Countries* (Oxford, 1915). Gustav Braun, *Die nordischen Staaten: Norwegen, Schweden, Finnland: Eine soziologische Länderkunde* (Breslau, 1924). J. Guinchard, editor, *Sweden: Historical and Statistical Handbook*, 2d ed., 2 vols. (Stockholm, 1914), is issued under the direction of the government; it contains excellent articles on the present life of Sweden and is well illustrated with photographs and maps. Sten De Geer, *Befolkingens Fördelning i Sverige* (Stockholm, 1919), is accompanied by a large map (1 : 500,000) showing by a dot and spherical symbol method the exact distribution of population, as well as the distribution of forests, industrial enterprises, etc., — a model treatment. See also "A Map of the Distribution of Population in Sweden: Method of

Preparation and General Results," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 12, 1922, pp. 72–83. A group of papers on Sweden's natural resources, Swedish industry, and living conditions is found in *Industry in Sweden*, published by the Federation of Swedish Industries, Stockholm (Upsala, 1927). Gunnar Andersson, "Den Svenska Industriens Geografi," *Ymer*, Vol. 46, 1926, pp. 229–282, is an excellent statement of the relation of population distribution to raw materials, transport routes, etc. The export of industrial products from Sweden is graphically portrayed in a map, p. 275. Carl Julius Anrick, *Area under Cultivation in Sweden*, in agreement with the official publications 1913–1920 of the Swedish Central Bureau of Statistics, scale 1:1,000,000 (Stockholm, 1921). K. B. Wiklund, "The Lapps in Sweden," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 13, 1923, pp. 223–242.

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C. E. Hill, *The Danish Sound Dues and the Command of the Baltic* (Durham, N. C., 1926), traces the origin of the sound dues and the effect upon the policy of Denmark and its neighbors and how their sound dues were at last redeemed. H. Rider Haggard, *Rural Denmark and Its Lessons* (New York, 1913). F. C. Howe, *Denmark: A Coöperative Commonwealth* (New York, 1921). H. L. Westergaard, *Economic Development in Denmark before and during the World War* (London and New York, 1922). Earl Hanson, "The Renaissance of Iceland," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 18, 1928, pp. 41–61. Knut Gjerset, "Danish-Icelandic Act of Union," *History of Iceland* (New York, 1924), pp. 449–451. *Greenland*, Vol. 1: The Discovery of Greenland, Exploration, and Nature of the Country (Copenhagen and London, 1928): first volume of a three volume work published by the Commission for the Direction of the Geological and Geographical Investigations in Greenland.

CHAPTER X. GERMANY

Joseph Partsch, *Central Europe* (New York, 1903), is a scientific geographical survey of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Friedrich Naumann, *Central Europe*, trans. by C. M. Meredith (London, 1916), deals with the political and economic phases of the German imperial project from the German point of view and was especially influential during the war period. J. A. R. Marriott and C. G. Robertson, *The Evolution of Prussia: The Making of an Empire* (Oxford, 1917), traces the growth of the German Empire. Gustav Braun, *Deutschland* (Berlin, 1916), is a good modern geography. A portfolio of maps provides the essential facts of the physical environment. There is a 2d edition of Vol. 1, *Norddeutschland*, 1926. For a good brief description of the Hanseatic League in the broader relations of its members to the other commercial centers of Europe see pp. 178–192 of M. V. Clarke, *The Medieval City State* (London, 1926), and for a geographical statement E. C. Semple, "The Development of the Hanse Towns in Relation to Their Geographical Environment," *Bull. Amer. Geogr. Soc.*, Vol. 31, 1899, pp. 236–255. A valuable study of German ports, giving the condition of German trade in 1913, is contained in a recent paper by F. Christiansen, "Die Stellung Stettins im Handel der deutschen Seehäfen," *Erde und Wirtschaft*, No. 3–4, January, 1928, pp. 115–141. The maps and graphs represent not only the conditions at Stettin but also

those of the other ports of Germany, and summarize shipping conditions in Europe also. W. S. Tower, "The New Steel Cartel," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 5, 1927, pp. 249–266. *Grosser Luftverkehrs-Atlas von Europa* is a publication of the German Luft Hansa (1927) containing 40 special maps on a large scale and 150 air port maps on the scale of 1 : 75,000. Erwin Scheu, *Deutschlands wirtschaftsgeographische Harmonie* (Breslau, 1924). E. J. Clapp, *The Navigable Rhine* (Boston and New York, 1911). Jacques Levainville, "The Economic Function of the Rhine," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 14, 1924, pp. 242–256. Anton Felix Napp-Zinn, *Rheinschiffahrt, 1913–1925: Ihre wirtschaftliche Entwicklung unter dem Einfluss von Weltkrieg und Kriegsfolgen* (Berlin, 1925): while nationalist in temper the paper has a large quantity of valuable statistical material. "Zur Geographie der Rheinlande," *Düsseldorfer Geogr. Vorträge und Erörterungen*, Part II, 1927. [Rhineland.] F. J. Rohr, "Home Colonization in Germany," *Internatl. Rev. of Agric. Economics*, Vol. 3, 1925, pp. 28–72, is a historical review of German colonization methods and its effect in the redistribution of population within Germany; provides an excellent background for the study of problems of land and population today and has a useful bibliography of publications from 1887 to 1923. Jean Brunhes and Camille Vallaux, "German Colonization in Eastern Europe," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 6, 1918, pp. 465–480, contains valuable historical and statistical information. L. Gallois, "La Paix de Versailles: Les nouvelles frontières de l'Allemagne," *Ann. de Géogr.*, Vol. 28, 1919, pp. 241–248. Joseph Partsch, *Schlesien, Eine Landeskunde für das deutsche Volk*, 2 vols. (Breslau, 1896), though now somewhat out of date, is still one of the best regional studies in the field of modern geography. *The Problem of Upper Silesia*, with 5 maps, edited by Sidney Osborne (London, 1921). On Upper Silesia see also references under Poland.

Das Deutsche Kolonialreich, 2 vols. (Leipzig and Vienna, 1909), by Hans Meyers and others, is the standard reference on former German colonies; it is elaborately illustrated with photographs and colored maps. On the same subject see Evans Lewin, *The Germans and Africa* (New York, 1915), and William Eveleigh, *Southwest Africa* (London, 1915); the latter discusses the suitability of the colony for white settlement. On Germany's former colonies in the Pacific see William Churchill, "Germany's Lost Pacific Empire," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 10, 1920, pp. 84–90.

CHAPTER XI. SWITZERLAND

Dictionnaire Géographique de la Suisse, 6 vols. and atlas (Neuchâtel, 1902–1910), published under the auspices of La Société Neuchâteloise de Géographie, is the standard treatment of the subject. *Atlas Graphique et Statistique de la Suisse* (Berne, 1914), is published by the Bureau of Statistics of the Swiss Department of the Interior, and contains a series of beautifully printed and authoritative maps. Otto Flückiger, edit., *Die Schweiz aus der Vogelschau* (München and Leipzig, 1924): aerial photographs by Walter Mittelholzer. R. C. Brooks, *Government and Politics of Switzerland* (Yonkers, N.Y., 1918), is a systematic treatment of its subject. Hugh Gibson, "Switzerland's Position in Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1925, pp. 72–84. Herman Weilenmann, *Die vielsprachige Schweiz; Eine Lösung des Nationalitätenproblems* (Basel and Leipzig, 1925). Julius Weyler, "Das Übervölkerungsproblem der Schweiz," *Zeitsch. für Schweizerische Statistik und Volkswirtschaft*, Vol. 59, 1923, pp. 3–39. Hektor Ammann, *Die Italiener in der Schweiz* (Basel, 1917), studies the problems arising from the increase of Italian population in Switzerland. Henri Hauser, "La position géographique de la Suisse: Étude de géographie politique," *Ann. de Géogr.*, Vol. 25, 1916, pp. 413–428, deals with Switzerland's relations to Europe's navigable waterways.

CHAPTERS XII, XIII, XIV. AUSTRIA, HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Die Osterreichisch-Ungarnische Monarchie in Wort und Bild, 24 vols. (Vienna, 1886–1902), contains a detailed survey of the former empire by provinces. The following contain

studies of the national and other problems of Austria before the World War: Virginio Gayda, *Modern Austria: Her Racial and Social Problems* (London, 1915); B. C. Wallis, "The Peoples of Austria," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 6, 1918, pp. 52–65. A. F. Pribram, *Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary 1879–1914* (New York, 1920): Volume I contains the texts of the various treaties that cemented the Triple Alliance; the second volume narrates the course of the negotiations leading up to each of the treaties. E. de Martonne, "Le traité de Saint-Germain et le démembrement de l'Autriche," *Ann. de Géogr.*, Vol. 29, 1920, pp. 1–11, pictures the present situation. Roland L'Estrange Bryce, "The Klagenfurt Plebiscite," *Geogr. Journ.*, Vol. 60, 1922, pp. 112–125. *Statistisches Handbuch für die Republik Österreich* (Vienna). "The Coal Resources of Austria," *Transactions of the First World Power Conference*, London, June 30 to July 12, 1924, Vol. 1, pp. 679–683. "Development and Utilisation of Water Power in Austria," *Transactions of the First World Power Conference, London*, June 30 to July 12, 1924, Vol. I, pp. 684–705: accompanying map shows, on the scale of 27 miles to the inch, the detailed distribution of water-power plants in Austria. Norbert Krebs, *Die Ostalpen und das heutige Österreich*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1928).

L. Eisenmann, "La Nouvelle Hongrie," *Ann. de Géogr.*, Vol. 29, 1920, pp. 321–333, discusses Hungary within its new boundaries; valuable especially for its statistical material and its outline of geographical conditions. Paul Teleki, *The Evolution of Hungary and Its Place in European History* (New York, 1923). B. C. Wallis, "The Peoples of Hungary," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 4, 1917, pp. 465–481; and by the same author, "Central Hungary: Magyars and Germans," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 6, 1918, pp. 421–435. *Magyarország Gazdasági Térképekben* (The Economics of Hungary in Maps), edited by Julius de Rubinek, prepared by Aladár de Edvi Illis and Albert Halász (Budapest, 1920), contains 68 maps, 6 diagrams, and in the preface a list of references to sources; the several maps give a complete picture of the economic elements of Hungary before the World War; transparencies showing present and former boundaries make it possible to see at a glance what Hungary lost as a consequence of the war. For Hungary and its neighbors an atlas of special value is Albert Halász, *New Central Europe in Economical Maps* (Budapest, 1928): a series of general European maps dealing with coal production, railways, arable land, etc., followed by a series of economic maps dealing with traffic, agriculture, industry, and foreign trade, each map being accompanied by statistical tables. See especially, in relation to the new boundaries, a map on page 31 indicating the larger cities of central Europe. "Wheat Currency in Hungary," *Econ. Rev.*, Vol. 7, 1923, pp. 433–434.

E. Beneš, *Bohemia's Case for Independence* (London, 1916), outlines the arguments for the formation of the Czechoslovak state. E. de Martonne, "L'État Tchécoslovaque," *Ann. de Géogr.*, Vol. 29, 1920, pp. 161–181, discusses the territorial limits and economic situation of the state as determined at Paris in 1919–1920. B. C. Wallis, "The Slavs of Northern Hungary," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 6, 1918, pp. 268–281, presents the demographic facts and the national and economic problems connected with the Slovaks and Ruthenians of Hungary. *Manuel statistique de la République Tchéco-slovaque* II (Prague, 1925), gives the latest available statistics on the area, population, size of farm holdings, and resources of the various main political divisions of the state. Hugo Hassinger, *Die Tschechoslowakei: Ein geographisches, politisches und wirtschaftliches Handbuch* (Vienna, Leipzig, Munich, 1925), is useful if allowance be made for political prejudices and special pleading. The railway connections between the different parts of Czechoslovakia and between Czechoslovakia and the rest of Europe are shown in detail on the map by Karl Peucker, *Artaria's Eisenbahnkarte vom südöstlichen Mitteleuropa*, 1 : 1,500,000 (Vienna, 1924). Josef Jellinek, "Agrarian Reform in the Succession States," *Econ. Rev.*, Vol. 16, 1928, pp. 10–11. Julie Moscheles, "Natural Regions of Czechoslovakia," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 14, 1924, pp. 561–575. Dalmay de la Garennie, "La Ruthénie tchécoslovaque russie subcarpathique," *Ann. de Géogr.*, Vol. 33, 1924, pp. 443–456. "Minority Grievances in Russinsko," *Publications of the Hungarian Frontier Readjustment League, IV* (Budapest, 1927), deals with the claims of the Ruthenians in the Carpathian region.

CHAPTERS XV–XIX. YUGOSLAVIA, RUMANIA, BULGARIA, ALBANIA, GREECE

Jovan Cvijić, *La Péninsule Balkanique* (Paris, 1918), is a thorough geographical treatment of the Balkan region and especially of the territory inhabited by the Yugoslavs. Giotto Dainelli, *La Regione Balcanica: Sguardo d'insieme al paese e alle genti* (Florence, 1922). Jacques Ancel, *Peuples et nations des Balkans* (Paris, 1926). M. I. Newbigin, *Geographical Aspects of Balkan Problems in their Relation to the Great European War* (London, 1915), deals in an exceptionally clear manner with the political geography of the region. M. I. Newbigin, "The Geographical Factor in Balkan Questions," *Scientia*, Vol. 29, 1921, pp. 41–50, is a short but competent treatment of the subject. H. F. Armstrong, *The New Balkans* (London and New York, 1927). R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans* (London, 1917), is a survey of the nationality problem in the Balkans. J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy* (Oxford, 1917), deals with events in the Balkans up to 1916. Clive Day, "The Pre-War Commerce and the Commercial Approaches of the Balkan Peninsula," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 9, 1920, pp. 277–298, describes the backward economic conditions of the Balkans and the pre-war commercial pathways. *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington, 1914), is a valuable impartial account on the basis of field investigations. Wace and Thompson, *The Nomads of the Balkans* (London, 1914), is concerned with the Vlach settlements in the Balkans.

B. Ž. Milojević, "The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes: Administrative Divisions in Relation to Natural Regions," *Geogr. Rev.* Vol. 15, 1925, pp. 70–83, has a series of maps in color. B. C. Wallis, "The Slavs of Southern Hungary," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 6, 1918, pp. 341–353. D. A. Wray, *The Geology and Mineral Resources of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State* (London, 1921). A detailed geological report dealing with all the mineral resources of the Yugoslav kingdom by geographical districts and topically by minerals. There are a number of geological sections and maps and a map showing drainage, railways, and towns of all of Yugoslavia on the scale 1 : 1,500,000. Giotto Dainelli, *La Dalmazia: Cenni geografici e statistici* (Novara, 1918), consists of an atlas with accompanying text, and presents the Italian claim to Dalmatia, with full cartographic treatment of the demographic facts. A. G. Ogilvie, "A Contribution to the Geography of Macedonia," *Geogr. Journ.*, Vol. 55, 1920, pp. 1–34. Also "Physiography and Settlements in Southern Macedonia," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 11, 1921, pp. 172–197. H. N. Brailsford, *Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future* (London, 1906). R. J. Kerner, *Slavic Europe: A Selected Bibliography in the Western European Languages* (Cambridge, 1918), is a scientific bibliography, brought down to the beginning of the World War; the works cited deal with the Russians, Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, Yugoslavs, and Bulgarians.

For a discussion of the Rumanian national problem see Eugène Pittard, *La Roumanie* (Paris, 1917). Charles Upson Clark, *Greater Roumania* (New York, 1922). "The New Rumanian State: Regions and Resources," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 13, 1923, pp. 377–397. E. de Martonne, "La Nouvelle Roumanie," *Ann. de Géogr.*, Vol. 30, 1921, pp. 1–31. E. de Martonne, "Essai de carte ethnographique des pays roumains," *Ann. de Géogr.* Vol. 29, 1920, pp. 81–98. E. de Martonne, *La Valachie: Essai de monographie géographique* (Paris, 1902), is a thorough geographical treatment with excellent maps and illustrations. I. L. Evans, *The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania* (Cambridge, 1924). St. Romansky, *Carte ethnographique de la nouvelle Dobroudja Roumaine* (Sofia, 1915). N. P. Commène, *La Dobrogea: Essai historique, économique, ethnographique et politique* (Paris, 1918). *European Economic and Political Survey*, December 15, 1927, Vol. 3, pp. 201–209, outlines the origin of the Rumano-Hungarian dispute arising out of the origin and progress of Hungarian landowners in Transylvania. "Bessarabian Question," *European Economic and Political Survey*, May 15–31, 1928, Vol. 3, pp. 553–561.

Albert Demangeon, "La Bulgarie," *Ann. de Géogr.*, Vol. 29, 1920, pp. 401–416.

For presentations of the claims of Bulgaria see the following: Balkanicus, *The Aspirations of Bulgaria* (London, 1915); A. Ishirkoff, *Bulgarien: Land und Leute* (Leipzig, 1917). J. Ivanoff, *Les Bulgares devant le Congrès de la Paix*, 2d ed. (Berne, 1919), outlines the Bulgarian position in relation to the peace settlement.

H. F. Armstrong, "Italy, Jugoslavia, and Lilliputia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 6, 1928, pp. 191–202. Edith Durham, *High Albania* (London, 1909), and *The Struggle for Scutari* (London, 1914), give vivid and intimate pictures of Albanian life and problems. Herbert Louis, *Albanien: Eine Landeskunde vornehmlich auf Grund eigener Reisen* (Stuttgart, 1927). Ernest Nowack, "A Contribution to the Geography of Albania," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 11, 1921, pp. 503–510. Eugen Oberhummer, "Die erste Volkszählung in Albanien," *Anzeiger der phil.-hist. Klasse der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien*, November 17, 1920, pp. 1–8. The new boundaries of Albania by the International Commission for the Delimitation of the Boundaries of Albania are represented upon *Karte von Albanien*, 1 : 200,000, published in 1928 by the Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin. This is now a standard map of Albania and consists of a compilation of Austro-Hungarian, Italian, and French surveys made during the World War, together with special surveys made by Dr. Herbert Louis, 1923–1924, and other sources, including photographs.

Otto Maull, *Griechisches Mittelmeergebiet* (Breslau, 1922). A. Philippson, *Das Mittelmeergebiet*, 4th ed. (Leipzig and Berlin, 1922). H. F. Armstrong, "The Unredeemed Isles of Greece," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1925, pp. 154–157, has notes on the Dodecanese and Cyprus. The standard reference on the Greek refugee problem is *Greek Refugee Settlement* (League of Nations, Geneva, 1926); accompanied by a map showing the changes in the ethnography of Greek Macedonia as a result of the settlement of refugees, and a second map showing the settlement of rural and urban refugees in the whole of Greece. For a broader view of the migration question in the Balkans see A. A. Pallis, "Racial Migrations in the Balkans during the Years 1912–1924," *Geogr. Journ.*, Vol. 66, 1925, pp. 315–331. Raoul Blanchard, "The Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 15, 1925, pp. 449–456. On Greek civilization of classical times and its setting see A. E. Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*, 4th ed. (Oxford, 1924).

CHAPTER XX. POLAND

The excellent series of cartographical works of Eugeniusz Romer includes the *Atlas géographique et statistique de la Pologne* (Warsaw, 1916, and second edition, 1921) and *La Pologne contemporaine: Atlas statistique* (Warsaw, 1926). See also his articles, "Poland: The Land and the State," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 4, 1917, pp. 6–25, and "The Population of Poland according to the Census of 1921," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 13, 1923, pp. 398–412; and H. Arctowski, "Agriculture and Landownership in Poland," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 11, 1921, pp. 161–171. Vol. 1 of the *Polish Encyclopædia* (Warsaw, 1912) contains a treatment of the physical geography of the Polish region and the physical characteristics of its inhabitants. E. Wunderlich, editor, *Handbuch von Polen* (*Kongress-Polen*): *Beiträge zu einer Allgemeinen Landeskunde*, 2d ed. (Berlin, 1918), is a broad geographical survey prepared under the direction of the German governor-general of Warsaw after the occupation of Russian Poland during the World War. R. H. Lord, *The Second Partition of Poland, a Study in Diplomatic History* (Cambridge, 1915), is a thorough piece of historical research and is fundamental to a study of Polish national character and problems in the period of decline that ended with the fall of the Republic. *Convention Germano-Polonaise relative à la Haute Silésie*, signed at Geneva, 15 May 1922. Bruno Dietrich, "Oberschlesien, seine Stellung innerhalb der deutschen Ostmark und seine Grenzen," *Verhandl. Deutschen Geographenlages*, Vol. 21, Berlin, 1926, pp. 97–112, deals especially with economic and political questions. A geographical and economic statement on the division of Upper Silesia is given by Pierre Dumas, in "Le Partage de la Haute-Silésie," *Ann. de Géogr.*, Vol. 31, 1922, pp. 1–14. For a historical summary of the neutral zones between Poland and Lithuania see the official

journal of the League of Nations, May, 1923, pp. 485 et seq. E. Romer, "Statistics of the Languages of the Provinces being under the Polish Civil Administration of the Eastern Lands (December 1919)" (Warsaw, 1920), gives the statistical results, and an analysis of them, of a census taken in the governments of Minsk, Vilna, and Brest Litovsk; the data relate to the disputed zone about Minsk, where the Soviet government made concessions to the Poles in the final treaty of peace signed early in 1921, and the disputed zone about Vilna.

CHAPTERS XXI, XXII. THE BALTIC STATES

Owen Rutter: *The New Baltic States and Their Future: An Account of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia* (London, 1925). W. Gaigalat, *Litauen, das besetzte Gebiet, sein Volk und dessen geistige Strömungen* (Frankfurt, 1917), outlines the problem in all its aspects from the Lithuanian point of view; valuable particularly for its description of ethnographic relations and its ethnographic map. Excellent as a systematic treatise. See also K. A. Jusaitis, *The History of the Lithuanian Nation and its Present National Aspirations* (Philadelphia, 1918). *The Vilna Problem*, with 5 maps, by the Lithuanian Information Bureau (London, 1922). On the Memel award see League of Nations *Treaty Series*, Vol. 29, 1924, No. 736. Latvian Statistical Yearbook, 1924. In *Meereskunde*, No. 152, 1919, Richard Pohle sketches the growth of Riga; his paper is illustrated by several interesting maps. "Latvijas-Krievijas robežas plans," an atlas of 25 maps, scale 1 : 21,000, showing in great detail a boundary strip from one to two inches wide on either side of the Latvian-Russian boundary with details of drainage, forest, towns, railroads, etc., 1921–1922. M. Martna, *L'Esthonie; Les Esthoniens et la question esthonienne* (Paris, 1920), covers the problems of Esthonia from the national point of view. Michael Haltenberger, *Landeskunde von Eesti, I: Die physische Struktur des Landes* (Tartu, 1926). See also his paper "Der wirtschaftsgeographische Charakter der Städte der Republik Eesti" (Tartu, 1925). Other geographical studies have already been produced by the Geographical Institute of the University of Dorpat, and this institution is in touch with a society founded in 1920 for the study of the country. In 1925 this society produced a monograph of over 700 pages on the department of Tartu. A good summary account of Estonia is given by Jonatan Grufman, "Estniska republikens geografi," *Ymer*, Vol. 43, 1923, pp. 452–491. "Baltic Problem," *European Economic and Political Survey*, Vol. 3, 1927, pp. 215–221, discusses the post-war attempts to establish a Baltic Union, including the Scandinavian countries. For reference to recent literature especially as regards agriculture and industry in Finland and the Baltic States, see Eugene van Cleef, "Some Economic Problems in the Baltic Republics," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 17, 1927, pp. 434–447.

CHAPTER XXIII. FINLAND

Atlas de Finlande, 1910, atlas and 2 vols. of text (Helsingfors, 1911), together with the earlier *Atlas de statistique sociale sur les communes rurales de Finlande en 1901* (Helsingfors, 1908), was published by the Finnish Geographical Society and constitute the best existing survey, along the lines of scientific geography, of the social and political conditions of the country. *L'Agriculture de la Finlande en diagrammes et cartes*, Suomen Maataloutta Kuvioin ja Kartoin. Edited by K. J. Ellilä, E. Cajander, E. Hynninen, O. Heikinheimo, J. Jyske, and Simo Lilja (Porvoo, 1925). Text in Finnish, Swedish, and French. Brings down to 1920, and in some cases to 1922, data presented in the *Atlas de Finlande*. E. Cajander, "Geographische Übersicht des Landsbaus in Finnland," *Fennia*, Vol. 27, 1927, No. 14. *Finnland im Anfang des XX. Jahrhunderts* (Helsingfors, 1920), published by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, despite its title has been brought down to 1919; it contains many maps. *La Finlande: Aperçu de l'organisation politique et administrative* (Helsingfors, 1921), is a general description of the country with a considerable body of recent statistics. A map gives the frontiers of Finland according to the treaty of Dorpat (1920) and shows in particular the Pechenga region. Erland Nordenskiold, "Finland: The Land

and the People," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 7, 1919, pp. 361–379. *Finland: the Country, its People and Institutions* (Helsingfors, 1926): a good popular account, well illustrated. Gustav Braun, "Finnlands Kusten und Häfen," *Meerskunde*, No. 172 (Berlin, 1927). Gustav Braun, "Politisch-geographische Probleme des Europäischen Nordens," *Mitt. aus dem Nordischen Institut der Universität Greifswald*, 2 vols. (Greifswald, 1921). After a brief analysis of the relations of the North European states there is a fuller treatment of the Åland Island question, Karelia, and Pechenga, with a useful bibliography of recent material. V. T. Homen, *East Carelia and Kola Lapmark* (London and New York, 1921).

CHAPTER XXIV. RUSSIA

Gregor Alexinsky, *Modern Russia* (London, 1913), is a general treatment of the historical and economic development of Russia, the constitutional situation before the World War, Russia's literature, and the problems of nationality and religion. The following works on the history of Russia may be recommended: R. Beazley, N. Forbes, and G. A. Birkett, *Russia from the Varangians to the Bolsheviks* (Oxford, 1918); F. H. Skrine, *The Expansion of Russia*, 1815–1900 (Cambridge, 1904). M. J. Olgin, *The Soul of the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1917), is an intimate and detailed view, chiefly social and political, but with sections on land tenure and local village or community government. W. de Kovalevsky, editor, *La Russie à la fin du 19e siècle* (Paris, 1900), published for the Paris Exposition, contains many useful maps and much statistical material, and will be found especially useful in comparative studies. Fridtjof Nansen, *Russia and Peace* (New York, 1924). T. G. Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia*, 2 vols. (London, 1919). E. A. Ross, *Russia in Upheaval* (New York, 1919). Charles Sarolea, *Great Russia: Her Achievement and Promise* (New York, 1916). Benjamin Semenov-Tian-Shansky, "Russia: Territory and Population: A Perspective on the Census of 1926," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 18, 1928. Benjamin Semenov-Tian-Shansky, editor, *Dazimetricheskaya Karta Evropeiskoi Rossii* (*Carte dasymétrique de la Russie d'Europe*), 1 : 420,000. Inst. d'Études "Le Sol et le Sous-Sol" (Leningrad, 1923–), is in course of publication. Walther Tuckermann, *Verkehrsgeographie der Eisenbahnen des Europäischen Russland* (Essen, 1916). A. W. Tschajanoff, *Die Landwirtschaft des Sowjetbundes; Ihre geographische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Bedeutung* (Berlin, 1926), is a fundamental paper on the present state of Russian agriculture. Contains 55 maps showing distributions for 1924. They give the distribution of population, the chief food and livestock distributions, excess and deficiency of grain, and the like. Boris Brutzkus, "Agrarentwicklung und Agrarrevolution in Russland," *Quellen und Studien, Abteilung Wirtschaft, No. 2 (N. F.)* (Berlin, 1926). E. D. Durand, "Agriculture in Eastern Europe," *Quart. Journ. of Economics*, Vol. 36, 1922, No. 2, pp. 169–196. A. M. Gillett, "A Sketch of the Historical Geography of the Black Earth Region of Central Russia," *Scottish Geogr. Mag.*, Vol. 39, 1922, No. 1, pp. 1–10. "Russian Foreign Relations," *European Econ. and Polit. Survey*, Vol. 2, 1927, pp. 633–639, contains an official statement of the principles of Russian foreign policy and an outline of Russian foreign relations up to the time of publication (June 15). The source of Russian mineral statistics is *Annual Report on the Mineral Resources of the U. S. S. R. 1925-26* (Leningrad, 1927). The new economic divisions of Russia are discussed in "Russia's New Economic Divisions," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1926, pp. 330–333, together with a map. The division is still in an experimental stage. It is also discussed by Jurij Semenow, in "Die Revolution und die Inneren Grenzen Russlands," *Geopolitik*, Vol. 4, No. 11, 1927, pp. 970–983. A large-scale map showing the relation of the boundaries of the economic regions to the political regions is *Map of the U. S. S. R.*, by the Commissariat of the Interior, 1 : 6,000,000 [1926]. N. M. Toulaikoff, "Drought in the Volga District," *Matériaux pour l'Étude des Calamités*, No. 8, Jan.–Mar. 1926, pp. 337–338. Stephen Rudnitsky, *Ukraine: The Land and Its People* (New York, 1918), is published by the Ukrainian Alliance of America; it had previously appeared in German under the title *Ukraina — Land und Volk: Eine Gemeinfassliche Landeskunde* (Vienna, 1916).

Foremost among works on Siberia is the *Atlas of Asiatic Russia*, published in Russian in 1914 by the Colonization Bureau; it contains an excellent series of maps and is accompanied by descriptive text in three volumes. The present state of settlement in Siberia is shown upon a dot map published in 1926, entitled *Map of the Agriculture of U. S. S. R.: Total Acreage under Crops and Northern Limits of Agriculture, 1926*, each dot corresponding to 1000 sown acres. The map accompanies a report by I. F. Makarov, "The Agricultural Map of the U. S. S. R.," *28th Suppl. to the Bull. of Applied Botany and Plant Breeding* (1926). The text is accompanied by detailed regional maps on which, by dots, are represented the more detailed distributions of sown land, each dot representing 100 hectares. Arved Schultz, *Sibirien: Eine Landeskunde* (Breslau, 1923). P. W. Danckwortt, "Sibirien und seine wirtschaftliche Zukunft: Ein Rückblick und Ausblick auf Handel und Industrie Sibiriens," *Osteuropa-Institut in Breslau, Quellen und Studien, Section 7, No. 2* (B. G. Teubner, Leipzig and Berlin, 1921). P. P. Goudkoff, "Economic Geography of the Coal Resources of Asiatic Russia," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 13, 1923, pp. 283–293, with insert map 1: 28,000,000 showing coal fields and density of population. [Map.] *Important Mines (Locations), Useful Minerals, Asiatic Russia*, 1: 10,500,000. *Explanation to Map*, 2d ed., Geol. Committee (Leningrad, 1924).

CHAPTER XXV. ANATOLIA

D. G. Hogarth, *The Nearer East* (New York, 1902), covers the region at the eastern end of the Mediterranean and beyond to Persia and Arabia, and contains many maps and diagrams. A. J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A study in the Contact of Civilisations* (Boston and New York, 1922). A. J. Toynbee and K. P. Kirkwood, *Turkey* (London, 1926; New York, 1927). Jacques Ancel, *Manuel historique de la question d'Orient (1792–1923)* (Paris, 1923), a convenient check list of the most important happenings in the Near East. William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, 1801–1927* (Cambridge, 1927), is the third edition of a useful volume with extensive bibliographies. Another historical work of note is: Lord Eversley, *The Turkish Empire: Its Growth and Decay* (London, 1917). Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1900), has been the standard work on Asiatic Turkey, though it is now unreliable because of the great shifting of population due to war and forced migration; it discusses each vilayet systematically. Among other geographical works which may be mentioned are: Ewald Banse, *Die Türkei: Eine moderne Geographie* (Brunswick, 1915); Alfred Philippson, *Das Türkische Reich* (Weimar, 1916). E. G. Mears, *Modern Turkey: A Politico-Economic Interpretation, 1908–1923 Inclusive, with Selected Chapters by Representative Authorities* (New York, 1924). E. M. Earle, *Problems of the Near East* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, International Relations Clubs Bibliography Series No. 2, Sept., 1924). A fairly complete and well organized source book for material on Turkey and the Near East generally. A systematic and summary account of the physical features, particularly the climate and hydrography, with a bibliography that includes all important modern cartographic material, is given by Ulrich Frey, "Das Hochland von Anatolien mit besonderer Berucksichtigung des abflusslosen Gebietes," *Mitt. Geogr. Gesell. in München*, Vol. 18, 1925, pp. 203–275. D. G. Hogarth, *A Wandering Scholar in the Levant* (London, 1896), has in Chapter III the best picture extant of Anatolian life and character. M. A. Czaplicka, *The Turks of Central Asia in History and at the Present Day* (London, 1918), is "an ethnological inquiry into the Pan-Turanian problem."

CHAPTER XXVI. CONSTANTINOPLE

Paul Masson, "Constantinople et les détroits," *Ann. de Géogr.*, Vol. 28, 1919, pp. 121–142, is a thorough statistical study of the commerce of the Straits. The handbook on the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, published by the French Commission de Géographie of the Service Géographique de l'Armée (Paris, 1915), should also be consulted. Chart No. 4167

of the U. S. Hydrographic Office, published July, 1919, is entitled "The Bosporus." It is on the scale of 2 inches to the mile and admirably represents the situation of Constantinople at the southern end of the narrow waterway. The principal public buildings are shown, including St. Sophia, and an inset on the scale of 4 inches to the mile shows the Golden Horn. For the relation of the Hellespont to the Greek world, and especially its place in Greek commerce and politics, see G. Neilson, "The Hellespont in Retrospect," *Proc. Royal Philos. Soc.* (Glasgow), Vol. 47, 1915–16, pp. 1–24. C. Phillipson and N. Buxton, *The Question of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles* (London, 1917), contains a well-rounded and scholarly treatment of the problem. Announcement is made in *L'Asie Française*, February, 1928, p. 88, of a government decision to make Constantinople a free port, with what result remains to be seen.

CHAPTER XXVII. TRANSCAUCASIA

Noel and Harold Buxton, *Travel and Politics in Armenia* (London, 1914), is noteworthy. H. F. B. Lynch, *Armenia: Travels and Studies*, 2 vols. (London, 1901); Vol. 1 deals with the Russian provinces and Vol. 2 with the Turkish provinces. Richard Gottheil, "Armenia and the Armenians. A List of References in the New York Public Library," *Bull. N. Y. Publ. Lib.*, Vol. 23, 1919, pp. 123–143, 251–277, 303–336. A valuable reference is *Conditions in the Near East*, the report of the American Military Mission to Armenia, Major General J. G. Harbord, 1919, published as Senate Document No. 266. Anton Büdel, "Transkaukasien: Eine technische Geographie," *Petermanns Mitt. Ergänzungsheft No. 189*, 1926. "Le Transcaucase et la République d'Arménie dans les textes diplomatiques du traité de Brest-Litovsk au traité de Kars, 1918–1921," *Revue des Études Arméniennes*, Vol. 3 (Paris, 1923), pp. 63–72, has a map. D. Ghambashidze, *Mineral Resources of Georgia and Caucasia* (London, 1919), though brief, is a useful treatise. J. D. Henry, *Baku: An Eventful History* (London, 1906), gives an account of the oil region.

CHAPTER XXVIII. PALESTINE

G. A. Smith, *The Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, 13th ed. (London, 1907), is a classic work, and is now admirably supplemented by the same author's *Atlas of the Historical Geography of the Holy Land* (London, 1915). See also the same author's *Syria and the Holy Land* (London, 1918). Ellsworth Huntington, *Palestine and Its Transformation* (Boston and New York, 1911). Isidore Singer, editor, *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, 12 vols. (New York, 1901–1906), should be consulted upon Jewish problems. Andrée Choveaux, "The New Palestine," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 17, 1927, pp. 75–88. L. Hersch, "La population de la Palestine et les perspectives du sionisme," *Metron*, Vol. 7, 1928, pp. 115–136. Mention may be made of *Palestine*, a small weekly published at London which chronicles events in Palestine and reviews new books on it from the Zionist standpoint.

CHAPTER XXIX. PERSIA

P. M. Sykes, *A History of Persia*, 2 vols. (London, 1915), carries the story of Persian history down to 1906. G. N. Curzon (Lord Curzon), *Persia and the Persian Question* (London, 1892), is a general treatise with the emphasis chiefly upon political questions; there is an abundance of geographical data; the point of view is frankly British and imperial. A. V. W. Jackson, *Persia Past and Present: A Book of Travel and Research* (New York, 1906). W. M. Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia* (New York, 1912), is an intimate and detailed account of international intrigue in Persia, by the American Treasurer-General of Persia. A map gives the three spheres (Russian, British, and neutral), defined in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. A. C. Millspaugh, *The American Task in Persia* (New York, 1925). Vincent Sheean, *The New Persia* (New York and London, 1927). For the present state of the developments of the oil fields of southwestern Persia consult J. W. Williamson, *In a Persian Oil Field* (London, 1927). Sir Arnold T. Wilson, *The Persian*

Gulf: An Historical Sketch (London, 1928), is by a distinguished authority on the region. S. B. Miles, *The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf*, 2 vols. (London, 1919).

CHAPTER XXX. INNER ASIA

H. H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, 4 vols. (London, 1876–1888), is a standard work on the Mongol invasions. It covers the period from the 9th century. Ellsworth Huntington, *The Pulse of Asia* (Boston, 1907), is a study in geographic environment and the influence of climate on history; the assertion is made that the drier phases of climatic cycles account for the Mongol invasions of Europe. A. Woeikof, *Le Turkestan Russe* (Paris, 1914). Lieut.-Colonel P. T. Etherton, *In the Heart of Asia* (London, 1925), deals with Chinese Turkestan. Arved Schultz, *Die Natürlichen Landschaften von Russisch-Turkestan* (Hamburg, 1920), is a geographical work on Russian Inner Asia. Emil Trinkler, "Afghanistan: Eine landeskundliche Studie auf Grund des vorhanden Materials und eigener Beobachtung," *Petermanns Mitt. Ergänzungsheft No. 196*, 1928. Standard references on geographical and archeological subjects are the recent articles or books, published variously, by Sven Hedin, Sir Aurel Stein, Holdich, and Younghusband.

CHAPTER XXXI. THE FAR EAST

A. Little, *The Far East* (Oxford, 1905). Alleyne Ireland, *The Far Eastern Tropics* (Boston, 1905), a group of studies of the administration of Hongkong, Malay States, French Indo-China, Java, the Philippine Islands, etc. L. H. Dudley Buxton, *The Eastern Road* (London and New York, 1924), observations on Japan and China. J. O. P. Bland, *China, Japan, and Korea* (New York, 1921). S. K. Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East* (New York, 1916), covers events leading up to the presentation of the Twenty-One Demands by Japan. C. K. Leith, "The Mineral Resources of the Far East," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 4, 1926, pp. 433–442. H. F. Bain, *Ores and Industry in the Far East: the Influence of Key Mineral Resources on the Development of Oriental Civilization* (New York, 1927); Wilfred Smith, *A Geographical Study of Coal and Iron in China* (London, 1926); C. Y. Hsieh, *General Statement on the Mining Industry (1918–1925)*, *Spec. Rept. Geol. Survey of China, No. 2* (Peking, 1926).

The Chinese question is so complicated that a first approach may be found useful through W. L. Williams, *China: Syllabus and Bibliography* (Columbia University, 1927). "One Hundred Selected Books on China," *China Institute in America, Bulletin 5* (New York, 1927?). Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, *Addresses by Chinese Minister to the United States* (Baltimore, 1926). H. K. Norton, *China and the Powers* (New York, 1927). P. H. Clyde, "International Rivalries in Manchuria 1689–1922," *Ohio State Univ. Studies, Contributions in History and Political Science, No. 8* (Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1926). *American Relations with China: Report of the Conference Held at Johns Hopkins University, September 17–20, 1925* (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1925). "The Far East," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 72, 1925. W. W. Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, 2 vols. (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1927). Henri Cordier, *Histoire générale de la Chine et de ses relations avec les pays étrangers depuis les temps les plus anciens jusqu'à la chute de la dynastie mandchoue* (Paris, 1920): a standard authority on Chinese life and history. G. Maspero, *La Chine* (Paris, 1918), has a useful account of the geography, history, and political and social structure of China, together with the history of Chino-Japanese relations. Hosea Ballou Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 3 vols. (London, 1910–1918), surveys comprehensively the period from 1834 to 1911. See also the same author's *The Trade and Administration of China* (London, 1913). The question of the present population of China is one that has engaged the interest of many scholars. For a critical summary and analysis, see W. F. Willcox, "The Population of China in 1910," *Journ. Amer. Statistical Assn.*, March,

1928, pp. 18–30. P. M. Roxby, "The Distribution of Population in China: Economic and Political Significance," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 15, 1925, pp. 1–24. Chang-Heng Chen, "Changes in the Growth of China's Population in the Last 182 Years," *Chinese Econ. Journ.*, Vol. 1, 1927, pp. 59–69. The map of China in *The New World* (Fig. 209, page 591), shows the distribution of population by provinces; a more detailed distribution is shown by the dot method in Fig. 10, p. 16, of W. H. Mallory, *China: Land of Famine* (American Geographical Society, New York, 1926), and still more detailed distributions are given in the province maps of this publication. The book treats of the economic, political, and social causes of famine. For a map showing the cultivated land of China by dots see O. E. Baker, "Agriculture and the Future of China," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 6, 1928, pp. 483–497. E. A. Ross, *The Changing Chinese* (New York, 1911), describes China as seen by a sociologist. Friedrich Otte, "China: Wirtschaftspolitische Landeskunde," *Petermanns Mitt. Ergänzungsheft No. 194*, 1927. E. T. Williams, "The Open Ports of China," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 9, 1920, pp. 306–334. Mongton Chih Hsu, *Railway Problems in China* (New York, 1915). E. J. Dingle, editor, *The New Atlas and Commercial Gazetteer of China* (Shanghai, 1918): the text contains a comprehensive treatment of the economic resources, means of transportation, principal cities, etc., of the various provinces of China. General map of China and adjacent regions showing treaty ports and railways, prepared for the Department of State by the Topographic Branch, U. S. Geological Survey, 1921 (revised to January, 1922).

L. H. Dudley Buxton, "Present Conditions in Inner Mongolia," *Geogr. Journ.*, Vol. 61, 1923, pp. 393–413. Chin-Chun Wang, "The Chinese Eastern Railway," *Annals Amer. Acad. of Polit. and Soc. Sci.*, Vol. 72, 1925, pp. 57–69. *Economic History of Manchuria*, by the Bank of Chosen (Seoul, Chosen, 1921). C. Walter Young, in *Chinese Econ. Journ.*, "Economic Bases for New Railways in Manchuria" (April, 1927), "Chinese Labor Migration to Manchuria" (July, 1927). "Manchuria: A Drama of Railways and Politics," *Round Table*, March, 1928, pp. 256–272; accompanied by a map showing railways. A temperate article written from the Japanese point of view is K. K. Kawakami, "Manchuria: the Crux of Chino-Japanese Relations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 6, 1928, pp. 379–394.

K. K. Kawakami, *Asia at the Door: A Study of the Japanese Question in Continental United States, Hawaii, and Canada* (New York, 1914), is written by an assimilated (Americanized) Japanese. The three following works are recommended for a survey of contemporary Japanese history (the last two are by Japanese): K. S. Latourette, *The Development of Japan* (New York, 1918); Count S. Okuma, *Fifty Years of New Japan*, 2 vols. (New York, 1909); G. E. Uyehara, *The Political Development of Japan, 1867–1909* (London, 1910). J. E. Orchard, "The Pressure of Population in Japan," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 18, 1928, pp. 374–401. Shiroshi Nasu, "The Problem of Population and Food Supply in Japan"; Naomasa Yamasaki, "A Note on the Geographical Distribution of the Density of Population, Birth- and Death-Rates of Japan," in *Problems of the Pacific* (Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, July 15 to 29, 1927, edited by J. B. Condliffe, Chicago, 1928). In *The Japan Yearbook* for 1927 (23d year of issue) supplementary chapters have been provided to give foreigners a better view of current problems, including, for example, the population problem, food supply, emigration, the house problem, and road-making. See also the annual *Résumé statistique de l'Empire du Japon. Japan: Trade During the War*, United States Tariff Commission Report (Washington, 1921), is a study of Japanese trade from 1913 to 1917 with special reference to the trade of Japan with the United States. G. H. Blakeslee, "Japan's New Island Possessions in the Pacific: History and Present Status," *Journ. of Internatl. Relations*, Vol. 12, 1921, pp. 173–191: a condensed and valuable summary of the history of the Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas down to the time of the opening of the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament and Far Eastern Questions. For a view of Russian penetration in Korea before the Russo-Japanese War, see pp. 192 et seq., in Angus Hamilton, *Korea* (New York, 1904). R. Malcolm Keir, "Modern Korea," *Bull. Amer. Geogr. Soc.*, Vol. 46, 1914, pp. 756–769, 817–830, discusses the resources and problems of the region.

CHAPTER XXXII. THE PACIFIC REALM

Among the many important topics discussed in *Problems of the Pacific*, Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, 1927, edited by J. B. Condliffe (Chicago, 1928) are immigration and emigration in the Pacific, population and food supply, land utilization in China, and the resources of Australia. "Committee on Vital Statistics of Primitive Races: Interim Report," *Rept. Seventeenth Meeting Australasian Assn. for the Advancement of Sci.*, August, 1924 (Adelaide, 1926) Section F, pp. 113–119. S. H. Roberts, *Population Problems of the Pacific* (London, 1927), deals with the pre-European system, the coming of the Europeans, the causes, extent, and remedies of depopulation; a final section deals with race mixture in the Pacific. G. H. Scholefield *The Pacific: Its Past and Future* (London, 1919), is an excellent general work. Among others may be mentioned: H. H. Bancroft, *The New Pacific* (New York, 1912; first publ. 1899); James Colwell, editor, *A Century in the Pacific* (London, 1914), "a review of the developments in the South Pacific during the past hundred years"; it has an extensive bibliography. *Stewart's Handbook of the Pacific Islands* (Sydney, 1923).

The chapters on Australia in Griffith Taylor's *Environment and Race* (Oxford, 1927) summarize the author's important work on Australia. See also H. P. Colebatch, "Westralian Wheat Lands," *United Empire*, December, 1926, pp. 660–662. On the history of Australia see T. A. Coghlan, *Labour and Industry in Australia from the First Settlement in 1788 to the Establishment of the Commonwealth in 1901*, 4 vols. (London, 1918), a somewhat encyclopedic industrial history of Australia. S. H. Roberts, *History of Australian Land Settlement (1788–1920)* (Melbourne, 1924). J. S. Battye, *Western Australia: A History from Its Discovery to the Inauguration of the Commonwealth* (1924). A. H. Charteris, "Australian Immigration Policy," *International Conciliation*, December, 1927 (No. 235). "The White Australia Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1925, pp. 97–111. *Northern Territory [Australia]: Development and Administration.* Report by Sir George Buchanan, with maps (1925). *The Territory of Central Australia: Report of the Government Resident for the Period 1st March, 1927, to 30th June, 1927*, published by the Commonwealth of Australia, deals with this new division. It was created by passage of the Northern Australia Act assented to 1 June, 1926, which provided division of "Northern Territory" into North Australia, north of 20° S. lat., and Central Australia to the south. For a comparative view of the Australian population, 1925 and previous years, consult "Australian Demography," *Bull. No. 43* (Melbourne, 1926).

CHAPTER XXXIII. AFRICA

Sir Harry Johnston was one of the foremost authorities on African problems. Among his many published works may be mentioned the following: *A History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races* (Cambridge, 1913); *British Central Africa* (London, 1897); *George Grenfell and the Congo*, 2 vols. (1908); *Liberia*, 2 vols. (1906); *The Uganda Protectorate*, 2 vols. (1902). J. S. Keltie, *The Partition of Africa*, 2d ed. (London, 1895), gives an excellent statement of the problems of political geography as they presented themselves in Africa during the nineteenth century. Charles Lucas, *The Partition and Colonization of Africa* (New York, 1922). Georges Hardy, *Vue générale de l'histoire d'Afrique* (Paris, 1922). N. D. Harris, *Intervention and Colonization in Africa* (New York, 1914), contains a history of the continent since the beginning of white exploitation. Leonard Woolf, *Empire and Commerce in Africa* (New York and London, 1920). The treaty documents for the period up to the end of 1908 are to be found in Sir Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Africa by Treaty*, 3 vols., with a portfolio of maps, 3d ed. (London, 1909). G. L. Beer, *African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, With Papers on Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Colonial Settlement*, edit. by L. H. Gray (New York, 1923).

"Colony and Protectorate of Kenya: Report for 1926," *Colonial Reports-Annual, No. 1352* (London, 1927), describes the transfer to Kenya Colony of the eastern part of the

Uganda Protectorate, thus directly joining Kenya Colony and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore, [Report on his] *Visit to West Africa during the Year 1926* (London, 1926). In addition to the reports published by the League of Nations dealing with African colonies, one should consult the *Report of the East Africa Commission* (London, 1925), that visited Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Tanganyika Territory, Uganda, and Kenya in 1924 to report upon their general economic development, the social conditions of the natives and their relation to non-natives, and questions of taxation. Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, "Labour in the Tanganyika Territory," *British Colonial Repts. No. 19*, London, 1926. F. D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (Edinburgh and London, 1922). Allan McPhee, *The Economic Revolution in British West Africa* (London, 1926). C. H. Stigand, *Administration in Tropical Africa* (London, 1914), outlines the problems connected with the government of African tropical dependencies. "La population italienne en Tunisie d'après le recensement de 1921" and "La population italienne en Tunisie d'après le recensement de 1926": maps in *L'Afrique Française*, May, 1927, p. 198. "Convention regarding the Organisation of the Statute of the Tangier Zone," *Treaty Series No. 23 (1924)*: signed at Paris, 18 December, 1923. "L'Espagne au Maroc et la question de Tanger," *L'Afrique Française*, Vol. 33, 1923, pp. 610–653. "La conférence de Tanger et l'opinion italienne," *Correspondance d'Orient*, Vol. 17, No. 313, pp. 19–23. "L'Oltregiuba," *Renseignements Coloniaux et Documents publiées par le Comité de L'Afrique Française et le Comité du Maroc*, Suppl. to *L'Afrique Française*, September, 1925, pp. 409–11, contains map showing strip of territory ceded to Italy by the Italo-British Convention of 15 July, 1924. A. W. Hodson, *Seven Years in Southern Abyssinia* (London, 1927). C. F. Rey, *In the Country of the Blue Nile* (London, 1927). R. C. F. Maugham, *The Republic of Liberia* (London and New York, 1920). H. F. Reeve, *The Black Republic* (London, 1923).

CHAPTER XXXIV. LATIN AMERICA

General geographical works are Wilhelm Sievers, *Süd- und Mittelamerika*, 3d ed. (Leipzig and Vienna, 1914); Pierre Denis, *Amérique du Sud*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1927), comprising Tome 15 of *Géographie Universelle;* Max Sorre, *Mexique, Amérique Centrale* (Paris, 1928), Tome 14 of *Geographie Universelle*. For a historical background see E. G. Bourne, *Spain in America, 1450–1580* (New York, 1904), with valuable critical essay on authorities. Viscount Bryce, *Observations and Impressions* (New York, 1912), presents a closely interwoven account of the historical setting of the Latin-American peoples and present economic, social, and political conditions. W. R. Shepherd, *Latin America* (New York, 1914), is a concise treatment of the essential historical facts and contains a useful bibliography. F. García Calderón, *Latin America: Its Rise and Progress* (New York, 1913), by a Peruvian diplomat, discusses "the German, North American, and Japanese perils," and other problems of Latin America. J. F. Rippy, *Latin America in World Politics: An Outline Survey* (New York, 1928). A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation* (Boston, 1916), traces the historical development of the doctrine since its proclamation. E. A. Ross, *South of Panama* (New York, 1915), is a survey by an observant sociologist. B. L. Miller and J. T. Singewald, *The Mineral Deposits of South America* (New York, 1919). See also Richard Stappenbeck, *Karte der Minerallagerstätten von Süd-Amerika* (Berlin, 1926), scale 60 miles to inch; insets on larger scales. R. R. Platt, "Present Status of International Boundaries in South America," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 16, 1924, pp. 622–638.

G. M. McBride, "The Land Systems of Mexico," *Amer. Geogr. Soc. Research Ser. No. 12*, 1923. Manuel Calero, Francisco S. Carvajal, Juan B. Castelazo, Toribio Esquivel Obregón, Jesús Flores Magón, Tomás Macmanus, Rafael Martínez Carrillo, Miguel Ruelas, Jorge Vera Estañol, *Essay on the Reconstruction of Mexico* (New York 1920), presents the anti-Carranza sentiment of Mexico. "Dispute between Costa Rica and Panama," *League of Nations Official Journal*, 2d Year, No. 4, June, 1921, pp. 341–344. The volume on *Colombia* by Eder, in Scribner's South American Series, is an authoritative

work. *The Boundary between Bolivia and Peru* (London, 1918), treats of the zone north of Titicaca long in dispute between these two republics. W. L. Schurz, "The Distribution of Population in the Amazon Valley," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 15, 1925, pp. 206–225. Roy Nash, *The Conquest of Brazil* (New York, 1926), is an interpretation of contemporary Brazil. Pierre Denis, *Brazil in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1910), an excellent work. Margaret A. Marsh, *The Bankers in Bolivia* (New York, 1928). Pierre Denis, *La République Argentine: La mise en valeur du pays* (Paris, 1920); Eng. transl.: *The Argentine Republic: Its Development and Progress* (New York, 1922). Mark Jefferson, "Peopling the Argentine Pampa," *Amer. Geogr. Soc. Research Ser. No. 16*, 1926. See the same author's "Recent Colonization in Chile," *Amer. Geogr. Soc. Research Ser. No. 6*, 1926; and "Pictures from Southern Brazil," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 16, 1926, pp. 521–547. Sir Thomas H. Holdich, *The Countries of the King's Award* (London, 1904), describes the Andes of Argentina and Chile, and the boundary settlement made there by the award of the King of England after a field study under the auspices of the Royal Geographical Society. "The Closing Session of the Chilean-Peruvian Conference," *Bull. Pan-Amer. Union*, September, 1922, pp. 217–228, contains text of arbitration protocol and supplementary act signed at Washington, 20 July 1922. H. F. Bain and H. S. Mulliken, "Nitrogen Survey. Part I: The Cost of Chilean Nitrate," *U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Trade Information Bull. No. 170*, 1924.

CHAPTER XXXV. THE UNITED STATES

A broad, yet penetrating, statement of the position of the United States in 1910 is given in A. C. Coolidge, *The United States as a World Power* (New York, 1912). It is indispensable in a study of the trends of foreign policy in the United States. C. A. Beard, *Contemporary American History* (New York, 1915). André Siegfried, *America Comes of Age* (New York, 1927), a critique by a distinguished French scholar. E. M. Douglas, *Boundaries, Areas, Geographic Centers and Altitudes of the United States and the Several States, With a Brief Record of Important Changes in Their Territory, U. S. Geol. Survey Bull. 689* (Washington, 1923). For many years the question of the American frontier and the sectional development of interest in politics and government have been the chief objects of studies by F. J. Turner. He has an excellent statement of the question in "Sections and Nation," *Yale Review*, Vol. 12, 1922, pp. 1–21: also "Geographic Sectionalism in American History," *Annals Assn. of Amer. Geogrs.*, Vol. 16, 1926, pp. 85–93. F. L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier* (Boston and New York, 1924).

J. Russell Smith, *North America* (New York, 1925). R. P. Teele, *The Economics of Land Reclamation in the United States* (Chicago and New York, 1927); a discussion from the economic standpoint of the experience of the United States in the reclamation of land for agricultural use. *Atlas of American Agriculture*, prepared under the supervision of O. E. Baker. Sections that have already appeared are: "Frost and the Growing Season" (1918); "Rural Population" (1919); "Cotton" (1918); "Precipitation and Humidity" (1922); "Natural Vegetation" (1924). O. E. Baker, "Population, Food Supply, and American Agriculture," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 18, 1928, pp. 353–373, is a comparative study following the author's earlier statement of the land and population question in the United States, "Land Utilization in the United States: Geographical Aspects of the Problem," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 13, 1923, pp. 1–26. An able statement of the land and population problem in relation to forests is contained in the *Yearbook* for 1922 of the United States Department of Agriculture under the title, "Timber: Mine or Crop?" by seven experts of the Forest Service. It is reprinted as Separate No. 886, 1923. Benton Mackaye, *Employment and Natural Resources: Possibilities of Making New Opportunities for Employment through the Settlement and Development of Agricultural and Forest Lands and Other Resources*, by the Department of Labor (Washington, 1919), presents a broad and suggestive plan for the betterment of living conditions in the United States and the more

economical use of resources and labor. For a striking series of maps on the distribution of manufactures in the northeastern part of the United States in the section from Boston to Chicago and St. Louis, see an admirable paper by STEN DE GEER, "The American Manufacturing Belt," *Geografiska Annaler, 1927*, pp. 233–359. ARTHUR W. GILBERT, *The Food Supply of New England* (New York, 1924). P. W. HENRY, "The Great Lakes–St. Lawrence Waterway," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 17, 1927, pp. 258–277. See also the note "Commerce on the Great Lakes and Connecting Waterways," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 18, 1928, pp. 500–502. R. M. BROWN, "Utilization of the Colorado River," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 17, 1927, pp. 453–466.

See especially, W. S. ROSSITER, "The Adventure of Population Growth," *Quart. Journ. Amer. Statistical Assn.*, 1923, for comment upon the growth of population in the United States. Changes in the population of various divisions, states, counties, etc., at the time of the Fourteenth Census are given by W. S. ROSSITER, in *Census Monograph I* entitled "Increase of Population in the United States 1910–1920" (Washington, 1922). For a paper criticizing the errors of the Census and presenting the negro point of view in the discussion of statistics of negro population, see KELLY MILLER, "Enumeration Errors in Negro Population," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 14, 1922, pp. 168–177. On the negro question the fundamental reference is JOHN CUMMINGS, *Negro Population 1790–1915*, by the Bureau of the Census (Washington, 1918). An analytical paper on the negro question by W. F. WILLCOX, "Distribution and Increase of Negroes in the United States," was read before the American Eugenics Congress, New York, 21 September, 1921. For a well-balanced statement of the rate of negro migration, its social and economic basis, and its effect upon negro health and character, consult H. H. DONALD, "The Negro Migration of 1916–1918," *Journ. of Negro Hist.*, Vol. 6, 1921, pp. v + 115. H. L. PIER and M. L. SPALDING, "The Negro: A Selected Bibliography," *Monthly Labor Review*, Vol. 22, 1926, pp. 216–230. The items in the bibliography date from 1913 to 1925. A thoroughgoing study of the negro in the national life of the United States is found in E. B. REUTER, *The American Race Problem: A Study of the Negro* (New York, 1927). The annual reports of the Commissioner-General of Immigration furnish a history of the successive recommendations respecting the nature of the European streams of population that flow toward the United States and the history of the present policy of restriction. In the volume for 1915 are two charts which give a striking picture of the nature of unrestricted or normal immigration to the United States during the preceding 96 years. The charts were republished in 1921, with later data down to 1920, included. E. A. Ross, *The Old World in the New* (New York, 1914), discusses the effect upon the population of the United States of the increasing number of immigrants. It is statistical and analytical as well as descriptive and has several excellent maps. For a discussion of the six major racial problems in American history and for a statement of the biological versus the economic principle in immigration, see *American History in Terms of Human Migration*, by H. H. LAUGHLIN, in the report of the hearings before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives, Seventieth Congress, 1928. G. M. STEVENSON, *A History of American Immigration, 1820–1924* (Boston and New York, 1926). "The Immigration Problem in the United States," *National Industrial Conference Board, Research Report Number 58* (New York, 1923). *Immigration Laws and Rules of March 1, 1927* (Bureau of Immigration, Washington, 1927).

The history of the boundary questions between the United States and Canada is ably presented by J. W. DAVIS, "The Unguarded Boundary," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 12, 1922, pp. 585–601. The best single reference to the situation of the United States in relation to Latin-American countries is to be found in the volume of Clark University addresses given in November 1913, entitled *Latin America* (New York, 1914). The volume includes 29 papers dealing with the principal aspects of the problem and the discussion is for the most part exceedingly well balanced and frank. An equally frank statement of problems is given in *Mexico and the Caribbean*, also a group of Clark University addresses, edited by G. H. BLAKESLEE (New York, 1920). The volume includes 23 papers of exceptional merit.

S. G. Inman, *Problems in Pan Americanism* (New York, 1921). In connection with Mexico the student should also read T. Esquivel Obregón, *Influencia de España y los Estados Unidos sobre el Méjico* (Spain, 1918). The history of American occupation of the Philippines and of the economic development of the Philippines during that period is given in full detail in the successive annual reports of the Philippine Commission. *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, 1900–1920*, 40 vols., with maps (Washington, 1900–1923): title varies: 1916–1920, *Report of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War. Census of the Philippine Islands, taken under the Direction of the Philippine Legislature in the Year 1918*, Vol. 2, Population and Mortality (Manila, 1921). For an account of the development of the Filipino people see D. P. Barrows, *A History of the Philippines*, revised edition (Yonkers, N. Y., 1926). "Report of the Special Mission of Investigation to the Philippine Islands," *House of Representatives Doc. No. 398, 67th Congr., 2nd Sess. Rept. of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands, January 1 to December 31, 1921*, pp. 13–43 (Washington, 1922). D. H. Smith, "The Panama Canal: Its History, Activities, and Organization," *Service Monographs of the United States Government* (Baltimore, 1927). E. S. Gregg, "The Influence of Geographic Factors on Ocean Shipping," *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 12, 1922, pp. 421–430, gives a brief and clear discussion of the present shipping situation of the United States. *United States Shipping Board Trade Routes and Shipping Services in Relation to Commerce of the United States and the Development of an American Merchant Marine*, Statistical Division, Merchant Fleet Corporation, U. S. Shipping Board (Washington, 1 March 1927). *Mandate for Palestine*, prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D. C. (1927). The value of this publication lies in the fact that it is a documented statement of the position taken by the United States with respect to "A" mandates.

APPENDIX

(*A*) PRODUCTION OF RAW MATERIALS WITHIN THE BRITISH EMPIRE

THE notes given below are explanatory of the items listed in the table of raw materials on page 38.

Following are the principal references used in the compilation of the table: *Mineral Industry of the British Empire and Foreign Countries, Statistical Summary* (1923–1925); *Statistical Abstract of the United Kingdom* (1910–1924); *International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics*, Rome (1921–1926); *International Statistical Yearbook, 1926*, League of Nations; the *Trade Information Bulletins* of the U. S. Department of Commerce; and the yearbooks of the different dominions and crown colonies.

Acknowledgment is also made of the assistance rendered by Miss E. H. Pearson of the Statistical Department of the London School of Economics.

ANTIMONY. The chief producer of antimony is China. Small quantities only are produced within the empire, largely in Australia. At the present time the imports into the United Kingdom come chiefly from Australia, although before the war an equal amount was imported from China.

ASBESTOS. Canada is the world's chief source of asbestos, producing 95% of the supply. Following the war South Africa has come into second place, superseding Russia, where the output has been nil since 1916. The United Kingdom is the next to the largest importer.

BORAX. None is produced within the empire. The United Kingdom and the dominions import large quantities.

BUTTER AND CHEESE. Although the production of dairy products within the empire is approximately equal to empire requirements, those of other countries are imported to a large degree. The United Kingdom takes 55% of the world's total export of cheese and almost half of the world's export of butter. New Zealand, Australia, and Argentina are the principal producers. New Zealand leads in the export of cheese; Australia in the export of butter.

CHROMIUM. 73% of the total world production was produced within the empire in 1923, as against 54% in 1913. Southern Rhodesia is the chief producing country. Large quantities are also produced in India and some in Canada.

COBALT. No cobalt to speak of was produced outside of the empire in 1923, whereas in 1913 the proportion of total world production within the empire was less than one half. Canada is the chief source of supply of metallic cobalt. Ores with varying percentages of cobalt content occur in different parts of the empire, and prior to the discovery of cobalt in Ontario, New South Wales was the largest producer. None has been mined there since 1904. Australia still produces some cobalt, probably in the form of concentrates.

COPPER. The production of copper within the empire fell from 10% in 1913 to 5% in 1923. Canada and Australia are the chief producers within the empire.

COTTON. The United Kingdom leads the world in the number of spindles, but her consumption of raw cotton has decreased about 27% since 1913. In pre-war years Great Britain's export of cotton goods reached nearly one third of the value of her total trade in manufactured articles. In 1920, out of 19,026,000 centals imported, only about one twentieth were grown in the empire, exclusive of Egypt. In the period 1921–1924 inclusive, the United Kingdom consumed 17% of the cotton grown in the empire, i.e., about 120,000 tons. A balance of 430,000 tons was imported from other sources, principally the United States. The Sudan production has been increased considerably with the completion of the new irrigation works, and it now holds third place within the empire as a cotton-producing area. The production figures for 1924–1925 show remarkable increase for all parts of the empire, the production in Uganda alone being 170,000 bales as compared with 48,290 bales in the season of 1921–1922. India also is now growing the long-stapled varieties which are in greater demand in the home market.

Chemical Fertilizers. In general, fertilizer consumption in the United Kingdom stands at a lower level today than in 1913. Owing to inability to secure Chilean nitrate during the World War, Great Britain turned to other nitrogen sources, of which she is now a heavy producer. Ammonium sulphate, a by-product of certain industries, has been found generally satisfactory and cheaper than nitrate if the nitrogen content is taken into account. The imports of Chilean nitrate increased from 60,000 metric tons to 83,000 tons from 1920 to 1923.

Graphite. The chief producers in the empire are Ceylon and Canada, though some graphite is mined in India, South Africa, and Australia. Ceylon produces the world's best graphite. Although in normal times the production in the empire is sufficient for United Kingdom requirements, nearly half the graphite imported comes from foreign sources. In 1913 the production in the empire was 22% of the world total; in 1923 it was 12%, but the figures are incomplete and are not to be taken too literally, owing to the abnormal conditions which still prevail by reason of an overstocked market at the end of the war.

Iron (Pig). Great Britain occupied second place in 1923 in the production of pig iron, steel ingots, and castings, thus replacing Germany, which ranked second in 1922. She produced 11% of the total production of pig iron in 1923, as compared with 9% in 1922, 7% in 1921, and 13% in 1913.

Lead. The empire's share of world production was 19% in 1923 as against 12% in 1913. Canada has quadrupled her output since the war and is still expanding her capacity; the output in Burma has nearly trebled; and Australia has for two years been well up toward her large war-time production.

Manganese. The most important deposits within the empire are in India. 36% of the total world production fell within the empire in 1913 as against 46% in 1923; but this increase may be explained by the decrease in production in Russia (where 54.4% of the total was produced in 1913) rather than by increased production within the empire.

Mercury. Some mercury is produced in Australia and New Zealand, but no deposits of real importance have been discovered within the empire.

Nickel. 90% of the total world production was credited to the empire in 1923 as against 69% in 1913. Canada is the largest producer in the world. Her proved deposits of nickel are estimated to contain 2,000,000 tons of nickel, and there are at present large reserves undeveloped.

Platinum. Tasmania and New South Wales are the largest producers within the empire, but they are not important. 3366 ounces were produced in Tasmania in 1925.

Sulphur. There are no important sources within the empire, but large quantities are imported. The imports into the United Kingdom and other parts of the empire have increased tremendously since 1922.

Thorium (Monazite). India is the chief world producer of monazite, Brazil and Ceylon being the only other sources of any consequence.

Tin. 35% of the world output of tin is produced in the Federated Malay States. Nigeria and Australia, to mention empire sources only, are also large producers.

Tungsten. India comes second to China as a producer of tungsten ore. Varying quantities are produced in other parts of the empire as well. 41% of the total world production was credited to the empire in 1913, as against 20% in 1923. The output in Australia dropped from 1100 tons in 1913 to less than 100 tons in 1923.

Wheat. Canada, Australia, and India are the three largest wheat-growing countries in the empire. Canada has supplanted India as the empire's chief producer. In 1923 her crop was more than 100,000,000 tons greater than that of India, while her pre-war average was 155,000,000 tons less. The Indian crop averages somewhat over 10,000,000 tons less than before the war, and the greater part of it is used at home. 39% of the total production of wheat within the empire is now grown in Canada; 38% in India; 14% in Australia. Canada's pre-war production was a little more than 5% of the world total; her post-war production is 10%. The post-war percentage for India is 9.5%, for Australia 3.5%.

Wood Pulp. Canada and Newfoundland are the chief sources of supply within the empire.

Wool. Australia is by far the largest wool-producing country in the world. In 1922 she supplied more than 27% of the total world production. Before the war 75% of the wool imported into the United Kingdom came from Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Since the war the imports from these colonies have increased to 82%. (The United Kingdom is the largest importer of wool.)

Zinc. Since the war Australia has become the largest producer of spelter within the empire. Large quantities of ore are mined in Canada and India (Burma). 7% of the total was produced in the empire in 1913; 10% in 1923.

(*B*) WAR DEBTS OWING TO THE UNITED STATES, 1927[1]

COUNTRY	PRE-ARMISTICE: CASH LOANS	POST-ARMISTICE: CASH LOANS	POST-ARMISTICE: WAR SUPPLIES AND RELIEF SUPPLIES	TOTAL INDEBTEDNESS	REPAYMENTS OF PRINCIPAL	NET INDEBTEDNESS
Armenia	.....	.....	$11,959,917.49	$11,959,917.49	.....	$11,959,917.49
Austria	.....	.....	24,055,708.92	24,055,708.92	.....	24,055,708.92
Belgium	$171,780,000.00	$177,434,467.89	29,872,732.54	379,087,200.43	$2,057,630.37	377,029,570.06
Cuba	10,000,000.00	.....	.....	10,000,000.00	10,000,000.00	.....
Czechoslovakia	.....	61,971,041.10	29,905,629.93	91,879,671.03	.....	91,879,671.03
Estonia	.....	.....	13,999,145.60	13,999,145.60	.....	13,999,145.60
Finland	.....	.....	8,281,926.17	8,281,926.17	.....	8,281,926.17
France	1,970,000,000.00	1,027,477,800.00	107,341,115.01	3,404,818,915.01	64,302,901.29	3,340,516,043.72
Great Britain	3,696,000,000.00	581,000,000.00	.....	4,277,000,000.00	202,181,641.56	4,074,818,358.44
Greece	.....	15,000,000.00	.....	15,000,000.00	.....	15,000,000.00
Hungary	.....	.....	1,685,835.61	1,685,835.61	.....	1,685,835.61
Italy	1,031,000,000.00	617,034,050 90	.....	1,648,034,050.90	364,319.28	1,647,669,731.62
Latvia	.....	.....	5,132,287.14	5,132,287.14	.....	5,132,287.14
Liberia	.....	26,000.00	.....	26,000.00	.....	26,000.00
Lithuania	.....	.....	4,981,628.03	4,981,628.03	.....	4,981,628.03
Nicaragua	.....	.....	166,604.14	166,604.14	138,721.15	27,882.99
Poland	.....	.....	159,666,972.39	159,666,972.39	.....	159,666,972.39
Rumania	.....	25,000,000.00	12,922,675.42	37,922,675.42	1,798,632.02	36,124,043.40
Russia	187,729,750.00	.....	4,871,547.37	192,601,297.37	.....	192,601,297.37
Yugoslavia	10,605,000.00	16,173,465.56	24,978,020.99	51,758,486.55	720,600.16	51,037,886.39
Total	$7,077,114,750.00	$2,521,121,825.45	$739,821,776.76	$10,338,058,352.20	$281,564,445.83	$10,056,493,906.37

[1] From the Foreign Policy Association, Information Service, Vol. III, Special Supplement No. 1.

(C) PRINCIPAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS, 1814–1920

THE list includes chiefly those treaties and agreements that serve as an historical background for the foreign relations of today. The treaties following 1920 are woven into the preceding text and need no separate description. For detailed lists of treaties and agreements, with texts and maps, see SIR EDWARD HERTSLET, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, in four volumes, of which volumes 1–3 were published in 1875, volume 4 in 1891. See also the same author's *The Map of Africa by Treaty*, in three volumes, with portfolio of maps (1909). An indispensable reference for the student of political geography is ANDERSON and HERSHEY, *Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia and Africa, 1870–1914* (1918); in one hundred and sixty main sections with several subdivisions each, are listed practically all the international acts essential to a knowledge of territorial problems. The introduction, the running text-comment, and the convenient and logical arrangement of the whole make it unusually valuable in spite of the absence of an index.

DATE	NAME	SIGNATORIES	TERMS OF IMPORTANCE IN THIS BOOK
1814	First Treaty of Paris (following deportation of Napoleon to Elba)	Austria, France, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain, Sweden	Provided for calling of Vienna Congress
1814–1815	Congress of Vienna	As above	Determined the main lines of the map of Europe as they stood in the 19th century
1815	Second Treaty of Paris (following Waterloo)	As above	France ceded certain bits of territory on her eastern frontier and paid an indemnity
1839	Treaty of London (the "scrap of paper")	Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Netherlands, Prussia, Russia	Belgium's neutrality guaranteed
1856	Treaty of Paris (close of Crimean War)	Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, Turkey	Independence and integrity of Turkey guaranteed. The Danube internationalized. Bessarabia annexed to Russia. Rumania under Turkish suzerainty. Serbia given a large degree of autonomy. Åland Islands to be unfortified
1859	Zurich	Austria, France, Sardinia	Beginning of unification of Italy
1864	Vienna	Austria, Denmark, Prussia	Cession of Slesvig-Holstein to Prussia and Austria
1866	Prague	Austria, Prussia	German Confederation dissolved. Austria renounced rights to Slesvig-Holstein, and consented to union of Lombardy and Venetia with Italian kingdom

DATE	NAME	SIGNATORIES	TERMS
1871	Frankfort (close of Franco-Prussian War)	France, Germany	Cession of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany. Indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs paid by France
1878	San Stefano	Russia, Turkey	Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria enlarged. Russia obtained Bessarabia and Transcaucasian territory. The opposition of the powers led to the Congress of Berlin and the modification of the treaty of San Stefano
1878	Congress of Berlin	Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, Turkey	Eastern Rumelia formed. Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina authorized. Independence of Montenegro and of Serbia recognized under enlarged boundaries. Rumanian independence recognized. Districts of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum ceded to Russia. Turkey promised reforms in Armenia
1879	Formation of Dual Alliance	Germany and Austria	
1882	Formation of Triple Alliance	Germany, Austria, Italy	
1885	Berlin Act	Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United States	Spheres of influence in Africa laid down. Formation of neutral Congo Free State. Free trade area in Africa defined. Declaration prohibiting the slave trade
1898	Paris (close of Spanish-American War)	Spain, United States	Independence of Cuba recognized. Porto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines ceded to the United States
1904	Anglo-French Convention	Basis of the Entente Cordiale	
1905	London	Alliance between Great Britain and Japan	
1907	The Hague	Delegates of 44 countries	Second Hague Conference [1] for the peaceful settlement of international disputes
1912	Lausanne	Italy, Turkey	Annexation of Tripoli (Libya) by Italy. Occupation of Dodecanese by Italy

[1] The first Hague Conference (1899) had a similar though more restricted program.

DATE	NAME	SIGNATORIES	TERMS
1913	London	Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey	Cession by Turkey to the Balkan allies of all territory (except Albania) west of the Enos-Midia line. Autonomous Albania to be created.
1913	Bucarest	As above, with Rumania added, and without Turkey	Frontiers as shown in Figure 132, page 380
1915	Secret Treaty of London	France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia	Italy to enter the war, and to receive the Trentino, Istria, a large part of Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands, Valona in Albania, a sphere of influence in Turkey, and territory in Africa if the other signatories made gains there
1916	Sykes-Picot Agreement	France, Great Britain	Provided for spheres of influence in Turkey. Later a new agreement included Italy, and provision was made for Russia (Fig. 50, page 179)
1918	Treaty of Brest Litovsk	Central Powers, Russia	Russia withdrew from the war and renounced her right to Baltic Provinces, Poland, and certain districts in the Caucasus
1918	Bucarest	Central Powers, Rumania	Rumania to withdraw from the war, and to cede certain districts to Austria-Hungary. Treaty was never ratified
1919	Versailles	Allied and Associated Powers, Germany	See chapter on Germany
1919	St. Germain-en-Laye	Allied and Associated Powers, Austria	See chapter on Austria
1919	Neuilly	Allied and Associated Powers, Bulgaria	See chapter on Bulgaria
1920	Trianon	Allied and Associated Powers, Hungary	See chapter on Hungary
1920	Sèvres	Allied Powers, Turkey	See chapter on Turkey
1920	Tripartite Agreement	France, Great Britain, Italy	Determined spheres of influence in Turkey (Fig. 51, page 181)
1920	Agreement among Allied Powers whereby Rumania receives Bessarabia, subject to later discussion by Russia		
1920	Riga	Poland, Russia	Eastern boundary of Poland and Polish control of Eastern Galicia
1920	Rapallo	Italy, Yugoslavia	Settlement of Adriatic question. See chapter on Yugoslavia
1920	Franco-British Agreement	France, Great Britain	Division of mandated territory in Syria. See chapter on Palestine

The Russian Soviet (Bolshevist) government has concluded, among others, the following treaties of peace with former parts of the Russian Empire:

COUNTRY	DATE	PLACE
Estonia	2 February 1920	Dorpat
Lithuania	12 July 1920	Moscow
Latvia	11 August 1920	Moscow
Poland	12 October 1920	Riga
Finland	14 October 1920	Dorpat

Each treaty recognizes the territorial limits of the state in question or provides for future settlement.

The immigration laws of the United States, and related agreements, are summarized in the map below.



Fig. 249. Territorial divisions affected by the immigration laws of the United States.

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